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Chapter 1 Introduction: immigration detention and political order
1.1. Introduction
From a sociological point o f view, camps or transit zones may present the institutionalisation o f 
temporariness as a form of radical social exclusion and marginalisation in modem society and a 
conservation of borders as dividing lines.1
1.1.1 Subject and scope of this study
All Member States of the European Union have provisions in their immigration 
legislation under which they can deprive foreigners o f  their liberty. The use o f detention 
for immigration related purposes by these countries has greatly increased over the past 
few years.2 Concerning asylum seekers this increase seems to be related to the extended 
use of accelerated procedures and preliminary border checks due to the implementation 
of the principles of safe third country, safe country of origin and the Council Regulation 
replacing the Dublin Convention 3 Concerning immigration in general it can be said that 
Member States perceive growing problems related to irregular immigration and one o f  
their responses has been an increasing exercise o f their powers to detain illegal 
immigrants.
The institutionalised practice of immigration detention has become an inherent 
part of a policy package that has as its main aims to deter future irregular migrants and 
to remove those already on national territory as fast and as effectively as possible. I f  
these policies are criticised by N G O ’s or other social actors, Member States defend their
1 Toth (2006), p. 3.
2 Kelly (2005), p. 2.
3 Council Regulation No 343/2003 o f 18 February 2003. establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national. OJ L 50/1,25 February 2005.
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detention policies with arguments bearing on the growing numbers of foreigners, the 
need to maintain the integrity of border controls and security related issues.
Detention of immigrants is seldom a transparent practice: information 
concerning detention facilities is often not made public and many of these facilities are 
located at isolated places. In addition, journalists are habitually denied access, allegedly 
in order to respect the privacy o f the inmates but resulting in the absence o f public 
control over the conditions, legality and procedures inside immigration detention 
centres.4 In 2004, an Italian journalist infiltrated in a detention centre in Sicily by acting 
as a Kurdish refugee and published an article on humiliating conditions that he had 
witnessed and experienced during his stay here.5 Instead of taking legal steps that might 
have resulted in the improvement o f the conditions at the centre, the Italian state opened 
a case against the journalist on charges of presenting a false identity.6 After the Italian 
section of ‘médecins sans frontiers’ published a critical report on the circumstances in 
various closed centres for migrants, the organisation was accused of disloyalty by the 
Italian government and denied entry to immigration detention centres.7
Numerous reports by NGO’s in various countries describe instances o f abuse of 
force by the police, lack of structures for adequate accommodation, illegal detention 
beyond the foreseen time limits, and the detrimental effects of detention on the mental 
health of immigration detainees.8 More often than not, these reports are confirmed by 
findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) during its visits to places where individuals 
are deprived o f their liberty. Furthermore, detaining children in immigration detention
4 T6Ü1 (2006), p. 8.
5 See Gatti (2005)
6 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2006), p. 215. The same journalist had already 
been handed a suspended 20 days sentence on the same charges in 2004, as he had infiltrated a detention 
facility for immigrants in Milan in 2000.
7 See Statcwatch (June 2004) The main violations that MSF found in this report pertained to limited 
contacts with the national health service; insufficient legal assistance; irregular use of psychiatric drugs; 
and excesses during interventions by guards. See Médecins Sans Frontiers (2004).
8 See for only a few examples: Amnesty International United Kingdom (2005); Amnesty International 
Italy (2005); Amnesty' International Spain (2005); Aide aux Personnes déplacées et al. (2006); and 
Cimade (2004).
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centres is becoming standard practice in many countries,9 contrary to international and 
domestic norms protecting children’s rights.10
In addition to the lack o f homogenous legislation on asylum and immigration in 
the Member States of the European Union, serious legal gaps as well as logistic and 
material problems exist with regard to the detention of non-citizens under immigration 
legislation. Immigrants are being accommodated in hotels ore makeshift shelters fo r 
extended periods, and the lack of space in the reception centres is often compensated 
with accommodation in prisons. Schemes o f legal assistance are often flawed, adequate 
medical structures absent, and the incidence of auto-mutilation and (attempted) suicides 
under the population in immigration detention is high.11 The British press in particular 
regularly features reports about abuse at immigration detention centres, but also in other 
countries the public media increasingly publish evidence of unacceptable conditions in 
closed centres for immigrants, reflecting a growing concern in civil society about the 
practice o f immigration detention.12
Under these circumstances, the detention o f thousands of people in Europe, 
merely because they allegedly breach the state’s territorial sovereignty, may easily be 
labelled as an anomaly for Western liberal democracies, especially when seen in the 
context and development of citizenship discourse, constitutionalism and human rights. 
However, it would be too easy to portray immigration detention solely like an 
incongruity for otherwise liberal regimes.
Instead, in this study I will argue that the practice of depriving unwanted 
foreigners of their liberty is a consequence o f the territorial foundations o f the global 
political system and their impact on constitutional discourse. Some forms of state 
violence have become so embedded in our understanding of the state and the structure 
of which it forms part of that they have remained insulated against the usual forms o f 
legal correction and political control. Thus it seems natural that either nationality or the 
absence o f state authorisation for presence on national territory can legitimately
9 Such as the United Kingdom, Ireland. Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia, Spain, Lithuania. Greece, Finland, 
France. Belgium and Poland. See Bolton (2006) and Gil-Robles (8 June 2005). p. 18.
10 Gil-Robles (15 February 2006), par. 254.
11 Silove. Steel and Mollica (2001); and Pourgourides (1998)
12 Allegations of ill-treatment of migrants suffering from psychiatic disorders in the closed centre of 
Vottem for irregular migrants, disclosed by guards of the centre, have recently prompted Amnesty 
International to call for an independent investigation. VRT News. Belgium (16 November 2006).
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constitute a ground for discrimination and a possible reason for the use of various forms 
of state violence.
Before turning to the way in which I intend to address these issues in this study, 
I will attempt to bring to life the structural features of the practice of immigration 
detention in EU Member States in order to contextualise my subsequent discussion of 
the law and theory pertaining to immigration detention in later chapters. In this study, I 
will use the term immigration detention to designate the administrative decision to 
deprive an individual of his liberty for reasons that are directly linked to immigration 
policy. This entails that both irregular migrants and asylum seekers fall under the scope 
of this study. At certain points, the distinction between the two groups will be explicitly 
made, for example when the relevant legal norms are applicable to only one o f the two 
categories or when the description o f state practice requires the distinction. However, it 
is important to mention at the outset that the focus of this study will not be on the 
deprivation of liberty of either asylum seekers or irregular migrant as distinct categories, 
but on the administrative detention of individuals on account of the lack of state 
authorisation for their presence on national territory.
With regard to this focus on administrative detention, an important complication 
needs to be mentioned with regard to the detention o f foreigners in the EU, which is the 
tendency towards increasing criminalisation o f illegal entry or stay on national territory. 
A state that has defined these acts as criminal offences, can “detain, charge, convict and 
sentence to further detention under criminal law” irregular migrants and even applicants 
for asylum.13 Cyprus for example appears to have no closed centres for irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers in surveys that address immigration detention. However, 
irregular immigrants in Cyprus are detained in police custody while awaiting 
verification of identity.14 As illegal entry and stay are penal offences under Cypriot law, 
punishable up to two years in prison, detention is not an administrative measure, but a
13 Guild (2006). See for international law relating to deprivation o f liberty as a criminal sanction on illegal 
entry: Pacurar (2003), pp. 9-10.
14 Foreigners that have been arrested for illegal entry or stay and then apply for asylum are detained for 
the duration of the sentence that is handed for their “offence”. If  their applications are rejected they are 
kept in police cells, until they can be deported, which often takes a long time due to reluctance of the 
embassies of countries of origin to cooperate. See EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report 
Cyprus, pp. 3 and 17.
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penal one.15 Also in Germany, illegal entry and residence in certain cases constitute 
criminal offences, and subsequent penal detention takes priority over administrative 
detention pending removal.16
In various other Member States, although they do not necessarily define illegal 
stay and entry as criminal offences, the legal position of the foreign detainee who w as 
initially apprehended on criminal charges is often unclear, due to the interaction 
between criminal proceedings with the administrative procedure o f expulsion to leave 
the country.17 Although the increasing criminalisation o f irregular migration is highly 
significant for the practice o f detaining individuals as a response to a breach of the  
state’s territorial sovereignty, for practical reasons concerning the length of this study, 
only the practice of administrative detention under immigration legislation w ill 
explicitly fall within its scope.
Another preliminary remark needs to be made about the terms “detention” and 
“deprivation of liberty”, which are used interchangeably in this study. The line between 
deprivation o f liberty or detention on the one hand and restrictions upon personal liberty 
on the other hand is not always easy to draw. The European Court o f Human Rights has 
observed that in many cases, that difference is merely one of degree or intensity, not one 
of nature or substance, and that some borderline cases are a “matter of pure opinion” .18 
This court regards the cumulative impact o f the restrictions, as well as the degree and 
intensity o f each one separately, when deciding as to whether one can speak o f  
deprivation o f liberty, in which case other guarantees apply than in the case o f  
restrictions on free movement.19
Especially in the area o f  migration law, the line between deprivation of liberty 
and restrictions upon free movement can be a blurred one. The most common
15 Ibid. p. 17-18. In additional complication o f such an approach is that it is difficult to obtain precise 
numbers o f the persons detained for these "offences”, as they arc grouped together w ith other offenders in 
the statistics. Recently, the Cypriot government has been reconsidering the criminalisation of illegal entry 
of irregular migrants (Commissioner for Human Rights. Follow-Up Report on Cyprus, 2006).
16 EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report Germany pp. 41-42. Other countries tliat define 
irregular stay or entry under certain conditions as criminal offences that are punishable by prison 
sentences are Estonia; France; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Lithuania;
17 See for example EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country Report Belgium, p. 19.
18 ECtHR. Guzzardi v*. Italy. 6 November 1980. §93.
19 Ibid. par. 95. Sec also UNHCR (1999). Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards 
Relating to the detention of asylum seekers. Guideline 1.
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distinction made in this regard is that between closed and open centres, the latter often 
referred to as reception centres where the individuals who are required to reside can 
leave at will or within reasonable limits.20 These so-called open centres, generally 
housing applicants for asylum, will not be included in my analysis. Neither will I look 
at migrants that are subjected to mandatory residence requirements, as they are merely 
restricted in their personal liberty, just as those that are obliged to report frequently to 
the authorities. Only the practice o f placing individuals in closed centres, or in any other 
narrowly confined location that they are not able to leave, including a ship, train or 
vehicle,22 will be the subject of my investigation.
Especially with regard to the situation of irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
that are kept in transit zones, such as the international zone of an airport, specific 
problems may arise with regard to the question whether one can define their situation as 
a deprivation o f liberty. States have repeatedly argued that individuals who are held in 
these zones are not deprived of their liberty, either because they are free to leave at will, 
or because they are not yet present on the territory of the state in question. These issues 
will receive detailed attention in later chapters where the impact of international human 
rights law on practice of immigration detention is discussed, but in this introduction, 
transit zones will explicitly be included in my presentation o f a general overview of the 
practice of immigration detention.
1.1.2 Im m igration detention as state practice within the EU
A first difficulty that one encounters when attempting to present an overview of 
state practice in this field is to obtain reliable figures with regard to immigration 
detention23 Many governments do not have coherent systems of recording figures
20 Guild (2006), p. 3.
21 See for an example the centres in the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. where migrants are free to 
leave during the day but need official permission if they want to leave for more than 24 hours. See 
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties. Justice and Home Affairs (January 2006).
22 See UN Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary' Detention (28 
December 1999).
23 On the grounds of partially available data, Jesuit Refugee Service (2004) estimated that the number of 
immigration detainees in Europe may be in the 100.000 persons per year.
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concerning immigration detention, especially when it comes to the duration o f detention 
and the reasons for ending the detention. Even the total numbers o f immigration 
detainees is often unknown to national governments themselves,24 as different 
categories of persons or different places for detention fall under different regulations 
and authorities.25 If states do keep statistics, they are notoriously reticent to make them  
available to the public.26 This official haziness surrounding immigration detention is 
exacerbated by the fact that in many countries, not only media but also human rights
24 In Austria, for example, reporting on administrative detention for immigration law purposes is  
extremely deficient (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report Austria, p. 24) In Greece, the lack 
of publication of any data by the Ministry of Public Order makes the calculation of the number of persons 
affected by administrative detention nearly impossible. (EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country Report 
Greece, p. 21). In Malta, none of the NGO's involved, nor the ministry is able to provide reliable figures 
of the persons detained at any time. (EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country Report Malta). In the 
United Kingdom, the Home Office only releases ‘snapshot’ Figures that range from 1105 detained asylum 
seekers on a given day to 1515. Amnesty International has concluded that the Home Office quarterly 
statistics belie the true scale of detention and this organisation believes that thousands of people are 
detained every year (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report United Kingdom, p. 34). France 
records 25.828 persons that were detained under immigration legislation in 2004. However, persons kept 
in zones d'attente are not included in this number. Countries that detain relatively low persons under 
immigration legislation generally keep better statistics, such as Estonia that recorded 68 immigration 
detainees in the period from 10 March 2003 until 31 December 2005 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, 
Country' Report Estonia) and Ireland that records 946 persons detained under immigration legislation fo r 
2004 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report Ireland).
25 See for example France where some of the administrative detention facilities fall under control o f  
“Sccuritc Public Regional*’, some under the border police and some others again under the Gendarmerie 
(EU Foreigners in Prison Project. Country' Report France). In a federal state such as Germany these 
difficulties are compounded because the federal states each have different regulations.
26 Guild (2006). p. 4. Some exceptions exist such as Belgium: according to the Office for Foreigners 
Affairs. 7.622 individuals have been detained during the year 2004 in closed centres for migrants (EU 
Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report Belgium) and The Netherlands, reporting a total of 1952 
irregular migrants detained at 31 December 2004 (Dienst Justiticilc Inrichtingen at http://www.dji.nl). In 
Sweden, a daily average of 214 persons was detained in 2005 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Countiyr 
Report Sweden). According to the Hungarian authorities, around 6000 foreigners a year arc placed in 
detention (Commissioner of Human Rights. Follow-Up Report on Hungary', 2006. p. 19). In other 
countries, possible indicators of the numbers of immigration detainees arc the places officially available 
for immigration detention: i.e. Germany: 2250; Finland: 40; Hungary: 640; Lithuania: 500; and Slovenia; 
180 (See the respective Country Reports of the EU Foreigners in Prison Project); and the United 
Kingdom: around 2750 at the end of 2005 (Gil-Robles, 8 June 2005, p. 15.)
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organisations are frequently denied access to places where migrants are kept in 
detention.27
The factual information in the following paragraphs is to a large extent drawn 
from the “EU Foreign Prisoners Project”, an extensive study on foreigners in European 
prisons that was recently completed in cooperation with the EU.28 The object of that 
project, encompassing all 25 Member States of the European Union, is to address the 
issue of social exclusion of prisoners who were detained in Europe outside their 
countries of origin. In addition to the various country reports o f the EU Foreign 
Prisoners Project, I will make use o f other sources of information such as the Council of 
Europe, various NGO’s and occasionally national governments.
Partly drawing on Elspeth Guild’s classification in her report for the European 
Parliament on a typology of different types of centres in Europe,29 I will distinguish 
between three types o f immigration detention in order to present structural features of 
state practice in this area. These are detention upon arrival; detention of individuals 
within the asylum system; and detention as a result o f a decision to deport or expulse 
the foreigner.30
2' See Written questions El 104/05 and E l 118/05 (23 March 2005) by MEPs H. Flautre and J. Muscat to 
the European Commission as regards the situation in Malta. 23 March 2005. See also the European 
Parliament Resolution on the situation with refugee camps in Malta of 6 April 2006, calling for unlimited 
access to the centres of the UN High Commissioner for refugees and competent NGO's who were 
formerly denied access. Another example is France, where only CIMADE, an ecumenical care service 
that provides social and legal support has access to the administrative detention centres. Regular human 
rights organisations are also denied access to the zones d’ attente. See EU Foreigners in Prison Project, 
Country Report France.
28 See hltp://www.foreignersinprison.eu. Co-ordinated by Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The 
various country reports (publication to be expected in February 2007) that the contributors to the project 
liave written will be referred to as “FPP-CR - name of the relev ant state” throughout this study.
29 Guild (2006).
30 Ibid, p. 5.
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1.1.2.1. Detention upon arrival
From southern Algeria to Malta, from the Island o f Lampedusa to the Ukrainian border, and  
from the Canaries to Slovenia, camps of all types are now strung out like so many nets fo r  
migrants, with the common aim of impeding, if not blocking, their way into Europe.31
Most EU Member States are familiar with legislation that provides for detention 
o f foreigners upon arrival in the state. Often, such detention is ordered by border guards 
and it is carried out in a so-called transit zone, which can be the international zone o f an  
airport, or any other place located close to border crossings32 Also regular prisons o r  
centres specifically designed for immigrants are used.33 Detention is thus used to  
prevent unauthorised entry, and serves to clarify the conditions for entry, including 
verification of identity. At times it is also justified by states with an appeal to health 
hazards or in order to implement readmission agreements.34
Serious concerns have been expressed by N G O ’s and other political actors about 
detention upon arrival, as the legal position of the detainee is often unclear and no t 
enough guarantees are applicable to the deprivation o f liberty. Insufficient access to  
legal aid appears to be structural, detainees are often not told of the reasons for the ir 
detention at all, or, when they are, not always in a language that they understand 36
31 Rodicr (2003).
32 In France, zones d'attente were introduced in 1992, and arc defined as places where "the foreign 
national arriving in France [,..]\vho is not authorised to enter French territory' or who seeks asylum” will 
be detained “during the time strictly necessary* for his leave, and. as an asylum seeker, for a check of Iris 
demand.” There are more than 100 waiting zones facilities, most o f them small rooms, for instance police 
stations, hotel rooms, administration offices, and are located near the borders, airports, harbours o r  
railway stations. However, the great majority of those detained upon arrival in France are found in the 
waiting zone Roissy-Charles de Gaulle in Paris (FPP-CR-France).
33 For example the so-called Grenshospitium in The Netherlands
34 FPP-CR’s-Czech Republic and Hungary*.
35 The French term for deprivation o f liberty in these zones d ’attente is ‘retention’, in which case lesser 
safeguards are applicable to the persons concerned then in the case of detentioa as France maintains that 
these people are free to leave French territory. Judicial review of the detention takes place after 72 hours, 
instead o f the 48 hours normally required by law in immigration detention cases (FPP-CR-France).
36 See Jesuit Refugee Service (2004). Following its visit in 2002 to the Czech Republic, the CPT signalled 
serious shortcomings concerning the information provided for the detainees on their legal position and 
rights (CPT, 12 March 2004, pp. 20-29). Also with regard to the situation of the immigration detainee in
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Furthermore, the conditions in these places are regularly below national constitutional 
and international legal standards as well.37 The length of time that a migrant may spend 
in pre-admittance detention varies greatly from less than 24 hours to several weeks, 
even months, and only some states have the duration of this kind of detention limited by 
law.38
The southern borders of the EU deserve special mention with regard to detention 
upon arrival. Large numbers of migrants who have been apprehended while attempting 
to reach mainland Europe are held on Malta, Lampedusa and the Canary Islands in what 
have been described as “internment camps of dubious legality where people are
Hungary, CPT expressed concern about access to information in a language that the foreigner could 
understand (CPT, 29 June 2006, pp. 24-25). In Latv ia, the judicial review of the immigrant who is 
deprived of his liberty lacks the required effectiveness, as the rights of the persons concerned are not 
clearly defined and the right to legal assistance is difficult to exercise. Latvia provides no legal assistance 
or exemption of legal fees (EU Network of independent experts on Fundamental Rights, 2005, pp. 74-75). 
In Ireland, persons deprived of their liberty upon arrival arc not informed of their right to bring legal 
proceedings against the detention, neither are they asked if they require legal assistance, nor are they 
informed that the can request it (Kelly, 2005, pp. 21-23). To these already significant problems, it can be 
added that many of the detention centres are far removed from anywhere, which makes contacts with 
lawyers even more difficult. See Gil-Robles (8 June 2005), p. 17 with regard to the United Kingdom.
37 The INADS centre at Brussels Airport for persons that arrive without documentation and who are 
refused entry in Belgium territory (INADS) has been criticised several times by the CPT, in particular 
with regard to factual access to a lawyer and the lack of any activity for people that are kept in waiting 
zones for weeks, sometimes even months (See for the most recent report: CPT (20 April 2006). Also 
Germany has received criticism in this respect, especially regarding the situation in the transit zone at 
Frankfurt am Main Airport (CPT, 12 March 2003, p. 60.) With regard to the situation in the United 
Kingdom, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons observed that none of the short term holding facilities in 
Heathrow were fit to hold detainees overnight, although all held detainees overnight and sometimes 
detainees were held there for up to 36 hours. Detainees asking but failing to get legal advice and basic 
information about their detention formed a structural problem as well (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 
2006b, p. 5. It can be added that many o f the detention centres are far removed from anywhere, which 
makes contacts with lawyers even more difficult. See Gil-Robles (8 June 2005), p. 17 with regard to the 
United Kingdom.
38 For example Ireland, where detention of people “refused to land” may not exceed 8 weeks. However, if 
those individuals bring legal proceedings to challenge the validity of the detentioa the ‘clock is stopped' 
on this 8 week period (Kelly 2005). But see also Hungary', which has a time limit for ‘detention for 
refusal’ of thirty days. However, if the authorities simply take a formal decision to expel the foreigner, the 
legal basis of the detention alters, and the foreigner can then remain legally in so-called aliens policing 
detention for a maximum of one year (FPP-CR-Hungaiy).
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deprived of their freedom yet supposedly are not prisoners.”39 These centres in 
particular have repeatedly been condemned on account of both the deplorable material 
conditions in which the detainees are held there, and their legality.40
1. 1.2.2. The use o f  detention within the asylum system
Regarding the detention o f asylum seekers,41 state practice shows a diverse 
pattern. All European governments detain people in the asylum procedure, but the 
conditions, maximum duration and actual time spent in detention by an asylum seeker 
are widely differing in the various Member States. It is important to note that with 
regard to this type of detention, relevant EC law exists. Under Article 18(1) of Council 
Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, the Member States shall not hold a person in 
detention for the sole reason that he applied for asylum.42
39 European United Lcft/Nordic Green Left (May 2006), p. 11.
40 The delegation of the European Parliament that visited the various Maltese administrative detention 
centres described the conditions as appalling, “unacceptable fo r  a civilised country and untenable in 
Europe which claims to be the home o f  human rights.” (European Parliament Committee on Civil 
Liberties. Justice and Home Affairs 30 March 2006. p. 9). See also the criticism expressed by the Spanish 
Ombudsman as regards the situation in Fucrteventuia and Lanzarote. addressing overpopulation, 
inadequate facilities, hard conditions of life, secrecy and lack of transparency, lack of interpreters and 
lack of regular medical care (FPP-CR-Spain): and European United Left/Nordic Green Left (2005) with 
regard to the situation at Lampedusa. Regarding the centre in Lampedusa, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner of Human Rights noted that at times of large influxes,11the congestion and overcrowding 
[...] defy imagination. The centre fa lls  totally short o f  the minimum standards o f  space and hygiene 
needed to accommodate numbers beyond its official capacity in decent condition.” (Gil-Roblcs. 14 
December 2005, p. 38.)
41 It should be noted that detention upon arrival and detention o f asylum seekers are not always separate 
categories as asylum seekers are often detained upon arrival in a state. See for example Poland, where 
asylum seekers are not detained, unless they apply for asylum while staying illegally on national territory', 
during border control while they Im  e no right to enter, or when they attempt to cross borders contrary to 
the law (FPP-CR-Poland). Taking into account that few persons seeking international protection first 
await a decision on a visa application in their countries of origin, many asylum seekers will be detained 
upon arrival in Poland.
42 OJ L 326/23 of 13 December 2005. See also Article 7 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 
2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in tlie Member States (OJ L 
31/18 o f 6 February 2003), which provides that Member States are authorized to confine an applicant to a
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Nevertheless, numerous countries detain asylum seekers without much further 
justification than the fact that they are asylum seekers, sometimes for a short time in 
order to determine the admissibility of the application,43 often as part of a ‘fast-track 
procedure’, after which those not rejected on admissibility grounds, are transferred to 
open centres.44 However, sometimes the detention of asylum seekers lasts longer and 
has almost become an inherent part of some stage,45 or even the whole of the asylum 
procedure 46 Concern has been voiced about this practice in particular as some feel that
particular place in accordance with their national law only ‘“when it proves necessary, fo r  example for 
legal reasons or reasons o f public order".
43 Or, as is the case in Czech Republic where all applicants for asylum arc initially detained, in order to 
identify the individuals: to subject them to a medical check; and to initiate the asylum procedure (FPP- 
CR-Czech Republic). In Italy, asylum seekers may be detained for a maximum of thirty days in a so- 
called identification centre (Gil-Robles, 14 December 2005, p. 35).
44 As in Portugal, where asylum seekers are detained until the authorities decide that they have legitimate 
grounds for asking for asylum, which takes an average of three days. Thereafter, these applying for 
asylum on legitimate grounds are transferred to open reception centres (FPP-CR-Portugal). Finland only 
detains asylum seekers after they have received a negative decision on their application (FFP-CR-Finland, 
p. 19) In Latvia, asylum seekers are detained if their identity is not confirmed, or if their claims have been 
rejected and they await expulsion (FPP-CR-Latvia).
45 In Austria, asylum seekers may be detained prior to a first negative decision if a procedural notice is 
issued by tlie Federal Asylum Authority during the admissibility proceedings stating that the application 
is likely to be dismissed or rejected, while there is no appeal possible against such a notice (EU Network 
of independent experts 2005, p. 75-76).
46 See for example Hungary w'here the detention of asylum seekers depends on “accidental circumstances 
and arbitrary decisions o f the authorities”. If the asylum seeker is able to file an application for asylum 
before he is apprehended by the border guards, he will not be detained. However, if the border guard 
apprehends him before he can do so. lie will be detained and an alien policing procedure will be started 
against him before he can possibly submit an application for asylum. Although the pending expulsion will 
be suspended as soon as lie submits an application, it will keep serving as the basis for continued 
detention (FPP-CR-Hungaiy, par. 3.5.). Malta has mandatory detention policy' for asy lum seekers and 
irregular migrants alike, but whereas for the latter group, the maximum length is 18 months, asylum 
seekers may not be detained for over 12 months. However, these limits are merely administrative 
practice, and arc not laid down in any binding legislation (Commissioner of Human Rights. Follow-Up 
Report on Malta. 2006). In Greece, not all asy lum seekers are detained, but those that file an application 
whilst in immigration detention (i.e. on the grounds of illegal entry' or stay) remain in detention until a 
decision on their applications is given, or until the lime limit of three months expires (FPP-CR- Greece). 
In the United Kingdom, the vast majority’ o f those detained have applied for asylum at one stage or 
another (FPP-CR United Kingdom; and Gil-Robles, 8 June 2005).
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“detention is resorted to on the basis that a bed is available in a detention centre,” rather 
than considering the “necessity, legality and appropriateness” of detaining asylum 
seekers.47
Furthermore, widespread discrimination on the grounds o f nationality exists, a s  
some states routinely detain certain nationalities (or ethnic groups),48 whereas others 
seldom or never end up in an immigration prison. Although some countries only allow 
for the detention of asylum seekers if  it is ordered by a judicial authority,49 in many 
other countries, the decision to detain is taken administratively.50 In that case, extensive 
discretion often exists for individual immigration officers to decide about the detention 
of asylum seekers,51 and sometimes automatic judicial review is absent,52 or it can take 
a long time.53 It should be noted that most countries’ legislation allows for the detainees 
themselves to contest the lawfulness of the detention through judicial review, habeas 
corpus proceedings or bail.54 Nonetheless, even in such cases, the possibility o f
4 Amnesty International EU Office (2005). Sec also Jesuit Refugee Service (2004). p. 4.
4K I.c. Roma in the United Kingdom. See Weber (2003).
49 Estonia. Germany, and Sweden.
5<J Finland (where tire decision to detain is taken by the police but needs to be reviewed by a judge w ithin 
four days); France (where the decision to detain is taken by the prefet, and must be reviewed within 48  
hours); Hungary (where the administrative decision to detain must be reviewed within five days); Latvia 
(where the administrative decision to detain pertains to a maximum period of ten days, and prolongation 
may only be given by a judge); Lithuania and Poland (where detention of more than 48 hours can only be  
ordered by a court, and where in tire former country, the foreigners presence is mandatory during the 
Court's hearing); The Netherlands; Belgium; Austria; Greece; the United Kingdom; Portugal; and Ireland 
(where asylum seekers that are detained must be brought before a judge as soon as practicable ( Kelly, 
2005. p. 29).
51 UNHCR Executive Committee (4 June 1999), p. 168. See Gil-Roblcs (8 June 2005) and Weber (2003) 
w ith regard to the situation in the United Kingdom.
52 Greece and the United Kingdom. If automatic judicial review is absent, the detention may be subject to  
periodical automatic administrative review as is the case in the latter country (Gil-Robles. 8 June 2005).
53 In the Netherlands, automatic review by a court of the lawfulness of the detention is provided, but it c a n  
take up to 7 weeks until it actually takes place. See Baudoin (2004).
54 With lire important exception o f Malta, wire re no proper form of judicial review' exists, although there 
is the possibility to appeal to an administrative board, which can only order release in a limited number o f  
circumstances (FPP-CR-Malta). In theory', the habeas corpus procedure from the criminal code is  
applicable, but has never been used (Gil-Robles. 12 February' 2004). In the United Kingdom, immigration 
detainees can apply for bail.
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effectively contesting one’s detention is frequently non-existent due to the lack of 
information provided to the detainees, or insufficient access to legal aid.55
In addition, the detention o f refugees in particular may also prejudice their legal 
position as persons applying for international protection, as they are not always 
informed about the possibility of applying for asylum while in detention, and sometimes 
they are even impeded from access to the asylum system as a result o f their detention.56
1.1.2.3. Detention and removal
The last category that I will address is the detention as a result of a decision to 
deport or expel the foreigner.57 If a third-country national58 has been ordered to leave
55 Often one encounters similar problems as were discussed above with regard to detention upon arrival, 
see in particular footnote 36. At times, the official regulations themselves provide well enough for the 
right of access to information about the reasons for detention and additional information about rights 
when held in detention, but in practice, detained asylum seekers are often not fully informed of their 
position and the full extent of their rights (See Kelly, 2005, p. 35; and Gil-Roblcs, 8 June 2005, p. 18).
56 In France, for example, asylum application forms have to be completed in French since August 2004, 
and foreign nationals that apply for asylum while in administrative detention have to pay for an 
interpreter themselves. The result is that it is made very' difficult for asylum seekers to claim for asylum 
while they are detained, as was observed by a European Parliamentary delegation that visited tire 
administrative detention centre of Mesnil-Amelot. about 50% of the asylum applications that were filed 
by persons held there were immediately rejected on the grounds of technical shortcomings, while the 
content of the applications was not examined at all (European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, 22 March 2006). In Italy, in Lampedusa Temporary Holding Centre, almost no 
asylum claims are made, and migrants there are not given information about the possibilities to claim 
asylum open to them under Italian law. Besides, there arc allegations that there have been consular 
authorities of third countries cooperating in identification procedures to determine migrants' nationalities, 
a situation that carries great risks for potential asylum seekers (European United Lefi/Nordic Green Left, 
2005, p. 10). Furthermore, anyone failing to observe the rules on absence in the closed Italian 
identification centres for asylum seekers is regarded as having withdrawn his asylum application (Gil- 
Robles, 14 December 2005, p. 35. Amnesty International has expressed concern that the Greek authorities 
may be impeding refugees access to asylum through their inability to communicate in Greek, especially in 
border areas. In addition, persons have told Amnesty International that upon arrival in the places of 
detention, they liad been persuaded to sign papers that they could not understand (Amnesty' International, 
12 October 2005; and CPT, 20 December 2006 , p. 38)
57 We liave already seen that it is not always possible to make a watertight separation between detention 
upon arrival and detention within the asylum procedure. Similarly, detention as a result of the decision to
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national territory, immigration legislation o f most EU countries provides for the 
possibility o f administrative detention.59 In theory, this type of detention is neither a 
punishment, nor a means of directly coercing the foreigner leave the country, but it 
serves to safeguard removal, such as expulsion or deportation 60 Thus, the sole fact o f 
irregular residence does usually not provide a sufficient justification for detention in the 
EU M ember States61 Nevertheless, foreigners are frequently kept in detention for 
significant periods of time before their deportation is practically arranged. In addition, 
although various national laws require that detention is to be necessary (often with a 
view to public policy or national security interests),63 in everyday practice, national 
authorities detain without due regard to the necessity and proportionality of the
expulse or deport can also affect asylum seekers if their claims have been rejected or declared 
inadmissible. In the United Kingdom for example, asylum seekers who were detained in ‘fast track 
centres* and whose applications are rejected, can remain in detention until they are removed (FPP-CR- 
United Kingdom CR, p. 34).
58 Detention of irregular migrants that arc EU citizens should be highly exceptional practice according to 
EC law, only to be resorted to if they constitute a genuine threat to public policy. Sec ECJ, Case C- 
215/03. Salah Ouiarte v. Minister voor Ï reemcklingenzaken en Integratie, 17 February 2005. par. 40-44.
59 Such as (not exhaustive) Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Czech Republic; France; 
Germany; Greece; Hungary ; Latvia; Luxembourg; Poland; United Kingdom; Portugal (although it is 
unusual practice); Slovenia; and Sweden.
60 See FPP-CR-Germany, p. 33. Nonetheless, there are countries that have provisions in their legislation 
that suggest the coercive nature of detention; in Ireland, the purpose of detention is to ensure that the 
person will co-operate in making arrangements, such as securing travel documents (FPP-CR-Ireland. p. 
22) .
61 Guild (2006), p. 5.
62 As is the case in Lithuania and the United Kingdom (EU Network of Independent Experts (2005), p. 
73). With regard to Hungary', the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe lias 
expressed concern that irregular aliens are detained for up to 12 months on the sole ground that they have 
been found on Hungarian territory w ithout a valid residence (Commissioner of Human Rights. Follow-Up 
Report on Hungary’, 2006, p. 20). Hungary also has the possibility’ of enforcing detention even if the 
deportation order is suspended (FPP-CR-Hungaiy). In addition, some countries, such as Hungary and 
Germany provide for the possibility o f detention in preparation of deportation procedures, therewith 
including verification of the identity of the foreigner and clarification of his residence status (FPP-CR's- 
Gemiany and Hungary).
63 For example Sweden where the legislation provides for detention if a decision to expel lias been taken 
and the person is likely to abscond or engage in criminal activity (FPP-CR-Sweden).
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detention, often as a result of wide discretionary powers conferred by them by domestic 
laws 64
Even injudicial procedures where the legality of the detention is challenged, the 
question as to whether the administration has employed its discretionary powers in 
accordance with these otherwise important principles is often not addressed 65 It remains 
to be seen whether this situation will change if Article 14 of the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals becomes part of 
EC law 66 According to this provision, immigration detention of third-country nationals, 
who are or will be subject to a return decision or a removal order, is only to be resorted 
to if there is a risk of absconding and where it would not be sufficient to apply less 
restrictive measures.
M UNHCR. Executive Committee of the High Commissioners Programme (4 June 1999). Sec Weber 
(2003) with regard to the situation in the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, the public order criterion 
of Article 56(1) is interpreted so widely in policy guidelines that the required balance of interests almost 
always results in an outcome in favour of the executive (van Kalmthout. 1995b, p. 326). In addition. 
Article 56(2) of the Aliens Act 2000 provides for detention 'required by public order* on the sole ground 
that the necessary papers for removal are available.
65 See for example Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 6 September 2005, 200507112/1, 
JV 2005/452. where the highest administrative court in the Netherlands (Raad van State) ruled that it is 
not for the judge to assess whether less restrictive measures could have been applied in order to safeguard 
the aim of removal. In the United Kingdom, according to paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration 
Act 1971, a person may be detained under the authority of an immigration officer pending his removal. 
Tlie House of Lords opinions that " ‘pending’ in paragraph 16 means no more than ‘until’. The word is 
being used as a preposition, not as an adjective. Paragraph 16 does not say that the removal must be 
"pending”, still less that it must be 'impending So long as the Secretary o f State remains intent upon 
removing the person and there is some prospect o f achieving this, paragraph 16 authorises detention 
meanwhile.” See House of Lords. Regina v. Secretary o f State for the Home Deparnnent (Respondent) ex 
parte Khadir (FC) (Appellant). 16 June 2005,12005] UKHL 39, par, 32.
66 European Commission (1 September 2005).
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Many countries have the duration of this type of detention limited by law 67 In 
this case, irregular migrants are released from administrative detention if  expulsion has 
not been effected within the legal period for detention 68 However, as they are often not 
able to  leave the country, they remain illegally on its territory, and are apprehended and 
detained over again. As a result, in many countries, irregular migrants may spend very 
long periods in detention with small breaks o f freedom that are followed by detention 
again.69 This actual situation is neither apparent from legal provisions that lay down 
time limits, not is it reflected in statistics that record the duration of detention 70
Concerning the legal position of the immigration detainee who is to be expelled 
or deported, similar remarks can be made as were made with regard to the two types o f 
detention discussed above. Often extensive administrative discretion exists with
67 In Belgium, detention for removal is normally imposed for a maximum of two months, but it inav be 
extended to five months. Further extension up to the absolute maximum of eight months is only permitted 
if it is necessary for the protection o f public order or national security. In Czech Republic, irregular 
migrants can only be detained w hen an administrative decision on expulsion is imposed, but it is subject 
to a time limit of 180 days. In Estonia, if expulsion is not possible within the legal time limit to 
administrative detention of two months, an administrative court can prolong the detention for a maximum 
of up to four months (the average time of this type of detention is also 4 months in Estonia). In Finland, 
there is no time limit laid down in legislation, but the courts order release after three months. A French 
law passed on 26 November 2003 prolonged the maximum duration of administrative detention from 12 
to 36 days. In Greece, if the foreigner is not expelled within three months, he must be released 
immediately. In Hungary', detention in preparation for expulsion may not last longer than 30 days, but 
detention in order to expulse is subject to a legal limit of twelve months. In L atvia administrative 
detention may not exceed twenty months. In Malta, before 2005, there w as no legal limit to the duration 
of the detention, and it was not unusual for persons to be detained for several years. A change in the law' 
set a general time limit of 18 months, but in practice, release does not take place automatically after 18 
months, and it may take many more months, even if this is against Maltese law s. In Poland and Slovenia, 
the total time spent in detention may not exceed tw elve months. See FPP, the respective country reports.
68 In Spain, if it is foreseeable that expulsion is not possible within the 40 day limit to the detention, the 
judge lias to be notified immediately so that the detainee can be released.
69 Sec for example Greece (FPP-CR-Greecc. p. 21).
70 A different situation, but with similar results, is the case of Belgium, where courts and tribunal have 
decided that whenever a detainee resists an attempt to actually remove him. the detention begins over 
new , and time previously spent in detention is not counted for the duration of the detention. (Jesuit 
Refugee Service. 2007). See also ECtHR. Stumba Kabongo c. Belgique (inadmissible), 2 June 2005.
71 Sec in particular footnotes 36 and 50-55. Opondo and Harrell-Bond (1996) argue that the major 
difference that exists in the United Kingdom between the legal position of criminals and that of
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regard to the decision to detain; countries that provide for periodical and automatic 
judicial review of the detention are the smaller part; and the possibility to appeal to a 
judicial authority against the deprivation of liberty, i f  provided for by law, is often 
difficult to exercise due to a lack o f (understandable) information regarding the right to 
challenge the legality of the detention or insufficient access to legal aid for detainees.72 
Often the basis for detention is not adequately explained, and at times, also the 
immigration status of the persons detained remains unclear to them.73
I will conclude this overview of state practice with some brief observations 
regarding the conditions of detention with a view to deportation or expulsion 74 The 
CPT has repeatedly held that “a prison is by definition not a place in which to detain 
someone who is neither convicted not suspected of a criminal offence”75 and has urged 
Contracting States to put an end to holding immigration detainees in ordinary law 
enforcement agency detention facilities.76 Even so, many Member States keep detaining 
persons that are subject to a removal order in ordinary prisons or police custody 
facilities, sometimes as a result from a lack o f available places in special centres, but 
often it is common policy.77 Furthermore, persons subject to an expulsion order are at
immigration detainees is that the latter can be detained for an indefinite period of time without a 
judgment.
72 See CPT (21 July 2005), pp. 31-32; HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2006a), pp. 25-26; Kelly (2005), 
pp. 40-42; and Gil-Robles (9 November 2005), p. 36.
73 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2006a), p. 26.
74 These observations are in many cases also applicable to the previous two categories of detention
75 See for example CPT (18 September 2003). par 69. Also the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention is of the opinion that custody should be effected in a public establishment specifically intended 
for this purpose. If this is for practical reasons not possible, immigration detainees should in any case be 
separated from persons who are imprisoned under criminal law UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 
December 1999).
76 CPT (20 December 2006), p. 24.
77 In Estonia, one expulsion centre opened in 2003 following a visit by the CPT. Detention in police cells 
for those to be expelled can only be resorted to for a maximum of thirty days (FPP-CR-Estonia. pp. 20- 
21.) Finland has one special custody unit for aliens as referred to in the Finish aliens act with a capacity of 
40 places. When the custody unit is full, an alien may exceptionally be placed in police detention 
premises, in vvliich case the detention may not exceed four days. In France, there are 18 administrative 
detention centres and many more local facilities specifically designed for foreigners on which no 
information is available. How ever, foreigners who are under measures or procedures of removal may be 
detained with prisoners who are detained under criminal law. (FPP-CR-France). In Austria, detention for
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times kept in transit zones. The latter situation calls for extra scrutiny as some states 
argue that in these situations it is not depriving individuals of their liberty at all 78
Even in the case that special holding centres exist for immigration detainees, 
conditions are at times worse than in ordinary prisons,79 with circumstances reminding 
of high security prisons and regulations that are not appropriate to the legal status of the 
inmates and the low security risk that they pose 80 In addition, many o f these centres
the purpose of removal is often practised in normal prisons (FPP-CR-Austria, p. 24). In Germany, special 
institutions for administrative detention under immigration legislation are to be found only in a few 
federal states. Most cases of administrative detention o f foreigners is carried out in penitentiary 
institutions and prisons (FFP-CR-Gcrniany p. 33). Greece lias only a few administrative detention centres. 
Thus, every detention facility of police stations all over the country constitutes de facto institution for 
administrative detention, where a vast majority of the immigration detainees arc held (FPP-CR-Grcccc. p. 
19). In Ireland, solely ordinary prisons are used (Kelly 2005). Also Hungary’ resorts to immigration 
detention in ordinary’ prisons. In that case, however, the immigration detainees are kept separate from 
those that are held under criminal law (FPP-CR-Hungary). Latvia lias one administrative detention 
facility, to which foreigners must be transferred if they have spent ten days in police detention facilities 
(FPP-CR-Latvia). Similarly, in Lithuania, foreigners can be kept in police facilities, but they must be 
transferred within 48 hours to the one centre for immigration detainees (FPP-CR-Lithuania). The 
Netherlands have special places for administrative detention, but detention is regularly carried out in 
police custody facilities or prisons (Baudoin, van dc Burgt, Hendrikscn 2002, pp. 211). In Swcdca 
special centres under the authority of the migration board exist for immigration detention. Placement in 
penitentiary institutions is only permitted only in the case of special circumstances (FPP-CR-Swcdca p. 
17). In Portugal, irregular migrants may be placed in prisons with convicted prisoners or in transit zones 
of the international airport (FPP-CR-Portugal).
78 Belgium for example, argues that in this case, the foreigners in question have no right of residence in 
Belgium, are subject to deportation orders issued by the Office for Foreigners and that by being placed in 
the transit zone, they are not being detained, but simply escorted to Belgium’s border and are free to leave 
by catching a flight to their country’ o f origin or a third country'. Sec Amnesty International (1 September 
2004).
79 In Latvia and France, the rules concerning the detention of illegal immigrants are more restrictive than 
those applied to persons convicted for criminal offences (FPP-CR’s-Latvia and France).
81 * Sec for example Travis (2005), reporting in the Guardian about a weapon commonly carried by prison 
officers in British removal centres, despite the fact that their use is banned in low security prisons. In 
some Austrian detention centres, detainees are only able to communicate with their visitors through a 
glass partitioning, which the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture did not deem in 
accordance with the low security risk of the persons detained (CPT. 21 July 2005. p. 32) In Germany, the 
CPT was alarmed by the existence o f violent and inappropriate security measures that could be used in 
the immigration detention centre o f Eissenhiittenstadt (CPT, 12 March 2003. p. 32.) The Council o f
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suffer from problems resulting from serious overpopulation, inadequate medical and 
hygienic care and limited possibilities for contact with the outside world81 In view of 
these problems, it is to be welcomed that the proposed directive on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
Europe Commissioner of Human Rights has called on the Maltese authorities to stop using militan7 
methods of searches of immigration detainees (Commissioner o f Human Rights. Follow-Up Report on 
Malta, 2006, p. 12) and to abolish the practice of systematically handcuffing migrants when they arc 
taken to and from the hospital (Gil-Roblcs. 12 February 2004. p. 8). In the Netherlands, the regulations 
for immigration detainees are comparable and sometimes identical to those applicable to persons who 
have been convicted of criminal offences. Van Kalmthout (2005a) argues that by subjecting the 
immigration detainee to restrictions that do not bear any relationship to the aim of the detention, the 
human rights of the immigration detainee are unnecessarily and disproportionately interfered with It is 
significant that in the Netherlands, administrative courts arc excluded by law (Articles 60 and 69 of the 
Penitairc Beginselenwet) from assessing the conditions and regulations applicable to immigration 
detention. See Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 28 April 2005, 200410273/1, JV 
2005/308. Nevertheless, there are also exceptions, see for example Finland, where detainees have access 
to better and more relaxed living conditions than normal prisoners and where the possibilities for 
receiving visits by friends and family are not limited (FPP-CR-Finland. pp. 20-21).
81 In Luxembourg, restrictions on the visits to immigration detainees are more severe than those 
applicable to normal prisoners (Gil-Robles. 8 July 2004, p. 11.) The CPT in its visit to the Czech 
Republic in 2002 criticised conditions of detention and was alarmed by allegations of ill-treatment and 
verbal abuse in some of the facilities (CPT, 12 March 2004, pp. 20-29). In Poland, the CPT observed that 
health care and psychological and psychiatric support for immigration detainees were not adequate. In 
addition, no regimes of activities appropriate to the detainees’ legal status and the length of the stay were 
available (CPT, 2 March 2006, pp. 22-27). See CPT (20 December 2006), pp. 22, 31-39; and Amnesty 
International (5 October 2005) for documentation about very poor conditions and allegations of ill- 
treatment in the detention facilities for illegal migrants in Greece. In Dougoz v. Greece (ECtHR, 6 March 
2001, par. 48). the Court in Strasbourg considered that the conditions of immigration detention at the 
Alexandras police headquarters and the Drapctsona detention centre, "in particular the serious 
o\>ercrowding and absence ofsleeping facilities, combined with the inordinate length o f the period during 
which the applicant vms detained in such conditions”, amounted to degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3 ECHR. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe called the conditions in 
the administrative holding centre for men under the Palais de Justice in Paris “disastrous and unworthy o f 
France" and urged its closure because a place of this kind at the heart of the French judicial system was 
unacceptable (Gil-Robles, 15 February 2006, p. 62, and for similar criticism see also European 
Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 22 March 2006)
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nationals82 lays down requirements regarding the conditions of temporary custody. 
According to Article 15 of the Proposal, immigration detainees shall, upon request, be  
allowed without delay to establish contact with legal representatives, family members 
and competent consular authorities as well as with relevant international and non­
governmental organisations. In addition, it stipulates that temporary custody shall be  
carried out in specialised temporary custody facilities,83 and that Member States shall 
ensure that international and non-governmental organisations have the possibility to  
visit temporary custody facilities in order to assess the adequacy o f the temporary 
custody conditions.
8: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and  
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. European 
Commission ( 1 September 2005).
83 Where a Member State cannot provide accommodation in a specialised temporary custody facility an d  
has to  resort to prison accommodation, it shall ensure that third-country nationals under temporary 
custody are permanently physically separated from ordinary prisoners (Article 15. par. 2).
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1.2. A i m  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  a n d  p l a n  o f  r e s e a r c h
The aim of this study is threefold. First it argues that the particular development 
of sovereignty, neither a natural nor a self-evident notion but the result o f historical 
contingencies, has led to a situation in which the use of force against outsiders is 
justified in a way which is fundamentally different from the way in which the use of 
force against insiders is scrutinised.
The second argument, strongly related to the first, posits that the contemporary 
application of human rights has not been able to formulate adequate answers to the use 
of force in the instances that the national state wishes to verify and enforce its 
sovereignty against those who have violated its material or symbolic boundaries. We 
will see that this so-called blind spot of human rights protection, which is nowhere more 
visible than in the contemporary practice of immigration detention, is due to an 
enduring perception of territoriality as a self-evident and innocent concept for the 
organisation of the global political system.
At the heart of this second argument is the premise that the concept of territory 
and the idea of rights are firmly linked and that the international legal discourse regards 
the jurisdictional content of sovereignty in a way that fundamentally differs from the 
way in which it considers its territorial frame. However, it is important to be aware from 
the outset that sovereignty’s form and content are necessarily intertwined. Both play an 
equally significant role with regard to the definition o f  political community, although 
their relationship within the context o f political organisation has varied over time.
Before the advent of the modem state, political power was based upon personal 
relations. After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this structure began to change slowly 
into a system where clearly demarcated and independent territorial units formed the 
basis for political power. The fact that the foundation of political power has over time 
shifted from the personal to the territorial does not entail that power over people has 
diminished in importance, nor does it mean that territory was politically insignificant 
before the emergence of the modem state. It means that at present, jurisdiction is 
exercised over individuals because o f their presence in a certain territoiy instead of on 
account of their specific position in the body politic. In addition, the state uses its spatial 
powers to protect its territorial borders. The enormous growth of state power during the 
last few centuries has been accompanied with increasing demands for safeguards
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against the state abusing its jurisdiction over people, resulting in a multifaceted system 
for the protection of individual liberties.
However, in this study I will argue that with regard to the state’s spatial powers 
and sovereignty’s territorial frame, a corresponding development through which the 
individual interests that are involved in it are accounted for, is lacking. This has led to  
what I call a “territorial blindness” on the part of constitutional principles in the 
domestic as well as in the international sphere.
The administrative detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers is one o f  
the ways in which European states protect their territories from unwanted immigration: 
in essence these states want to sustain the above-mentioned territorial blindness o f  
systems of individual rights protection. However, immigration detention is special 
amongst the other instruments and policies by which these states try to stem the flows o f  
migration. In the first place, it is special because deprivation o f liberty is the sharpest 
technique by which the state protects that blindness. We will see that personal liberty 
and sovereignty are conceptually intertwined: the protection o f the former is the reason 
for the existence of the latter. In societies based upon the rule o f law there is no m ore 
serious interference with an individual’s fundamental rights as depriving him of his 
liberty.
Secondly, immigration detention is not only a way in which states violently 
guard the territorial blind spots o f individual rights protection, but as a practice itself it 
attempts to make ultimate use of these same blind spots. Thus, territorial blindness o f  
the rule of law, a blindness that states seem only too eager too protect, has made the  
detention of thousands of people, simply because they crossed boundaries, not only 
possible but also commonplace.
The second argument thus presents the administrative detention of foreigners as 
a legal anomaly in societies that are otherwise based upon respect for the rule of law. 
However, this study will not merely portray immigration law enforcement in the form 
of detention as illiberal practices of liberal regimes, made possible by a structural 
feature of contemporary political organisation. In addition, it hopes to introduce a 
complementary but more hopeful approach by showing how the administrative 
detention of foreigners, however deplorable as contemporary political practice, may also 
provide opportunities to erase the artificial distinction in the modem version of the rule 
of law  between the state’s exercise of jurisdiction within a given body politic and the
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territorial frame in which this power is exercised, and thus to deconstruct the narrow 
linkage between territoriality and personal rights.
Drawing on Roberto Unger’s idea of “destabilization rights”,84 the third aim of 
this study is to argue that the capacity of the destitute, the refugee and the citizen of 
dictatorships, while interned by European states on European territory, to resort to 
traditional rule of law guarantees, however marginal such guarantees may be in their 
specific cases, has the potential to destabilize the institution of territorial sovereignty, 
and therewith it may in time strike at the conceptual innocence and perceived neutrality 
of territorial borders in constitutional discourse, domestically as well as internationally.
This study sets out with an investigation into the conceptual background of 
immigration detention from the perspective of the sovereignty paradigm. What is 
sovereignty (Chapter 2), and whether and how can it be limited (Chapter 3) are 
questions which will be dealt with in the first two Chapters. Subsequently, a general 
contextualisation of immigration detention will be provided by exploring the 
development and nature of the international legal framework regulating international 
freedom o f movement (Chapters 4 and 5).
Thereafter, I will specifically deal with the limits that have been set to the use of 
immigration detention by human rights law. First, I will address the way in which these 
limits are formally given shape in various general human rights instruments (Chapter 6). 
Subsequently, I will analyse in depth how the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as the constitutional court for Europe applies fundamental rights to cases of 
immigration detention (Chapter 7). These two Chapters intend to determine whether the 
limits that are set to the use of detention in immigration policy are satisfactory when 
regarded in the light o f other contemporary discourses about limiting the violence 
potentially inherent in sovereignty. Where I find that this is not the case, I maintain that 
the reason for the fact that immigration detainees receive inadequate protection is 
related to the idea of territoriality. I argue that the problem is not so much territoriality 
in itself, but has to be sought in the fact that the territorial frame of sovereignty does not 
have the same history o f being subjected to critical scrutiny as its jurisdictional content.
Although territorial sovereignty has so far remained largely immune to 
traditional forces of domestic and international correction, in the conclusions to this 
study (Chapter 8), I contend that the international human rights discourse has the
84 Unger (1987). See also Sable and Simon (2004).
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capacity to change the meaning of territorial borders and mitigate the exclusive effects 
of modem sovereignty. Paradoxically, the practice of immigration detention, instead o f 
being only illiberal practice, may hand us the tools to transform the international legal 
order such as to make it into one that is more true to some of its underlying 
universaliStic ideals.
1.3 . C o n t e n t  o f  t h is  s t u d y
Deprivations of liberty on a massive scale constitute the ultimate example o f the 
use of force by the state. Apart from a concrete manifestation of state violence, 
immigration detention camps are also an expression o f the state’s claim to determine 
where the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ lies. Immigration detention is one o f  
the possible outcomes of the conflict between the sovereign claim to determine that 
boundary and the individual’s ideal o f freedom of movement. Thus, apart from looking 
into how sovereignty has generally legitimised the use o f  force by the state over time, in 
Chapter 2, special attention will be paid to the inside/outside distinction that the modem 
notion o f sovereignty has brought about by use of the concept o f territoriality: the 
linkage o f political power to clearly demarcated territory. Territoriality shaped the 
notions o f nationality and nation state, of belonging and membership in a historically 
specific way. The result is that at the heart of the modem state we find the two 
conflicting forces of “the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the 
particularism of a community united by historic destiny” .85 A thorough understanding 
of this tension is essential in order to comment on the practice o f immigration detention.
In addition, Chapter 2 will discuss the external aspects of modern sovereignty in 
the Westphalian state system in order to contribute to a proper evaluation o f legal norms 
dealing with international migration in later chapters (Chapters 4 and 5).
Thus, Chapter 2 addresses sovereignty’s territorial form and its jurisdictional 
content within a given body politic, as well as its underlying tension between 
universalism and particularism. Chapter 3 weaves further upon these two lines. This 
Chapter treats the various ways that have been devised to limit the use of force by the 
state. Citizenship, constitutionalism and international human rights law are all
83 See Habermas (1998). pp. 405-406.
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discourses that intend to limit the use of force of the state internally. All of them are 
characterised by the same tension between a rights-based uni versai ism and the political 
particularism that we discern at the heart of the modem state.
We will see that citizenship is the most problematic o f these discourses when the 
use of force is employed in order to defend a certain inside/outside distinction, because 
in addition to protecting against sovereign power, citizenship strongly participates in 
sovereignty’s claim to determine a certain inside from the outside. Constitutionalism as 
the theory and practice of the limits of power as a more general, inclusive discourse is 
also addressed.
International human rights as the most recent way of posing limits to state 
violence will receive particular attention in Chapter 3, since the raison d ’etre of modem 
human rights law is to overcome the particularism of traditional rule of law guarantees. 
However, we will see that also here the assumed naturalness and neutrality of the 
concept of territoriality poses limits to human rights’ capacity to become truly universal 
guarantees for human dignity. In addition, Chapter 3 will briefly deal with the 
international law of war and humanitarian law. These areas of law receive attention 
because they also exemplify that the notion of territoriality is pivotal in international 
law and they exemplify its aim of maintaining the territorial order.
In Chapters 4 and 5, international freedom of movement is investigated. Where 
Chapters 2 and 3 can be seen as presenting the conceptual framework of these elements 
of contemporary political organisation that are fundamental to understanding 
immigration detention, Chapters 4 and 5 flesh out this framework in the particular 
direction of individual movement crossing international borders.
Chapter 4 addresses historical perspectives on the right to leave and the 
international legal framework regulating exit is analysed in detail. We will see that the 
right to leave is a right that the national state can no longer restrict, except for a few 
narrowly defined exceptions. In other words, sovereignty decreased in importance when 
it comes to matters concerning exit, a process that found it culmination in the 
codification of the right to leave in international law in the twentieth century.
Regarding the entrance of non-nationals, Chapter 5 shows that sovereignty has 
made a reverse development. This Chapter first traces the historic development of the 
common assumption that the entry and sojourn of foreign nationals are matters that fall 
largely within the sovereign discretion of the national state alone. Subsequently, it 
closely examines international legal exceptions to this assumption, such as flowing from
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general international law, the prohibition o f inhuman treatment, the international 
refugee regime and the right to family life. Chapter 5 will argue that, exempting the 
norm of non-refoulement flowing from the prohibition on inhuman treatment, all the 
legal exceptions to the state’s exclusionary powers fit within a territorial image o f 
political order. Instead o f denouncing the way in which responsibility, rights and 
territory are linked, most rights bearing upon a right to enter or stay attempt to fix the 
inevitable gaps in such a system, and by doing so, they reinforce it. However, we will 
see that the application o f the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment in the 
immigration context shows that territory and rights can be decoupled, if  it were not for 
states’ ever growing attempts to resort to extra-territorial measures of immigration 
control.
Chapter 5 pays specific attention to immigration law enforcement as well. A 
perception of the state’s undeniable right to control aliens' entry into and residence in its 
territory surely must have an impact on the assumed appropriateness of the violence that 
is used to exercise such control, such as deportation and detention. We will see that 
deportation and detention are not merely the results o f an exclusionary immigration 
policy, but that they constitute practices which possess a separate socio-political logic o f  
their own.86 Instead of just one of the many options available to national states, 
deportation and detention of unwanted foreigners are presented as the natural and 
singular response of the modem state to those who have violated its territorial 
sovereignty. This is reflected in the fact that the detention centre as an organizational 
structure to administer entry and deportation o f foreigners increasingly prevails over 
other forms of administration in contemporary European societies.87 We will see that 
the state practice of detention in particular constitutes the litmus test for the present 
regime governing cross-border movement and the unyielding impact of territoriality on 
the individual’s life.
Chapters 4 and 5 taken together show that the regime regulating trans-national 
freedom of movement brings to light some striking ambiguities and inherent tensions in  
the international legal order. Chapters 2 to 5 will have made clear that most of these 
inconsistencies derive from two premises. The first is that the assumed naturalness o f  
territorial borders has led to a conceptual distinction between the jurisdictional content
86 De Genova and Pcutz (forthcoming).
87 Challenge (11 April 2006).
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and the territorial form of sovereignty. As a result, international law, although it has 
increasingly conceded that the sovereign state’s jurisdiction over people cannot be 
without limits, has so far simply refused to take account of the individual interests that 
are involved in territorial sovereignty.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the sharp distinction in 
international law between the jurisdictional aspect and the territorial aspect of 
sovereignty is artificial. Both aspects of sovereignty play an equally important role in 
the state’s construction of political community; and ultimately it is the latter concept 
that is the rationale for most restrictions on fundamental rights of the individual.
The second premise is that the international order based on sovereign 
independent states does not only regulate the behaviour of states amongst each other, 
but it also functions as a mechanism to determine who belongs where. Territorial 
sovereignty in this system is a principle that allocates the responsibility for separate 
populations amongst distinct territorial units. The asymmetries within the international 
legal framework regulating the movement of individuals can only be understood when 
we take into account these two premises that underpin the international legal system.
The state’s assertion of its territorial sovereignty leads to practices such as 
immigration detention. Chapters 6 and 7 will address the way in which international 
human rights discourse has constrained this specific instance of state violence resulting 
from a historically contingent conception of sovereignty. In Chapter 6 , 1 sketch a broad 
outline of the human rights discourse regulating the administrative detention of irregular 
immigrants and asylum seekers. This Chapter gives an overview of various human 
rights instruments that are relevant for the practice of immigration detention. Case law 
concerning immigration detention of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional 
Protocol88 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)89 
receives particular attention.
Chapter 7 treats the protection afforded by article 5 of the 1950 Convention for 
the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in cases of 
immigration detention. It consists of a detailed analysis of the case law by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Article 5 ECHR. In this Chapter, I will 
argue that in the ECtHR’s case law on immigration detention, one can discern a serious
88 See UNGA Res. 2200A (XX) of 16 December 1966
89 19 December 1966. 999 U.N.T.S. 171
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lack in proportionality and as such the Court endorses detentions which are unnecessary 
and therefore in contradiction with the core of the protection of Article 5 ECHR. When 
compared to case law concerning the deprivation of liberty in other cases, serious 
inconsistencies can be identified in the ECtHR’s approach to immigration detention. We 
will understand these inconsistencies once we are conscious of an obdurate and self­
reinforcing notion of territorial sovereignty. I argue that the ECtHR in most o f its case 
law dealing with immigration detention defers to international law’s distinction between 
the state’s exercise of jurisdiction over persons and the alleged neutral and pre-given 
territorial framework in which this jurisdiction is exercised. As a result, it is unwilling 
to address interferences with the right to personal liberty in immigration law in the same 
manner as it addresses interferences that occur in a purely domestic context where the 
territoriality o f  the modem state is not a factor to be reckoned with.
Thus, Chapter 7 argues that the main international mechanism for protecting 
human rights in the European context is characterised by a blind spot when it comes to 
limiting the state’s power to resort to violence in the form o f immigration detention. The 
discourse o f human rights in this context proves to be a limited discourse. In the 
conclusions to  this study in Chapter 8, I will conclude that international constitutional 
discourse in general suffers from a serious blindness whenever a state presents the 
exercise of power as being predominantly based on sovereignty’s territorial frame. This 
blindness can be characterised as what Hilary Charlesworth in a different context has 
called a “silence within the law”, which is not the same as a lacuna that can be filled 
with some “simple construction work” 90 Indeed, this territorial silence is integral to the 
whole structure o f international (and domestic) law, “a critical element o f its stability” 91
However, 1 will argue that “a shift in its stabilisation”92 may be brought about by 
a new role for human rights, more in keeping with their proclaimed status as universal 
standards based on the dignity o f the individual. I contend that in order for the system o f 
human rights to function effectively, the nation state needs to be held responsible for the 
exercise of its power on account o f its territorial sovereignty, instead of allowing it to 
present sovereignty’s territorial frame as a predisposed and neutral given. By taking into 
account the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s frame international
90 Hilary Cliarlesworth with regard to international law’s silence of women. Charlesworth (1999), p. 381
91 Ibid.
92 Korhoncn (2002), p. 213. See also Charlesworth (1999).
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human rights may become what Roberto Unger calls destabilization rights 931 will draw 
on the work of Charles Sabel and William Simon, who apply the idea o f destabilization 
rights to public law litigation, in order to explain how the application human rights in 
immigration detention may induce a transformation of sovereignty’s territorial frame in 
a process in which it must respond to what was previously an excluded stakeholder: the 
individual 94
The fact that this process, as a result of its destabilizing impact on legal 
structures, have far-reaching political effects need not deter courts whose function it is 
also to provide individual with the protection of their fundamental rights. What Roberto 
Unger calls “the halo of reasoned authority and necessity upon the institutionalised 
structure o f society”95 should not deter lawyers from imagining alternative possibilities 
for organising that structure, quite the contrary. I will argue that the way in which 
constitutional courts such as the ECtHR apply fundamental rights in cases of 
immigration detention could help this process on its way.
93 Unger (1987).
94 See Sabel and Simon (1994), p. 1056
95 Unger (1996), p. 96.
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Chapter 2 Sovereignty, people and territory
2 .1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n
The discursive practice o f sovereignty profoundly influences the way 
immigration is perceived and it strongly affects the question of the legitimacy o f the 
instruments that the state uses to deal with unwanted immigrants. In the specific context 
of immigration detention, I believe that in certain respects sovereignty has become one 
of these discursive practices that Rob Walker so powerfully describes as having “turned 
an historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present.”96 
The practice of immigration detention, in its broader context of freedom of movement, 
is capable of bringing to light insights in the relation between the institution o f 
territorial sovereignty and individual rights that normally remain concealed in 
commonly accepted notions about political power, political community and the 
organisation of the global state system. As such, it may expose shortcomings in the 
modem version of the rule of law, embodied in the discourse of international human 
rights.
However, before I turn to  these issues in later Chapters of this study, it is first 
necessary to understand sovereignty’s fundamental claims and their underlying 
assumptions. In this Chapter, 1 take a close look at the notion of sovereignty with the 
particular practice of immigration detention and its context of international migration in 
mind. This means that certain implications of sovereignty will not be touched upon at 
all, whereas other aspects will be emphasised. In this introduction, I explain why I deem 
an inquiry in the concept of sovereignty essential in order to comment upon 
immigration detention and I will indicate which of its aspects will receive particular 
attention in my analysis.
96 Walker (1993), p. 31
97 See Unger (1996) for a more general version of this argument about the relation between individual 
interests on the one hand and institutions on the other hand, and its implications on legal analysis.
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The most common differentiation made within sovereignty’s various functions is 
that between its external and internal aspects. Internally, the function o f sovereignty is 
to ensure that there is no higher authority within the territorial limits of the state than the 
state itself -  within its borders the state has exclusive and ultimate authority. In the 
course of history, such exclusive and ultimate authority came to entail both power over 
people and power over territory. Internal sovereignty is bound up with the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as well as with its claim to determine what 
constitutes the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’98.
External or Westphalian sovereignty entails the exclusion of external authority 
from the territory o f the state. We will see below that, although sovereignty was initially 
thought o f as a concept to conceptualise and justify ultimate political authority within 
the state, it inevitably came to bear upon relations amongst states as well. The internal 
and external sovereign claims that the contemporary state makes with regard to people 
and territory -  the monopoly on the use of violence; the determination o f the boundary 
between inside and outside; and those related to the Westphalian structure that all states 
form part of -  touch immediately upon immigration detention and its broader context of 
international movement of people.
In the first place, deprivations of liberty on a massive scale of asylum seekers or 
other immigrants clearly constitute the use of force by the state. Only states can 
legitimately resort to the imprisonment of individuals and in order to understand 
immigration detention, we need to understand the sovereign state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence.
In the second place, we need to take into account the particular context in which 
this specific form of imprisonment takes place. In contemporary Europe, that is a 
context o f an immigration policy which is focussed increasingly on the restriction of 
individual rights and which finds its justification in the language of crisis and threat. 
Sovereignty’s claim to determine the inside from the outside is employed to portray 
migration mainly as a security issue, in response to which the use of force is assumed to 
be justified because “the process of demarcation of friends and enemies, delineation of 
boundaries of order versus disorder has been the prerogative of the sovereign state, 
provider o f security within its boundaries and preserver of ‘law and order’.”99
98 Walker (2003). p 22; and Werner and Wilde (2001). p. 288.
99 Aradau (December 2001).
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Thus, national responses to international migration do not only illustrate the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but perhaps even more importantly, 
they also exemplify the sovereign claim of the state to determine its boundaries. These 
boundaries can be concrete and tangible, such as territorial borders, but they can be 
implicit as well, contained as they are in concepts such as nationality and citizenship. 
Both sets of boundaries constitute the sphere where sovereignty’s claim to distinguish 
the inside from the outside and the individual’s ideal of freedom of movement conflict. 
Immigration detention is at once a concrete manifestation of this claim by the state, and 
a possible outcome of such a conflict between state and individual. We will see that the 
stance taken by the contemporary sovereign state with regard to immigration epitomizes 
that internal sovereignty is about the unity of the body politic and the definition o f 
political community. The state uses both its territorial sovereignty and its jurisdiction 
over people in order to attain or maintain such unity.
However, we will not be able to understand the international legal regulation o f 
international migration if  we merely focus on the internal sovereign claims o f the nation 
state. States do not exist in a vacuum, but they form part o f a system of sovereign states 
and international migration engages precisely this system. Thus, the role and place o f  
the notion o f sovereignty within this system, as opposed to its mere internal functions, 
needs to be taken into account as well, in order to place the domestic practice o f  
immigration detention in the wider context of international rules that regulate movement 
of people between states, as will be done later in this study (Chapters 4 and 5).
Above, I have briefly outlined these aspects of sovereignty that are relevant for 
achieving an adequate understanding of the contemporary practice of immigration 
detention. Accordingly, the following inquiry will pay particular attention to the 
following matters: the manner in which the use o f force by the state has been 
legitimised; the way in which the modem state distinguishes between inside and outside 
by the use o f concepts such as nation state, political community and identity; and the 
global structure of a territorial system of sovereign states in which these concepts 
operate. It should be mentioned at the outset that immigration detention and its context 
of international migration also show unambiguously that all aspects o f sovereignty are 
interrelated and that conceptual separations between them do not always reflect reality.
Indeed, we will see in this study that sovereign states’ responses to international 
migration exemplify that the actual content o f sovereignty, i.e. jurisdiction over persons, 
is necessarily intertwined with the territorial frame in which it operates. In a similar
38
fashion, such responses illustrate that the internal and external aspects of sovereignty 
cannot be understood in isolation from each other. As all aspects of sovereignty are 
profoundly related to and mutually influence each other, it would not do justice to 
reality to classify their respective developments in distinct categories. For that reason, 
the structure o f this Chapter does not accurately reflect the distinctions made above. 
Rather, I hope that by using these various aspects of sovereignty as red lines running 
through my inquiry of the sovereignty paradigm, they will bring out those aspects o f our 
understanding o f the modem state and the system that it forms part of that are essential 
in order to comment on the practice o f immigration detention in contemporary European 
states in later Chapters o f this study.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2., I give an overview of 
the development of the concept of sovereignty, as a legitimating discourse for ultimate 
political power within the body politic. The account of this development is divided in 
two parts. Section 2.2.1 treats the emergence of a theory of sovereignty against the 
historical background of gradual territorialisation of political organisation; and Section
2.2.2 addresses the theory of popular sovereignty. Subsequently, in Section 2.3., I deal 
with the manner in which the modern state has construed its understanding of inside and 
outside by using territory and identity. We will see that territorialisation, the process by 
which political authority came to be linked to clearly demarcated territorial units, 
influenced the way in which the modem state conceives of identity and political 
community.
Thus, Sections 2.2. and 2.3. make a division within the concept of sovereignty 
by treating respectively the way in which the exercise of power in a given body politic 
has been legitimised and the way in which understandings of inside and outside have 
been constructed. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, we will see that the historical 
processes that gave rise to these two aspects of sovereignty cannot be neatly separated 
as relating solely to the one or the other. On the one hand, it will become clear that the 
way in which the theory of popular sovereignty has legitimised political authority has 
strongly influenced the manner in which modem states have drawn their boundaries. On 
the other hand, we will see that the process of territorialisation facilitated the emergence 
o f the very notion of sovereignty as legitimation o f ultimate power within the body 
politic.
The conclusions to this Chapter in Section 2.4. will pay attention to the impact 
o f both the development of the notion o f sovereignty and the process of territorialisation
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on the legitimacy of violence. The interrelatedness of all sovereignty’s aspects is briefly 
reiterated with specific regard to national responses to international migration.
2.2. Sovereignty: legitimisation of political power within the body politic
2.2.1. Development of the modern notion of sovereignty
With regard to freedom o f movement, Michael Walzer asserts that emigration 
and immigration are morally asymmetrical; arguing as he does that restraint on entry 
serves to protect a group of individuals who are committed to each other, whereas 
restrictions on exit imply replacing commitment with coercion.100 It is only in Chapters 
4 and 5 that questions regarding freedom of movement will be addressed, but the reason 
that I refer to Walzer’s views here is that I find the last part of his statement intriguing. 
Does he mean to say that replacing commitment with coercion is not acceptable? Yet 
we don’t seem to think that it is always objectionable that coercion by the state takes the 
place o f commitment on the part of the individual if the latter is lacking: i f  we do not 
provide our children with the care that our society deems appropriate they may be 
separated from us, and if  we refuse to pay taxes we could end up in prison. Although 
coercion may not be the only thing that state power is about, it is certainly a very 
important aspect of it.
“Ultimate violence may not be used frequently. There may be innumerable steps in its 
application, in the way of warnings and reprimands. But if  all the warnings are disregarded, even 
in so slight a matter as paying a traffic ticket, the last thing that will happen is that a couple o f  
cops show up at the door with handcuffs and a Black Maria. [...] In Western democracies, with 
their ideological emphasis on voluntary compliance with popularly legislated rules, tliis constant 
presence of official violence is underemphasized. It is all the more important to be aware of it. 
Violence is the ultimate foundation of any political order.”101
Amongst other things, sovereignty entails a claim to hold a monopoly on the 
legitimate use o f force. Some authors feel that the term “legitimate use o f  force” is a
100 Walzer (1983), p. 39-40.
101 Berger (1963) p. 69.
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contradiction in terms: “It seems contrary to common sense and logical precept that an 
institution should be able to project its moral injunctions through acts of brute force ”102 
Although the discussion of what constitutes legitimate political power has a much 
longer history, my analysis starts with the early emergence of sovereignty during the 
late middle ages. We will see that the manner in which men have since then attempted 
to legitimise the exercise of political power, thereby turning it into authority instead of 
mere force, have varied from appeals to religion and the natural order to the notion of 
the people. Many thinkers about sovereignty have included the use of force explicitly in 
their perception o f political power, either on the grounds o f raison d’Etat, or because in 
their theory subjects surrendered their right to self defence to the sovereign, whose task 
it then became to protect them, or because sovereignty is logically impossible without 
complete control and free disposal over the means of violence.
Thinking about sovereignty predated a world in which independent territorial 
units were the main building blocks for political life.103 In medieval Europe, political 
power was not characterised by territoriality, but different territorial entities overlapped 
each other, and power structures were complex and hierarchical in varying degrees. 
Political power manifested itself in personal relations rather than with regard to 
territory, and these relations could be manifold. However, by the end of the fifteenth 
century, monarchical power had grown enormously in almost all o f Europe at the 
expense of medieval institutions, such as feudalism, free city states and the church, the 
latter perhaps the most conspicuous of all medieval institutions. The role o f  the 
Reformation in the breakdown of the medieval order should not be underestimated, for 
before the Reformation Europe was perceived as a single community, even if  only in 
theory: the Res Publica Christiana with its head as the agent of God.104
The gradual consolidation of power and territory under a single and supreme 
ruler, especially in France, but also in Spain and England, changed modes of political 
thought and it provided the opportunity for the notion of sovereignty to re-emerge from 
Roman imperial law and from the theory of divine right.105 In order to see how the 
notion of sovereignty was able to secure its fundamental place in political thought, it is 
instructive to take a brief look at the writings of Machiavelli, and not only because it
,o: Hoffman (1988), p. 73.
1(0 Muiphy (1996), p. 82; Hinsley (1986), p. 21; and Wcmcr and Wilde (2001). p. 289.
UM Philpott (1997), p. 28-33.
,Cl> See Hinsley (1986) about earlier manifestations of sovereignty.
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was mainly these writings that created the meaning that is still attached to the term state 
in political usage.
Machiavelli (1469-1527) was living exactly at the time when the medieval 
political order, defined by a hierarchy of authorities started to change slowly into to the 
modem decentralised system of independent political entities defined by territory. The 
move in Europe from the medieval to  the modem was not smooth and peaceful -  on the 
contrary, it was accompanied by civil wars and chaos caused by competing claims to 
political power. It is no coincidence that many thinkers about sovereignty have been 
preoccupied with political stability and the unity of the body politic. Machiavelli, 
although he did not develop a theory on sovereignty and merely hinted at the notion, 
was no exception. He was deeply disturbed by the particularly chaotic state Italy found 
itself in at the end of the fifteenth century; for although medieval institutions had broken 
down there was no power strong enough to unite the whole o f Italy and bring order and 
stability to the region. According to Machiavelli, preservation and continuance of the 
state is the aim o f politics. Every prince must seek to maintain his state and “a wise 
prince is guided above all by the dictates o f necessity.”107
“When the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention 
should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or 
ignominious. On the contrary, every other consideration set aside, that alternative should be 
wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and presen e the freedom of one’s country.”108
Thus, it appears that Machiavelli perceived the polity as an abstract entity, and 
its ruler is placed outside and above the legal and moral framework that applies to the 
ruled. Linked to his perception of the ruler, is Machiavelli’s conception o f the supreme 
importance o f the legislator in a society. However, he never developed his belief in the 
omnipotent legislator into a general theory o f sovereignty or absolutism. Although he 
was aware o f the idea of the body politic as an instrument in the hands o f the ruler in the 
interest of the political community, he did not conceive o f a theory in which the prince
,"6 Sabine (1941). p. 351; and Bobbio (1989), p. 57. 
10 Skinner(1981). p. 38.
108 Machiavelli (1987), p. 515.
42
*
and the community were tied together in a body politic which itself would possess
109sovereign power.
Jean Bodin (1529-1596) was the first to make a systematic statement of the 
modem idea of sovereignty. He did so in his Six Livres de la République (1576), a work 
written in and clearly influenced by the disorder of a secularising France in the late 
sixteenth century. According to Bodin the existence of a sovereign power -  ‘la 
puissance perpétuelle et absolue d’une république’ -  is necessary in the interests of the 
community. Sovereignty for Bodin is indivisible and consists o f an unlimited power to 
make law. However, his views on that limitless quality of sovereign power are not 
altogether clear. For although he states that sovereignty cannot be limited in function, 
time, or law, he also maintains that the sovereign is bound by divine and natural law, as 
well as by the fundamental and customary laws of the political community and the 
property rights of the citizens.110
For Bodin, government is not possible without sovereignty; without the 
existence of a sovereign power, there will just be anarchy. Sovereignty is the essence of 
the state; the latter cannot exist without the former. This led him to conclude that the 
character of the political community made it necessary that this power be legally 
recognised as sovereignty.111 Thus, the existence of sovereign power does not need to 
be justified with an appeal to God, but rather it is explained by the nature of political 
community. Bodin distinguished between different forms of body politic, depending on 
where the sovereign power was located, but he himself preferred that form in which the 
sovereign power resided in one person, a monarchy.
The originality of Bodin consisted in his partial detachment of the notion o f 
sovereignty from God, Pope, Emperor or King and by presenting it as a legal theory 
logically necessary in all political associations.112 Although theories of sovereignty have 
evolved significantly since Bodin’s introduction of the concept, its rudimentary 
conceptual foundation has remained largely the same. We will see that contemporary 
sovereignty, just as it was for Bodin and subsequent theorists, is still concerned with the 
unity of the body politic.
109 Hinslcv (1986). p. 113.
110 Allen(1926). p. 56; Bobbio (1989), p. 93-94; andHinsley (1986). p. 123.
111 Hinsley (1986), p. 121; and Pot and Donnerf 1995), p. 15.
1,2 Allen (1926). p. 59. But see also Engster(1996) fora contrary opinioa
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In medieval Europe, political society was conceived as an order instituted by 
God, in which ruler and people were distinct from each other, each with their own 
position, rights and duties. The implications of this belief remained tangible even in the 
seventeenth century; there was little awareness of a conception of the ruler as the 
personification of the body politic, o f the people as more than a collection of 
individuals, let alone of the idea that the body politic could in itself be a sovereign entity
m i
in which ruler and people were linked.
The separateness of ruler and ruled in the thoughts o f most men in this period 
caused them to think that sovereignty had to be vested in one and only one o f the two. 
Thus, on the one hand, there were monarchists who used Bodin’s theory of sovereignty 
to strengthen the theory o f Divine Right. On the other hand, a thinker such as Johannes 
Althusius (1557-1638) insisted that sovereign power belonged exclusively to the people, 
basing his ideas on popular sovereignty equally upon the legislative foundations o f 
sovereignty laid by Bodin.114 There were inherent contradictions in both positions, and 
writers such as Grotius (1583-1645), who in De Jure Belli ac Pacisy attempted to  
reconcile both positions in a single theoiy, were not successful.115 The notion o f 
sovereignty did not attain logical coherence until Hobbes (1588-1679), using some 
elements already present in Bodin’s legal theory, based it on radically new premises.
In Leviathan, written in 1651, Hobbes takes as a starting point for his theory o f  
sovereignty a state of nature in which people are only driven by instincts of self- 
preservation and a will to power which is never satisfied. People have no natural rights 
and there would accordingly be w ar o f all against all. This image of the state of nature 
was completely at odds with the portrayal of mankind in medieval Christendom.
Moreover, natural law had always been linked with God and normative concepts 
such as justice, while Hobbes regarded (human) nature as nothing else but a system o f  
causes and effects. Since even the weakest can under circumstances be a threat to the 
life o f the strongest, nobody can ever be safe in Hobbes’ state of nature. As this means 
that everybody is equal in the state of nature -  which is with Hobbes clearly not a  
normative statement -  no one will enter into conditions of peace if not upon equal 
terms. Yet, even in the case that all would agree to respect each others ‘rights’; it would
1,3 Hinsley (1986), p. 130.
114 London Fell (1999), p. 113. 
1,5 Hinsley (1986), p. 139.
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not be rational for the individual to keep such an agreement. Relations of power will 
always be temporary, a stable order is impossible. To establish such an order, a 
conscious choice is necessary, made by all, unconditionally and upon equal terms, to 
surrender completely their freedom to one power, the sovereign.
In the sovereign, the will of all is united; it is a supreme power whose only 
command is complete obedience, sanctioned with his complete and exclusive control 
over the means of violence. Only at the moment of surrender does a mere collection of 
individuals become a people; the multitude constitutes only the people by the will o f  the 
sovereign. There cannot be any distinction between state and society, just as the 
distinction between state and government is an illusion. If there is no state, there can be 
neither government, nor a society. Sovereignty is indivisible and unlimited. The 
multitude enters into a covenant with each other in which they agree to surrender to the 
sovereign, but the latter is not a party to it. For if he could be bound, the absolute power 
would lie elsewhere, and accordingly he would not be sovereign. Questions of 
legitimacy of government do not play a role for Hobbes at all -  a government is a 
government by its capacity to govern and a tyranny is merely a government disliked. 
Whereas for Bodin sovereign power had meant the power to make law, for Hobbes it 
was to be understood as the exclusive control over coercive force:116
“In substance his theory amounted to identifying government with force; at least, the force must
always be present in the background whether it has to be applied or not.” 117
After the turmoil and civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
European monarchies were increasingly able to consolidate their powers and the idea of 
sovereign monarchical power became commonly accepted.118 Related to this was the 
conception of an independent territorial state system, for which the Peace o f Westphalia 
provided the first formal step.119 The ruler was seen as the personification of the state, 
and in him was absorbed the personality of the people.
However, there was no writer in Europe who defended the absolutism o f the 
sovereign power that was for Hobbes a logical consequence of the very idea o f
ll6 Poggi (1990), p. 44. See also Sabine (1941). p. 468,
1,7 Hinslcv (1986), p. 468.
118 Pot and Dormer (1995), p. 21.
119 Murphy (1996). p. 86.
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sovereignty. Defenders of Divine Right concurred that divine and natural law placed 
constraints on the sovereign ruler. A natural lawyer such as Pufendorf (1632-1694) 
insisted that even though to be sovereign meant to be absolute and supreme, sovereignty 
was not equivalent to absolutist power in relation to the society that was subjected to 
jt 120 -pjie questjon was now how t0  reconcile the notion o f sovereignty with the idea that 
the ruler is responsible to the community that he governs.
The notion of popular sovereignty was to provide the answer to this question. 
The idea that sovereignty rests with the people who have conferred it by means of a 
contract to the ruler was not a new one. Nonetheless, the clarity that Hobbes had given 
to the very notion of sovereignty combined with the wish o f most thinkers to refute the 
absolutist implications of Hobbes’ theory, made a new version of social contract 
theories unavoidable.
2.2.2. The people as the source of legitimacy
In his Two Treatises o f  Government, Locke (1632-1704) attempted to  counter 
Hobbes’ arguments for the logical necessity o f political absolutism with a theory o f 
constitutional government.121 In the first Treatise, the theory o f Divine Right o f  Kings is 
rejected, whereas the second analyses why governments exist at all. Locke’s thinking 
illustrates the approaching enlightenment: instead o f a medieval fixation on the spiritual 
world, he thinks that the use of empirical experience and reason will leam and enable 
man to live a good life. Like Hobbes, he too takes the state o f nature as a starting point 
for his theory o f government
However, unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that in the state of nature, natural law 
governed, the content of which could be known by reason. If, in the state o f nature, 
someone would transgress this law, entailing that no one ought to harm another, nor in 
his life, nor in his liberty or possessions, the inflicted party had a right to redress the 
injury, but only in a manner that was proportionate to the infraction. Only if natural law 
would be altogether ignored, would a situation comparable to Hobbes’ state o f nature be
120 Hinsley (1986), p. 151.
121 Sabine (1941), p. 524.
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brought about, but this would be an exceptional situation, no longer to be called the 
state of nature but the state of war.
Whereas medieval thinking had emphasised the duties of a mankind that was 
divided into a natural (divine) order, Locke instead accords a central place to the unity 
of mankind and sees natural law as a claim to inalienable rights inherent in each 
individual.122 Modernity marked a different way of thinking about power: legitimacy of 
power was no longer based on a divine or natural order, but on the assumed will of 
individuals. Locke argues that a government is necessary in order to guarantee 
individual rights and with this presumption, the limits o f governmental power are 
simultaneously established, The state is created by a society of contracting individuals, 
but sovereignty remains with the people who have the right to revolt against a 
government, to which they have delegated their supreme power, if  it fails to protect their 
rights. In order to make the idea of individual consent plausible, Locke resorted to a 
fiction, whereby every member of society gives his consent to be a member of the body 
politic by making use of its government or alternatively, by simply agreeing to be in its 
territory.
Locke’s theory on sovereignty is also a theory on constitutional government -  
the theory of popular sovereignty explains the foundation for political power, but its 
important normative assumptions at the same time establish clear limits on the exercise 
o f sovereign power. However, it is important to keep in mind that the question of the 
legitimisation of the foundation for political power is different from the question of the 
legality of its exercise. This Chapter deals only with the former question; theories of 
individual rights, the doctrine of government by law, and related concepts will be dealt 
with in Chapter 3.
The theory o f popular sovereignty found a clear expression in the French and 
American Bills of Rights. However, revolutions were needed before these bills of rights 
were established, revolutions that would change thinking about the state and power 
radically and which would anchor the principle of popular sovereignty firmly in 
Western political thought and practice. But in the eighteenth century, established 
government still strongly resisted claims that the community was free to decide how
122 Pot and Donner (1995). p. 24: Sabine (1941). p. 525.
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much power to give up to government and how much to retain for itself, and insisted 
that the Ruler, as the personification o f the community, was the sovereign.123
In Du Contrat Social, Rousseau (1712-1778) dismisses this absolutist 
interpretation and presents a radical new version of the concept of popular sovereignty. 
Rousseau in fact adopts Hobbes’ absolutist implications o f the notion of sovereignty, 
but transfers absolute power unconditionally and permanently to the people. In order to 
arrive at this position, Rousseau starts with the state of nature as well, but in contrast to 
the usual account o f it, he reverses the situation completely by arguing that in the state 
o f nature people were good and innocent. It was, according to him, civilisation with its 
constant appeal to reason that had spoiled mankind. In a sense, Rousseau breaks 
radically with the ideals o f the enlightenment; not by progress and the use of reason will 
men find out how to live the good life, but they need to return to nature with which he 
means the common sentiments with regard to which people hardly differ at all.
Rousseau emphasised the importance of community, and he opposes the 
systematic individualism on which the theories of Hobbes and Locke were built. People 
do not really exist if not within a community, “for apart from society there would be no 
scale of values in terms of which to judge well-being.”124 The ideals of the 
enlightenment with their emphasis on the individual have created the kind o f civilisation 
in which man cannot find his true self. A return to the liberty and equality o f the state of 
nature is only possible when every man submits himself completely to the community. 
The state is the community, but as the people possess exclusive and omnipotent 
sovereignty that is inalienable, government is merely the executor of the general will o f 
the community.
Whereas Locke had accorded the people a right of revolt under certain 
conditions -  that is, in the case when the government had not kept the terms of the 
contract -  for Rousseau such a construction is unthinkable because the government 
always has to respect the general will and can thus be dissolved at any moment should 
the community wish so. The ‘volonté générale’ is not the same as the sum of all 
individual wills, nor is it the will o f the majority, for in both cases Rousseau’s theory 
would equally be based on the individualism which he attacks. The general will of a 
community is a collective good, with its own life and destiny, which is not the same as
13 Hinslcy (1986), p. 152-153. 
124 Sabine (1941), p. 588.
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the private interests of its members together. Man becomes man only as a member of 
the community and accordingly it is unthinkable that rights can ever be exercised 
against the community but instead they are something to be enjoyed within it.
Since Rousseau’s time the doctrine of popular sovereignty lias frequently been restated. But it 
will be found that, while Rousseau’s statement of it can be modified in detail, it cannot in 
essence be outdone. Since the American and French Revolutions toward the end of the 
eighteenth century it has sooner or later come to be the prevalent doctrine, at least in all the more 
advanced political societies.” 126
Rousseau wanted to eradicate the distinction between state and community by 
extracting a unitary state personality out of the abstract notion of the general will, and 
the problem was that this left the people without a possibility for governance with actual 
power over them.127 As a result, although his account o f popular sovereignty has 
prevailed, the practical need for governance has made it necessary to accommodate it. 
Indeed, while the modem notion o f sovereignty has created congruence between ruler 
and ruled, it has not been able to resolve the disparity between people and state. And 
although his problem has remained without a solution, there have been ways to deal 
with the tension between the principle of the executive state as merely the agent o f the 
people’s will and the reality that it has the potential to turn into Hobbes’ absolute 
sovereign.
One of these is the abstract notion of the sovereign state, based on the 
constitutionalism that liberal democracies have resorted to, for if  the popular will can 
only be expressed through representation, safeguards for the individual against the 
power of the executive and the danger of tyranny of the majority have to be built in. 
These safeguards, first embodied in constitutionalism and the discourse of citizenship, 
and later also in the international human rights regime, will be looked at in depth in the 
next Chapter that investigates formal and material limits to government. In concluding 
this Section, I want to emphasise that the modem notion o f sovereignty distinguishes 
itself from all earlier notions on political authority by its very abstraction. The modem 
states distinguishes itself from earlier forms of political organisation in that factual
125 Ibid. p. 588.
126 Hinsley (1986). p. 154. 
i r  Hinsley (1986). p. 155.
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relations between individuals do no longer provide the basis for political authority; 
instead the abstract notion of the people and the concept of territoriality have assumed 
that role. The way in which these concepts relate to each other will be discussed in the 
next Section.
2.3. The state, its territory and identity: political particularism
2.3.1. The sovereign claim to distinguish inside from outside
“The present approach to the determination of ow nership of territory is exclusive, partial and 
silencing. (...) Territorial boundaries have become barriers. They determine and identify those 
within and those without the boundary, based on a particular conception of sovereignty.”128
In the previous two Sections, I have explored how a theoiy o f sovereignty 
became a conceptual necessity in order to legitimise the state’s exercise o f political 
authority within the body politic. Different theories on the source of sovereignty were 
addressed and we have seen that popular sovereignty has become the prevalent way in 
which to legitimise ultimate political power within the body politic. However, the 
important question of how the body politic is to be defined, which is a fundamental 
question when we take into account the unity with which sovereignty is ultimately 
concerned, has not been dealt with in the preceding Sections.
Sovereignty by its very nature draws a clear distinction between inside and 
outside.129 Here we see the partial overlap between internal and external sovereignty, for 
in international relations, Westphalian sovereignty refers to the linkage of independent 
political authority to inviolable and sharply delimited space. The sovereign claims o f 
each and every state operate in a global structure of mutually independent territorial 
units with supreme and exclusionary authority within their domain. Nonetheless, the 
internal sovereign claim o f the modem state to distinguish between the inside and the 
outside is not only based on territorial boundaries, but in addition, it is deeply related to 
matters of identity and political community.
128 McCorquodale (2001), pp. 145, 152.
129 Giddcns (1985), p. 88.
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Therefore sovereignty’s content (the state’s exercise o f jurisdiction over people) 
and its form (the fact that this jurisdiction is exercised within a territorial frame) are not 
separate notions that operate independently from each other. When focussing on the 
political significance of clearly delimited space in the discourse of sovereignty, the 
abstract concepts o f nationality, citizenship and political community cannot be ignored. 
On the contrary: territorial boundaries that are in themselves no more than arbitrary and 
imaginary lines on the surface of the earth, acquire their meaning in precisely these 
concepts and the practices resulting from them; practices that are brought about both by 
the state’s exercise o f jurisdiction over people and the particular territorial frame in 
which this jurisdiction is exercised.
This Section will seek to understand the way in which sovereignty’s claim to 
distinguish the inside from the outside is construed. It will become clear that 
sovereignty’s two claims -  to determine the boundary between inside and outside and to 
ultimate political authority -  are inextricably linked to each other. The discourse of 
popular sovereignty legitimises political power by tying community, authority and 
territory together. I will argue that this particular conception of sovereignty, which 
effectively ties people to territory, is the result of specific historical processes that led to 
the structuring of the global political system in territorial nation states.
It should be borne in mind that my account on the formation of nation states is 
largely inspired by the experiences of some few Western European states, and there are 
many nation states which took shape in a very different fashion. However, precisely the 
experiences of the early nation states as France, England and Spain, have led to the 
formulation of durable concepts such as nationality, citizenship, and territoriality, which 
today are relevant to all nation states and the system they form part of
In order to achieve an understanding of the way in which the modem state 
distinguishes between inside and outside, this Section is divided in three parts. Above, 
some attention has already been paid to the fact that, in the period stretching from the 
sixteenth until the eighteenth century, the idea of territoriality gained ground due to 
increasing power o f the European monarchs. Apart from touching upon the context of 
this historical process of consolidation of exclusive territorial rule, Section 2.3.2. will 
describe how medieval ideas of allegiance, under the influence of changing ideas about 
the nature and location of sovereignty, transformed and acquired new significance in the 
concept of nationality. Subsequently, in Section 2.3.3. we will see how the interplay 
between territoriality and the notion of popular sovereignty led to the formation of
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exclusive political identities. As theories of popular sovereignty fail to define what is 
meant with the concept of the people, the notion o f territoriality and its accompanying 
notion o f Westphalian sovereignty profoundly influenced the answer to this question. 
The result was that the universalistic ideals on which theories of popular sovereignty 
were based, translated into a particularistic practice. The tension between the universal 
and the particular has remained at the heart of the modem state, and its implications for 
the way in which the modem state distinguishes the inside from the outside is discussed 
in paragraph 2.3.4.
2.3.2. Em ergence of territorial states and changing perceptions of allegiance and 
loyalty
In medieval Europe, the feudal system had determined the relation of people to 
territory. However, relations o f authority, as command over loyalties, were based more 
on personal ties than on territorial considerations. Feudal concepts of fealty were not at 
all comparable to nationality in the modem sense, and social groups had complex and 
multiple relations to each other, some based on speech, some on religion and some on 
administrative loyalty. The governance of any such a group could depend on many 
different authorities and the idea of rule was certainly not determined by “a conception 
of permanent borders within which such rule applied and outside of which it did not 
apply.”130 The overlap between (political) identities entailed that there was no clear or 
uniform mechanism by which to distinguish “us” from “them”, “inside from outside” . 
We have seen above that the medieval order characterised by pluralism under the 
umbrella of universal Christendom changed slowly because of the consolidation of 
monarchical power and the influence o f the Reformation.
The process of state formation in Europe was exclusionist practice: before 
territorial boundaries hardened, attempts were already made by states to homogenise 
populations by expulsing peoples, such as religious minorities whose allegiance one 
could not be sure of.131 Monarchs increasingly tried to reduce regional differences in 
their territories, fashioned distinctions between insiders and ‘aliens’, and encouraged the
130 Caporaso (2000), p. 22.
131 Linklater (1998), p. 28.
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use of standardised languages in order to create stronger loyalties between the 
inhabitants of their territories, something that was deemed necessary in order to engage 
their subjects in the waging o f war against other emerging states.
The emerging territorial state struck the right balance between possession of the 
means of violence and capital accumulation so that this form of political organisation 
became the dominant one during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.132 Sovereign 
states survived because their size was ideal for the fighting of wars: they were large 
enough to withstand attack and small enough to enable administration from a central 
point.133 Territory started to play a bigger role in political life, but initially the 
perception that relations o f authority were decidedly personal, remained. This was only 
logical in view o f  the fact that sovereignty was seen as vested in the king. As the 
sovereign was the state, ‘nationality’ -  better described as subjecthood -  had implied 
allegiance to the King, not to a certain demarcated territory, and certainly not to a 
particular social group.
When the feudal order started to transform gradually into absolutism, everybody 
became, in addition to his status in the hierarchical feudal order, a subject of the King. 
In time, the doctrine of perpetual allegiance developed, entailing that none of his 
subjects could unilaterally renounce his obligations towards the King. Subjecthood was 
generally acquired by birth and could not be changed afterwards. As the will of the King 
was the source of allegiance, it was also the King who decided who would be conferred 
with subjecthood. Ideologies such as nationalism, alluding to a deeper relationship 
between people and territory, or other ideological convictions tying the notions of 
people and their state to each other in a more profound way were not yet conceivable. 
Formally, people were subjects by virtue o f their being subjected to the sovereign, and 
not because they had a special relation with each other or with the territory in which 
they lived.
In practice, however, territorialisation led to a situation in which the people over 
whom the sovereign ruled were defined by virtue of their location within certain
13: Tilly (1992), pp. 30-31.
133 Linklater (1998), p. 27. Of course there were many more factors influencing the establishment of the 
modem system of states. See Ruggie (1993). pp. 152-166. However. I will not go into these; here it 
suffices to observe that the modem state system developed as the result of specific historical 
circumstances. Sec also Kaldor (1999). p. 11-20.
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borders.134 This situation became a structural aspect of political organisation after 1648, 
the year when the Peace of Westphalia, by establishing external sovereignty as a 
principle o f international relations, ascribed to each territorial state the exclusive 
government o f the population within its territory.135
During the Enlightenment, earlier attitudes with regard to allegiance and 
political authority started to change. Due to changing perceptions about the location and 
nature of sovereignty, the object and foundation of allegiance altered. On the one hand, 
allegiance became a less stringent condition, for this duty, finding its source in the tie 
between sovereign and subject established at birth, “an implied, original and virtual 
allegiance, antecedently to any express promise”,136 was replaced by a notion that, as we 
saw above, deducted political obligations from consent or voluntary contract:
“ ‘Tis plain then, ...by the Law of right reason, that a Child is bom a Subject of no Country, or 
Government. He is under Iris Fathers Tuition and Authority, till he come to the Age of 
Discretion: and then he is a Free-inaa at Liberty what Government he will put himself under, 
wliat Body Politick he will unite himself to.”137
However, according to Locke, after an individual had consciously chosen to be a 
member o f society, he could never again possess the liberty he would have had in a state 
of nature. Thus Locke’s lifelong contract still implies perpetual allegiance. Later 
thinkers, such as Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), extended the scope of Locke’s initial 
voluntary choice to a choice on an ongoing basis. Unsurprisingly, it was precisely the 
American Revolution that challenged the principle of perpetual allegiance. This was not 
only caused by political problems that the Revolution brought about,138 but it was also 
the result o f the very ideals that inspired the Revolution.139
134 Philpott (1997), p. 19.
135 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
136 Blackstone (1865), p. 369.
137 John Locke (1961), pp. 345-346.
138 The doctrine of perpetual allegiance led eventually to war between Britain and America in 1812 as 
Britain had been stopping ships on the high seas to impress British bom seamen, despite their claims o f  
American citizenship. See Dowtv (1987). p. 45.
139 On the outbreak of the Revolution each inhabitant of America was given tlx; choice whether he wanted 
to remain a British subject or become an American citizen. Plendcr (1972). p. 13.
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As already mentioned, these Enlightenment ideals did not only challenge the 
foundation of the principle of allegiance, but they also changed its object The idea that 
allegiance was owed to the kingdom instead of the King gained in importance, 
explainable by altering perceptions on the location of sovereignty. When sovereignty 
had passed from the King to the people, allegiance acquired a completely different 
meaning: it was replaced by the abstract notion of nationality, the bond expressing the 
fact of a person's belonging to a certain state.
“La notion de nationalité, lien de droit public qui assujettit un individu à un Etat, a succédé à la
veille idée féodale d’allégeance, lien personnel unissant le souverain à son sujet.” 140
Nonetheless, even if the concept of nationality can be seen as the successor to 
the feudal notion o f allegiance in the sense that they both unite the sovereign with its 
subjects, important distinctions between the two concepts make them otherwise 
disparate. Apart from changing ideas on the location and source of sovereignty, which 
altered perceptions of allegiance, the process of territorialisation led to a situation in 
which the individual’s relation to the sovereign was factually determined by territory, 
and not longer by any personal attribute of the subject, as it had done in the feudal 
order. States were able to establish to a large degree exclusive control over their 
territories and the populations within it. The resulting internal sovereign claim 
corresponds with the state’s external sovereignty in the Westphalian structure through 
which each territorial state was ascribed the exclusive government o f the population 
within its territory. The concept o f sovereignty, linking territory, political community 
and political power plays a fundamental role in the division of humanity into distinct 
national populations, with their own territories and states. The precise way in which the 
modem theory of sovereignty has merged these concepts together will be addressed 
below.
140 Boulbcs (1956). p. 16.
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2.3.3. Popular sovereignty and the discovery o f the nation: inconsistent 
universalism
The secularisation of political theory, combined with other, more practical 
circumstances, which resulted in the consolidation of exclusive territorial rule, led to 
perceptions of the state as a unified force, with supreme and exclusive authority over the 
population within a certain territory.141 The modem territorial state began to take shape, 
and with its emergence, identity became a clear matter of inside and outside:
“Legitimations of identity gave way to legitimations o f difference, with difference here 
becoming a matter of absolute exclusions. The principle o f identity embodied in Christian 
universalism was challenged by the principle of difference embodied in the emerging territorial 
state. Hus was perhaps not much more than a change in emphasis. But this change in emphasis 
had enormous repercussions. From then on. the principle o f identity', the claim to universalism, 
was pursued within states.” 142
With the emergence of the territorial state, there cam e to be clear demarcations 
by which to differentiate, and those were not only territorial ones. The modem state, 
apart from claiming exclusive territorial jurisdiction, also asserts a specific national 
identity. Its borders are “inscribed both on maps and in the souls of citizens.”143 Yet, it 
should be noted, the formation of the territorial state and the building o f  the nation were 
different, although convergent, processes.144
How does nationalism -  the idea that every nation should have its own state -  
relate to the Westphalian state system? Is nationalism, as some argue, solely the product 
of the struggle for state power: monarchs attempting to homogenise their populations in 
order to augment and facilitate their rule? Or, instead, is it only logical that pre-political 
communities -  people related to each other by shared culture, language, and history -  
wish to choose their own sovereign?145 In other words, do state and nation exist apart,
141 Plendcr(1972). p. 10.
142 Walker(1993). p. 117.
143 Xenos (1996), p. 239.
144 Habemias (1996), p.283
145 Caporaso (2000), p. 3.
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and is it possible to distinguish between the various collective bodies of human beings, 
which are called nations, on other grounds than common government146
A different, although related, question is how nationalism and the political 
philosophy that accompanied the emergence of independent territorial states, relate to 
each other. At first sight they seem to contradict each other, for it is difficult to see how 
one can reconcile the universaliStic ideals of eighteenth century enlightenment thinking 
-  expressed in the theory of popular sovereignty -  with the formation of exclusive 
political communities during that same era.
We will not find an answer to these questions in early liberal theory itself, for 
that failed to address the inconsistency between “universal man, which is its point of 
departure and the citizen or subject of a state, which is its point of arrival ”147 For 
Hobbes the body politic is not a natural body, but it is created by men from the state of 
nature. Community does not pre-exist the body politic -  indeed, we saw that in his 
theory, it is artificial to make a distinction between society and state: the idea of 
community is dependent on the notion of the sovereign power. But his theory leaves 
unanswered the question why particular communities exist instead of one universal 
community. This could be explained by the fact that Hobbes’ writings were occasioned 
by civil wars and internal chaos, and his Leviathan was a fiction to explain and justify 
the kind of political power that he deemed logically necessary in a given body politic as 
well as a practical necessity in his own country.
But also Locke fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem caused by 
territorial particularism in the face of universal humanity. While for Hobbes there is no 
community at all without the body politic, for Locke there exists a universal community 
o f mankind in the state of nature, in which all men are free and equal: a moral statement 
flowing from natural law. We saw how Locke explained why men would want to make 
a contract with each other in order to opt out this state of nature but he does not clarify 
why this contract is not made between all members of the natural community of 
mankind instead of just between members of particular communities. Social contract 
theories failed to explain how, if pre-political humanity was one, anyone could be made 
sovereign if  it were not with the universal consent of all humanity.148
146 Veit-Brause (1995), p. 63.
147 Seth (1995). p. 44.
148 Seth (1995), p. 48: and Linklater (1998). p. 105-106. Samuel Pufendorf was in this respect an 
exception among the early liberalists. According to him people have a natural right to create separate
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Nevertheless, although nationalism and the theory o f popular sovereignty -  in 
fact, modem ideas concerning equality of mankind in general, seem to contradict each 
other, the two must somehow be connected. Nationalism is not some “primitive and 
tribal idea”, which survived despite modernity.149 On the contrary, nationalism is 
modem, and wherever theories of popular sovereignty emerged, nationalism appeared. 
This tension at the heart o f modernity cannot be explained by a simple cause but it is 
instead the result of the conflictive and ambiguous processes that led to the formation o f 
the territorial state based on popular sovereignty.
The French Revolution and the radically new notion of citizenship to which it 
gave birth, illustrate these ambiguities very well. The revolution was inspired by the 
ideal o f universal mankind, but the spreading of revolutionary ideals over Europe lead 
to demands for national rights of people, not to claims concerning the universality of 
mankind.150 If  we look at the Declaration of the Rights o f Man and Citizen, we see that 
it declares that the source of all sovereignty resides in the nation. Thus, all o f a sudden, 
the concept o f the people in the theory o f popular sovereignty was defined as the nation. 
The struggle for control of state power was surely no longer a matter o f Divine Right, 
but nor was it solely an issue of natural rights for the people: instead, it had shifted to 
the area o f national identity.151 What had caused to the concept of the people to be 
translated in the notion of the nation?
Part o f  the answer to that question is to be found in the fact that political 
reformers inspired by enlightenment ideals were operating in a pre-existing territorial 
framework. They were rebelling against a monarch whose struggle for power had 
gradually led to  the breakdown of the medieval Christian order and to the establishment 
of the territorial state. In this struggle, boundaries were gradually drawn,152 and attempts 
to homogenise populations were made, in order to secure loyalties. Extended periods o f 
war, which had consolidated the territorial state during the sixteenth, seventeenth and
societies, for they need to associate only with those with whom they share special inclinations; where 
possible political boundaries should converge with an existing harmony of dispositions. See Linklater 
(1998), p. 51.
Deudney (1996), p. 129. See also Seth (1995), p. 54; and Veit Brause (1995), p. 61.
150 Kristeva (1991), p. 151.
151 Xenos (1996), p. 238.
152 Although it would take a long time before these boundaries actually hardened.
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early eighteenth centuries, had sowed feelings of identity and patriotism.153 All this had 
caused the Christian ideal of universal humankind to lose ground during the seventeenth 
century, and its revival in the eighteenth century did not take place in a vacuum, but in a 
certain political environment.
Thus, the ideals of popular sovereignty were elaborated upon in an emerging 
system of territoriality where political rule was defined by territory. They were 
unavoidably shaped by that very framework. If there had not been absolutist, centralised 
government on the scale that the territorial state provided, it is doubtful whether 
political philosophy would have developed as it did. But more importantly, territoriality 
was a fact by the time that ideas of popular sovereignty were brought into practice.
A brief look at France will illustrate the consequences of the fact that the 
political ideals had to be executed in the framework of the territorial state of which the 
boundaries had already been drawn before. Before the Revolution there was no other 
bond uniting Frenchmen with each other than their common allegiance to the 
monarch.154 After the Revolution, governance became impersonal, based on abstract 
ideas of equality instead of based on the personal ties as it had always been. Two 
different processes were necessary in order to realise the ideal of equality. First, 
privilege and feudalism were abolished. Individual political equality, by the use o f the 
concept o f citizenship, was gradually realised, although important exceptions to this 
ideal did never disappear completely. Second, the different parts of the territorial entity 
that was France, formerly joined by personal chains o f command that had been vertical, 
had to be integrated into the abstract idea of the body politic based on popular 
sovereignty.
A new idea was needed to imagine this new abstract idea of the body politic, 
governed by the people, just as a new political identity had to be devised to give 
expression to political equality. The nation became the all-compassing political entity 
that was the source of equality, and citizenship indicated membership in this political 
community. The people became the people by their transformation of subjects o f the 
King to citizens o f a nation. That a universaliStic ethic came to be construed in the 
particularistic language of nation and national citizenship was caused by the fact that it
153 Hough (2003), p. 8.
154 Fitzsimmons (1993). p. 29
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was not within a universal empire but within the territorial state that enlightenment 
ideals were politically translated.
We see the same mechanism at work in the concept of citizenship. In most 
accounts o f citizenship, its rights and equality aspect is emphasised. However, it should 
not be overlooked that citizenship is not only a complex package of rights with which 
the free and equal individual is endowed, but that he is endowed with them precisely 
because o f  his membership in a certain polity. This aspect o f citizenship has been called 
“the gatekeeper between humanity in general and communities of character,”155 The 
French Revolution merged the two aspects together, and in the same way as with regard 
to the concept of the nation, identity is thus constructed by “straddling the claims of the 
universal and the particular.”156
Also here, territoriality played a major role: the Treaties o f Westphalia, long 
before modem ideas of equality became politically significant, firmly anchored the 
principle o f sovereignty in ‘international’ relations, by establishing mutually 
independent territorial political units with supreme and exclusionary authority within 
their territories. The resulting division o f ‘humanity’157 into distinct populations defined 
by territory was largely a fact at the time that the modem reformers brought their 
political ideals in practice.
So, it may be, as Julia Kristeva observes, regrettable to find the duality of 
man/citizen at the heart of the maximal demand for equality that the French Declaration 
o f the Rights of Man and Citizen was.158 However true this is in the light o f later 
developments as we will see in Chapter 3, the drafters o f the Declaration could not 
foresee the consequences which identification o f the citizen with man could give rise to. 
Citizenship was intended to provide equality to all those subject to the power o f the 
state, and the distinction between man and citizen in the eighteenth century did not pose 
the kind of problems that would arise in later times.159
Practical circumstances, o f which the organisation o f  political life on the basis o f 
territoriality constitutes the most important, may explain the birth o f a concept such as
155 Kratochwil (1996). p. 182.
156 Jam s and Paolini (1995), p. 10.
157 The term humanity is misleading in more than one sense in the context of modernity as the whole 
discourse was exclusively European.
158 Kristeva (1991), p. 150.
159 Feirajoli (1996).
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the nation, but they do not explain the importance that that concept subsequently 
acquired. Nationalism has proven to be a strong force. The romantic reaction against the 
enlightenment played a crucial role with regard to the importance that nationalism as an 
ideology gained in later times. But it has also been argued that it is liberal theory itself 
that makes the turn to nationalism possible, although at first sight this does not seem 
logical. For not only is there a tension between the universalistic ethic of early liberal 
theory and the particularistic attitude nationalism takes, but in addition it is difficult to 
see how the self-interested, rational individual on which theories of the modem state are 
based would want to fight and ultimately die for a political community called the nation.
In order to understand the appeal of nationalism we need to understand the very 
abstraction of the concept of popular sovereignty. The principle of order and legitimacy 
in pre-modern political entities, whether they were kingdoms, empires or city-states, 
was based on “inequality, difference and complementarity.”160 As already mentioned, in 
the medieval world all individuals had their own position, rights and duties, which 
unified them personally with the sovereign in an order instituted by God. The unity of 
the modem state is based on an opposite principle: individualism expressed in a contract 
based on equality. According to Arthur Melzer, this individualism and.the concept of 
equality has lead to the identification that is the root of all nationalisms.161
In addition, the spread of popular sovereignty, by introducing the abstract and 
intangible concept o f the people, changed understandings o f political community that 
are not self-evident.162 In the words o f Bernard Yack, it has, on the one hand, led to the 
nationalisation of political community, exactly because liberal theory has no 
justification for the existence of territorial boundaries, boundaries that were a fact when 
liberal theory came about. As a consequence, it facilitates imaginations of a national 
community that is pre-political. Yack explains how on the other hand, theories of 
popular sovereignty have given rise to politicisation o f national communities.163 
Sovereignty implies exclusionary control over territory, and popular sovereignty insists 
that this control be exercised by the people. The exclusiveness of territorial control in 
the concept of sovereignty in general, when applied to popular sovereignty in particular, 
means that there can only be one ‘people5 that controls a certain demarcated territory.
116(1 Melzer (2000), pp. 126.
161 Melzer (2000). p. 125-126.
16:1 Yack (2001), p. 518 
163 Yack (2001). p. 523-530.
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And although this concept of the people in liberal theory is certainly not a national 
community, the problem is, once again, that liberal theory does not show us how to 
define the concept of the people. Accordingly, it invites “assertions o f national 
sovereignty by justifying the right of peoples to de-establish and reconstruct the 
authority of the state.”164
I have argued in this Section that the interplay between territorialisation and 
liberal theory led to the formation of political identities that hold a large potential for 
political particularism. By the time that the Napoleonic Wars had swept over Europe, 
the abstract concepts of national citizenship, nation state and territoriality were 
established concepts in political thought. Independent sovereign territorial entities had 
become the building blocks for political life, their borders defined the identity of 
individuals, and their territorial integrity was seen as essential to prevent destruction and 
violence. Subsequent changes in the Westphalian system during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century were not so much caused by changes in its underlying premises, but 
more by alterations in emphasis, as we will see below .165
The tension between the universal and the particular has remained at the heart of 
the modern state, and if anything it has become more acute in our present societies. Its 
implications for the way in which the contemporary discourse of sovereignty has 
distinguished the inside from the outside will be addressed in the next Section.
2.3.4. Nation and the territorially defined population as foundations of sovereignty
As the nineteenth century advanced, nationalism thus largely lost its early 
implications o f individual freedom and rights. It was no longer about encouraging the 
integration o f diverse populations and classes into one nation, based on the idea of an 
inclusive political community, as it had been for the French Revolutionaries. Instead, it 
became a tool for states’ exclusionist practices. The trend that accorded national 
identity, as a criterion by which to distinguish between “us” and “them”, unique 
importance was initiated by the reaction that took place against the Enlightenment. 
Romanticism placed emphasis on tradition, emotion and community. I already
164 Yack (2001). p.528.
165 See Caporaso (2000). pp. 8-11.
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discussed the thought of Rousseau with regard to the location and nature of sovereignty. 
The volonté générale is, as we saw, not a construct based on rationality and self-interest, 
but it is something that is inherent in the concept o f community. The cosmopolitanism 
of the Enlightenment, according to Rousseau, was an empty promise, and ties that 
resulted from a common feeling of belonging were infinitely more important than 
abstract ideas o f universal mankind. Hence, he warns of cosmopolitans “who seek far 
off in their books duties which they fail to accomplish nearby.”166 For Rousseau, man 
becomes human by his membership in a community: “We begin properly to become 
men only after we have become citizens.”167 Community in Rousseau’s sense is not 
necessarily the nation, but it is not difficult to see how his thoughts could be applied to 
the newly emerging idea of the nation, which was exactly what subsequent thinkers, 
such as Hegel (1770-1831) would do.
In Hegel’s philosophy there is no distinction between community, state and 
nation. The significant unit is neither the individual, nor just any group of individuals, 
but it is the nation. If for Rousseau sovereignty is expressed in the general will, for 
Hegel state sovereignty is the fundamental expression of the national will. If, up until 
contemporary times, nationality is the primary political identity, leaving all other 
loyalties and ties far behind, that trend was started by Hegel, by whom the state is 
continually represented as standing for the highest possible ethical value.168 Increasing 
nationalism noticeably changed the role of the state: just as in Hegel’s philosophy the 
state became identified with the nation.
In addition, nationalism reinforced the “sovereign territorial ideal”.169 By the 
end of the nineteenth century, sovereignty, territory and the identity of the political 
community had become inextricably linked. Cultural and “ethnic” homogeneity in a 
state was something to be aspired. It was nationalism that, if  not exactly gave birth to, at 
least nourished “ the intimate relationship between identities and borders”170. People 
were bound to each other and their territory by virtue of their nationality.
In the period between the two world wars, national identity had become the 
highest political priority; states generally did not recognise any other identity or loyalty.
166 Kristeva (1991), p. 143.
167 Sabine (1941). p. 582.
168 Sabine (1941), p. 639.
169 Muiphv (1996), p. 97.
170 Lapid (2001). p. 10.
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The national state had a monopoly control on violence, it was the highest court of 
appeal and it had an exclusive right o f representation in the international sphere.171 The 
structural importance of clearly demarcated and inviolable territory, ruled by the nation 
as a discrete social unit, was strengthened by the Treaty o f  Versailles. People were 
defined by virtue of to which state they belonged. Political community became 
increasingly closed in upon itself, and more and more hostile to outsiders, due to 
nationalistic forces and new state structures that intensified the totalising project. 
These outsiders were not only people belonging to other states, but also those belying a 
different identity within the state.
It was however, not only nationalism that changed conceptions of the 
relationship between people, territoiy and state. After the First World War, many 
regimes proclaimed a collectivist ethic. Instead of the ethnic or cultural homogeneity the 
nationalists strive after, collectivism aims at social homogeneity. Collectivism maintains 
that the will o f the individual coincides with the will of the state -  the interests o f the 
individual are identical to the interests o f the state. In practice, this meant that the 
aspirations o f the individual were completely subordinated to those of the state.
Although the Second World War made clear the dangers of unbridled 
nationalism, nationalism as an acceptable political ideology was not discarded, as was 
shown by decolonisation and the transformation o f former USSR republics into nation 
states. The tendency to fuse the meanings o f state and nation is evident up until today, 
and the perception of the territorial state as a “container o f society”173 is a persistent 
one. The territorial state is seen as the proper unit for organising political life, and "the 
categories through which we have attempted to pose questions about the political are 
precisely those that have been constructed in relation to the state.”174 Thus, the exercise 
of citizenship has become inseparable from belonging to the nation; a very specific kind 
of membership in a territorially defined political community. Territorial boundaries 
are to be guarded jealously and strictly, especially with regard to the movement o f 
persons, because the territorially fixed population has become one of the foundations o f 
the concept o f sovereignty: “when the rules for differentiating between the inside and
r i  Carr (1946). p. 228.
1 : Linklater (1998), p, 4.
1 3 Agnew and Corbridge (1995). pp. 82-92. See also Murphy (1996), p. 103; and Tully (1997), p. 187.
VA Jarvis andPaolini (1995), p. 7,
1 5 See Balibar (1988). p. 726; and Caporaso (2000), p. 22.
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the outside become blurred and ambiguous, the foundations of sovereignty become 
shaky.”176
O f course, in some areas there are exceptions to this fundamental place o f the 
territorial nation state in politics, most notably the case in the European Union. Within 
the Union, Member States are limited in their use of territorial borders to maintain a 
strict divide between inside and outside. However, with regard to the Union’s external 
frontiers, no such movement away from a traditional conception of sovereignty can be 
discerned. The external frontiers of The EU have the long-established meaning that 
territorial boundaries have in distinguishing between “us” and “them”. They may even 
have reinforced the importance of such distinctions.177 The fact that the EU in this sense 
is not as novel as some would like us to believe is perhaps illustrated best by the denial 
of EU citizenship for long term residents of the EU. Nationality, territory and 
community become increasingly decoupled for insiders, but for outsiders their linkage 
remains as strong as ever.
The successful elimination o f internal frontiers will of course accentuate in a symbolic way (and 
in a veiy real sense too) the external frontiers of the Community [...] In one way, the more that 
these external borders are accentuated, the greater the sense of internal solidarity [...] in the very 
concept of European citizenship a distinction is created between the insider and the outsider that 
tugs at their common humanity.178
2.4. C o n c l u s io n s : B o r d e r s , v io l e n c e , a n d  s o v e r e ig n t y ’s  c l a im s
In this Chapter we have seen how territorialisation, “a historically specific, 
contradictory, and conflictual process rather than a pre-given, fixed, or natural 
condition”179, has led to the current perception of sovereignty as a self-evident and 
natural abstraction that links state power, people and territory. Sovereignty, understood 
as the state’s claim to ultimate political authority within its territory is based on two
176 Doty (1996), p. 122.
177 See Balibar (2002); and Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004). p. 6. 
1,8 Weiler (1992). pp. 65, 68.
179 Brenner (1999). p. 12.
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pillars: the state’s asserted monopoly on the legitimate use o f violence and its claim to 
determine the inside from the outside.
I have attempted to show that the question of the legitimacy o f political power 
cannot be seen separate from the modem state’s claim to  determine its boundaries. On 
the one hand, the process of temtorialisation facilitated the emergence of the abstract 
notion of sovereignty as legitimation of ultimate power w ithin the body politic. On the 
other hand, the way in which the theory of popular sovereignty subsequently legitimised 
ultimate political authority within the body politic has in turn led to an exclusive ideal 
of political community. In addition, the territorial aspect o f the modem state’s claim to 
determine its boundaries cannot be understood properly when we fail to take into 
account the Westphalian structure in which each and every state necessarily operates.
However, the historical and factual link between all these aspects of sovereignty 
is often ignored, which in turn leads to a reification o f territoriality as an organising 
principle for politics.180 We will see later in this study that the result is the near 
immunisation o f sovereignty’s territorial frame against forces of political and legal 
correction. While the content of sovereignty has always been open to debate, contention 
and change from various perspectives over time, its territorial form has acquired a status 
of neutrality and innocence. Such self-evidence and uncritical acceptance of 
territoriality obscures the transformative possibilities in the concept of sovereignty as a 
whole, and the opportunities for change that may emerge from the relation between our 
thinking about “ideals and human interests and thinking about institutions” .181 In order 
to make this argument at a later stage, this conclusion will first provide some further 
insights in the relation between the legitimacy of violence on the one hand, and the way 
in which the territorial state has distinguished between inside and outside on the other 
hand. After that, the interrelatedness o f sovereignty’s aspects in the specific context of 
international migration is briefly touched upon.
Charles Tilly aptly expresses the link between violence and the state, when he 
writes that the state made war while war made the state.182 Tilly refers to factual 
circumstances o f  armed conflict that caused the territorial state to become the dominant 
form of political organisation. However, we have also seen how the religious wars o f
180 Agncw and Coibridgc (1995), p. 82. See also Walker (1993); and Anderson and Bigo (2002). p. 17.
181 Unger (1996), pp. 3-7.
18: Tilly (1992).
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the seventeenth century gave a strong impulse to the theory of sovereignty as the 
foundation for ultimate political authority in the body politic. The notion of sovereignty 
was partly formulated as an answer to the violence that ravaged Europe. An essential 
feature of the consolidation of the European state system was that the state’s monopoly 
on the use of force was vigorously institutionalised.183 With the advent of popular 
sovereignty, one o f the tasks of the modem state was to provide security, and one o f  the 
reasons why the modem state was successful in establishing its monopoly on the use of 
violence, was its very ability to provide citizens with security.
From then on, individuals had no longer the right to use force between each 
other. We have seen that most theorists on sovereignty were primarily concerned with 
its internal claims, but in international relations the concept came to bear upon the 
relations between states as well. Also the external aspect o f exclusive territorial 
sovereignty, for which the Treaties of Westphalia provided the first step, was perceived 
as a necessity in order to prevent recurrence of the violence that had devastated Europe 
during the Thirty Years War.
The way in which the modem state distinguished, from then onwards, between 
inside and outside, by use of territorial boundaries and later by the assumption o f  a 
“necessary alignment between territory and identity, state and nation,”184 influenced the 
question of legitimate violence profoundly. In fact, through the process of 
territorialisation, which was initiated by the monarchical consolidation of territorial rule 
in the fifteenth century, a new structure by which to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate violence could materialise.
Before the modem state with its rigid link between clearly demarcated territory 
and political power came into existence, it was difficult to distinguish between war and 
mere crime within the widespread violence that Europe continually suffered. The 
absence of a clear mechanism to determine “us” from “them”, due to the overlap 
between identity-based boundaries, made it impossible to make a distinction between 
those forms of violence that were legitimate and those that were not.185 It was only 
when the territorial state had taken shape that distinctions o f this kind could be made 
within the concept of violence. War was legitimate if it was waged by the authority that
183 Hough (2003). p. 7.
184 Campbell (1996), p. 171.
185 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p. 56.
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had the right o f  waging it: the state.186 War was thus distinguished from mere crime by 
defining it as something that only sovereign states engaged in. In nineteenth century 
conceptions o f international law, the right of a state to wage war in order to settle
disputes with other states was regarded as a fundamental aspect o f that state’s
♦ 188 sovereignty.
These issues will receive further attention in the next Chapter, but for now it is 
important to see how the very process of territorialisation has shaped the norms 
delimiting legitimate from illegitimate violence, and thus cannot be seen separate from 
the exercise o f political authority. In addition, the Peace o f Westphalia made a sharp 
distinction possible between internal and external violences. Internal violence was 
regulated by the sovereign state alone, consistent with the idea of sovereignty as 
supreme legitimate authority over the population within a certain territory. Violence 
between states, on the other hand, was regulated by the articulation of international 
norms, which were again based on strong territorial assumptions as will be dealt with 
extensively in the next Chapter.
I have already mentioned that the lack of attention for the relation between the 
exercise of state power through political institutions and the clear spatial demarcation of 
the territory on which this power is exercised has led to a reification of the principle of 
territoriality.189 If  we look at early modem Europe, we see that in definitions of political 
authority, personal power relations preceded power that found its basis in territory. 
Nonetheless, at present, the linkage o f political power to clearly demarcated territory is 
seen a natural way of organising the global political system and it has led to a 
framework where the legitimacy o f violence is largely dependent on territorial 
demarcations. The result thereof is that the territorial form that sovereignty has assumed 
over the course o f history is often perceived as separate from its jurisdictional content.
However, we have seen in this Chapter that such a distinction between content 
and form of sovereignty fails to do justice to reality. The territorial frame in which the 
modem state operates and the jurisdictional claims over persons that it makes within 
this frame do not make sense if analysed in isolation from each other. Indeed, the 
territorial basis o f the state intends to “fix and enforce boundaries of identity so that the
186 Rifaat (1979). p. 12.
187 Van Creveld,( 1991). p. 41.
188 Brand (2002). p. 287; and Steiner and Alston (2000), p. 114.
189 Agnew and Corbridge (1995), p. 82.
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distinction between inside and outside [becomes] defensible.”190 These boundaries of 
identity have everything to do with the unity of the body politic and the definition of the 
political community. The state uses both form and content of sovereignty to protect and 
maintain such unity and community. The vague and overlapping identities of medieval 
Europe gave rise violence, chaos and destruction, but we will see later in this study that 
the way in which the modem state perceives, construes, and protects political 
community gives rise to its own sorts of violence.
National responses to international migration exemplify that the Westphalian 
distinction between the state’s internal and external sovereign claims is blurred and 
similarly they illustrate the interrelatedness of the territorial frame and the jurisdictional 
content of sovereign power. The movement of people across borders engages the 
external sovereign claims of national states in a Westphalian structure that divides 
humanity in distinct and separate entities. At the same time, international migration 
engages the internal sovereign claims o f  the national state in a policy area where its 
identity-based boundaries and its territorial borders converge. A state who regards 
immigration as a threat attempts to guard its territorial boundaries, inter alia with the 
use of military patrols to intercept illegal migrants at the border, and military police to 
cany out expulsions. Simultaneously, it establishes controls within society, ranging 
from obligatory language courses for foreigners to checks on ‘bogus’ marriages, to 
ensure that its identity remains unthreatened. Immigration is thus perceived as both a 
“resistant element to a secure identity on the inside” as well as a territorial “threat 
identified and located on the outside o f  the state through a discourse of danger that 
contains elements applicable to both.”191
In this study, I will argue that the doctrinal separation between the jurisdictional 
content and the territorial frame within the notion of sovereignty, resulting from the 
reification of territoriality as a neutral framework in which the abstract notion o f 
sovereignty operates, has led to a structural blindness for the involvement of personal 
interests whenever the state bases its claims on the sovereignty’s territorial frame.
It is evident that such blindness is exacerbated whenever the very individuals 
who are affected by the state’s sovereign power are rendered invisible, either because 
they are far away and unknown or alternatively because they are very different from
190 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001). p. 56. See also Newman (2001), p. 139 and 145.
191 Campbell (1996), p. 169. See also Balibar(1998), p. 220.
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“us” Indeed, we will see that the tension between the universal and the particular at the 
heart o f  the modem state is made more acute by a strict separation between form and 
content o f sovereignty. The distinction between the state’s territorial framework and its 
resulting spatial powers on the one hand, and its jurisdiction over people within a 
certain territory on the other hand obscures the fact that constraints on individual 
behaviour and freedom are always motivated on account o f the notion of political 
community and the unity of the body politic. Just as its jurisdictional content, the 
territorial frame of sovereignty has enormous repercussions for individual behaviour 
and freedom, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5 that deal with international movement 
of individuals. However, before turning to the way in which both the external and 
internal sovereign claims of the national state influence questions o f international 
migration, the next Chapter addresses constraints on the exercise of political power by 
the sovereign state, most of which are motivated precisely by the concept of individual 
freedom.
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Chapter 3 Limits on sovereign power
3 .1 . I n t r o d u c t io n
In the previous Chapter, I have investigated how the concept of sovereignty 
legitimised the state’s exercise of political power within its territory. In the modem 
state, political power is expressed as a legitimate claim to a monopoly of violence, and 
coercion is a defining element in the construction of state and sovereignty.192 Due to the 
way in which it determined boundaries, and later also because it turned into popular 
sovereignty, sovereignty became a legitimate site of violence. However, that is not to 
say that it is an unproblematic site of violence. As a response to the growing power o f 
the modem state and its particular notion of sovereignty, ways have been devised to 
circumscribe the power of the state to resort to its means o f coercion. This has been 
done because, even though the modem notion of sovereignty attempts to attain 
congruence between ruler and ruled, it has not been able to resolve the disparity 
between people and state, a disparity that results from the very abstractness of the 
modem notion of sovereignty. Many o f the limits on the power o f the modem state 
result directly from this distinction between state and society: as it is the sovereign state 
that is in possession o f the legitimate means of coercion, certain safeguards for the 
people are necessary. These safeguards, first embodied in so-called constitutionalism 
and the rule of law and the discourse o f citizenship, and later also in the international 
human rights regime, will be the subject o f this Chapter.
In this Chapter, I will argue that in the legal discourses that aim to limit state 
violence, we can discern both universality and particularity. The modem tension 
between the universal and the particular that we encounter in the very concept of the 
territorial nation state has not been extinguished in the instruments developed to protect 
against the sovereign power of that specific form of political organisation. In some o f 
these discourses the balance tends to fall more towards an ideal o f universality, whereas
192 Bobbio (1989). p. 75.
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in others political particularism is explicitly emphasised. I will argue that the reification 
of the territorial form of sovereignty poses limits to the universality of all these 
discourses, including, and with particular emphasis on, the modem version of an 
international rule of law.
We will see in later Chapters of this study that the practice of immigration 
detention provides an outstanding example of the implications on the life of the 
individual of such immunisation of sovereignty’s territoriality against domestic and 
international forms of legal correction. Immigration law and policy is one of the areas in 
which the tension between the universal and the particular is bound to come out most 
distinctly, as it is a field that is defined by the very distinction between “us” and “them”.
In addition, as we saw in the concluding remarks o f last Chapter, the field of 
immigration shows distinctly that the territorial form of sovereignty and its 
jurisdictional claims are intertwined, and that the state bases its claims on both aspects 
of sovereignty in order to preserve the unity o f the state and protect its political 
community. Thus, in this Chapter, the tension between the universal and the particular 
as well as the conceptual division within sovereignty between its territorial form and its 
content will be recurrent themes in my investigation of the various instruments that have 
over time sought to protect the individual against the power o f the modem state.
This Chapter is structured as follows. First, I address a general theory of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Section 3.2. Many o f constitutionalism’s 
fundamental guarantees have become institutionalised in the concept of citizenship, 
which will be dealt with in Section 3.3., where we will see that the process of 
territorialisation caused a political particularistic reality to  triumph over citizenship’s 
original universaliStic ideals. After that, in Section 3.4., I investigate the way in which 
international law  regulates state violence. In this Section, not only the protection o f the 
individual against the sovereign power of the modem state will be addressed, but also 
the regulation of inter-state violence receives attention in order to understand 
territoriality’s impact on international law as a discipline. Particular emphasis will be on 
the emergence o f modem human rights law, as this relatively recent area of law 
emerged as an explicit attempt to overcome the traditional political particularism in the 
field o f individual rights.
Section 3,5. explores the implications of modern human rights law for 
sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside from the outside, a claim that is 
traditionally based, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, on territory and identity. In
72
Section 3.6., I will conclude that the notion of territoriality impedes the realisation of 
the self-proclaimed universality of human rights. In fact, just as they did with regard to 
citizenship, the territorial borders of the modem state have principally kept their role in 
delimiting the universality of fundamental rights.
3.2. Constitutionalism and the rule of law
“In Training a government which is to be administered by men over men. the great difficulty lies 
in tliis: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in tlie next place 
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is. no doubt the primary control on 
government; but experience lias taught mankind the necessity of auxilian- protections.”193
3.2.1. The theory and  practice of the limits on political power
At no point i n hi story has sovereignty m eant ab solute rule wi thout 
accountability, and arbitrary use of power by the sovereign has never gone 
unchallenged. Certainly, it would have seemed strange to Bodin that the sovereign 
could be bound by law -  for him that would have meant that the sovereign is bound by 
his own will, something he found inconceivable.194 Nonetheless, we have seen that also 
in his theory, sovereign power is subject to limits, albeit not embodied by any human 
law, but incorporated in the law of God and nature. Even Hobbes’ sovereign is not 
absolute once it is appreciated that his power is only absolute if  it is effective: he needs 
to provide his subjects with security: hence his monopoly on the means of violence.
We have seen that in the modem state, the foundation for the legitimacy of 
political power is provided by the idea o f popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty 
itself is based on ideals of individual liberty and equality. Consequently, not only the 
foundation, but also the exercise of political power has to be based on the same 
principles o f liberty and equality. If government is necessary to guarantee each 
individual’s natural rights, it follows that, apart from an obligation to protect these 
rights against violations by other individuals, the state is obliged to protect these
193 Madison, Hamilton and Jay (1987), p. 319-320.
194 Allen (1967). p. 50.
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principles also against the state itself. In order to render such protection effective, it is 
necessary to lim it, as well as control, the powers of the state. In the modem state, this is 
achieved through constitutionalism’s fundamental principles o f limited government 
(governments only exist to serve specified ends) and the rule o f law (they should only 
govern according to specific rules)195.
Already before the modem state came into existence, there were theories about 
the limits to political power. However, compared with traditional constitutional 
doctrines, the constitutionalism of the modem state, based on popular sovereignty and 
each citizen’s equality, is better capable o f imposing effective and consistent limits on 
political power.196 In modem constitutionalism, individual rights determine the limits, 
scope, and aim o f governmental power, and the prohibition on the arbitrary use of 
power is shaped by the idea of equality. Modem constitutionalism poses the issue of 
limits to political power in terms o f the relation between power and law.197 By 
stipulating that the state itself is bound by the law -  requiring that its powers be 
exercised in accordance with the law -  constitutionalism and the doctrine of the rule of 
law intend to prevent the arbitrary use o f power by the state.
3.2.2. The rule o f  law through institutional design and formal limits on government
Constitutionalism, as the theory and practice of the limits to political power, 
“finds its fullest expression in the constitution that establishes not just formal but also 
material limits to political power.”198 As mentioned, modern constitutional ideals of 
limited government find their origin in the enlightenment era. In most states, their 
consolidation in law generally took place during the nineteenth century.199 I will first 
pay attention to  the formal limits which the rule of law places on the power o f the 
modem state, after which I will investigate its material limits, embodied in theories of 
fundamental rights.
195 Schochct (1979). p. 1. In the following paragraphs I will use the terms rule of law and 
constitutionalism interchangeably.
196 Ibid. p. 3-4.
197 Sec Bobbio (1989), p. 89.
198 Ibid. p. 97.
199 Ommeren (2003), p. 11; and Zocthout (2003). p. 69.
First of all, the rule of law prevents arbitrary use o f state power through its 
requirement that the exercise of power by the state is in accordance with, and finds its 
formal basis in, the law. Ultimately, the legal basis for political power is to be found in 
the constitution, which “constitutes” the various branches of government, their tasks and 
the limits of their powers.200 With regard to the principle that power should solely be 
exercised in accordance with the law, the principle of equality compels these laws to 
consist of general rules, equally applicable to every citizen.
Secondly, inhibition of arbitrary exercise of state power is also achieved through 
rules of institutional design. John Locke argued in his Second Treatise that, as the 
supreme power of the people had to be delegated, it would be best for political power to 
be divided amongst several independent spheres of right in order to prevent abuse. This 
line of thought was developed further by Montesquieu (1689-1755), whose name is 
mostly associated with the idea of separation of powers, an idea he alleged to have 
discovered by a study of the English constitution.201 Montesquieu was afraid that the 
despotism of the French monarchy, which in his eyes equalled law with the sovereign’s 
will, had so damaged the traditional constitution of France that freedom had become 
forever impossible.202 For him, personal liberty was the most important value, and 
would be secured best if  the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of the state were 
to be divided amongst different branches of government, which would then be able to 
control each other.
The idea of separation of powers was not a new one, but Montesquieu made it 
into a coherent legal system of checks and balances between the different parts of the 
constitution,203 a legal doctrine that is still a central feature of the contemporary 
Rechtsstaat. Each power is accorded its own status and tasks, but all powers are to a 
certain extent dependent on each other, which leads to a system of checks and balances 
in which the different branches can exercise a degree o f control on each other. Different 
legal systems have differing systems of checks and balances, but essential to the 
doctrine of separation of powers is that restrictions on individual freedom can ultimately
200 Zoethout (2003). p. 60.
~01 Although at the time that Montesquieu was studying the English constitution the Civil Wars had 
destroyed the remnants of medieval mixed government and the Revolution in 1688 had settled 
Parliamentary supremacy. See Sabine (1941), p. 560.
202 Sabine (1941). p. 552.
203 Sabine (1941), p. 558. See also Bobbio (1989), p. 96.
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only be enacted by the legislature, that actions of the executive are bound by the rules 
which are laid down by the legislative, and the existence o f  an independent judiciary 
that ensures that the executive acts within the limits that are set by the legislature.
Judicial review of the exercise of political power is thus inherent to the idea of 
the separation o f powers. However, as an independent judiciary takes such a central 
place in the theory o f constitutionalism,204 I address judicial review by independent 
courts separately, as a third requirement o f the Rechtsstaat. An independent judiciary is 
indispensable to ensure that the other requirements o f the rule o f law are actually put 
into practice. First, an independent judiciary is in the best position to make sure that 
action by the state is in accordance with the law, and in conformity with its legal basis.
Furthermore, in ensuring the fair application o f the law and its strict 
enforcement, an independent judiciary guarantees the principle of equality. Most 
importantly of all, individual rights, which, as we will see below, pose material limits to 
the exercise o f power, are only capable o f bringing about such limits when they are 
effective. Individuals need to be able to secure the protection of their fundamental 
rights, which should occur at an altogether different plane as at which these rights were 
infringed upon or restricted. Fundamental rights protection is unthinkable without the 
existence of an independent judiciary. In paragraph 3.2.4., I will address the manner in 
which they interact in further detail.
3.2.3. Individual rights as material limits to political power
The rule of law is not confined to matters of procedure or questions of 
institutional design. Individual liberties are intrinsic to the idea of the rule of law as 
precisely principles relating to each m an’s freedom and equality constitute the basis for 
the idea of limited government. The way in which the constitution establishes material 
limits to political power is “well represented by the barrier which fundamental rights -  
once recognised and legally protected -  raise against the claims and presumptions of the 
holder of sovereign power to regulate every action of individuals or groups.”205
204 Gordon (1999), p. 43.
205 Bobbio (1989), p. 97.
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We already saw that the idea of inalienable rights was the ratio behind social 
contract theories. We find a first impulse towards such an idea of rights in the Christian 
tradition, although in the medieval feudal order, individual rights were not perceived as 
such, but they consisted of privileges, split off feudal authority. Instead of a conceptual 
foundation that spoke o f rights inherent in men because they were men, those rights had 
a contractual character.206 A famous example of such contractual guaranteeing of rights 
is the Magna Carta o f 1215.
The modem idea of fundamental rights developed in the seventeenth century. 
We have seen that in the enlightenment tradition, natural law was seen as a claim to 
inalienable rights inherent in each individual.207 Fundamental rights are accorded to man 
by virtue of his humanity and not because of his particular position in the body politic. 
This new conception of rights finds a clear expression in the Bill of Rights of the 
American States and the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen. This notion o f fundamental rights, a guarantee for the individual’s freedom 
independently from and antecedently of the existence any political community, 
constitutes constitutionalism’s material limits on state power. Individual rights in this 
sense are called classical fundamental rights, or civil rights, the most important o f which 
are the right to life, liberty, physical integrity, and equality, and diverse freedoms such 
as freedom of thought, religion, and expression.
Later developments with regard to the regulation of governmental power and the 
tasks of the modem state, led to the articulation of additional kinds of fundamental 
rights: political rights and social or economic rights. Political rights, such as the right to 
vote and to fulfil a public office, aim to ensure equal participation for every citizen in 
the body politic. Their purpose is to translate the ideal of popular sovereignty into 
political practice. The emergence of economic and social rights is directly related to 
changing conceptions at the beginning of the twentieth century about the role which the 
modem state should play in the life of its citizens. Social demands were reframed in the 
language of rights, when governments became obliged to promote actively the well­
being of their citizens. In the modem language of individual rights, civil, political and 
social rights are all accorded the status of fundamental rights. In political practice, the
206 Shafir (2004), p. 13; and Burkens (1989). p. 3.
207 Pot and Dormer (1995), p. 24; Sabine (1941). p. 525.
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three groups o f  rights and their exercise by the individual are related, most clearly 
illustrated in the concept of citizenship.
3.2.4. Judicial review, fundamental rights and the limits o f the rule of law
Rules o f institutional design are closely related to the protection of classical 
rights, which aim to establish an area in which the individual is free from interference 
from the state. In some instances, it may not be possible or desirable that individuals 
exercise the full scope o f their fundamental rights. One example is the case in which the 
fundamental rights o f two individuals conflict with each other; another example is the 
case in which the state’s task of providing security for all its subjects clashes with 
individuals’ unrestricted exercise of their fundamental rights. In these cases, the 
exercise of fundamental rights can be restricted, provided that the essence o f the right in 
question remains intact.
Interferences by the executive with the individual’s fundamental rights should 
be based on restrictions that are endorsed by the legislature. When his rights are 
interfered with, the individual has the right to have the interference reviewed by an 
independent judiciary. This accountability needs to real, which means that, when 
assessing whether an infringement of a fundamental right has occurred, judges should 
not merely examine whether the executive has acted in accordance with the rules laid 
down by the legislative, but in addition, they should assess whether the interference 
itself is not in breach with the core of the right in question. Thus, also fundamental 
procedural rights and issues o f fairness are associated with the rule of law.208
The rule o f law thwarts assertions of sovereignty as power without restraint. 
Especially in the field of the rights of the individual, political power is clearly 
circumscribed, according to rules that simultaneously set formal and material limits to 
its exercise. Nonetheless, there are situations in which the normal constitutional 
guarantees of the state do not apply fully. In these situations, we can catch a glimpse of 
sovereignty in its pure form as absolute power, both with regard to its territorial form as 
with regard to its content as power over people.
208 Dauvergne (2004), p. 593.
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Contemporary migration policy is one of the fields in which we are most likely 
to perceive pure sovereignty, associated as it is with the essence of the nation. Chapters 
4 and 5 will deal with the regulation o f international movement, and Chapters 6 and 7 
investigate restrictions on the right to liberty in the specific context of immigration law 
and policy. Those Chapters will show that in the field o f immigration policy, extensive 
executive discretion and a traditional deference of the judiciary with regard to actions o f 
the executive exist. Thus, with regard to the rule of law, the relevance of the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders is not only that outsiders generally enjoy a lesser degree 
o f access to judicial protection,209 as the Section on citizenship below will describe. We 
will see that particularity of the rule o f law goes further than that. Its territorial 
assumptions are illustrated with the fact that in the field of migration we encounter 
“power which does not conform to judicial or legislative modes of exercise.” The 
exact way in which migration law and policy may engage the exposed core of state 
power, where arbitrary exercise of political power is most likely to manifest itself, will 
be addressed in detail later in this study.
3.3. C it iz e n s h ip , in d iv id u a l  r ig h t s  a n d  t e r r it o r y
The rule o f law and constitutionalism are products of specific historical 
processes, which, from the seventeenth century onwards, took place within sovereign 
states defined by territoriality. With regard to rules regulating institutional design, their 
embeddedness in the territorial state is logical and does not bring about serious 
inconsistencies. However, concerning individual rights, the consequences of their 
“particular historical institutionalisation in sovereign states”211 may turn out to be in 
contradiction with their underlying ideals of equality and dignity o f universal 
humankind. The institutionalisation of individual rights in the state has mainly occurred 
in the concept of citizenship, a concept that impinges significantly on the life outside 
constitutional affairs.212
209 DclfOlio (2005). p. 25.
21M Dauvergnc (2004). p. 592.
211 Huysmans (2003), with regard to democratic forms of politics. 
2,2 Tilly (1999), p. 253.
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My account of modem citizenship is divided in three Sections. Section 3.3.1. 
will deal with the factual circumstances that gave birth to modem citizenship. In 
addition, it will show that the very tension at the heart o f the modem state between 
ideals based on a universal humankind and a political particularistic reality -  a tension 
that is, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, largely the result of territorialisation -  
is also present in the concept of citizenship. Section 3.3.2. addresses the resulting 
implications o f this tension for the rights o f the individual. W e will see that universal 
rights have been actualised mostly within national states, and that national citizenship 
became a necessary condition for access to those rights that one supposedly has by 
virtue o f belonging to universal humankind. Subsequently, in Section 3 .3 .3 ,1 will focus 
on citizenship’s role in a global structure of sovereign states based on clearly 
demarcated territory, in order to argue that outsiders are not only denied access to 
fundamental rights on account o f the internal sovereign claims o f the national state, but 
that discrimination against them is also a structural aspect of the Westphalian state 
system.
3.3.1. Citizenship as an apparent paradox
The idea of citizenship itself is much older than the existence of the territorial 
state. Since ancient Athens, theories o f citizenship have rested on some idea of political 
participation.213 However, citizenship as a status which accords people, at least 
formally, a uniform collection o f rights and duties, by virtue o f  their membership o f the 
polity is a modem idea, which developed in the framework o f the emerging nation state. 
In all accounts o f citizenship as it emerged after the French Revolution, two notions are 
emphasised. The first represents membership of the polity, which, as marker of identity, 
creates a clear boundary between inside and outside, and the second connotes a legal 
status, endowing the individual with a set o f rights and responsibilities. Most writers 
about citizenship have depicted these two elements of citizenship as conflicting with 
each other, the tension which exists between them making their synthesis in a single
213 Rubenstein (2003), p. 160.
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concept seem a paradox. Partly this tension is explained by the fact that modem 
citizenship fused two ways of thinking about liberty.214
The first, dating much further back than the second, relates to the extent in 
which the individual can partake in political affairs. Citizenship of ancient Greece was 
based on such a conception of liberty. The idea of political participation in the modem 
state is determined by the collective right to exercise popular sovereignty,215The second 
way of thinking about liberty is a modem one, and its appearance on the political state 
dates from the enlightenment era. Instead of a political concept, it is a legal notion, 
which is based on equality and characterised by the rights of the individual216
When these two ways of thinking about liberty are merged in the single concept 
o f citizenship a certain tension will surface. For to lay claim to a right based on 
universal equality o f mankind one does not need any further qualifying conditions than 
to be human, but in order to claim a part in collective decision making about the future 
o f the polity, one has to form, by definition, part of that collective. Precisely this is what 
Pietro Costa refers to when he writes that citizenship is a seemingly successful synthesis 
between two very different traditions, the first being the one based on the unbreakable 
ties between individual and the body politic and the second embodied by the natural law 
paradigm in which the individual is the symbol of sovereignty and the immediate 
titleholder of rights.217
However, there is more to it. Ties between the individual and the body politic 
are not stable and are not necessarily unbreakable. Furthermore, they need not be based 
on criteria that are exclusive. But modem citizenship developed simultaneously with the 
modem state. Inevitably, then, it is influenced by the ambiguities inherent in the modem 
state. Indeed, citizenship’s innate tension is the same as that which we find in the 
territorial nation-state, as was described in Chapter 2. There it was portrayed as the very 
tension that lies at the heart of modernity, between ideals concerning the universality o f 
mankind and particularistic claims of distinct communities, in castt distinguished by 
varying national origins, however understood. Nationalism determined which ties 
between people and state are politically relevant, and as such, by putting citizenship on
214 Lange (1995).
215 Ibid. p. 97.
216 Ibid. p. 98.
217 Costa (2002). p. 218-219.
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a
a par with nationality, it has magnified the potential for conflict between the different 
idea’s that underlie citizenship.
More than in contemporary nationalism per se, which by definition has become 
a particularistic claim, the paradox between universal humanity and political 
particularity is still deeply ingrained in the discourse o f citizenship. In the words of 
Andrew Linklater, much of the moral capital that has accumulated in the course of 
resistance to the growth of state power is embodied in the concept o f citizenship.218 But 
at the same time, by its equation with nationality, the same concept of citizenship is 
employed to defend a certain distinction between the inside and the outside.
“The citizenship project is about the expansion of equality among citizens. But as equality is 
based upon membership, citizenship status forms tlx: basis of an exclusive politics and 
identity.”219
i
Chapter 2 made clear how the universal ideals inspired by the French Revolution 
developed into particularistic realities. I will briefly reiterate, with specific regard to 
citizenship, some of the issues that were touched upon there. As the Revolutionaries 
wished to abolish all titles of distinction that were current during the old regime, the 
concept of equality o f all members o f the body politic required expression in the new 
notion of citizenship. Before the French Revolution, certain parts of Europe had known 
urban citizenship, providing those who were fortunate enough to possess it with 
autonomy, control of guild institutions and even social welfare entitlements at the local 
level 220 However, after the Revolution a new kind of citizenship spread over Europe. 
Particular rights and duties based on a notion o f universal humankind found their place 
in a political discourse that would keep its relevance in the future as it could be adapted 
to fit all kinds o f struggles for equality on a national scale. Fitzsimmons captures how 
the new idea o f equality related to the concept o f the nation, when he writes that 
“membership in the nation, rather than privilege mediated through the monarch, became 
the basis for political rights in the polity.”221
218 Linklater (1998), p. 169.
219 Rubenstein (2003), p. 163.
220Hanagan (1997), p. 398; and Marshall (1950). 
221 Fitzsimmons (1993), p. 32.
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The concept o f citizenship played an important role with regard to the new mode 
o f  legitimation of political power. Theories of popular sovereignty were the driving 
force behind the transformation o f subjects o f a King to citizens o f a nation. The French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen expresses the ideal o f equality of universal 
mankind in the concept o f citizenship. For the early Revolutionaries the distinction 
between man and citizen was not problematic: The title of French Citizen could be 
accorded to foreigners, living in France or abroad, who “in various areas of the world, 
[had] caused human reason to ripen and blazed the trail o f liberty”222.
However, citizenship was affected by the changing character of the concept of 
the nation. As we have seen in Chapter 2, that concept, originally founded on equality 
and liberty, acquired a different meaning in the nineteenth century. Its emphasis shifted 
from ‘demos’ to ‘ethnos’. Citizenship became a tool in an exclusionist philosophy, 
instead of a principle for realising on a small (territorial) scale ideals concerning 
universal humankind. But before turning to these changing connotations of nation and 
citizenship, the beginning of which were marked by the Revolutionary Wars, it is 
necessary to add some additional observations regarding the emergence and 
development o f citizenship.
We have seen how ideals o f popular sovereignty led to citizenship. However, the 
“ moral capital” which accumulated in the notion of citizenship was not just a result of 
political ideals and a discourse that was based on universalistic conceptions o f justice. 
Certainly, sovereignty in the form of direct rule based on representation required the 
notion of citizenship, in order to solve the legitimation problem posed by the abstract 
notion of popular sovereignty and to realise ideals of equality. But in addition to the 
ideals of the Revolutionaries, which made citizenship as a concept ideologically 
conceivable, it was direct rule, exercised by the modem state based on popular 
sovereignty, which made citizenship practically possible and necessary. More 
prosaically, the content o f modem citizenship is the result o f war, coercion, and 
violence.223
This link between citizenship and state power is emphasised in the work of 
Charles Tilly, who describes the role played by warfare, state expansion and direct rule
2-2 Kristeva (1991). p. 156. See also Ferrajoli (19%). p. 153. 
223 Tilly (1995).
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with regard to the emergence of citizenship.224 When, in the second half o f the 
eighteenth century, states were in need o f ever bigger armies, they did not rely so much 
any more on mercenaries, but started to draw troops from their own populations. 
Taxation of the population was the way in which they financed increasing military 
activity. Resistance by domestic populations to these practices led to citizenship:
(...) both ordinaiy people and their patrons fought war-impelled taxation conscription, seizures 
of goods and restrictions on trade by means ranging from passive resistance to outright rebellion, 
put down with varying combinations o f repression persuasion and bargaining. The very' acts of 
intervening, repressing, persuading and bargaining formed willy-nilly the institutions o f direct 
rule. Out o f struggle emerged citizenship, a continuing series o f transactions between persons 
and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by 
virtue of the persons’ membership in an exclusive category, a category o f native bom or 
naturalized people.""5
Thus Tilly emphasises the role played by warfare and state expansion: “the 
causal chain from military activity to citizenship”. In a similar vein, Andrew Linklater 
regards citizenship as a reaction to the totalising project. W ith the totalising project he 
refers to efforts made by central governments to homogenise communities and their 
creation of a clear mechanism to distinguish inside from outside, in order to meet the 
challenges o f war.226 As such, he argues, states’ totalising practices led to the 
elaboration o f citizenship rights, because as subjects were confronted with the extension 
of state power and the increasingly demanding and restrictive character of political 
communities, they were forced to organise political and legal rights 227 In addition, he 
stresses the importance of capitalism and production processes in the process of 
establishing direct rule and the expansion of citizenship’s moral potential 228
I have briefly paid some attention to these more factual roots of citizenship 
because it is essential to understand that citizenship is not only a concept which was 
conjured up in an age dominated by ideals regarding equality and universality of 
mankind, but that it is very much linked to the actual process of state formation. In
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid. p. 230.
2:6 Linklater (1998), p. 6.
"  Ibid. p. 146-147.
2:8 See also Marshall (1950).
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addition to examining citizenship’s place in political thought and discourse, one needs 
to be aware that it is to a large degree formed by the actualities of political power. As 
such, it is able to transform and keep its relevance, as it can be adapted to support all 
kind of struggles for equality. Marshall’s classic account o f citizenship, depicting the 
evolution of civil to political to social rights, exemplifies this clearly. In his account, 
citizenship’s potential for equality and universality, clearly surfaces. But as already 
mentioned above, there is also a particularistic side to citizenship, one that was 
emphasised by the role which the nation assumed on Europe’s political stage during the 
nineteenth century and onwards.
We have seen in Chapter 2 that by the time that the Napoleonic wars had swept 
over Europe, territoriality and sovereignty were firmly anchored political concepts. 
Citizenship became inextricably linked to these concepts. Citizenship was territorial 
because the population over which the state exercised its rule was territorially defined. 
But the role that nationalism was to play in the subsequent century with regard to the 
setting of boundaries to the political community, shaped citizenship’s political 
particularism in an even more decisive way. Nationality and citizenship developed into 
interchangeable terms, in a manner that could not have been foreseen by the 
Revolutionaries who drew up the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
Chapter 2 described how nationalism in the nineteenth century caused the 
discourse o f sovereignty to become a particularistic one, excluding a universal approach 
based on the idea o f a common humanity. These tendencies reached their zenith in the 
twentieth century, in the period between the two World Wars.230 Citizenship became an 
indicator as well as an instrument of exclusion and provided protection only for those 
who ‘belonged’.
The conflicting tendencies of the modem state are thus exemplified by the role 
and content of citizenship during this period. The contraction of the political community 
in the twentieth century was synchronous with the extension o f citizenship rights 
internally. These may seem contradictory tendencies, but perhaps it is more accurate, 
following Linklater, to depict them as trends that reinforced each other.231 When welfare 
rights became part o f the citizenship package, states acquired more influence in the
229 Ibid.
230 Linklater (1998). p. 161.
231 Ibid p. 150.
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everyday lives o f their citizens. The totalising project thus received new impetus, 
national feelings were strengthened, and as a result, trans-national loyalties weakened. 
On the other hand, it was also nationalism that shaped the conditions for unprecedented 
levels o f social and political mobilisation.232
Hence, the interaction between nationalism and citizenship is complex and 
cannot be regarded as only leading to a more exclusive notion o f citizenship. Be that as 
it may, citizenship’s political particularism was undoubtedly enhanced by nationalism. 
The hostile way in which national governments responded to the problems regarding 
displaced people after the First World W ar and concerning large migration flows in the 
latter half of the twentieth centuiy emphasised the new function citizenship had 
assumed since its invention in the nineteenth century.
In this Section, I have elaborated upon the development of citizenship. I have 
discussed the factual circumstances gave rise to the birth of citizenship. In addition, we 
have seen that the universal ideals that originally underpinned that concept were 
gradually overshadowed by the instrumentalist use that the modem state made o f the 
concept in order to distinguish the inside from the outside, Before the national state 
came into existence, states also defined their social boundaries in terms of who is and 
who is not included in the community. However, when government was not yet based 
on popular sovereignty, membership had ju st meant that one was subjected to the 
authorities of that s ta te233
Popular sovereignty, social contract theories and the idea of natural rights 
changed the meaning of membership that was not self-evident. In order to understand 
territoriality’s fundamental role in the particularistic connotations that citizenship has 
acquired in the course of history, one needs to understand that the initial question of 
membership itself cannot be settled by social contract theories. Instead, whether one 
does or does not belong to the people can ultimately only be determined by territoriality 
and jurisdiction, instead of by any (implied) contract 234 The specific implications of 
citizenship’s particularism for the rights o f the individual will be dealt with below.
232 Ibid. p. 145.
233 Habermas (1996), p. 285. 
:3  ̂Kratochwil (1996). p. 183.
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3.3.2. National citizenship as a condition for access to universal rights
Whereas in the eighteenth century citizenship was meant to provide equality to 
all because the distinction between man and citizen was not seen as problematic, 
presently we live in an age in which this distinction has become a highly significant 
one. In this Section we will see that universal rights have been actualised mostly within 
national states, and that citizenship became a necessary condition for access to those 
rights that one supposedly has by virtue o f belonging to universal humankind. In order 
to understand this process properly, we need to take into account the political forces that 
shaped the nation state and take a closer look at the development o f the concept of the 
Rights of Man and their subsequent implementation in political reality.
When the Rights o f Man were reinvented in the enlightenment era, they were 
proclaimed as inalienable. They did no longer flow from religion, nor were they 
privileges granted by the King or any other ruler, but man itself was their source. 
Nevertheless, at the same time they became linked to the right o f the people to self- 
government, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Thus, man had for the first time in history 
just appeared as an individual who carried rights without reference to a larger order, 
when these rights almost immediately came to be identified with the rights of peoples, 
guaranteed by the concept of the nation.235 As Julia Kristeva observes, “the man 
supposedly independent o f all government turns out to be the citizen of a nation.”236
The explanation for the duality o f man/citizen at the heart of the French 
Declaration is the interdependence of sovereignty and rights. And if  on the one hand, 
the modem state based on popular sovereignty was an effective and powerful vehicle 
for the protection and implementation of the Rights of Man, that state at the same time 
set obvious limits to the universalism of those rights.237 Equal rights and freedoms were 
secured through membership in a nation, which was constituted by the ‘people’. Even 
though the French Revolution, with its emphasis on universal humankind, is hostile to 
any pre-constitutional concept of the people,238 we have seen in the previous Chapter 
how theories of popular sovereignty open the door to particularistic nationalist claims, 
due to the fact that liberal theory fails to define what is meant by a concept as intangible
235 Arcndt (1976). p. 291; and Xcnos (1996). p. 233.
236 Kristeva (1991). p. 150.
237 Shafir (2004). p. 24.
238 Brunkhorst (2000). p. 51.
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as the people. These nationalist claims are facilitated in a system where the organisation 
of political life on the basis of clear territorial demarcations is a fact. -
Nationalism played an ambiguous role in the development of citizenship: 
without it the political mobilisation that led to the extension and expansion of 
citizenship would perhaps not have been possible, because for that an appeal was 
needed that was stronger than the somewhat abstract ideas on human rights and popular 
sovereignty.239 However, the result was that only national citizenship seemed to be able 
to secure access to the rights of man. Hannah Arendt depicts this process 
unambiguously:
“The whole question of rights [...] was quickly and inextricably blended with the question of 
national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's own people, 
seemed to be able to ensure them. As mankind, since the French Revolution was conceived in 
the image of a family of nations, it gradually became self-evident that the people, and not the 
individual was the image of man.240
The disastrous consequences of this identification of the rights of man with the 
rights o f citizen, according to Arendt, became clear only in the twentieth century. 
Nationalism had by then long lost its original function of integrating diverse social 
strata and peoples in one nation, but it had led to an exclusive ideal of the nation state, 
purportedly constituted by a people whose bonds to each other and to its territory were 
pre-political. The plight of the refugees and the stateless, and the sufferings o f the 
victims o f the totalitarian governments showed that “the Rights of Man, supposedly 
inalienable, proved to be unenforceable -  even in countries whose constitutions were 
based upon them -  whenever people appeared who were no longer citizen o f any 
state.”241
Without belonging to an organised political community of a particular sort - the 
territorial nation state - rights had become illusionary: the loss of national rights in 
practice meant the loss of human rights. The attempts o f the stateless and the minorities 
to fight for their own national states only strengthened the perception of a natural and 
necessary link between the territorial state, citizenship and individual rights. In a similar
239 Habermas (1996). p. 285.
240 Arendt (1976). p. 291.
241 Arendt (1976), p. 293.
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manner was such a perception of the link between national sovereignty and rights 
reinforced by the minority treaties concluded after the First World War, which were 
deemed necessary to protect the rights of minorities that did not have a state of their
242own.
After the Second World War the dangers inherent in a system in which the rights 
of man had “no reality and no value except as political rights, rights o f the citizen”243 
was recognised. The idea of natural rights based on tmly universal humankind received 
new impetus, and although the nationality-territory link still grants unconditional access 
to many entitlements, formal citizenship status and rights have to a certain extent 
become disconnected in contemporary political societies. Human rights discourse and 
constitutional norms underlying Western liberal democracies, have led to what some 
scholars describe as post-national citizenship, an approach to rights which is allegedly 
not linked to territorial or national exclusivity. This notion of so-called post-national 
citizenship will receive attention in Section 3.5.2, after I have looked at the emergence 
and development of human rights in international law in Section 3.4.4.
3.3.3. Citizenship's structuring role in a world of nation states
However, before turning to international law, there is another aspect of 
citizenship that deserves our attention. Whereas most accounts of citizenship focus on 
the relation between the individual and the state, the role of citizenship on a global scale 
in the Westphalian state system is often ignored. Barry Hindess is a scholar who turns 
away from this wholly internalist perspective on citizenship, but instead examines its 
global role. He argues that discrimination is a requirement of the modem state system, 
and not only a result o f the internal sovereign claims that contemporary states make on 
behalf o f their own populations.244
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that, by establishing external sovereignty as a 
principle of international relations, the Peace o f Westphalia ascribed to each territorial 
state the exclusive government of the population within its territory.245 States were able
-4- Sliafir (2004). p. 23.
2Ai Balibar (1994). p. 212. See also Edwards (2001).
244 Hindess (2000) and (1998)
245 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
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to establish to a large degree exclusive control over their territories and the populations 
within it. The important point made by Hindess is that the modem state system as such 
does not only regulate the conduct o f states amongst each other but that it 
simultaneously constitutes “a dispersed regime o f governance covering the overall 
populations of the states concerned .”246 This regime o f governance is dependent on the 
division of humanity into distinct national populations, with their own territories and 
states.
The notion o f citizenship serves as an instrument o f  such a system of global 
governance that determines who belongs where. Thus, citizenship’s particularism is not 
only the result o f the internal sovereign claim o f the state to determine its own 
boundaries. Distinctions between nationals and foreigners are also an inevitable 
outcome of the Westphalian state system that partitions “humanity into citizens of a 
plurality of states (and a minority who are both displaced and stateless).”247
By looking at citizenship’s structural role in the territorial state system, 
important insights surface, which are lost when we depict citizenship solely as a 
national project that gradually turned the privileges o f the few into the rights o f the 
many. In our contemporary global system, citizenship is an important tool for an 
ongoing construction of territory as a political concept. It is a fundamental notion in 
order to maintain a global political system based on territoriality, as it perpetuates “an 
image of a world divided into ‘national’ populations and territories, domiciled in terms 
of state membership.”248 The notion o f the nation state as a container of society plays an 
important role: the assumption that various sovereign states constitute a world system of 
separate, closed and homogenous units 249
The era after the Second World War gives a clear example of the process by 
which identity and territory are linked and by which the latter is inscribed with strong 
political meaning. Massive population transfers based on ethnicity were tellingly called 
‘repatriation’ and those people without a nationality were termed ‘displaced’.
An internalist account o f citizenship ignores the structural role of citizenship in 
the Westphalian state system. Citizenship can be understood as a project that gradually 
led to turning the privileges o f the few into the rights o f the many only if  the national
246 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
247 Hindess (1998), p. 66.
248 Walters (2002), p. 282.
249 Tully (1997), p. 187.
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state is perceived as a closed container, in which the only relevant political processes 
take place. If, however, we perceive territorial boundaries not as natural and self- 
evident, but as features o f political life that have grown out o f particular historical 
contingencies, then it becomes, to say the least, doubtful whether citizenship has really 
turned the privileges o f the few into the rights o f the many. The borderline between the 
privileged and the rightless may simply have shifted when the territorial state came into 
existence.
In addition, by focussing on the citizens of the most prosperous and democratic 
countries, most theoretical accounts o f citizenship ignore the fact that all human beings 
are supposed to be citizens o f some kind o f political community.250 It is exactly with 
regard to individuals whose national rights do not match the standard account of 
citizenship, that citizenship’s particularism becomes truly problematic. People detained 
in waiting zones at European airports, or those intercepted at the Mediterranean, 
certainly are citizens o f one state or another. But instead of being a guarantee for social, 
political or economical rights in their home countries (the absence of which in many 
cases constituted the very reason for their departure), the discourse o f citizenship denies 
these people the possibility to pursue these rights elsewhere. By allocating populations 
to specific states, the global institution o f national citizenship implicitly endorses the 
view that only national self-emancipation is suitable for securing the Rights of Man.
Hence, the two aspects of citizenship that I have discussed here -  citizenship as 
a condition for access to rights and citizenship as a tool for allocating populations to 
specific territories -  interact to reinforce the ideal of national sovereignty and 
territoriality, Hannah Arendt explains the lack of attention for the concept of human 
rights during the nineteenth century by arguing that such rights were supposed to be 
embodied in the notion o f citizenship, and in theory, all members of humanity could 
achieve citizenship rights.
All human beings were supposed to be citizens of some kind of political community; if the laws 
of their country did not live up to the demands of the rights of Man, they were supposed to 
change them, by legislation in democratic countries, or through revolutionary action in 
despotisms.251
250 Hindess (2000), p. 1495.
251 Arendt (1976), p. 293.
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The idealisation of national sovereignty and the interconnectedness of the 
concept of rights and territoriality, which are both inherent in such a perception of 
citizenship, are apparent when we realise that the words with which Hindess condemns 
the contemporary international discourse o f citizenship, essentially express the same 
idea:
The teleological discourse of citizenship promises the poorest o f the world that, if only they 
would stay at home and learn to behave themselves, they too could be citizens like us.:5:
As such, for many people citizenship offers far less than protection against 
sovereign power: it justifies their exclusion and it sustains inequality on a global scale. 
In Section 3.5., I will investigate whether post-national citizenship has severed the link 
between nationality, rights and territory so as offer a more inclusive protection against 
sovereign power. Post-national conceptions o f citizenship, based upon a notion o f rights 
that is no longer nationally exclusive, partly emerged in response to developments in 
international law. The Section below will address these developments.
3.4. International law and violence
3.4.1. Sovereignty and international law
In this Section I will investigate the way in which international law has set limits 
to the use o f violence by the state. However, before turning to these limits, some 
preliminary remarks about the relationship between sovereignty and international law 
are necessary. Realists have often portrayed the Westphalian system as providing law 
and morality solely within states, whereas outside these states anarchy and chaos reign. 
The international environment is seen as a permanent Hobbesian state of nature. And 
how else could it be, these realists ask, in the absence of an international Leviathan: a 
‘supra-national’ authority that manages the relations between sovereigns? In the eyes of 
thinkers such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Morgenthau, the concept of state sovereignty 
necessarily entails anarchy in international relations. And certainly, in view of the sheer 
number o f international conflicts, “the history o f international relations since the days of
”5: Hindess (2000), p. 1496.
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the Westphalia treaties provide overwhelming evidence that [theirs] is a reasonable 
accurate depiction o f the dynamics of relations between states.”253 Admittedly, the 
concept of sovereignty as elaborated upon in Chapter 2 precludes an ‘international 
sovereign’ who rules over sovereign national states. A realist account of international 
relations is inevitable in Hobbes’ theory o f sovereignty, where government is identified 
with force and it is a logical impossibility for the sovereign to be bound.
However, contemporary international reality also demonstrates that restrictions 
on the liberty o f states to manage their affairs are legion.254 To understand these it is 
essential to be aware that sovereignty is not only a monopoly over the legitimate means 
o f coercion, nor merely ultimate authority, but that these aspects of sovereignty are 
exercised exclusively within a certain territory. Westphalian sovereignty entails the 
exclusion of external authority within the territory o f the state. Thus, although 
sovereignty was initially thought o f  as a concept to conceptualise and justify authority 
within the state, its territorial form inevitably came to bear upon relations among states.
International law thus developed alongside the emergence of the system of 
sovereign states. Nevertheless, in spite o f the normative and regulating character o f 
international law, it should be clear from the outset that there are limits to what 
international law can achieve. Some authors have found the reason for these limits 
generally in the configurations o f state interest and the distribution o f state power. In 
this study, I argue more specifically that the existence of these limits, expressed in an 
almost structural immunisation of territorial sovereignty against international forms of 
correction, are due to the reification of territoriality as an organising principle for the 
modem state system.
We will see that even the modem version of the international rule of law 
embodied in the concept of international human rights suffers from what I will call a 
“territorial blind spot”. In order to properly evaluate the alleged novelty of the modem 
version of the rule of law embodied in the human rights discourse, in that it breaks with 
traditional, exclusive and silencing notions of international law, we need to understand 
the importance of territoriality in classical international law. Therefore, this Section will 
first picture the development o f traditional international law with regard to the
253 Holsti (1995). p. 6.
254 Brownlie (2003), p. 369; and Tamanaha (2004), p. 131.
255 Goldsmith and Posner (2005). p. 13.
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regulation of violence, after which it will focus on modern human rights law as it 
developed after the Second World War.
In international law, the regulation o f violence and territorial boundaries are 
connected to each other by much the same logic as which binds people, territory and 
authority within the nation state. Similarly, the same tension that exists between 
particularism and universalism in the idea o f the nation state and its accompanying 
concepts, such as citizenship, comes to  the fore in international law, albeit in a different 
fashion. Here the tension between universalistic ideals and a reality which is in a high 
degree particularistic is expressed in differing conceptions about who are the subjects of 
international law. The way in which this tension is resolved, has profound implications 
for which kinds o f violence have becom e a matter o f concern for international law. 
Whether one believes that “only states have international legal personality” or assumes 
that, on the contrary, “individuals are the true and exclusive legal persons”256 makes an 
enormous difference, especially in this area o f international law.
In Section 3.4.2., I will argue that until recently, this tension has been resolved 
in favour of the national territorial state. Subsequently, Section 3.4.3. will address 
different sorts o f violence that classical international law deals with. The consequences 
of the ideal of the national territorial state dominating the international legal discourse 
regarding state violence will be illustrated with examples relating to the regulation o f 
interstate violence, diplomatic protection and the treatment of minorities under 
international law. Lastly, in Section 3.4.4., I will concentrate in detail on international 
human rights law. I will seek an answer to the question whether the state based 
approach of classical international law, based upon the same obdurate link between 
sovereignty, territory and identity as that we find in the citizenship discourse, has been 
abandoned there.
3.4.2. The national territorial state as the true and only subject of international law
International law emerged at a time when the state was not yet the decisive 
political entity it was later to become, and in early international law, the individual was 
fully included. The influence of ideas which had their roots in the Res Publica
^  Nijman (2004), p. 6. See also McCorquodale (2004).
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Christiana were for a long while palpable in international law, such as the notion that 
the rights of individuals were morally prior to the rights of the body politic to which 
they belonged. Early theorists of international law were natural lawyers and argued that 
assertions of what is now called Westphalian sovereignty are subject to limits. Vitoria 
(1480-1546) and Suarez (1548-1617) grounded international law in the divine order, in 
which the individual had its own place. Grotius (1583-1645) modernised the law of 
nations, as he maintained that its content could be based on reason. For him, 
international law was still natural law, but no longer divine. In Grotius’ law o f nations 
the individual featured as a subject, inevitably, in view of the foundation for his ins 
gentium, a society o f sovereigns and their subjects who were united in the natural bond 
o f mankind.257
Chapter 2 described that the emergence of the modem state with its reliance on 
territory and the concept of the nation caused the universalistic ideals from the 
enlightenment era to translate in a political particularistic reality. Similarly, with the 
emergence of the modem state, the tension in international law with regard to its 
subjects gradually begins to be decided in favour of the nation state, and the individual 
loses much of his relevance as a subject of international law. Enlightenment ideals 
influenced this process twofold.
First, as we have already seen, indirectly, as the modem territorial state based on 
nationality clearly differentiated between inside and outside. A consequence was that 
the nation state was gradually perceived as a unified force, with supreme and 
exclusionary authority within a clearly demarcated territory. The manner in which this 
conception of the state influenced international law is aptly illustrated by the work of 
W olff (1679-1754). Still a natural law theorist, instead of according natural rights to 
individuals, he ascribes them to states, in his eyes the exclusive subjects of international 
law. One of the natural rights of states was the right to non-interference by other 
states.258
A second trend that contributed to the demise o f the individual in international 
law was the emergence o f empiricist theories during the enlightenment. Instead o f 
deriving international law from absolute principles, it was reinterpreted in terms of what
257 Nijman (2004), p. 46-47
258 Nijman (2004), p. 82.
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actually happened between states.259 The work o f Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) 
marks the transition from natural law  theories in international law to an approach that 
identified the law of nations with positive law between sovereign states. To him, as to 
Wolff, the exclusion of external authority, as a characteristic of sovereignty, was one of 
the cornerstones of the law o f nations. Under the influence o f legal positivism in the 
eighteenth century, the law of nations cam e to rely fully upon national sovereignty, and 
legal personality in international law was dependant on absolute sovereignty.260
In this way, the role o f the state in international law was doubly emphasised. 
Eighteenth century ideals of individualism and human equality did not lead to a 
strengthening o f the position o f the individual in international law. On the contrary, just 
as they had contributed towards nationalism and hostility towards outsiders within the 
nation state, they consolidated the importance o f the sovereign state in international law 
as the sole bearer of rights. In the nineteenth century, this tendency in international law 
was reinforced, as idealised concepts such as nation and state were romantically 
perceived as one. As a result, the idea o f  the individual as a subject of international law 
had become unthinkable in the late nineteenth century, with its Hegelian glorification of 
the state and national sovereignty. In short, a positivist approach which obscured the 
natural law origins of international law, combined with the mythic dimension the state 
had acquired, by use of idealised or constructed concepts such as territory and 
nationality, led to a perception of international law as law solely for and by states.261
In those few cases where the individual featured, his position was derived from 
and dependent on the will of the sovereign state,262 as we will see below. This situation 
would last until 1945, although already before that time voices were heard to make the 
international legal system more inclusive, by deconstructing the “artificial and absolute 
separation” that existed between the state and its citizens in international law.263 We will 
see below that a perception o f the territorial state as the sole subject of international law
259 Shaw (1997), p. 22.
:6u Nijnian(2004). p. 111.
‘61 In addition, sovereignty did not only function as a shield between the individual and the international 
legal system, but by defining it as something exclusively European, it excluded for a long time non- 
westem states and indigenous communities from international law. Sec Orford (2004). p. 470.
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has had a strong impact on the regulation and legitimisation of violence by international 
law.
3.4.3. Sorts of violence regulated by classical international law
Here I will outline the forms o f  violence that traditional international law 
regulates, and the way in which it does that. Far from being an in-depth investigation of 
this field of international law, this outline serves to further elucidate some aspects of the 
relationship between (illegitimate violence, sovereignty, territory, and people. As a 
result, we will see that the way in which international law offers protection against 
violence, and how it determines whether the use of force is legitimate or not, is to a 
large degree determined by the concept of national sovereignty and the meanings 
ascribed to territorial boundaries.
Although the relevance o f inter-state violence, humanitarian law, diplomatic 
protection and the treatment of minorities may not seem directly apparent for the subject 
under consideration in this study, these issues illustrate that the international legal 
regime dealing with violence is decisively shaped by the way in which territorial 
boundaries are drawn in the past, and by the meanings that were subsequently ascribed 
to them. Only a thorough understanding o f this structural characteristic of international 
law, will make it possible to evaluate the alleged novelty of international human rights, 
Thus, as already mentioned, emphasis will be on classical conceptions of international 
law, as the law between sovereign states. Developments of a more recent date will be 
addressed in Section 3.4.4. that deals with international human rights law.
3.4.3. J. Interstate violence
We have seen in Chapter 2 that the emergence of a territorial state system led to 
a new structure delimiting legitimate and illegitimate violence. Before territorial 
demarcations became the foundation for political authority, the absence of a clear 
mechanism to determine “us” from “them” made it impossible to make a distinction 
between war and mere crime,264 even though there were religious theories justifying the
264 Mansbach and Wilmcr (2001). p. 56.
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use o f  violence in specific instances, such as the doctrine of just war. Through the 
establishment o f the Westphalian order, war could be distinguished from mere crime by 
defining it as something that only sovereign states engaged in.265 In nineteenth century 
conceptions o f international law, the right of a state to wage war in order to settle 
disputes with other states was regarded as a fundamental aspect o f that state’s 
sovereignty.266 State interest was a legitimate reason for resorting to violence against 
other states, if  only conditioned by the requirement that it should be a last resort.
Thus, territorialisation diminished the importance o f non-state actors twofold: as 
we have seen above, only the sovereign state was in possession of international legal 
personality, and only violence waged by the sovereign state was regarded as legitimate. 
The result was that whenever the individual featured in the laws of war, his position was 
derived from the state’s right to resort to force. Regulation o f  violence was monopolised 
by national states in a very literal sense: fighters that did not fight for a national army, 
such as religious minorities and sub-state rebels, were not accorded rights, just as 
indigenous peoples were not protected, by the laws o f war.
After the First World War, the attitude in which the right to wage war was 
perceived as inherent in sovereignty changed. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 
renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy except in self-defence. This attitude 
was reinforced by the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials in which the Japanese and German 
were prosecuted for planning aggressive wars, so-called crimes against the peace. The 
prohibition on the use of force is forbidden in contemporary international relations, 
pursuant to Article 2(4) of the Charter o f the United Nations.26® Territorial integrity of 
sovereign states is a cornerstone o f  contemporary international law.269 Nevertheless, 
even if  the right to wage war is no longer regarded as inherent in sovereignty, the 
language of war has principally remained the language of the state. This is illustrated by
265 Van Crcveld, (1991), p. 41.
266 Brand (2002), p. 287; and Steiner and Alston (2000), p. 114.
267 M ansbachand Wilmer(2001), p. 61.
268 UN Charter Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use o f force against the territorial integrity o r political independence o f any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
269 See ICJ. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
U.S.A.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Reports 4. 27 June 1986.
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the way in which international law has formulated exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force and the present framework of international humanitarian law.
The two exceptions to the prohibition on the threat or use of force are both 
clearly modelled on the ideal of the Westphalian state system, consisting of independent 
territorial entities with exclusive rule within their territories. Chapter 7 of the Charter o f 
the United Nations permits the collective use of force and sanctions the right of self- 
defence solely in the case of an armed attack on a state's territory. More recent 
developments in international law with regard to humanitarian interventions, where 
purely internal situations are capable of being deemed a threat to the peace, are related 
to the emergence of an international human rights regime, which will be dealt with later.
Although contemporary international law has somewhat weakened the strict 
assumption o f sovereignty as precluding any legal interference in domestic politics, 
international laws o f war remain largely constructed against the background of the 
Westphalian state system. Norms regarding international responses to civil wars are less 
developed than those that regulate interstate wars, humanitarian law regulating internal 
conflict offers less protection than that which pertains to interstate wars, and only states 
can become parties to the Geneva Conventions270
3.4.3.2. Diplomatic protection and the treatment o f minorities
In Chapter 2 we have seen how the Westphalian structure did not only lead to a 
new  structure by which to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate violence, but 
it also resulted in a division between internal and external violence. Violence that was 
resorted to by the state within its own territory has long remained within the exclusive 
sphere of domestic jurisdiction, consistent with the idea of sovereignty as supreme 
legitimate authority within a territory. However, although international law has largely 
ignored the question o f violence by the state within the state,271 the treatment o f 
minorities and foreigners constitute exceptions to this notion o f domain réservé in 
classical international law.
Chapter 2 demonstrated how in the course of history ties of allegiance, 
nationality and citizenship have provided the basis for the legal community of the
270 Fitzpatrick (2002); and Kaldor (1999), p. 116.
271 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p. 63; Donelly (1994), p. 8; and Henkin (1999), p. 4.
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state.272 The protection of the rights o f aliens in international law demonstrates the 
relevance of the same ties in international law. International law’s recognition of the 
significance o f these ties has led to the paradox that “the individual in his capacity as an 
alien [enjoyed] a larger measure o f protection by traditional international law than in his 
character as the citizen of his own state.”273 Generally speaking, international law 
decrees that foreigners may not be unlawfully discriminated against, have the right to 
respect for their life and property, and most importantly, that they are entitled to judicial 
protection to vindicate their rights in the host country.274
Although the significance o f the individual in this field of international law is 
obvious, the traditional stance with regard to international legal personality is not 
abandoned here: only the sovereign state is actually accorded rights. Individuals 
wronged by a foreign state cannot appeal to international law; solely national states can 
claim compliance with international rules to the benefit o f their nationals residing 
abroad, which is the right to exercise so-called diplomatic protection. Neither can 
individuals under classical international law claim a right to  seek and obtain diplomatic 
protection o f their national state; legal entitlements to such forms of protection are a 
matter of domestic law alone 275
Diplomatic protection with respect to nationals in foreign countries has existed 
since the Middle Ages, but practice with modem features appeared in the late eighteenth 
century.276 During the nineteenth century issues o f diplomatic protection increased 
enormously because more people resided outside their national states than ever 
before 277 From that time onwards, the place that diplomatic protection occupies in 
international law is determined by two features of the modem state: a strong linkage of 
identity and sovereignty internally, and a powerful assertion o f sovereignty externally. 
VattePs argument that an injury to an alien is an injury to  his state,278 illustrates the
272 Brownlie (2003), p. 497.
273 Lauterpacht (1968), p. 121.
~74 Casscse (2005), p. 121. Diplomatic protection can only be invoked when the individual has exhausted 
the domestic remedies available in the host state.
2 5Cassese (2005), p. 122.
276 Brownlie (2003), p. 500.
“In the century after 1840 some sixty mixed claims commissions were set up to deal with disputes 
arising from injury to the interests of aliens.” Brownlie (2003), p. 500. 
r8  McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen (1976), pp
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assumption by international law that one’s state interference with another one’s national 
may constitute a breach of the sovereignty of the former state. “In taking up a case of 
one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic protection or international judicial 
proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure 
in the persons of its nationals respect for the rules of international law ”279
In the discourse concerning limitations upon a state’s treatment of foreigners we 
can distinguish two different approaches: one which argues that it is sufficient for 
foreigners to be treated as nationals; the other maintaining that their treatment should 
live up to a minimum standard o f civilisation: the international minimum standard.280 In 
the latter discourse, a purely state centred discourse is abandoned in favour o f an 
approach based on the dignity o f the individual. And as the latter approach prevailed, it 
can be contended that, even though international law does not confer individuals 
directly with rights regarding their treatment by a foreign state, universaliStic ideals 
based on the dignity of the individual came to play an important role in this field of 
law.281
The fact that the modem state is based on ties of allegiance, nationality and 
citizenship, and its linkage o f sovereignty and identity, provide a rationale for the 
existence o f a right of diplomatic protection in international law. The weight which 
international law attaches to the meaning of these ties is proven by its insistence that the 
presence o f such ties is not merely a formal question. In the Nottebohm Case, the 
International Court o f Justice declared Liechtenstein’s claim against Guatemala, 
concerning the treatment of one of its nationals, inadmissible. It was of the opinion that 
Mr. Nottebohm’s nationality could not be validly invoked by Liechtenstein against 
Guatemala, as it did not correspond to a factual situation.282 The Court reaffirmed that 
matters concerning nationality are within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, which 
settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition o f its nationality.
However, the issue to be decided by the Court did not pertain to the domestic 
legal system of Liechtenstein, but instead it dealt with the international effects of 
naturalisation. International law can only recognise naturalisation if it constitutes a legal
279 Panavezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania). 28 February' 1939, Ser A/B No 76 (1939).
280 McDougal. Laswell. and Chen (1976). p. 443.
281 Although the two approaches often reflect conflicting economic and political interests. See Casessc 
(2005), p. 120 and Brownlie (2003), p. 503.
282 ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 6 April 1955.
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recognition o f  a person’s factual membership in a state’s population. Such membership 
is expressed, according to the Court, by adherence to the state’s traditions, its interests, 
way o f life and by assuming the obligations and rights o f its citizens. The concept of 
diplomatic protection in international law  as such is consistent with the structural role of 
citizenship, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. The way in which international law affords 
protection to  the individual is by regulating the relations between sovereign powers and 
allocating to each their specific responsibilities concerning those that allegedly “belong” 
to them.
The allocation to the sovereign of those that “belong” is mostly based on 
territorial demarcations made in the past. Minorities occupy a special place in the 
discourse that distinguishes the inside from the outside o f the modem territorial state, 
and their protection has always been a concern for international law. Chapter 2 argued 
that the Treaties of Westphalia anchored the notion of external sovereignty in 
international relations, by establishing mutually independent territorial political units 
with supreme and exclusionary authority within their domains. By doing so, it gave the 
sovereign the right to determine the religion within his territory.
Yet, this is not a complete account o f the Treaties.283 They also contained 
restrictions on the sovereign’s right to regulate religious affairs in his territory by giving 
minority religious groups the right to practice their religion, and by prohibiting religious 
discrimination to a certain extent284 Thus, although the Peace of Westphalia established 
sovereignty as a principle governing international relations by ascribing a fixed territory 
to the sole jurisdiction of a sovereign and categorising populations as belonging to one 
state or another, at the same time these Treaties impinged significantly on the supreme 
right of the sovereign, by placing him under an obligation to protect and respect certain 
religious freedoms within his territory.
The enforcement mechanism for these rights was largely effective, as it 
consisted o f  “a clear and easy-to-implement threat o f retaliation: protestant states would 
conduct reprisals against their own minority population and vice versa.”285 Here we can 
discern a parallel with diplomatic protection. Sovereign states would regard 
coreligionists living in another state as a matter o f their concern, just as they consider
283 Krasner (2001).
284 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 113.
285 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 155.
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the treatment of their nationals by another state as not falling entirely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the latter state.
After WWI, the issue of minorities was brought to the forefront of international 
law and the protection of minorities was placed under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations. The design of a system of minority protection by the League of Nations was 
prompted by the fact that many claims of self-determination of national groups in 
Europe were not satisfied.286 This system was built on the basis of several documents, 
which regulated the situation of specific states and certain population groups living in 
these states.287 Obligations on minority protection did not amount to a closed system of 
international law, as they were only imposed on certain states, and only concerned some 
o f the minorities living under their jurisdiction.288
The Permanent Court of International Justice, in an advisory opinion, formulated 
two general principles, which form the basis of the minority protection by the Treaties. 
First, nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities were to be “placed 
in every respect on a footing of perfect equality respect with the other nationals of the 
state.” Secondly, these minorities had a right to “the preservation of the racial 
peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics ” 289
The cases of minority protection and diplomatic protection constitute an 
exception to the assumption that the deployment of internal violence is a matter for the 
sovereign state alone, in which classical international law has no role to play. 
Nevertheless, international laws that protect minorities and aliens do not depart from a 
traditional understanding of sovereignty which links authority, territory and people and 
makes a strict distinction between inside and outside. By providing ‘outsiders’ -  
foreigners and minorities -  with protection against sovereign power, international law in 
this area reinforces the ideal of the nation state with its perfect link between identity and 
territory.
Such an ideal led to a perception in which “only nationals could be citizens, only 
people of the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions,” 
and in which “people o f a different national origin needed some law of exception ”2<>0 In
286 Henrand (2000). p. 4.
287 Ibid. p. 4-5.
288 See Arcndt (1976). p. 272.
289 PCIJ, Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1956.
290 Arcndt (1976), p.275.
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addition, it should be noted that the Minority Treaties had a clear geopolitical aim which 
consisted of maintaining the territorial ideal: “the system o f protection of minorities 
(...) is also intended (...) to ensure that States with a minority within their boundaries 
should be protected from the danger o f interference by other powers in their internal 
affairs.”291 Accordingly, just as in the discourse o f citizenship and the regulation o f 
interstate violence, in these fields of international law, we see once more affirmed that 
“the relationship between identity and borders underlies both the process of norm 
articulation and the kinds o f violence identified as problematic” ,292
3.4.4. International human rights
W e have seen above that the rise o f territorial concentrations o f power in the 
Westphalian era has been checked by developments in two different areas.293 These 
developments took place along separate lines and each followed a different logic. 
Internally, the growth of state power led to the demand for citizenship rights, offering 
protection to the people against the arbitrary use o f power by the state. Externally, the 
state was to undergo constraints formulated by international law.
The separateness of the discourses regulating internal and external restraints on 
state power led to a gap between national and international law. International law was 
the law between sovereign states, in which the regulation of violence was determined by 
strong territorial assumptions and in which the individual as such did not feature. The 
treatment by a state of its territorially defined population usually did not involve any 
question of international law, with its acceptance of sovereignty’s exclusive link 
between power, territory and population. Internally, the concept of fundamental rights, 
based on the dignity o f the individual, became linked to national sovereignty, which 
involved a similar exclusive linkage between territory, nationality, and citizenship. 
Accordingly, within the nation state, the original universality of citizenship rights 
gradually turned into a particularistic conception of rights, based on national belonging.
291 League of Nations Official Journal, Volume 9,1928. p. 942.
292 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p 56.
293 Linklater (1998), p. 213.
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When, during the period between the two world wars, sovereignty’s narrow link 
-  internally as well as externally -  between power, territory, identity and rights, was at 
its firmest, the existence of the gap between international and domestic law resulted in 
the absence of any enforceable rights for large groups of individuals. The terrible 
consequences thereof became clear during the Second World War, exemplified as they 
were in factual spaces o f rightlessness, such as the concentration and extermination 
camps and, to a lesser degree, the internment camps for displaced people and refugees.
After 1945, the welfare of the individual, irrespective o f his nationality, was 
increasingly considered as a matter o f international concern by the international 
community.294 The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials prosecuted individuals on the novel 
charge of crimes against humanity. Crimes committed against a state’s own population 
became a general matter of concern for international law. The Nuremberg Trials did not 
break completely with the territorially defined “process of norm articulation and the 
traditional kinds of violence identified as problematic”, seeing that crimes against 
humanity could only be committed in connection with war crimes or crimes against the 
peace. Thus, the treatment of Germany’s Jewish population by the Nazi’s prior to 1939 
was not adjudicated. Howevér, the Trials marked an important first step in 
deconstructing sovereignty’s function as a barrier between the individual and the 
international legal order. Although the criminalization of aggression in the Trials 
amounted to erecting “a wall around state sovereignty”, the effect of criminalizing 
certain acts carried out against a state’s own population was “to pierce the veil o f 
sovereignty.”295 Indirectly, the enactment of ‘crimes against humanity’ constituted the 
recognition o f individual rights in international law that are superior to the law of the 
sovereign state.296
The emerging human rights regime captured in various legal documents carried 
this process further. In the Charter of the United Nations, human rights were explicitly 
listed as a matter of concern for the new organisation, and it imposed on its members
294 Oda (1968). p. 495.
:95 Luban (1994). p. 336.
296 Lauterpacht (1968). p. 38. As I am concerned with individual rights and protection against violence 
employed by the state, I will not look into developments which deal with individual criminal 
responsibility under international law. These developments, however, give also a clear indication of the 
diminishing importance of sovereignly as shielding the individual from the international legal system.
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the obligation to  respect such rights, irrespective o f nationality.297 The post-war period 
saw an immense proliferation of international institutions and norms dedicated to 
protecting human rights. Many of these norms acquired binding legal force as they 
became embodied in multilateral frameworks for the protection of human rights.298 
Apart from treaties that were open for signature to all states, irrespective o f their 
geographic location, human rights were also incorporated into international law on a 
regional scale.299
In addition, certain rights o f individuals have become customary international 
law. Irrespective o f the fact whether a state has entered into specific treaty obligations 
with regard to the rights of the people under its jurisdiction, the prohibition on torture, 
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, extra-judicial killings and disappearances have 
acquired the status of customary international law, or even ins cogensm) International 
law no longer permits states to defend violations o f these rights as legitimate exercises 
of national sovereignty. The status o f  international law in this area is confirmed by the 
fact that states, even when violating basic human rights norms, generally do not assert a 
legal entitlement to do so; instead, they deny that such violations took place.301
Not only the development o f individual rights was suddenly taking place beyond 
the nation state, aspects relating to their enforcement and implementation were in some 
cases transferred to the international sphere as well. International institutions, such as 
the United N ations’ Commission on Human Rights, acquired monitoring tasks with 
regard to member states’ human rights obligations, and in case of violations, the
29 Donnelly (1994). p. 8; and Lautcrpacht (1968), p. 347.
The most important of which: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39* Session., Supp. No. 51, 
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/708 (1984); Convention on the Elimination o f  all Forms o f Discrimination 
Against It omen, 18 December 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46. at 193, 
U.N. Doc. 34/46/ (1980); International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature on 7 March 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; ICCPR; International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide, 9 December 1948. 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
299 ECHR; American Convention on Human Rights. 1969; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 1981.
31X1 McCorquodale (2004). p. 486; and Aceves (2002), p. 261. See also the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
Case, 5 February 1970.
301 Fox (1997). p. 115-116.
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individual in some cases can appeal directly to an international body.302 Nonetheless, 
real enforcement and implementation of universal human rights, going further than 
monitoring and pressure procedures, have largely remained national.303
This does not mean that the real effect of international law is nugatory in this 
area. First o f all, in the absence of effective international institutions, national judges of 
liberal states have assumed an important role with regard to the enforcement o f 
international human rights norms, as will be looked into more closely below.304 
Secondly, there is an indirect effect o f international human rights law in domestic 
systems, even when that law concerns so-called soft law: national judges may interpret 
national law in conformity with standards laid down in international instruments, even 
when those are not binding, or not ratified.305 Thirdly, the existence and 
acknowledgement of international norms with regard to the dignity of the human person 
have important normative consequences: demands can now be framed in the language 
o f law, which make them more powerful, and lends them a legitimacy they might have 
been lacking before.306
The regional record with regard to the implementation and enforcement o f 
human rights shows a diverse picture.307 Asia and the Middle East lack 
intergovernmental regional human rights organisations, whereas Africa, Europe and the 
Americas have established international mechanisms to ensure the protection o f 
fundamental rights. By far the most effective and extensive of these is the protection of 
human rights in the framework of the Council of Europe.
The ECHR covers mainly civil and political rights, and is ratified by all forty- 
one Member States of the Council o f Europe. Its influence is not only felt in the 
domestic systems of the Member States, the majority o f which have incorporated it into 
national law, but also the European Union, although not a party to the ECHR,308 has
302 See the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
303 Donnelly (1994), p. 9.
304 See also Aceves (2002).
305 Gurowitz (2004), p. 144.
306 Gurowitz (2004), p. 149; Martin (1989); and Tamanaha (2004), p. 131.
307 Donnelly (1994), p. 9.
308 And accession to the ECHR in the near future is unlikely, see ECJ. Opinion 2/94. Accession by the 
Community to the European Com’ention for the Protection o f Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
28 March 1996.
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undertaken to respect the fundamental rights as guaranteed by it.309 The ECHR accords 
the individual a right o f appeal to an international body, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), in the case of an alleged breach of the fundamental rights protected by 
the Convention. Contracting parties to the ECHR have undertaken to abide by the 
judgements o f the Court, which has, in the case that it finds a violation of one of the 
rights enumerated in the Convention, the right to oblige a state to pay just satisfaction to 
a victim, or to  take other measures. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe supervises the execution o f judgements, and makes recommendations with 
regard to  general measures, in the case that domestic legislation or administrative 
arrangements make subsequent similar breaches o f the ECHR foreseeable. Member 
States o f the Council of Europe generally comply with the judgments of the European 
Court, encouraged as they are by a number o f pressures and interests.310
By its transfer to the international sphere o f constitutional principles, which had 
thus far only featured in the domestic sphere, international human rights law intends to 
close the aforementioned gap between national and international law. Perhaps this is 
best illustrated by the way in which human rights are protected in the framework of the 
Council o f Europe, with the ECHR as an “instrument of European public order”,311 in 
which individuals are not only accorded international rights, but in addition, are able to 
secure the protection of these rights on the international plane.
In order to understand the way in which international human rights affect the 
modem state, it is helpful to distinguish between the internal and external effects of 
international law in this area. Externally, the sovereign state can no longer maintain that 
the treatment o f  its population is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The individual has 
become a subject of international law, and it has been said that “the development of 
international law  in this century is likely to be framed and judged not so much by the 
way international law defines relations between states, as by the way it defines relations 
between persons and states.”312 Within the nation state, national citizenship can no 
longer legitimately be the only foundation upon which rights are determined, as
309 Article 6 TEU. See Spielinann (1999), p. 759-760,
310 For an exception, see the case of Loizidou vs. Turkey, Judgments of 23 March 1995 (preliminary 
objections); and 18 December 1996 (merits); and 28 July 1998 (just satisfaction). See Ovey and White 
(2002). pp. 431-435.
311 The ECtHR in Loizidou v. Turkey, (prelimianry objections), 23 March 1995. §75.
3,: Brand (2002), p. 280.
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international law guarantees fundamental rights irrespective o f a person’s nationality. 
The ‘piercing of the veil of sovereignty’ in these two directions engages the sovereign 
claim of the modem state, as it results in incapacity o f the modem state to maintain a 
strong distinction between the inside and the outside. The precise implications o f 
modem human rights law on the sovereign claims of the modem state will be dealt with 
in the next Section.
3.5. Closing the gap: A more inclusive protection through human rights?
3.5.1. Legitimacy and sovereignty
We have seen above that in traditional international law, Westphalian 
sovereignty entailed that the state was able to maintain a distinction between inside and 
outside, inter alia by designing certain areas as falling under its domestic jurisdiction, 
where international law had no role to play. The treatment o f the individuals under its 
power, apart from some exceptions (in which the status o f individuals under 
international law was derived from the sovereign status of the state), constituted one o f 
the areas o f domestic jurisdiction. Presently, international law has changed in this 
respect: incorporation o f norms concerning human dignity in international law results in 
an inability of states to argue that national sovereignty entails that the treatment of the 
individuals under their jurisdiction is not a matter for international law.
Thus, contemporary international law has caused congruence between the ideas 
underlying Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. Internally, sovereignty has always 
been “authority, not might.”313 Externally, however, it was actual power and not legal 
authority, which constituted the basis for Westphalian sovereignty, where statehood was 
determined by effective control over a defined territory and a permanent population. 
With the recognition of human rights (and before that, the prohibition on the use o f 
force) in modem international law, this standard of material effectiveness has been 
diluted, as the international community can refuse recognition of statehood when
313 Mclhvain (1969), p. 30.
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effective control within a territory is established in violation with fundamental human 
rights, the principle of self-determination, or the prohibition on the use of force.314
Also in this respect we see that sovereignty is no longer capable of bringing 
about a strict divide between the domestic and the international. Formerly, such a divide 
entailed a territorialisation of the rule o f  law, containing the legal within the territorially 
defined state where authority is defined and bound by the rule o f law, and defining the 
international as a space that lacks a constitutional order (at least with respect to the 
individual).315
Consequently, human rights law has instituted a constitutional order over and 
across national boundaries, and as a result, a blurring between domestic and 
international law has occurred in the field of individual rights. International human 
rights norms add a new dimension to the rule of law within the constitutional state, with 
particular repercussions concerning its practice o f  judicial review. As such, human 
rights can simultaneously be seen as a tool to close the gap between national and 
international law, and as an attempt to  overcome the tension between particularism and 
universality o f a global structure of sovereign states that each have jurisdiction within 
clearly demarcated territories. Whether it succeeds in establishing a guarantee for 
individual freedom that is not trapped within “the image o f  the sovereign, the territorial 
state and its traditional [...] institutions”316 will be investigated below.
In addition to the domestic -  international divide, w e have seen that sovereignty 
traditionally distinguished the inside from the outside through two related claims: the 
first concerning territory; the second regarding matters o f identity. I will start 
investigating the effect of the blurring between domestic and international law on 
matters of identity with specific regard to individual rights in Section 3.5.2. We will see 
that distinctions regarding inside and outside that are based on national identity have 
lost much of their former importance. Due to international human rights norms, post­
national conceptions of citizenship have developed within the state.
314 Waibrick (2003), p. 205: and Nollkaemper (2004), pp. 116-118. Examples arc the resolutions of the 
U.N. Security Council in which the establishment of the South African homelands (violation of the 
prohibition of apartheid), and the establishment of North Cyprus by Turkey (violation of the prohibition 
on the use of force) w ere deemed in violation of international law. S/Rcs/181 and S/Res/182 (1962) and 
S/Res/541 (1983).
3I> Huysmans (2003). p. 215-216. See also Fox (1997), pp. 113-114.
316 Huysmans (2003). p. 223. who poses this question with regard to trans-national democracy.
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With regard to the modem state’s territorially based claims, which will be 
looked at in Section 3.5.3., however, the picture is more ambiguous, and I will argue 
that territoriality as an organising principle has not been weakened by international 
human rights norms. On the contrary, we will see that the limits to the validity of these 
norms are often determined precisely by territoriality.
3.5.2. Identity and rights in the contemporary state: post-national citizenship
I have described in Section 3.3.1 how citizenship and nationality acquired 
identical meanings when the meanings of statehood and nationhood coincided.317 Just 
like nationality, the institution of national citizenship was centred on exclusive 
allegiance,318 and legal personhood became linked to nationality. Individual rights were 
in reality national rights, and the result was that non-citizens fell in a gap that existed 
between national and international law, without real possibilities for enforcement o f 
those rights that were proclaimed as inalienable when they were formulated during the 
enlightenment.
However, the linkage of nationality and citizenship does not need to be 
“ indispensable, inevitable or necessary.”319 On the contrary, we have seen that the 
bundling of the rather diverse elements in the single institution of citizenship came 
about as a result of specific historical processes. In this Section, I argue that 
contemporary developments indicate, in some respects a gradual weakening of the 
linkage between nationality and citizenship, if not with regard to citizenship as a formal 
status, than at least with regard to citizenship as a normative project. According to 
Saskia Sassen, the tension between citizenship as a formal status or as an increasingly 
comprehensive social membership, have been fuelled by “globalisation and human 
rights, therewith furthering the elements o f a new discourse on rights.”320
Thus, not only the increased prominence o f the international human rights 
regime features in Sassen’s analysis o f how globalisation destabilizes the particular 
bundling of diverse elements in the institution of citizenship, and how it "brings to the
317 Preufl (1996), p. 128.
3.8 Sassen (2004), p. 194.
3.9 DelfOlio (2005). p. 13.
320 Sassen (2004), p. 198.
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fore the fact itself of that bundling and its particularity."321 In addition to international 
human rights, Sassen accords a crucial role to various forms o f globalisation, such as 
economic deregulation and the subsequent prominence o f  the markets. Important as 
these developments are, I will not address them when examining the changing 
connotations o f  social membership. The scope of this study allows only for 
investigation o f  the influence o f human rights norms on the discourse o f rights within 
the nation state.
Moreover, I take the opportunity to point out that in this Section, I will not 
investigate the way in which international human rights norms involve a right o f non­
citizens to be present on the territory o f  the state. Although an important aspect when 
examining how international human rights norms limit state sovereignty and how they 
have the capacity to transform citizenship as a normative project, questions with regard 
to the right to  cross national boundaries and the right to remain in the national state’s 
territory will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Under the influence of human rights norms, formal membership in the 
territorially exclusive nation-state ceases to be the only ground for entitlement to rights. 
Although, as we will see in later in this study, international law is largely silent with 
regard to the national state’s discretion to admit or refuse aliens, once these aliens are 
present within the territory of the national state, international human rights norms 
impose important obligations upon the state with regard to non-citizens. As 
governments are obliged to guarantee some fundamental rights irrespective of 
nationality, rights based on universal personhood have broken the state’s monopoly on 
granting membership rights.322
At this point, it is important to reiterate the blurring which human rights law has 
caused between national and international law. The international human rights regime 
operates partially within the nation state, as adherence to the rule of law within the 
nation state, as discussed in Section 3.2., ensures that international human rights norms 
are grounded in national institutions and practices. As a result, these norms have 
changed the domestic constitutional order by their implication that an individual is 
protected by the law as an individual, and no longer because of formal citizenship 
status. In addition, most o f the enforcement of human rights norms takes place within
3:1 Sassen (2004), p. 191.
322 Murphy and Harty (2003), p. 181.
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the nation state, with domestic courts playing an especially important role.323 These 
courts have become obliged to extend basic legal protection to anyone falling under the 
state’s jurisdiction.324 Consequently, any tension between sovereignty as absolute power 
and international human rights should not be perceived as a conflict between a clear-cut 
inside and the outside, but this tension may surface purely within the national state.
In the case of rights protection for non-citizens, the tension between 
international human rights and sovereignty acquires an additional dimension, as human 
rights interests in that case do not compete merely with states’ jurisdictional 
independence, but with another central element of sovereignty that I have addressed in 
the previous Chapter: the right to determine who belongs to the community.326
Under the influence of human rights norms, a blurring has occurred between the 
position of nationals and long-term or legal residents within the nation state. I will not 
deal with the question whether this gradual increase in rights for aliens is the result o f 
international developments,327 or rather due to the “liberalness of liberal states” and the 
way domestic courts in these states have been guaranteeing rights for aliens over the 
past year, as Christian Joppke argues.328 As already said, the human rights discourse 
operates both within and without the nation state, which is one of its defining 
characteristics. The fact that extension of rights to non-citizens has taken place mostly 
in Western states under the rule of law through domestic judiciaries, does not 
necessarily diminish the importance of an international dimension to human rights, but 
it could instead underscore the unique quality of these norms when compared to other 
forms of (international) law.
Human rights norms have secured civil and a certain amount of political as well 
as social rights for non-citizens, who as a result become part of the community of the 
state. Even if  these non-citizens do not acquire citizenship as a formal status, their 
position in the nation state is anchored in an explicit discourse on rights and belonging, 
which has been called post-national citizenship.329
323 See Aceves (2002), p. 277; Martin (1989). p. 564: and Sasscn (1999). p. 181.
324 See McDougal, Lasswell. and Chen (1976), pp. 461-463.
325 Sassen(1996). p. 61.
326 Bosniak (2004). p. 329.
327 See for example the HRC in Gueye et ai v. France. 3 April 1989.
328 Joppke (1998). see in particular pp. 292-293.
329 Soysal (1994). See also Jacobson (2001) and (1996). who instead talks about the decline of citizenship.
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However, with regard to discourses on post-national citizenship, it is important 
to make a distinction between the various categories of fundamental rights, as not the 
full range o f political and economic rights forms part of the post-national citizenship 
package. Furthermore, with regard to non-citizens’ status in the nation state, lawful 
residents should be distinguished from persons who do not have the authorisation of the 
state to be present on its territory. Accordingly, even m ore so than with regard to 
national citizenship, the content of post-national citizenship is impossible to define, as it 
is a scale on which diverse factors determine the extent o f  rights and the degree of 
belonging for each individual.
International human rights instruments oblige the state to respect classical 
individual rights, such as the right to life, liberty, physical integrity, freedom o f thought, 
conscience and religion, etc, to anyone under their jurisdiction, without regard to 
nationality. Thus, anyone present on the territory o f  the state -  citizen, legal resident and 
illegal immigrant alike -  is entitled to the enjoyment o f  fundamental civil rights. 
Especially in the case of undocumented migrants, international norms, such as laid 
down in instruments such as the ECHR and the ICCPR are frequently invoked, as those 
people have no formalised status within the state to rely on.
However, with regard to their entitlement to rights, important differences exist 
between documented and undocumented migrants. The way in which human rights 
norms weakened the link between nationality and social membership is most distinctly 
illustrated in the case of legal, long-term residents. In addition to civil rights, most 
European states grant long-term legal residents many social rights on an almost equal 
footing with their own citizens. The gradual expansion o f  social rights to this class of 
non-citizens is emphasised by Sassen, who argues that concerning social services, 
citizenship status is of minor significance in Europe: “W hat matters is residence and 
legal alien status.”330 In contrast, the status of illegal immigrants within the nation state, 
although not devoid of access to rights, can hardly be described as approaching 
something like citizenship status.
With regard to political rights, the distance between post-national citizenship of 
legal residents and national citizenship remains greatest. Notwithstanding the fact that 
in many European countries, long-term residents have the right to vote in municipal 
elections, foreigners, when they do not naturalise, are by far not accorded the full range
330 Sassen (1996), p. 95.
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of political rights within the national state. A clear example o f the universality of civil 
rights versus the enduring particularity of political rights is provided by the ECHR. 
Most rights which this Convention guarantees are civil rights thus to be secured to 
anyone under the jurisdiction of one o f the Contracting Parties, as is required by Article 
1 ECHR. However, with regard to Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, respectively securing 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association -  freedoms that consist 
o f the exercise of political rights -  Article 16 ECHR expressly stipulates that nothing in 
these provisions shall be regarded as preventing the Contracting Parties from imposing 
restrictions on the political activity of aliens. The fact that political rights are only to a 
very limited extent included in the post-national citizenship package is due to the direct 
link of such rights with the concept of popular sovereignty, and as such with a 
resounding particularistic connotation of the concept of the people.
With specific regard to post-national citizenship, it is once again important to 
stress the importance of the existence o f the rule of law domestically, in order for 
human rights norms to reach their full potential and as such to transform the traditional 
domestic legal order. I have remarked already several times upon the fundamental role 
which domestic courts play with regard to the enforcement of such norms. The judiciary 
in a state based upon the rule of law is able to mediate between the international and the 
domestic legal order. Sassen contends that, as domestic courts have to accept the 
existence of undocumented migrants making rights-based claims, a new social contract 
comes into being between these aliens and society at large.331
The same holds true, even more so, for immigrants that have acquired legal 
residence status. Such a new form of social contract may partly make up for the lack o f 
political rights for non-nationals. David Jacobson and Galya Ruffer claim replacement 
o f the traditional democratic route o f voting, civic participation and political 
mobilization, by the concept of judicial agency: “Through this new mode o f political 
engagement, litigants challenge legislative and executive authority as they cross 
organizational and even national boundaries.”332 In line with Sassen’s argument, they 
contend that judicial agency, which term designates individual access to a dense web o f 
judicially mediated rights and restraints, changes the connotations of the traditional
331 Sassen (1996). p. 96.
33: Jacobson and Ruffer (2003). p. 74. See also Stacy (2003), p. 2050. who argues that the human rights 
regime causes political requests to be framed in the language of rights.
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social contract, for also outsiders can avail themselves o f  such access, and as such 
become part o f  the organised political community. Exclusive measures taken by the 
executive are challenged at the level o f the nation state, where the judiciary assesses 
their legality in light of international human rights obligations of the state. Conflicting 
forces between the judiciary and the executive lead to  a “shift o f power towards formal 
commitment to human rights”, which thwarts executive but also legislative attempts 
to exclude non-nationals from the enjoyment of rights which were originally retained 
for nationals.
Any account of post-national citizenship is incomplete when it ignores 
citizenship o f the European Union, the only formal constitutional! sation of post-national 
citizenship. The Treaty on the European Union, which was agreed upon and signed by 
the Member States in Maastricht in 1992, introduces the concept of citizenship of the 
European Union. Article 17 EC Treaty provides that every person holding the 
nationality o f a Member State shall be a citizen o f  the Union, which citizenship shall 
complement and not replace national citizenship.
The most important right which European citizenship enshrines is the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory o f all Member States (Article 18 EC Treaty), 
but it should be emphasised that the right to reside in another Member State for a period 
exceeding three months is granted only to certain classes o f  Union citizens.334 Citizens 
of the Union who reside lawfully in the territory o f another Member State have the right 
to equal treatment within the material scope of community law, giving them in effect 
much the same social and economic rights as nationals o f  that Member State. Freedom 
of movement and the prohibition o f  discrimination on the grounds o f nationality in 
Article 12 EC Treaty were codified long before the notion o f Union citizenship came 
into being. Indeed, as these principles constitute cornerstones of EC law, the concept of
333 Jacobson and Ruffer (2003), p. 79.
334 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of April 29, 2004, (to be 
implemented by April 30, 2006), on the right of the citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of tire Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 
1612/68 and repealing directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC. 73/148/EEC, 74/34/EEC 
75/35/EEC. 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC, and 93/96/EEC, [2004J, O.J. L I58/77, grants a right of residence 
for a period longer than three months to Union citizens who are workers or self-employed, who have 
sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host state, students and 
family members of these citizens. See Lenaerts. Van Nuffel and Bray (2005), p. 548.
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citizenship of the Union formalised already existing community law in the field o f 
socio-economic rights. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the approach which the ECJ 
has taken to the concept of citizenship has the effect of significantly extending access to 
fundamental rights for EU citizens, sometimes even contrary to secondary Community 
legislation.335
Furthermore, citizenship o f the Union entails more than the right to move and a 
prohibition on discrimination on the ground of nationality. Every citizen of the Union 
has the right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman336 In 
addition, in the territory of a non-Member State in which their Member State is not 
represented, Union citizens are entitled to protection by the diplomatic authorities o f 
any Member State, on the same conditions as nationals of that State.337 Moreover, every 
citizen of the Union has the right to vote and stand as candidate for municipal and 
European Parliament elections o f the Member State in which he or she resides.338 
Although to a limited extent, Union citizenship is thus complemented with political 
rights.
The impact o f  Community law in this respect extends outside the Community 
legal framework into other areas of international law, which more specifically aim at the 
protection o f human rights proper. In Piermoni v. France, France relied on the 
aforementioned Article 16 ECHR to restrict the freedom of expression of a German 
national who was present in French Polynesia 339 Contending that neither European 
citizenship, nor the status of Ms Piermont as a member of the European Parliament was 
relevant, France argued before the ECtHR that Ms Piermont came within the scope o f 
Article 16 ECHR, as anyone did who was not a national of the country in which he 
intended to exercise the freedoms of Article 10 and 11 ECHR. However, according to 
the Court in Strasbourg, although not taking into account the concept of European 
citizenship as the Community Treaties did at the material time not recognise any such
335 See Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide social d ’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 20 
September 2001; Case C-209/03. Bidar v. London Borough o f  Ealing, 15 March 2005; and Case C- 
456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public D ’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles, 7 September 2004.
336 Article 21 ECT.
337 Article 20 ECT.
338 Article 19 ECT.
339 ECtHR. Piermont v. France. 27 April 1995.
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citizenship, EU Member States were precluded to raise Article 16 against anyone in 
possession of the nationality o f  one o f  the Member States.340
Nonetheless, Union citizenship is traditional in the sense that it maintains a 
strong link between the very concept o f nationality and rights. Only individuals who 
possess the nationality of one of the Member States are endowed with Union 
citizenship. Long term residents that do not possess the nationality o f one o f the 
Member States -  those that according to Yasemin Soysal benefit from access to rights 
on the ground o f post-national citizenship -  do not benefit from the right o f free 
movement and other Union citizenship rights, save the right to petition the Parliament 
and the Ombudsman. So although discrimination on grounds of nationality becomes 
increasingly prohibited with regard to persons that posses the nationality of one of the 
Member States, such discrimination is permitted with regard to the large numbers of 
non-European citizens present on the same territory.341 Council Directive 
2003/109/EC342 attempts to improve the status of third country nationals, but essential 
differences remain. Even if  voices are heard to base Union citizenship on residence 
status,343 in light of individual Member States’ reluctance this will probably not happen 
in the near future.
If EU membership were to be truly post-national, the link between territory, 
nationality and rights would have to be disconnected more radically. From the outside -  
in the eyes o f  individuals who do not possess the nationality of one o f the Member 
States -  with the establishment of Union citizenship, the EU as a whole acquired the 
characteristics o f the traditional territorial state. Indeed, Union citizenship even 
enhanced national citizenship,344 as could be confirmed by those outsiders who are 
subject of expulsions organised by EU  joint charter flights. Rainer Baubock contends 
that taking Union citizenship seriously entails that such citizenship should be accessible
340 Ibid. par. 64.
341 Boelaert-Suominen (2005), p. 1015.
342 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long term residents, O.J. L 16 of 23 January 2003, p 44.
343 See for example European Parliament, Working Document on the Fourth Report o f  Citizenship o f  the 
Union (1 May 2001 -  30 April 2004), Committee on Civil Liberties. Justice and Home Affairs, 30 June 
2005; and also the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Recommendation 1714 (2005), 
Abolition des Restrictions au Droit de Vote, text adopted by the Assembly on 24 June 2005.
344 See Dell’Olio (2005).
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under fair conditions to all long-term residents in the Member States. The fact that 
nationality laws of Member States are not harmonised, and in addition are illiberal and 
exclusionary, is “a matter of concern to the Union as a whole as it is through them that 
membership in the Union is regulated.”345 The status o f third-country nationals is de 
facto determined by Member States’ national immigration rules,346 which matter will 
receive closer attention in Chapter 5.
We have seen that the internalisation of international human rights norms within 
the nation state has led to a shading of the distinction between inside and outside. Inside 
and outside can no longer be separated by drawing an unambiguous line between 
nationals and foreigners, but instead the extent of inside and outside can be expressed in 
term s of degrees. Wholly inside are those who posses the nationality o f the nation state, 
entitled to the full range of civil, political and social rights. Wholly outside are those 
that do not find themselves under the jurisdiction of the nation state. Inside, albeit to a 
lesser degree than nationals, are foreigners who are in possession o f a formal residence 
status that secures their entitlement to civil rights, a range of social and economic rights, 
and in some cases a limited amount of political rights. Partially inside and partially 
outside are foreigners who are illegally present on the nation state’s territory: their 
entitlement to rights concerns mainly civil rights.
The erosion o f the link between nationality and citizenship is exemplified by this 
shading of the distinction between inside and outside. Apart from the erosion of this 
once necessary linkage, it should also be noted that under the influence of international 
law, issues related to the concept of nationality itself no longer fall exclusively under 
the national state’s domestic jurisdiction. Although international law still largely allows 
each state to determine whom it regards as its citizens,347 it is possible to discern 
developments at the international plane, indicating that the state no longer enjoys an 
unlimited discretion with regard to all matters relating to nationality. These 
developments relate mostly to the prevention of statelessness and issues of dual 
nationality, and should not be overstated.348 Nonetheless, with regard to these issues, 
international law treats questions of nationality increasingly from a rights-oriented 
perspective. As such, they may signal a departing from international law’s traditional
345 Baubock (2003), p. 6. See also Lange (1995), pp. 109-110.
346 Boelaert-Suominen (2005), p. 1049.
347 Rubenstein (2003). p. 168-169.
348 See for a detailed discussion: Spiro (2003).
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approach to nationality law, which consisted o f a “m atter of human geography 
confronted on the same ternis as territorial geography”, predicated to the maintenance of 
international order instead o f directly accounting for individual interests.349 Kim 
Rubenstein argues along the same lines, suggesting a movement away from the 
centrality of the state in international law  towards a rights-based, individualized focus: 
“as international law becomes more flexible in its use of nationality so too it becomes 
part o f citizenships progressive project.”350
This Section has argued that international law has increasingly taken account of 
the individual interests that are involved in the exercise o f jurisdiction over people by 
the state within its territory. International human rights have factually led to a 
weakening o f the tie between formal citizenship status and individual rights within the 
nation state. In this sense, one can speak o f  what I will call the ‘denationalisation of the 
rule of law1. The next Section will investigate how human rights have affected 
territoriality: what is their impact on the territorial claim of the modem state to 
distinguish inside from outside? Are human rights norms capable of transforming the 
territorial form o f sovereignty in a likewise manner as they have affected its content, so 
as to  be able to  speak of a ‘de-territorialisation of the rule o f law’?
3.5.3 Sovereignty, territory, and individual rights
In the previous Section, we have seen that human rights norms have led to an 
extension of citizenship status, if  not formally, than at least with regard to citizenship as 
a status indicating membership and access to rights in the organised political 
community. However, although this has certainly been beneficial for large groups of 
individuals living in states which are not their own, in this Section I will argue that 
advancing human rights norms have not led to a truly radical new approach to 
citizenship, one that is able to abandon the decisive distinction between universalism 
and particularism. We will see that formal citizenship status remains of fundamental 
importance for a territorial regime o f  governance and access to fundamental rights for 
the individual.
349 Spiro (2003), p. 94-95.
350 Rubenstein (2003). pp. 185-186.
120
" While it may be true that advancing human rights norms increasing!) commit courtncs to 
granting the same civil and social (though not political) rights to those mcrcl> resident in their 
territories as accorded their full citizens, this development docs not ncccssanls signal tie 
"decline of citizenship” for most people. These arguments primarily concern the access to nplits 
only of immigrants, not of the main stock of the populations that constitute and replenish tie 
bodies of citizens that constitute states. Such arguments tend to oserstate lie significance of 
what are, in fac t relatively marginal phenomena. From this point of sicu. it seems quite 
exaggerated to claim that, "in terms of translation into nglus and privileges, [amon.il 
citizenship] is no longer a significant construction."351
We have seen that within the nation state, the status of legal residents and 
undocumented aliens differ in important respects. According to Linda Bosniak, it is the 
state’s claim to territorial sovereignty that accounts for this difference in treatment She 
argues that with regard to undocumented immigrants, the state’s territorial sovereignty 
has been breached, which explains why the state accords these persons far less rights 
than legal residents352
The way in which the modem state perceives and wishes to maintain its 
territorial sovereignty, has a direct link with individual rights, and as such also with its 
capacity to exercise power over people. Nevertheless, the territorial form of sovereignty 
and its actual content as jurisdictional claims over people within a certain territory arc 
often perceived as separate from each other because the former has acquired an image 
o f  neutrality and self-evidence. Whereas we have seen that international law has 
increasingly conceded that the content of sovereignty implicates individual interests, 
acknowledgement o f the fact that the territorial form of sovereignty involves individual 
interests as well is rare.
In this Section, my first argument will be that territoriality exerts a limiting 
influence on the universality of human rights. To make this point, I will first confirm the 
importance of territoriality in this respect by examining the territorial scope of human 
rights obligations of national states and the way in which access to rights is factually 
guaranteed to the individual in Section 3.5.3.1. Secondly, I will contend that human 
rights norms have made very few inroads whenever the states bases its claims on its 
territorial sovereignty in Section 3.5.3., which investigates the way in which 
fundamental rights limit the state’s spatial powers or its assertions of territorial
351 Torpey (2000). p. 156.
352 See for a detailed discussion Bosniak (1991), pp. 753-756.
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sovereignty. I will conclude that international law regards the notion of territoriality and 
sovereignty’s territorial frame essential to the preservation o f  a particular international 
order. The result is that the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s form 
are still only marginally accounted for, a proposition that will be investigated further in 
Chapters 4 and 5.
3.5.3.1. Territorial scope o f human rights protection: Duties beyond borders?
“The concept of universal human rights is antithetical to the [...] geographic distinctions that 
cause the protection of humanitarian law and the Constitution to be variable and 
unpredictable.”353
Most human rights instruments provide that the state is to ensure individual 
rights protection to anyone under its jurisdiction.354 Thus, in any case, actions o f  states 
within their national territory may not violate any fundamental rights. With regard to 
actions of states outside national territory, the situation is more complex. Concerning 
European states’ human rights obligations, the admissibility decision of the ECtHR in
' i c e
Bankovic has led to ambiguity with regard to how the notion o f jurisdiction in Article 
2 ECHR is to be interpreted and the Court’s approach to this issue has been criticised as 
fundamentally flawed 356 Before considering the implications of Bankovic and other 
recent case law, I will discuss the approach that the Strasbourg organs have traditionally 
taken towards extra-territorial application of the Convention, as well as the way in 
which other international human rights bodies have dealt with the question o f extra­
territoriality.
Taking into account the object and purpose of human rights obligations of 
national states, there is no a  priori reason why they should not be held responsible for 
those violations attributable to them that occurred outside national territory.357 Both the 
European Commission for Human Rights and the ECtHR have repeatedly held that in
353 Fitzpatrick (2002), p. 334.
354 Article 1 ECHR, Article 1 American Convention on Human Rights. Article 2 ICCPR.
355 ECtHR, Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others (inadmissible), 12 December 2001.
356 Altiparmak (2004); Mantouvalou (2004); Rüthand Trilsch (2003); and Happold (2003).
357 Meron (1989), p. 78.
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certain instances the national state can be held responsible for actions of its authorities 
outside its national territory, as the term jurisdiction is not limited to the national 
territory of the contracting states.358 According to the Commission, “it is clear from the 
language [...] and the object of [Article 1] and the purpose of the Convention as a 
whole, that High Contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to 
all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is 
exercised within their own territory or abroad.”359
Apart from the situation in which it has occupied foreign territory,360 a state can 
be held responsible for violations of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who 
were in the territory o f another state, but who were “found to be under the former state’s 
authority and control through its agents operating -  whether lawfully or unlawfully -  in 
the latter state.”361 Before the Bankovic Case, the case law of both the Strasbourg 
Commission and the Court show that in order to engage a state’s liability under the 
ECHR, overall exercise of jurisdiction is not always required and even a specific act 
committed abroad is capable of bringing a person within the jurisdiction of the state to 
which that act can be attributed.362
“[...] nationals of a State are partly within its jurisdiction wherever they may be, and authorised 
agents of a State not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad, but bring any other person 
"within the jurisdiction" of that State to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons.
358 ECtHR, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 26 June 1992. EcommHR, Hess. v. United 
Kingdom, Decision of 28 May 1975. In particular, actions by a state’s consular and diplomatic 
representatives may involve tlie liability of a national state under the ECHR. See EcommHR. A', v. 
Germany, Decision of 25 September 1965; and Lush (1993), p. 898. In Drozd and Janousek, the Court 
accepted that France had limited its jurisdiction ratione loci by a declaration under Article 63, but it 
concluded that it exercised jurisdiction ratione personae. Lush (1993) concludes that the Convention thus 
seems to be "hybrid, not without a measure o f  internal consistency.”
359 EcommHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Decision of 26 May 1975 and EcommHR. X. and Y. v. Switzerland, 
Decision of 14 July 1977.
360 And exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. See ECtHR. Loizidou v. 
Turkey, (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, par. 62 and 18 December 1996 (merits), par 52.
361 EcommHR, Af v. Denmark, decision of 14 October 1992; and lllich Sanchez Ramirez v. France. 
decision of 24 June 1994, p. 155.
362 EcommHR, ii*. v\ Ireland. Decision of 28 February 1983, par. 17. Altiparmak (2004), pp. 233-244.
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Insofar as the State's acts or omissions affect such persons, the responsibility of that State is 
engaged.”363
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Committee take a similar approach in order to establish extra-territorial responsibility 
for human rights violations.364 According to  these bodies, the meaning of the term 
jurisdiction is not to be equated with territorial competence, but it should also cover 
extra-territorial acts by the state or its agents that violate the fundamental rights 
protected by respectively the IACHR and the ICCPR outside national territory.365
This broad interpretation of the term jurisdiction, taking as a starting point the 
“relationship between the person affected and the state concerned, not [...] the 
geographical location of the violation”366 may perhaps not reflect the ordinary meaning 
of jurisdiction in international law, but it is consistent with the object and purpose of 
international human rights documents. When the term jurisdiction is used in 
international law to discuss the relationship between states amongst each other, it is 
clear that its scope is limited by the sovereign (territorial) rights of other states. The 
concept of jurisdiction in human rights documents in contrast should be understood as 
having a direct relationship with the rules concerning state responsibility in international 
law, which determine that responsibility derives from control.367 This line o f reasoning 
is confirmed by the Commission’s observations in Stocké:
“An arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, without the prior 
consent of the State concerned, does not [...] only involve State responsibility vis-à-vis tire other 
State, but [it] also affects that person’s individual right to security under Article 5(1) . The 
question whether or not the other State claims reparation for violation of its rights under 
international law is not relevant for the individual right under the Convention”
363 EcommHR, Stocké v. Germany, Report o f  12 October 1989, par. 166-167. See also EcommHR, 
Chrysostomides and others v. Turkey, Decision o f 4 March 2003.
364 Inter-Ainerican Commission of Human Rights, Coard et al. v. The United States, decision of 29 
September 1999, par. 37, 39, 41; HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, par. 12.3 and HRC, 
Ceíiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, par. 10.3.
365 Lush (1993).
366 Altiparmak (2004), p. 239.
36' Lawson and Schermers (1999). p. 603. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, International 
Law Commission (2001).
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Thus, although a state’s jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial, 
responsibility for violations of fundamental rights is not restricted to national territory. 
Case law o f the Strasbourg organs, the IACHR and the HRC make clear that 
responsibility ratione personae for extra-territorial acts, although it may not be as 
straightforward to establish as responsibility ratione loci, is not exceptional.368 This 
approach is in fact required by the idea of the modem rule o f law, which wishes to 
overcome the particular, territorially defined, universalism of traditional constitutional 
discourses. In the words of the IACHR, “no person under the authority and control o f a 
state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid o f legal protection for his or her 
fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”369
However, in Bankovic, the ECtHR seemed to depart from some of the principles 
that were deemed established jurisprudence by both the Commission and the Court. The 
application originated in the 1999 NATO bombing o f Radio Televizije Srbije in 
Belgrade and was lodged by one individual who had been injured by the bombing and 
five surviving relatives of those killed by it. They alleged that by bombing the Serbian 
Television Station, the respondent States had violated Articles 2, 10 and 13 of the 
Convention. The Court declared their application inadmissible as it was not satisfied 
that the applicants and their deceased relatives were within the jurisdiction of the 
respondent states on account of the extra-territorial act in question.370 Although it has 
been argued that the Court’s conclusion can be supported on the ground that the NATO 
did not at any moment assert authority or exercise control over the individuals,371 the 
decision of the Court was framed in much wider terms that certainly signalled a 
departure from the stance that the Strasbourg bodies have previously taken towards the 
question of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
In the first place, the Court referred to the 1969 Vienna Convention in order to 
ascertain the “ordinary meaning” of the term jurisdiction. It went on to state that, from
368 In addition to the cases quoted above see also IACHR, Salas v. The United States, 14 October 1993 
and; the Haitian Centre fo r  Human Rights et. At. v. United States, decision of 13 March 1997.
369 IACHR. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Request for Precautionary Measures, March 13.2002.
370 Bankovic v. Belgium (inadmissible), 12 December 2001, par. 82.
371 Happold (2003), p. 90 who calls it tlx: right decision for the wrong reasons. The right decision as there 
was no structured relationship between the NATO and the \ictims of the bombing, who were rather 
unfortunate enough to be in a building targeted by NATO forces.
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the standpoint o f  international law, the jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily 
territorial. If extra-territorial jurisdiction is exercised, the suggested bases o f such 
jurisdiction are, according to the Court, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights of other states.372 It concluded that “Article 1 of the Convention must be 
considered to reflect this ordinary and essential territorial notion of the term jurisdiction, 
other bases o f jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the 
particular circumstances o f each case.”373
In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to its previous case law, which 
“demonstrates that the recognition o f the exercise o f extra-territorial jurisdiction is 
exceptional: [the Court] has done so when the respondent state, through the effective 
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government o f that 
territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally ascribed to that 
government.374 It is unfortunate that the Court did not refer to decisions o f the 
ECommHR, such as the above cited Stocké Case, where the question as to whether the 
extra-territorial act occurred with or without the consent of the state on whose territory 
it took place w as deemed irrelevant for the interpretation of Article 1.
The Court’s adherence to the ordinary meaning in international law of the term 
jurisdiction in Bankovic375 is problematic for a number of reasons, such as involving a 
danger “to embroil the Court in disputes as to whether a state has acted lawfully or 
unlawfully” 376 More fundamentally, it adheres to an understanding o f the territorial 
frame o f sovereignty that thwarts international human rights law’s underlying 
principles. That it is no longer the sovereignty of the violating state that constitutes a 
barrier to claim rights that are supposed to be inalienable, but instead the sovereignty of 
the state on whose territory the violation took place, does not matter much from the 
viewpoint of those whose rights are violated.
In the second place, the Court’s interpretation o f previous cases that were 
decided or pending is problematic. It stated that in the admissibility decisions in the
3 " Bankovic v. Belgium, 12 December 2001, par. 60.
3 3 Ibid. par. 61.
374 Ibid. par. 71.
375 Its approach was repeated in Gentilhomme and Others v. France, 14 May 2002, §20.
376 Happold (2003), p. 83.
126
cases o f Issa,377 Ocalan,378 and Xhavara,379 the Respondent States did not raise the 
jurisdiction issue.380 Apart from the fact that the absence of claims by the parties 
concerning admissibility has not impeded the Court from addressing the issue of 
admissibility, the circumstance that the respondent states refrained from raising 
admissibility objections that were related to the jurisdiction issue at least indicates state 
practice that does not adhere to the ordinary meaning of the term jurisdiction.
But it is the Court’s referral to its judgment in the Cyprus v. Turkey Casem  that 
is perhaps most unsettling. Its observation in the latter case that there was a need to 
avoid “a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection” in Northern 
Cyprus was to be read in the territorial context of that case:
“ [...] the inhabitants of Cyprus would have found themselves excluded from tlx: benefits of the 
Convention safeguards and system which they had previously enjoyed, by Turkey’s effective 
control of the territory and by the accompanying inability of the Cypriot government, as a 
contracting state, to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken under the Convention.**w:
It went on to state that the desirability of avoiding a vacuum in human rights 
protection has so far be relied on the Court in order to establish jurisdiction solely with 
regard to territories that would normally be covered by the Convention. Accordingly, 
the Court excluded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the legal space in which 
contracting states have to ensure respect for the Convention, even in respect of their 
own conduct. This analysis has been criticised as turning an argument that was 
originally intended to expand the court’s jurisdiction into one that limits extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.383
377 ECtHR, lssa and others v. Turkey (Admissible), 30 March 2000.
378 Ocalan v. Turkey (Partly admissible). 14 December 2000.
379 Xha\’ara and others v. Italy and Albania* 11 January 2001.
380 Bankovic v. Belgium, 12 December 2001, par. 81. It also mentioned the admissibility decision in tire 
case of Ilascu. In the latter case, the Court stated that responsibility under tire Convention may also arise 
when a state exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory as a consequence of 
military' action. However, tire Court did not draw any conclusion on tire jurisdiction issue as it found it too 
closely bound up with the merits of the case that it would be inappropriate to determine them at tire 
admissibility stage. See Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (admissible). 4 June 2(X)I.
381 Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001.
382 Bankovic v. Belgium. 12 December 2001, par. 80.
383 Ruth and Trilsch (2003), p. 172.
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In fact, the Court’s approach in Bankovic illustrates that it is at times decisively 
and unnecessarily influenced by territoriality and the resultant (territorial) division of 
humanity as falling under the responsibility o f one particular state, even though this 
construction may obstruct the important principle of effective protection o f the 
Convention Rights and Freedoms, so often invoked by the Strasbourg Court itself.384
When deciding on the merits o f  the Issa Case,3*5 the Court seemed to mitigate 
its restrictive interpretation of the term jurisdiction again. This time it did refer to some 
of the cases decided by the HRC and former decisions o f the ECommHR, and it 
declared that a state may be held accountable for violation o f Convention rights of 
persons “who are in the territory of another state but who are found to be under the 
authority and control o f the former state through its agents operating -  whether lawfully 
or unlawfully -  in the latter state.”386 However, the Court concluded that the applicants 
came not within the jurisdiction of Turkey as they could not prove that the Turkish 
armed forces had conducted operations in the area were the alleged violations took 
place387
Also in its judgment on the merits in the Ocalart case, the Court referred to the 
ECommHR decision in Stocké,388 According to the Court, the ûcalan case was to be 
distinguished from Bankovic as the “applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey 
by Turkish officials and was subject to  their authority and control following his arrest 
and return to Turkey.”389 When it decided on the merits in the llascu Case, the Court 
again stressed the ordinary meaning o f  the term jurisdiction in public international law 
and referred to Bankovic to stress the prevalence of the territorial principle in the
384 See for example ECtHR in Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, par. 72.
385 Issa and others v. Turkey, 16 November 2004. Worth noting that the Turkish Government submitted 
post-admissibility observations contending that in Bankovic the Court had departed from its previous case 
law on the scope o f interpretation o f Article I. Sec par. 52 of the judgment
386 Ibid. par. 71.
387 Ibid. par. 81.
388 Ocalan v. Turkey, 12 March 2003, par. 88.
389 Ibid. par. 93. See also ECtHR, Hussein w Albania and others (Inadmissible), March 2006, where the 
Court decided that the arrest of Saddam Hussein in Iraq did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
respondent European States as he had not substantiated any evidence of a jurisdictional link between 
himself and those States.
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application of the Convention. However, it added that the concept of “jurisdiction1 is 
not necessarily restricted to the national territory of the contracting states.390
Thus, we may conclude that if a state acts extra-territorially, in certain cases, 
w hether they are deemed exceptional or not, it is theoretically bound by its international 
human rights obligations. Everyday reality, however, poses limits to extra-territorial 
responsibility that are perhaps even more difficult to overcome than those formulated in 
a court of law. We will see in Chapter 5 that especially in the field of immigration 
policy, European countries resort to a range of extra-territorial measures to prevent 
immigrants reaching their territory, actions that may result in breaches of fundamental 
rights. In practice, these measures are seldom challenged judicially, not least because 
persons affected by them are not likely to be able to bring their cases to court, an 
observation that brings us to a further issue to be investigated in order to understand 
territoriality’s influence on the modem version of the rule of law.
Apart from looking at the territorial scope of human rights obligations as laid 
down in various instruments, one needs to investigate the way in which access to those 
rights is factually guaranteed in order to comprehend the importance of sovereignty’s 
territorial frame for the notion' of individual rights. This leads back to Torpcy’s 
scepticism concerning the decline of citizenship in a world where territory is exclusively 
divided amongst nation states. Indeed, we need to investigate citizenship once more, but 
now  in terms of a global system of governance, to become aware of the fundamental 
role which space as a political construct plays in determining access to rights.
Human rights and their realisation depend on the state system, a global structure 
in which governance is still largely undertaken on a territorial basis.391 Celebrations o f 
post-national citizenship overlook the territorial aspect of the global political system, 
and thus fail to appreciate the importance of territory in the practice of fundamental 
rights protection.392 As such, accounts of post-national citizenship, just as traditional 
accounts of citizenship, take an internalist perspective. Citizenship is investigated as a 
process taking place within the nation state as a closed container, territorially defined.
390 Ilascu and others. 8 July 2004. par. 310-314.
391 Henkin (1999), p. 7; and Shafir (2004). p. 23.
392 See Murphy and Harty (2003). who make the same argument with regard to what they call models of 
post-sovereign citizenship and self-determination of sub-state nations.
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“The state under the rule o f law is one of the key institutional arenas for the 
implementation o f  human rights o f all individuals regardless o f nationality.”393
From a wholly internalist perspective, it makes sense to claim that nationality is 
no longer determining the status of an individual. In other words, nationality is no 
longer decisive for the extent of access to rights, but only as long as an individual is 
present within the territory o f the nation state. However, from a global perspective, 
taking into account the numerous individuals living in states not governed by the rule of 
law, nationality, citizenship and fundamental rights are still firmly linked. In practice, 
rights are “territorially limited at the level o f the nation state”394
The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) states that 
fundamental rights are to be guaranteed, not only without distinction to the personal 
characteristics o f an individual, but in addition without distinction on the basis o f the 
political, jurisdictional or international status o f the country or territory to which a 
person belongs. However, the concept o f territoriality, continuously confirmed and 
reinforced by international law,395 leads to a different reality. We saw that the ECtHR 
has stated unambiguously that Article 1 ECHR sets limits on the reach of the 
Convention 396 Even apart from the question of responsibility for extra-territorial acts, 
these limits in general can only be explained in a system that divides responsibly and 
population on the basis o f territory, and they constitute the very limits on the 
universality o f  human rights generally. As long as political community is based on 
space; in other words, when the “territorial compartmentalisation of the globe remains 
based on the existing pattern o f sovereign states,”397 true universality of human rights 
remains mere theory. In this context, Gershon Shaftr argues that human rights can only 
be really effective if  they are transformed in membership in a global community, which 
has its own distributive and enforcing institutions 398
It goes beyond this study to design feasible instances o f citizenship that are not 
dependent on territorially demarcated units such as the nation state, the enforcement
393 Sassen (1999), p. 194 i
394 Chandler (2003), p 332. j
395 McConquodale (2004), p. 480. ƒ
396 Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995, par. 62. /
39' Newman (2001). p. 138. j
398 Shafir (2004), p. 24. See also Eriksen (2003), pp.369-370. ;
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capacity of which is presently so important for the realisation of human rights.399 What I 
have attempted to do in this Section is show how territoriality impedes the realisation of 
the universal aspirations of the human rights discourse.
Even though within the territory of the nation state, citizenship as a normative 
project and nationality become increasingly decoupled, I have argued that outside its 
territory, the two remain doctrinally linked. Although, as Sassen asserts, the ascendance 
o f  human rights may strengthen the tendency to move away from nationality as an 
absolute category, the territorial borders of the nation state at the same time determine 
the exact limits of this tendency. Hence, I disagree with her argument that human rights 
equally contribute to a move away from national territory.400 Similarly, I contest the 
claim made by Yasemin Soysal, who argues that, as national belonging per se is no 
longer the basis for rights, we witness the emergence of a new “model of membership, 
anchored in deterritorialized notions of person’s rights.”401
On the contrary, it may well be that a reassertion of territorial sovereignty is the 
modem  state’s answer to the growing significance of individual rights protection -  
irrespective of nationality -  within its territory. In a system where presence on territory 
is decisive for the extent of rights to be enjoyed, states may actually benefit from 
keeping people out of their territories. Whether there are limits to such assertions of 
territorial sovereignty will be investigated below.
3.5.3.2. Limits to the state's spatial powers
Dora Kostakopoulou and Robert Thomas argue that the British asylum regime 
cannot be understood without reference to a specific understanding of territoriality, 
which is modelled upon private ownership law.402 According to these authors, the idea 
o f territoriality is conducive to the formation of what they call a geo-authoritarian 
culture, which culture does not only impede the recognition of duties beyond borders, as 
w e have seen above, but also increases the spatial powers of governments 403 Asylum 
and matters relating to freedom of movement more generally will be addressed in the
399 See Lipschutz (2004), pp. 45; and Sliafir (2004). p. 24
400 Sassen (1999), p. 185.
401 Soysal (1994), p. 3.
4u: Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004), p. 7.
403 Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004). p. 7.
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next two Chapters, but here I will sketch the context in which the state is able to make 
use of its spatial powers when dealing with these issues.
First, it has become clear in the Sections o f this Chapter dealing with citizenship, 
be it national or post-national, that territory is the means through which governments 
compartmentalise and control populations.404 Furthermore, we have seen in the Section 
on international law that inviolability o f  national territory is one o f the key principles of 
international law. In international law, sovereignty stands for ownership of territory, and 
international law functions as a distributive mechanism for determining which state can 
exercise sovereignty over a certain territory 405 International law organises power and 
authority into territorially defined sovereign units, and inviolability of national territory 
and the maintenance o f the territorial status quo are its elemental principles. In this 
particular context, David Luban discusses what he calls Nuremberg’s “equivocal and 
immoral legacy” . He argues that, although the veil of sovereignty was pierced by 
criminalizing certain acts which are carried out by the state against its own population, 
the criminalization o f aggression in the Trials amounted to erecting a wall around state 
sovereignty, resulting in the old-European model of unbreachable nation states 406
It follows that that international law makes a difference between the 
sovereignty’s territorial form and the exercise of its jurisdiction within this territorial 
framework. Although the state is no longer permitted to employ the latter in whatever 
way it pleases, the maintenance of the integrity of its territorial boundaries remains its 
exclusive prerogative. It seems that human rights norms have transformed international 
law, but only with regard to the sovereign state’s jurisdictional claims over persons 
within a given territory. Regarding territorial sovereignty, international law is still the 
law for and by sovereign states alone,407 and its main aim is to  serve the narrow interests 
of the stability o f international order and those of already existing states.408
404 Newman (2001), p. 144.
405 McCorquodale (2001), p. 142
406 Luban (1994), p. 336,
407 It may be countered that humanitarian considerations in contemporary international law sometimes 
justify violations o f national territory. In the case where a purely internal situation is deemed a threat 
against the peace, international law may authorise a breach of territorial sovereignty. However, although 
such interventions clearly violate territorial sovereignty', their justification lies in the state's abuse of 
jurisdiction over people in a given body politic, not in the use of its spatial powers. In addition, and 
perhaps more significantly, the example of humanitarian interventions proves that human rights norms 
play an important role in maintaining the system of sovereign states based on territoriality: if the modem
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Perhaps the prohibition on the use of force can hardly be used as an example to 
demonstrate that the state’s spatial power -  its territorial sovereignty -  is not limited by 
international law. However, as we have seen in Section 3.4.3., the notion of war, 
legitimate violence, and territorial boundaries are intertwined. They mutually influence 
each other in a discourse that attempts to reduce every trans-national problem to a 
territorial solution. And, as Mary Kaldor writes, “the stylised notion of war [...] as a 
construction o f the centralised, ‘rationalised’, hierarchically ordered, territorialized 
modem state, [...] dominates, even today, the way policy makers conceive of
»409security.
Accordingly, the nearly absolute value of territorial integrity extends far beyond 
the language of armed force between national states, while it is at the same time 
decisively shaped by that language. In this respect, international law still regards 
territorial sovereignty through much the same eyes as the United States Supreme Court 
did in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which was decided in 1889:
“to presen e its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is 
tlie highest duly of every' nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations arc to be 
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from 
the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in 
upon us”410
With regard to freedom of movement of persons, Chapters 4 and 5 will more 
specifically explore the relationship between the regulation of the permeability of the 
national border and international law. In Chapter 5 ,1 will examine in closer detail the 
allegation that “human rights norms have seen states yielding jurisdiction, but not 
territory, which remains doctrinally enclosed.”411 There, I will investigate with specific 
regard to individual rights and international movement whether human rights norms
state respects human rights there are no reasons to doubt its territorial claims. Just as in the cases of 
diplomatic protection and the protection of minorities, international law's exceptions seem to prove the 
territorial rule
408 See McCorquodale (2001), p. 138.
409 Kaldor (1999), p. 15.
410 Chae Chan Ping v. United States {Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. (1889) 581» at 606.
411 Panglangan(2001),p. 165.
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have nevertheless contributed towards a development in which account is taken of the 
individual interests that are involved in the territorial form of sovereignty.
In this Section, I have investigated the link that exists between territory and 
rights. I have argued that territoriality impedes the realisation o f human rights’ universal 
aspirations. At the same time, it seems that human rights have not made any significant 
inroads in the state’s assertion o f its territorial sovereignty, a provisional conclusion that 
will be examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to territorial sovereignty, 
international law seems to be still largely the law for and by sovereign states alone. In 
this respect, it seems justified to conclude that human rights have failed to establish a 
constitutional order over and across physical borders.
In addition, it can be argued that human rights norms perhaps even have a 
reifying effect on territoriality, as the progressive development of these norms has 
“formally enshrined modem ideals o f legitimate statehood in the normative fabric of 
international society.”412 When we regard human rights from this perspective, it seems 
that they form an inherent part of the modem discourse o f legitimate statehood, a 
discourse that still seeks to justify territorial particularism on the grounds of ethical 
universalism413
3 .6 . C o n c l u s i o n s : A  p a r t i c u l a r i s t  u n i v e r s a l i s m ?
In this Chapter, I have explored the ways in which, over time, the use of 
violence by the state has been limited by various discourses. We have seen that in the 
general concept o f the rule o f law w e can discern material and formal limits on the 
exercise of political power. The former are constituted by fundamental rights, whereas 
with regard to the latter, the separation o f powers and an independent judiciary deserve 
special attention.
It is important to bear in mind that there exists a difference between the 
legitimacy of the exercise of political power (legality), and the legitimacy o f its 
foundations. The latter question is decided by the concept o f sovereignty as the 
construction o f  a particular legal order; an intrinsically political concept the foundations
412Reus-Smit (2001). p. 531.
413 Reus-Smit (2001), p. 522, with regard to the proliferation o f new sovereign units and decolonisation.
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o f which cannot be cannot be assessed with reference to that same legal order. In 
contrast, the exercise of state power within a constitutional framework can be subjected 
to the requirements o f the rule of law, and can accordingly be judged as to its legality or 
legitimacy. Consequently, at the moment that the rule o f law or the normal 
constitutional guarantees of the modem state do not fully apply, we can observe 
sovereignty’s undisguised claim to distinguish the inside from the outside, a claim that 
is, as we have seen in Chapter 2, based on both territory and identity. The emergence of 
the exposed core o f state power in this sense is likely in the field of migration, 
associated as it is with the “essence o f the nation”414 and the unity of political 
community in contemporary Western states, and which is indeed an area where we 
discern extensive executive discretion and widespread judicial deference, as will be 
shown later in this study.
We have seen that citizenship’s potential for universalism was nipped in the bud 
on account of territorialisation, both by the resulting Westphalian order as a global 
structure (the structural dimension o f citizenship) and by the ensuing internal sovereign 
claims of the territorial state. This led to a construction by which membership in the 
territorially defined state became a necessary condition for access to those rights that 
w ere supposed to be universal: the loss of national rights in practice entailed the loss o f 
human rights. Citizenship’s internal and structural dimensions interact to reinforce the 
ideal of national territorial sovereignty, and it presents the link between rights and 
territorial belonging as natural and necessary.
However, it is not only citizenship’s linkage between rights and identity, which 
shows how territorial boundaries drawn in the past, influence the question of which 
kinds of state violence are prone to correction through the law. Also international law’s 
regulation of state violence is strongly shaped by the way in which territorial 
demarcations were brought about. The result is that in international legal regulation of 
state violence, matters of identity and territorial boundaries are connected to each other 
by the same sovereign logic as which binds together people, territory and authority 
within the nation state. And just as a tension exists between the universal and the 
particular within the nation state, the same tension is present in all accounts o f 
international law, expressed in differing conceptions of who are the subjects of 
international law.
414 Dauvergne (2004), p. 592.
A stubborn conception o f  the territorial state as the sole subject of international 
law has had a strong impact on the regulation and legitimisation o f violence. 
International law, until the advent of international human rights, has largely ignored 
domestic violence, but it has attempted to  regulate those kinds o f violence that crossed 
national boundaries. When in the course o f the twentieth century, territorial integrity 
became a cornerstone of international law, sovereignty in international law no longer 
entailed a right to wage war as an instrument o f foreign policy. Nonetheless, the old 
language o f war, a state-based discourse with emphasis on the territorial component of 
sovereignty that is firmly rooted in the Westphalian state system, still decisively shapes 
the way in which we conceive of sovereignty, political community and the state 
prerogatives with regard to its territorial boundaries.
Even classical exceptions to the rule that internal violence is a matter for the 
sovereign state alone affirm a particularistic conception of the modern state and the 
system it forms part of. As these rules only confer states with rights, they are consistent 
with citizenship’s structuring role in the global world, in which national sovereignty is 
supposed to embody a perfect link between territory and identity. In addition, 
international law ’s exceptions concerning the treatment o f minorities and foreigners 
prove and reinforce the rule that decrees that territorial belonging is essential in order to 
enjoy rights that were supposed to be universal and inalienable.
The way in which both citizenship and classical international law afford 
protection against state violence is thus profoundly shaped by sovereignty’s claim to 
distinguish the inside from the outside. The argument by Richard Mansbach and Franke 
Wilmer that “the relationship between identity and borders underlies both the process of 
norm articulation and the kinds o f violence identified as problematic”415 thus proves to 
be true, not only in the international arena, but equally with regard to the domestic 
order.
Thus, different discourses traditionally regulated internal and external state 
violence. The existence of the notion o f domain réservé in international law, 
exemplified the separateness o f the domestic and international orders. Even though not 
directly apparent, the strict separation between international and domestic law that was 
brought about by the territorial state and the system it forms part o f made a theoretical 
division within the concept o f  sovereignty possible. Sovereignty’s claim to distinguish
415 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p 56.
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the inside from the outside is based on both power over territory and power over people; 
nevertheless, in due time sovereignty’s territorial frame became conceptually distinct 
from the exercise of jurisdiction over people within a body politic. The state’s 
jurisdiction within a clearly demarcated territory was regulated by domestic law only. 
Matters relating to the territorial frame of sovereignty were dealt with by international 
law, as external violence was perceived as engaging the territorial sovereignty o f the 
modem state in an area where only the interests of states were legally recognised. The 
result was that the exercise of power through political institutions and the clear spatial 
demarcation of the territory on which this power was exercised, became distinct aspects 
in the definition o f the state,416 and the intrinsic bond that existed between them was 
seldom accounted for.
After the Second World War, the international community recognised the 
inherent dangers o f the old system. Human rights law was intended to close the gap 
between national and international law. From then onwards, international law decrees 
that all individuals present within the territory of the nation state, citizens and non­
citizens alike, are entitled to protection of their fundamental rights. Human rights law 
has thus to a certain degree caused convergence between national and international law. 
Internally, citizenship can no longer be the only foundation for access to rights, and the 
domestic judiciary in the constitutional state plays an important role with regard to the 
implementation of international norms protecting human dignity. Externally, the 
individual has become a subject of international law, and the treatment by the national 
state of persons under its jurisdiction is no longer a mere matter of sovereign discretion.
Nevertheless, even though human rights have caused convergence between 
national and international law with regard to the rule of law, they have not succeeded in 
abolishing the conceptual distinction between content and form of sovereignty, which in 
turn results in the immunisation of the territorial component of sovereignty against legal 
forces of correction. In order to see this clearly, I have investigated the way in which 
modem human rights law affect sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside from the 
outside.
We have seen that human rights norms have significantly limited the state’s 
claim to decide matters of inside and outside within its territory by reference to identity. 
Nevertheless, when sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside and the outside is
416 Agnew and Corbridge (1995).
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based on territory, human rights law has not achieved a similar transformation. In spite 
of notions of post-national citizenship, the modem version of the rule of law remains 
territorially limited for two reasons.
In the first place, in most cases, access to fundamental rights is factually 
determined by presence on territory. National states refuse to be held accountable for 
actions that took place outside their national territories, an attitude that in the European 
context may be facilitated by ambiguous recent case law o f the ECtHR that seems to  
revert to a territorial version o f the legal space in which the ECHR applies.
In addition, territorialisation ensures that territory and rights remain linked in a 
more structural way. Celebrations o f  post-national citizenship suffer essentially from the 
same shortcoming as any theory that presents citizenship simply as a project that 
gradually turned the privileges of the few into the rights o f the many. The viewpoint 
from which they investigate citizenship is the territory o f  the national (liberal) state. 
When the territorial basis of the global state system is disregarded or taken for granted, 
it makes sense to claim that nationality and rights have become untangled. However, the 
internal perspective that such theories take, conceal the fact that this is only the case 
within the territory of the liberal, Western democracy. Outside its territory, questions o f  
identity and rights remain firmly linked. Thus, territoriality causes the stateless, the 
refugee and the citizen of dictatorships to remain largely beyond the fundamental rights 
protection of the constitutional state.417
In the second place, I have provisionally concluded that human rights law does 
very little to limit the exercise of the state’s spatial powers. Territorial integrity is a 
cornerstone o f  international law, and protection of its territorial boundaries has 
remained the exclusive prerogative o f  the national state. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at 
these issues, but for now it is important to reiterate that the way in which the notions of 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries interact is still decisively shaped by a state- 
centred discourse which adheres to  the sanctity o f territorial boundaries in order to 
maintain a stable order of sovereign states, instead o f a just community of individuals. 
In addition, we need to be aware of the possibility that in a situation in which presence 
on national territory automatically leads to entitlement to fundamental rights, the 
sovereign state may wish to keep people outside its territory in order to not have to 
accord them these fundamental rights.
417 Isaac (1996). p. 162.
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Hence, in spite of its increasing ‘denationalisation’, the modem rule o f law 
remains territorially limited, and it seems that the status o f sovereignty’s territorial 
frame in international law has remained largely the same as it was before the advent of 
modem human rights law. Nuremberg’s “equivocal and immoral legacy” combined 
with the reification of territoriality has led to a structural blindness for the involvement 
of personal interests whenever the state bases its claims on the notion of territorial 
sovereignty, a proposition which will be investigated in further detail in the next two 
Chapters. There we will see that such blindness is exacerbated whenever the individuals 
who are affected by such claims are rendered invisible, either because they are far away 
and unknown or alternatively because they are very different from “us” and that the 
territorial blind spot o f the modem version of the rule of law affects individual rights 
most obviously and disadvantageously in the global context of immigration from poor, 
underprivileged citizens of non-Westem countries into the Western, liberal 
democracies.
A version of the rule of law that keeps the content of sovereignty within a 
territorially defined body politic and its territorial form apart, scrutinising the former 
aspect while it is largely silent with regard to the latter aspect, obscures the fact that 
constraints on individual behaviour and freedom are always motivated on account o f the 
notion of political community and the unity of the body politic, interests that concern 
both form and content of sovereignty. The fact that the modem version o f the rule of 
law has not acknowledged the interrelatedness between the nation state’s exercise o f 
jurisdiction over people within a given body politic and the territorial framework in 
which those jurisdictional claims take place is a particularly serious concern when it 
comes to the national state’s perception of and responses to “new threats”418, such as 
immigration. In later Chapters, we will see that international movement of persons 
constitutes a field that by its very nature engages sovereignty’s territorial frame as well 
as its jurisdictional content as we will see in later Chapters.
^ S e e B ig o  (2001).
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Chapter 4 The extent of the right to leave
4 .1 . In t r o d u c t i o n
‘‘Theoretically, in tire sphere of international law. it had always been true that sovereignty is 
nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalization, nationality and expulsion; 
the point, however, is that practical consideration and the silent acknowledgement of common 
interests restrained Rational sovereignty until tlic rise of totalitarian regimes.”'119
In the previous Chapter, I have looked at the way in which the sovereign power 
of the state has been restrained by the use o f various discourses. I have argued that the 
notion o f  territoriality has exerted a limiting influence over all these discourses, 
bringing to light the tension between universalism and particularism within each o f 
them. Citizenship is the most obvious example of these potentially “explosive 
tensions”420, but the way in which a political particularistic reality has triumphed over 
universal ideals in classical international law as well is for a large extent the result o f the 
Westphalian territorial constellation. Until the advent of international human rights, the 
few instances in which international law concerned itself with the interests o f 
individuals were those when the territory-identity-population ideal o f the sovereign state 
was most clearly not reflected in reality, as in the case of minorities and resident aliens.
Another significant anomaly in a territorial world that international law cannot 
afford to overlook is the phenomenon of international migration. People between 
borders expose the construction, as opposed to the naturalness, of territoriality’s ideal. 
This Chapter and the next (Chapter 5) will explore the development and the nature of 
the legal framework regulating international freedom of movement. I will argue that the 
decisive impact o f territoriality upon the rule o f law and the resulting immunisation of 
territorial sovereignty against international legal correction is unambiguously expressed 
in international law ’s regulation of international migration.
*19 Anendt(1976), p. 278. 
420 Costa (2002), p. 218.
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Many studies dealing with questions directly related to contemporary 
immigration policies do not concern themselves with the way in which the issue o f exit 
is regulated by legal norms. Nicholas De Genova has argued that, whenever 
immigration law is addressed, a detailed empirical investigation of its actual operations 
is often not provided 421 The result is that existing laws appear to provide merely a 
neutral framework 422 In this study, I do not intend to carry out empirical research on the 
way in which immigration law affects the lives of individuals. Nonetheless, its actual 
operations will be more closely looked at by including the issue of exit. In this way, I 
hope to demonstrate that immigration laws do anything but provide a neutral 
framework. Instead, they are a result o f changing perceptions o f political authority, and 
intimately linked to the way in which we perceive the nation state. Indeed, states’ 
monopolisation o f the right to regulate movement, therewith comprising both the right 
to enter and  the right to leave, has been intrinsic to the very construction of the 
territorial state.423
By looking at the overall framework regulating international movement, one o f 
territoriality’s most significant implications on the rule of law will be exposed: the 
artificial distinction between sovereignty’s territorial frame and its jurisdictional content 
within a given body politic. A further reason to include the right to leave in a study 
dealing with the detention of immigrants in Europe is provided by the fact that 
questions o f emigration are greatly affected by current immigration policies, which have 
increasingly externalised, as we will see in Chapter 5.
Accordingly, this Chapter deals with the right to leave, leaving questions o f 
immigration to Chapter 5. Section 4.2. presents an overview of the way in which over 
time perceptions on the issue o f exit have developed. We will see that at various times 
in history, emigration was looked upon in the same way as immigration is at present: it 
had to be directed in channels which the authorities deemed favourable in the national 
interests.424 After the Second World War, however, the possibility of an individual to 
leave his or her country became recognised as a fundamental right in international law. 
Section 4.3. deals with the international legal norms regulating emigration in detail, 
with particular emphasis on the permitted restrictions on the exercise of the right to
421 Dc Genova (2002), p. 432.
422 Ibid. p. 424.
423 Torpey (2000), p. 6.
424 See Christie Tail (1927).
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leave. In the conclusions to this Chapter, in Section 4.4., I will briefly touch upon the 
way in which contemporary immigration policies o f Western countries have an impact 
on individuals’ actual exercise of the right to leave, a matter that will be further 
elaborated on in Chapter 5.
4.2. The right to leave in its historical context
The right to leave one’s country is the ultimate form of self-determination. Not 
to be able to leave a country factually amounts to deprivation o f liberty: imprisonment 
within imagined lines on the surface o f the earth instead o f incarceration by concrete 
walls. Centuries ago, the right to leave was already recognised in the Magna Carta of 
1215:
In future it shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to our kingdom unharmed and without 
fear, by land or water, preserving his allegiance to us. except in time of w'ar, for some short time, 
for the common benefit of the realm.425
Thus, the Magna Carta qualified the right to leave: it was made subject to the 
condition that allegiance to the Kingdom was guaranteed and it provided for restrictions 
on exit in times o f war. The latter sort o f  limitation is still to be found in present 
formulations of the right to leave, which I address in Section 4.3.2. At this moment, it is 
the qualification “preserving his allegiance to us” which deserves closer attention, for it 
clearly illustrates the changes that the medieval feudal order was undergoing under the 
influence of the growing powers of European monarchs.
In medieval Europe, the extent o f  freedom of movement had been determined by 
the feudal order. Many people were tied to territory because o f  their obligations to their 
feudal lord. The system of serfdom granted no individual freedom of movement 
whatsoever as serfs were not allowed to leave their place of employment.426 
Nonetheless, movement was free for those whose status was free. National borders 
“were insignificant to the individual traveller, though state boundaries were of warlike
42:1 Chapter 42 of the Magna Carta of 1215.
426 However, serfdom in Europe was an economic relationship betw een lord and serf which implied that 
serfs could in theory and sometimes also in practice buy their freedom. See Dowty (1987). p. 25.
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concern to rulers ”427 In the restriction on the right to leave as formulated in the Magna 
Carta, only granted to free men, an early shift from feudalism to absolutism can be 
discerned. In Chapter 2, we saw how the doctrine of perpetual allegiance developed 
when everybody, in addition to their status in the feudal hierarchy, also became a 
subject of the King. Consequently, permanent emigration, as we know it now, was 
theoretically impossible, for it was assumed that a subject could always be recalled to 
his duties to his King.
The recognition of the qualified right to leave in the Magna Carta of 1215 was 
only short-lived. It is not to be found in later versions of that document, due to the 
assertion by later kings of their absolute powers to control exit. The situation was not 
different in other European countries. From the fifteenth century onwards, feudalism 
was no longer the defining hierarchical relationship. Henceforth, it would be the 
relationship between the sovereign and its subjects that determined the extent of actual 
freedom of movement. In the era stretching from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, 
the relationship between people, territory and authority was determined by 
“mercantilism in the service of absolutism”428 and the right to leave was virtually non­
existent. Population was considered a scarce economic and military resource, and rulers, 
in their efforts to maximise economic growth en military power, prohibited emigration 
almost entirely.
Nonetheless, in this era, the prohibition of emigration was mainly instrumental 
in securing a concrete state interest. Conceptions o f freedom of movement had nothing 
to do yet with ideologies such as nationalism, alluding to a deeper, symbolic 
relationship between people and territory, or other ideological convictions, tying the 
notions of people and their state to each other in a more profound way. This was 
reflected by the fact that immigration was in most cases welcomed; European monarchs 
even attempted to acquire populations from what was for them the outside world.429
Chapter 2 showed that at the end o f the seventeenth century, the absolute power 
o f the sovereign came under attack by the idea of natural rights and changing ideas 
about the location of sovereignty. Whereas before emigration had been considered a 
matter entirely subject to the discretion o f the sovereign, theorists of international law
421 Dummet and Nicol (1990), p. 11. 
4=8 Dowty (1987). p. 29.
429 Zolberg(1992). p. 37.
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increasingly perceived the right to emigrate as a natural right.430 This was only logical if  
the idea of political society as a voluntary contract was to be taken seriously. For if  
every individual must, by free choice, be able to determine whether he wants to be a 
member o f that society, he should also be free at any time to break his ties and leave.431
Nonetheless, actual practice o f the new regimes that were inspired by 
enlightenment ideals was not always consistent with the same ideals. In France, 
restrictions were imposed on freely leaving the country on grounds of national security 
soon after the Revolution, even though the revolutionary regime had abolished the 
passport, and in spite of the fact that the right to leave was recognised in the French 
Constitution o f  179 1 432 Officially, American governments did not even recognise the 
right o f voluntary expatriation until 1907.433
However, liberal ideals continued to penetrate governments so that at the end o f 
the nineteenth century it had become possible to leave almost any European state.434 
Very few countries required passports or other documents in order to exit their 
territories. Their liberal attitude in this regard was not only due to enlightenment ideals 
that had influenced daily political practice; also the fact that under-population was no 
longer a problem in these states made those states regard emigration without concern. 
All European and American states, except Russia, in practice regarded the right to leave 
as a basic right which was inalienable 435 W hen serfdom was finally entirely abolished 
throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, thousands of people left their homes to sail 
for the Americas, Australia or Asia. Nonetheless, freedom of movement was typically 
not granted to inhabitants of the colonies. It was clearly in the interests of the imperial 
powers that these citizens should not leave the colonies. As in many other instances, the 
rulers applied liberalism at home, but in Africa and Asia they held on to medieval ideas.
The First World War signalled the end of the liberal era regarding freedom of 
movement and caused passports to reappear on the international stage. During the 
twentieth century, possession o f these documents would develop into a requirement for
430 Jagerskiold (1981), p. 169.
431 Whelan (1981), p. 650.
432 Sec about the rather complicated issue o f freedom of movement during the Revolutionary years: 
Toipey (2000). p. 21-56.
433 Dowty (1987), p. 49.
434 Dowty (1987), p. 46.
435 Dowty (1987), pp. 54,82.
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lawful exit.436 In the twenties and thirties, more and more European countries restricted 
their citizens’ possibilities to leave 437 Various factors contributed towards this 
narrowing down o f the right to leave. Countries were no longer as open to immigration 
as they had been, due to xenophobia and racism of their populations and their own 
nationalistic aspirations, and the losses caused by the First World War combined with 
reduced birth rates made population once again a scarce resource. The restrictions on 
freedom of movement however, were not comparable to those in the mercantilist era.
The difference is found in altering conceptions o f the relationship between 
people, territory and state. Chapter 2 described how nationalism led to a perception of 
sovereignty as entailing an unbreakable and self-evident link between territory, 
population and authority. National identity became an instrument to distinguish between 
us and them. People were defined by virtue of where they belonged, and cultural or 
ethnic homogeneity in a state was something to be aspired. It was nationalism which, if 
not exactly gave birth to, at least nourished “the intimate relationship between identities 
and borders”438. People were bound to each other and their territory by their ethnicity. 
For the nationalistic mind a liberal attitude to emigration is inconceivable: it cannot be 
possible to choose freely one’s allegiance with a state or abandon it at will, if such 
allegiance is conceived as belonging to a community of individuals bound to each other 
and ‘their’ land by common identity, history and ‘blood’.
Moreover, the collectivist ethic proclaimed by many regimes after the First 
World War also contributed to a restrictive view on the right to leave. Instead of the 
ethnic or cultural homogeneity that the nationalists strive after, collectivism aims at 
social homogeneity. Likewise, the collectivist state cannot regard emigration without 
suspicion. Leaving the society will inevitably be an act of disloyalty, even treason.439 In 
addition, it becomes difficult to maintain that the interests of the citizens are the same as 
those of the state when these citizens are leaving the country en masse. Finally, a regime 
sustained by coercion or in which there is no room for dissent can presumably only 
survive by restricting exit.
436 Hofmann (1988). p. 3; and Torpey (2000). p. 21.
437 Christie Tait (1927), p. 31
438 Lapid (2001). p. 10.
439 Dowtv (1987), p. 60; and Torpey (2000). p. 124-125.
440 Dowty (1987). p. 60.
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After the Second World War, the idea of natural rights revived, as we have seen 
in the previous Chapter. Human rights, as they were called now, were codified and one 
of them was the right to leave. Over time, the right to leave was laid down in many 
different binding human rights treaties, as we will see in Section 4.3.1. Judging from the 
codification o f  the right to leave in all major human rights instruments, one could safely 
assume that, during the period following the Second World War, it had become a right 
generally recognised in international law. However, perhaps the most conspicuous 
effect o f  this promise made by international law was that the practice of a substantial 
number o f countries was only the more striking. The most obvious violators of the right 
to leave were the Communist countries: while the collectivist ethic inspired by the 
extreme right had not survived the Second World War, its counterpart on the other side 
of the political spectrum had expanded.
None o f the countries united by the Warsaw Pact recognised the right to leave as 
a human or constitutional right.441 Instead, it was regarded by these countries as a 
favour, the granting o f which fell wholly within the sovereign state’s discretion. This 
did not mean, however, that policies regarding exit permits were the same in all these 
countries; neither were they equally restrictive.442 The erection of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 was the ultimate illustration of the Communist view on freedom of movement. In 
time it became easier for citizens o f the East-Bloc countries to visit other countries of 
the ‘socialist w orld system’, but permission for this kind of travelling was by no means 
obtained as a matter of course 443 Moreover, although travel to the West increased over 
time, the right to  leave was definitely not recognised as such for the purpose of visiting 
Western countries or for emigration. The German Democratic Republic was, according 
to its penal code, able to persecute those seeking official permission to emigrate for the 
crime o f “incitement hostile to the state.”444 Its constitutional legal doctrine justified the 
lack o f a basic right to emigrate by the socialist government’s concern for each o f its 
citizens: Allowing a citizen to emigrate to the West “was tantamount to delivering him 
up to an imperialist, aggressive and anti-social system o f exploitation”.445 In addition, 
East German policy o f prohibiting its citizens to visit Western countries was defended
441 Brunner (1990), p. 204.
442 Dowty (1987). pp. 111-127; and Hannum (1987), pp. 95-105.
443 Brunner (1990), p. 208.
444 Turack (1978). p. 55.
445 Brunner (1990), p. 217.
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on the grounds that the Federal Republic did not recognise the citizenship of the 
German Democratic Republic.446
In Russia, the right to leave had never been recognised, not even before the 
Communist era 447 After serfdom was abolished in 1S61 in Russia, the former serfs had 
lived in village communities, from which no-one could leave without communal 
permission. Communist ideology strengthened traditional restrictive notions concerning 
the right to leave to such an extent as to equal it with treason. For other East-Bloc 
countries, restrictive views on the right to leave were a result both of their ideologies 
and economic considerations. These countries had an interest in population building in 
general, and having educated professionals at their service in particular. The fact that 
these countries were closely linked to Western Europe and had in the past been 
relatively open, would have made it easier for their population to cross borders in 
pursuit of more rewarding opportunities then it was for Soviet nationals 448 If these 
countries had permitted free immigration, presumably a large part of their population 
would have left for the West.
Despite the international obligation of countries to permit citizens and others to 
leave their territory as laid down in inter alia the ICCPR and the UDHR, the reality o f 
East-Bloc practice was acknowledged in the Helsinki Accord 449 The Helsinki Accord 
proclaimed that the participating states should act in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the UDHR, and that they should fulfil their obligations as set forth in 
international human rights instruments by which they are bound. It seems to be in direct 
contradiction with this statement that the Helsinki Accord then, instead of recognising a 
general right for citizens to leave their country permanently, requires the signatories 
solely “to facilitate freer movement on the basis o f family ties, family reunification,
446 The Federal Republic maintained that an all German nationality still existed and accorded West 
German identity papers to all East-Germans who applied for such documents. See Turack (1979), p. 110- 
111.
447 Dowty (1987. p. 208) argues that Communist countries applying restrictive exit policies are copying 
from the Soviet Union policies that are not so much Communist as Russian This would explain the 
relative absence of such strict policies in countries with related ideologies but less political links to the 
USSR if compared to those countries heavily under Soviet political influence, such as the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact.
448 Dowty (1987). p. 116. Evidently, this was especially so with regard to emigration from East Germany 
to West Germany. Sec also Reinke (1986), p. 665.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: immigration detention and political order
1.1. Introduction
From a sociological point o f view, camps or transit zones may present the institutionalisation of 
temporariness as a form of radical social exclusion and marginalisation in modem society and a 
conservation of borders as dividing lines.1
1.1.1 Subject and scope of this study
All Member States o f the European Union have provisions in their immigration 
legislation under which they can deprive foreigners of their liberty. The use of detention 
for immigration related purposes by these countries has greatly increased over the past 
few years.2 Concerning asylum seekers this increase seems to be related to the extended 
use o f accelerated procedures and preliminary border checks due to the implementation 
of the principles of safe third country, safe country o f origin and the Council Regulation 
replacing the Dublin Convention.3 Concerning immigration in general it can be said that 
Member States perceive growing problems related to irregular immigration and one of 
their responses has been an increasing exercise of their powers to detain illegal 
immigrants.
The institutionalised practice o f immigration detention has become an inherent 
part o f  a policy package that has as its main aims to deter future irregular migrants and 
to remove those already on national territory as fast and as effectively as possible. If 
these policies are criticised by N G O ’s or other social actors, Member States defend their
1 Toth (2006), p. 3.
2 Kelly (2005), p. 2.
3 Council Regulation No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003. establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
detennining die Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country’ national. OJ L 50/1,25 Februarv 2005.
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detention policies with arguments bearing on the growing numbers of foreigners, the 
need to maintain the integrity o f border controls and security related issues.
Detention of immigrants is seldom a transparent practice: information 
concerning detention facilities is often not made public and many of these facilities are 
located at isolated places. In addition, journalists are habitually denied access, allegedly 
in order to respect the privacy of the inmates but resulting in the absence o f public 
control over the conditions, legality and procedures inside immigration detention 
centres.4 In 2004, an Italian journalist infiltrated in a detention centre in Sicily by acting 
as a Kurdish refugee and published an article on humiliating conditions that he had 
witnessed and experienced during his stay here.5 Instead of taking legal steps that might 
have resulted in the improvement of the conditions at the centre, the Italian state opened 
a case against the journalist on charges of presenting a false identity.6 After the Italian 
section of ‘médecins sans frontiers’ published a critical report on the circumstances in 
various closed centres for migrants, the organisation was accused of disloyalty by the 
Italian government and denied entry to immigration detention centres 7
Numerous reports by NGO’s in various countries describe instances o f abuse of 
force by the police, lack of structures for adequate accommodation, illegal detention 
beyond the foreseen time limits, and the detrimental effects of detention on the mental 
health of immigration detainees.8 More often than not, these reports are confirmed by 
findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) during its visits to places where individuals 
are deprived o f their liberty. Furthermore, detaining children in immigration detention
4 Tôtli (2006), p. 8. 
s Sec Gatti (2005)
6 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2006). p. 215. The same journalist had already 
been handed a suspended 20 days sentence on the same charges in 2004, as he had infiltrated a detention 
facility for immigrants in Milan in 2000.
7 See Statcwatch (June 2004) The main violations that MSF found in this report pertained to limited 
contacts with the national health service; insufficient legal assistance; irregular use of psychiatric drugs; 
and excesses during interventions by guards. See Médecins Sans Frontiers (2004).
8 See for only a few examples: Amnesty' International United Kingdom (2005); Amnesty International 
Italy (2005); Amnesty International Spain (2005); Aide aux Personnes déplacées et al. (2006); and 
Cimade (2004).
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centres is becoming standard practice in many countries,9 contrary to international and 
domestic norms protecting children’s rights.10
In addition to the lack of homogenous legislation on asylum and immigration in 
the Member States of the European Union, serious legal gaps as well as logistic and 
material problems exist with regard to the detention of non-citizens under immigration 
legislation. Immigrants are being accommodated in hotels ore makeshift shelters for 
extended periods, and the lack o f space in the reception centres is often compensated 
with accommodation in prisons. Schemes o f legal assistance are often flawed, adequate 
medical structures absent, and the incidence of auto-mutilation and (attempted) suicides 
under the population in immigration detention is high.11 The British press in particular 
regularly features reports about abuse at immigration detention centres, but also in other 
countries the public media increasingly publish evidence of unacceptable conditions in 
closed centres for immigrants, reflecting a growing concern in civil society about the 
practice o f immigration detention.12
Under these circumstances, the detention o f thousands of people in Europe, 
merely because they allegedly breach the state’s territorial sovereignty, may easily be 
labelled as an anomaly for Western liberal democracies, especially when seen in the 
context and development o f citizenship discourse, constitutionalism and human rights. 
However, it would be too easy to portray immigration detention solely like an 
incongruity for otherwise liberal regimes.
Instead, in this study I will argue that the practice of depriving unwanted 
foreigners of their liberty is a consequence of the territorial foundations of the global 
political system and their impact on constitutional discourse. Some forms of state 
violence have become so embedded in our understanding of the state and the structure 
of which it forms part of that they have remained insulated against the usual forms of 
legal correction and political control. Thus it seems natural that either nationality or the 
absence o f state authorisation for presence on national territory can legitimately
9 Such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Latvia, Spain, Lithuania. Greece. Finland. 
France, Belgium and Poland. See Bolton (2006) and Gil-Robles (8 June 2005). p. 18.
10 Gil-Robles (15 February 2006), par. 254.
11 Si love, Steel and Mollica (2001); and Pourgourides (1998)
Allegations of ill-treatment of migrants suffering from psycliiatic disorders in the closed centre of 
Vottem for irregular migrants, disclosed by guards of the centre, have recently prompted Amnesty 




constitute a ground for discrimination and a possible reason for the use of various forms 
of state violence.
Before turning to the way in which I intend to address these issues in this study, 
I will attempt to bring to life the structural features o f the practice o f immigration 
detention in EU Member States in order to contextualise my subsequent discussion of 
the law and theory pertaining to immigration detention in later chapters. In this study, I 
will use the term immigration detention to designate the administrative decision to 
deprive an individual o f his liberty for reasons that are directly linked to immigration 
policy. This entails that both irregular migrants and asylum seekers fall under the scope 
of this study. At certain points, the distinction between the two groups will be explicitly 
made, for example when the relevant legal norms are applicable to only one o f the two 
categories or when the description of state practice requires the distinction. However, it 
is important to mention at the outset that the focus o f this study will not be on the 
deprivation of liberty of either asylum seekers or irregular migrant as distinct categories, 
but on the administrative detention of individuals on account of the lack of state 
authorisation for their presence on national territory.
With regard to this focus on administrative detention, an important complication 
needs to be mentioned with regard to the detention o f foreigners in the EU, which is the 
tendency towards increasing criminalisation o f illegal entry or stay on national territory. 
A state that has defined these acts as criminal offences, can “detain, charge, convict and 
sentence to further detention under criminal law” irregular migrants and even applicants 
for asylum.13 Cyprus for example appears to have no closed centres for irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers in surveys that address immigration detention. However, 
irregular immigrants in Cyprus are detained in police custody while awaiting 
verification of identity.14 As illegal entry and stay are penal offences under Cypriot law, 
punishable up to two years in prison, detention is not an administrative measure, but a
13 Guild (2006). See for international law relating to deprivation of liberty as a criminal sanction on illegal 
entry: Pacurar (2003), pp. 9-10.
u  Foreigners that have been arrested for illegal entry or stay and then apply for asylum are detained for 
the duration of the sentence that is handed for their “offence". If their applications are rejected they are 
kept in police cells, until they can be deported, which often takes a long time due to reluctance of the 
embassies of countries of origin to cooperate. See EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report 
Cyprus, pp. 3 and 17.
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penal one.15 Also in Germany, illegal entry and residence in certain cases constitute 
criminal offences, and subsequent penal detention takes priority over administrative 
detention pending removal.16
In various other M ember States, although they do not necessarily define illegal 
stay and entry as criminal offences, the legal position of the foreign detainee who was 
initially apprehended on criminal charges is often unclear, due to the interaction 
between criminal proceedings with the administrative procedure of expulsion to leave 
the country.17 Although the increasing criminalisation of irregular migration is highly 
significant for the practice o f detaining individuals as a response to  a breach of the 
state’s territorial sovereignty, for practical reasons concerning the length of this study, 
only the practice of administrative detention under immigration legislation will 
explicitly fall within its scope.
Another preliminary remark needs to be made about the terms “detention” and 
“deprivation of liberty”, which are used interchangeably in this study. The line between 
deprivation o f liberty or detention on the one hand and restrictions upon personal liberty 
on the other hand is not always easy to draw. The European Court of Human Rights has 
observed that in many cases, that difference is merely one of degree or intensity, not one 
of nature or substance, and that some borderline cases are a “matter o f pure opinion” .18 
This court regards the cumulative impact o f the restrictions, as well as the degree and 
intensity o f each one separately, when deciding as to whether one can speak o f 
deprivation  o f  liberty, in which case other guarantees apply than in the case o f 
restrictions on free movement.19
Especially in the area o f migration law, the line between deprivation of liberty 
and restrictions upon free movement can be a blurred one. The most common
15 Ibid. p. 17-18. In additional complication of such an approach is that it is difficult to obtain precise 
numbers o f the persons detained for these "offences'’, as they are grouped together with other offenders in 
the statistics. Recently, the Cypriot government has been reconsidering the criminalisation of illegal entry 
of irregular migrants (Commissioner for Human Rights. Follow-Up Report on Cyprus, 2006).
16 EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country' Report Germany pp. 41-42. Other countries that define 
irregular stay or entry' under certain conditions as criminal offences that arc punishable by prison 
sentences are Estonia; France; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Lithuania;
17 Sec for example EU Foreigners in Prison Project. Country' Report Belgium, p. 19.
18 ECtHR, Guizardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980. §93.
19 Ibid. par. 95. See also UNHCR (1999). Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards 
Relating to the detention of asylum seekers. Guideline 1.
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distinction made in this regard is that between closed and open centres, the latter often 
referred to as reception centres where the individuals who are required to reside can 
leave at will or within reasonable limits.20 These so-called open centres, generally 
housing applicants for asylum, will not be included in my analysis.21 Neither will I look 
at migrants that are subjected to mandatory residence requirements, as they are merely 
restricted in their personal liberty, just as those that are obliged to report frequently to 
the authorities. Only the practice of placing individuals in closed centres, or in any other 
narrowly confined location that they are not able to leave, including a ship, train or 
vehicle,22 will be the subject of my investigation.
Especially with regard to the situation of irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
that are kept in transit zones, such as the international zone of an airport, specific 
problems may arise with regard to the question whether one can define their situation as 
a deprivation of liberty. States have repeatedly argued that individuals who are held in 
these zones are not deprived of their liberty, either because they are free to leave at will, 
or because they are not yet present on the territory o f the state in question. These issues 
will receive detailed attention in later chapters where the impact o f international human 
rights law on practice of immigration detention is discussed, but in this introduction, 
transit zones will explicitly be included in my presentation of a general overview of the 
practice o f immigration detention.
1.1.2 Imm igration detention as state practice within the EU
A first difficulty that one encounters when attempting to present an overview of 
state practice in this field is to obtain reliable figures with regard to immigration 
detention.23 Many governments do not have coherent systems of recording figures
20 Guild (2006), p. 3.
21 See for an example the centres in the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla, where migrants are free to 
leave during the day but need official permission if they want to leave for more than 24 hours. See 
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties. Justice and Home Affairs (January 2006).
22 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (28 
December 1999).
23 On the grounds of partially available data, Jesuit Refugee Service (2004) estimated that the number of 
immigration detainees in Europe may be in the 100.000 persons per year.
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concerning immigration detention, especially when it comes to the duration of detention 
and the reasons for ending the detention. Even the total numbers of immigration 
detainees is often unknown to national governments themselves, as different 
categories of persons or different places for detention fall under different regulations 
and authorities25 If states do keep statistics, they are notoriously reticent to make them 
available to the public.26 This official haziness surrounding immigration detention is 
exacerbated by the fact that in many countries, not only media but also human rights
24 In Austria, for example, reporting on administrative detention for immigration law purposes is 
extremely deficient (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country Report Austria, p. 24) In Greece, the lack 
of publication of any data by the Ministry' of Public Order makes the calculation of the number of persons 
affected by administrative detention nearly impossible. (EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country Report 
Greece, p. 21). In Malta, none of the NGO’s involved, nor the ministry is able to provide reliable figures 
of the persons detained at any time. (EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country' Report Malta). In the 
United Kingdom, the Home Office only releases ‘snapshot’ figures that range from 1105 detained asylum 
seekers on a given day to 1515. Amnesty International has concluded that the Home Office quarterly 
statistics belie the true scale of detention and this organisation believes that thousands of people arc 
detained every year (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country’ Report United Kingdom, p. 34). France 
records 25.828 persons that were detained under immigration legislation in 2004. However, persons kept 
in zones d ’attente are not included in this number. Countries that detain relatively low persons under 
immigration legislation generally keep better statistics, such as Estonia that recorded 68 immigration 
detainees in the period from 10 March 2003 until 31 December 2005 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, 
Country Report Estonia) and Ireland that records 946 persons detained under immigration legislation for 
2004 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project, Country' Report Ireland).
Sec for example France where some of the administrative detention facilities fall under control of 
“Securité Public Regional", some under the border police and some others again under the Gendarmerie 
(EU Foreigners in Prison Project. Country' Report France). In a federal state such as Germany these 
difficulties are compounded because the federal states each have different regulations.
~6 Guild (2006), p. 4. Some exceptions exist such as Belgium: according to the Office for Foreigners 
Affairs. 7.622 individuals have been detained during the year 2004 in closed centres for migrants (EU 
Foreigners in Prison Project, Country’ Report Belgium) and The Netherlands, reporting a total of 1952 
irregular migrants detained at 31 December 2004 (Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen at http://www.dji.nl). In 
Sweden, a daily average of 214 persons was detained in 2005 (EU Foreigners in Prison Project Country 
Report Sweden). According to the Hungarian authorities, around 6000 foreigners a year are placed in 
detention (Commissioner of Human Rights. Follow-Up Report on Hungary, 2006, p. 19). In other 
countries, possible indicators of the numbers of immigration detainees are the places officially available 
for immigration detention: i.e. Germany: 2250: Finland: 40; Hungary: 640; Lithuania: 500; and Slovenia: 
180 (Sec the respective Country’ Reports of the EU Foreigners in Prison Project); and the United 
Kingdom: around 2750 at the end o f 2005 (Gil-Robles, 8 June 2005, p. 15.)
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organisations are frequently denied access to places where migrants are kept in 
detention.27
The factual information in the following paragraphs is to a large extent drawn 
from the “EU Foreign Prisoners Project”, an extensive study on foreigners in European 
prisons that was recently completed in cooperation with the EU.28 The object of that 
project, encompassing all 25 Member States of the European Union, is to address the 
issue of social exclusion of prisoners who were detained in Europe outside their 
countries o f origin. In addition to the various country reports o f the EU Foreign 
Prisoners Project, I will make use of other sources of information such as the Council of 
Europe, various NGO’s and occasionally national governments.
Partly drawing on Elspeth Guild’s classification in her report for the European 
Parliament on a typology of different types of centres in Europe,29 I will distinguish 
between three types of immigration detention in order to present structural features of 
state practice in this area. These are detention upon arrival; detention of individuals 
within the asylum system; and detention as a result o f a decision to deport or expulse 
the foreigner.30
21 See Written questions El 104/05 and El 118/05 (23 March 2005) by MEPs H. Flautre and J. Muscat to 
the European Commission as regards the situation in Malta. 23 March 2005. See also the European 
Parliament Resolution on the situation with refugee camps in Malta of 6 April 2006. calling for unlimited 
access to the centres of the UN High Commissioner for refugees and competent NGO’s who were 
formerly denied access. Another example is France, where only CIMADE. an ecumenical care sen-ice 
that provides social and legal support has access to the administrative detention centres. Regular human 
rights organisations are also denied access to the zones d' attente. See EU Foreigners in Prison Project 
Country Report France.
:s See hun:/Avww.foreignersinorisoaeu. Co-ordinated by Tilburg University-, the Netherlands. The 
various country reports (publication to be expected in February 2007) that the contributors to the project 
have written will be referred to as “FPP-CR - name of the relevant state” throughout this study.
:9 Guild (2006).
30 Ibid, p. 5.
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1.1.2.1. Detention upon arrival
From southern Algeria to Malta, from the Island of Lampedusa to the Ukrainian border, and 
from the Canaries to Slovenia, camps of all types are now strung out like so many nets for 
migrants, with the common aim of impeding, if not blocking, their way into Europe.31
Most EU Member States are familiar with legislation that provides for detention 
o f foreigners upon arrival in the state. Often, such detention is ordered by border guards 
and it is carried out in a so-called transit zone, which can be the international zone o f an 
airport, or any other place located close to border crossings 32 Also regular prisons or 
centres specifically designed for immigrants are used33 Detention is thus used to 
prevent unauthorised entry, and serves to clarify the conditions for entry, including 
verification of identity. At times it is also justified by states with an appeal to health 
hazards or in order to implement readmission agreements.34
Serious concerns have been expressed by NGO’s and other political actors about 
detention upon arrival, as the legal position o f the detainee is often unclear and not 
enough guarantees are applicable to the deprivation of liberty.35 Insufficient access to 
legal aid appears to be structural, detainees are often not told of the reasons for their 
detention at all, or, when they are, not always in a language that they understand.36
31 Rodier (2003).
32 In France, zones d’attente were introduced in 1992. and arc defined as places where “the foreign 
national arriving in France [...Julio is not authorised to enter French territory or who seeks asylum" will 
be detained “during the time strictly necessary for his leave, and. as an asylum seeker, for a check of his 
demand." There are more than 100 waiting zones facilities, most of them small rooms, for instance police 
stations, hotel rooms, administration offices, and are located near the borders, airports, harbours or 
railway stations. However, the great majority of those detained upon arrival in France are found in the 
w aiting zone Roissy-Cliarles de Gaulle in Paris (FPP-CR-Francc).
33 For example the so-called Grenshospitium in The Netherlands
34 FPP-CR’s-Czech Republic and Hungary.
35 The French term for deprivation of liberty in these zones d’attentc is ‘retention’, in which case lesser 
safeguards arc applicable to the persons concerned then in the case of detention as France maintains that 
these people are free to leave French territory. Judicial review' of the detention takes place after 72 hours, 
instead of the 48 hours normally required by law in immigration detention cases (FPP-CR-France).
36 See Jesuit Refugee Service (2004). Following its visit in 2002 to the Czech Republic, the CPT signalled 
serious shortcomings concerning the information provided for the detainees on their legal position and 
rights (CPT, 12 March 2004. pp. 20-29). Also with regard to the situation of the immigration detainee in
14
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Furthermore, the conditions in these places are regularly below national constitutional 
and international legal standards as well.37 The length of time that a migrant may spend 
in pre-admittance detention varies greatly from less than 24 hours to several weeks, 
even months, and only some states have the duration o f this kind of detention limited by
law 38
The southern borders of the EU deserve special mention with regard to detention 
upon arrival. Large numbers of migrants who have been apprehended while attempting 
to reach mainland Europe are held on Malta, Lampedusa and the Canary Islands in what 
have been described as “internment camps of dubious legality where people are
Hungary. CPT expressed concern about access to information in a language that the foreigner could 
understand (CPT, 29 June 2006. pp. 24-25). In Latvia, the judicial review of the immigrant who is 
deprived of his liberty lacks the required effectiveness, as the rights of the persons concerned arc not 
clearly defined and the right to legal assistance is difficult to exercise. Latvia provides no legal assistance 
or exemption of legal fees (EU Network of independent experts on Fundamental Rights, 2005, pp. 74-75). 
In Ireland, persons deprived of tlicir liberty upon arrival arc not informed of their right to bring legal 
proceedings against the detention, neither are they asked if they require legal assistance, nor are they 
informed that the can request it (Kelly, 2005, pp. 21-23). To tírese already significant problems, it can be 
added that many of the detention centres are far removed from anywhere, which makes contacts with 
lawyers even more difficult. See Gil-Robles (8 June 2005). p. 17 with regard to the United Kingdom.
37 The INADS centre at Brussels Airport for persons that arrive without documentation and who are 
refused entry in Belgium territory' (INADS) has been criticised several times by the CPT, in particular 
with regard to factual access to a lawyer and tire lack of any activity for people that arc kept in waiting 
zones for weeks, sometimes even months (See for the most recent report: CPT (20 April 2006). Also 
Germany has received criticism in this respect, especially regarding the situation in the transit zone at 
Frankfurt am Main Airport (CPT, 12 March 2003, p. 60.) With regard to the situation in the United 
Kingdom. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons observed that none of the short term holding facilities in 
Heathrow were fit to hold detainees overnight, although all held detainees overnight and sometimes 
detainees were held there for up to 36 hours. Detainees asking but failing to get legal advice and basic 
information about their detention formed a structural problem as well (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons. 
2006b, p. 5. It can be added that many of the detention centres are far removed from any where, which 
makes contacts w ith lawyers even more difficult. See Gil-Robles (8 June 2005), p. 17 with regard to the 
United Kingdom.
38 For example Ireland, where detention of people ‘'refused to land" may not exceed 8 weeks. However, if 
those individuals bring legal proceedings to challenge the validity of the detention, the ‘clock is stopped’ 
on this 8 week period (Kelly 2005). But sec also Hungary, which has a time limit for ‘detention for 
refusal’ of thirty days. However, if the authorities simply take a formal decision to expel the foreigner, the 
legal basis of the detention alters, and the foreigner can then remain legally in so-called aliens policing 
detention for a maximum of one year (FPP-CR-Hungary).
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deprived of their freedom yet supposedly are not prisoners.”39 These centres in 
particular have repeatedly been condemned on account of both the deplorable material 
conditions in which the detainees are held there, and their legality 40
1.1.2.2. The use o f  detention within the asylum system
Regarding the detention of asylum seekers,41 state practice shows a diverse 
pattern. All European governments detain people in the asylum procedure, but the 
conditions, maximum duration and actual time spent in detention by an asylum seeker 
are widely differing in the various Member States. It is important to note that with 
regard to this type of detention, relevant EC law exists. Under Article 18(1) of Council 
Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, the Member States shall not hold a person in 
detention for the sole reason that he applied for asylum.42
39 European United Left/Nordic Green Left (May 2006), p. 11.
40 The delegation of the European Parliament that visited the various Maltese administrative detention 
centres described the conditions as appalling. “unacceptable fo r  a civilised country and untenable in 
Europe which claims to be the home o f  human rights.” (European Parliament Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 30 March 2006, p. 9). See also the criticism expressed by the Spanish 
Ombudsman as regards the situation in Fucrteventura and Lanzarote, addressing overpopulation, 
inadequate facilities, hard conditions of life, secrecy and lack of transparency, lack of interpreters and 
lack of regular medical care (FPP-CR-Spain); and European United Left/Nordic Green Left (2005) with 
regard to the situation at Lampedusa. Regarding the centre in Lampedusa, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner of Human Rights noted that at times of large influxes, “the congestion and overcrowding 
[...] defy imagination. The centre fa lls totally short o f  the minimum standards o f  space and hygiene 
needed to accommodate numbers beyond its official capacity in decent condition." (Gil-Robles. 14 
December 2005, p. 38.)
41 It should be noted that detention upon arrival and detention of asylum seekers arc not always separate 
categories as asylum seekers are often detained upon arrival in a state. Sec for example Poland, wliere 
asylum seekers are not detained, unless they apply for asylum while staying illegally on national territory, 
during border control while they have no right to enter, or when they attempt to cross borders contrary to 
the law' (FPP-CR-Poland). Taking into account that few' persons seeking international protection first 
await a decision on a visa application in their countries of origin, many asylum seekers will be detained 
upon arrival in Poland.
4_ OJ L 326/23 of 13 December 2005. See also Article 7 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 
2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States (OJ L 
31/18 of 6 February' 2003). wliich provides that Member States arc authorized to confine an applicant to a
16
Nevertheless, numerous countries detain asylum seekers without much further 
justification than the fact that they are asylum seekers, sometimes for a short time in 
order to determine the admissibility o f the application,43 often as part of a  ‘fast-track 
procedure’, after which those not rejected on admissibility grounds, are transferred to 
open centres.44 However, sometimes the detention o f asylum seekers lasts longer and 
has almost become an inherent part of some stage,45 or even the whole o f the asylum 
procedure.46 Concern has been voiced about this practice in particular as some feel that
particular place in accordance with their national law only “when it proves necessary, fo r  example for 
legal reasons or reasons o f public order".
43 Or, as is tire case in Czech Republic where all applicants for asylum are initially detained, in order to 
identify the individuals: to subject them to a medical check; and to initiate tire asylum procedure (FPP- 
CR-Czech Republic). In Italy, asylum seekers may be detained for a maximum of thirty days in a so- 
called identification centre (Gil-Robles, 14 December 2005, p. 35).
44 As in Portugal, where asylum seekers are detained until the authorities decide that they have legitimate 
grounds for asking for asylum, which takes an average of three days. Tlrcrcaftcr, these applying for 
asylum on legitimate grounds are transferred to open reception centres (FPP-CR-Portugal). Finland only 
detains asylum seekers after they have received a negative decision on their application (FFP-CR-Finland, 
p. 19) In Latvia, asylum seekers are detained if their identity is not confirmed, or if their claims lave been 
rejected and they await expulsion (FPP-CR-Latvia).
45 In Austria, asylum seekers may be detained prior to a first negative decision if a procedural notice is 
issued by the Federal Asylum Authority during the admissibility proceedings stating that the application 
is likely to be dismissed or rejected while there is no appeal possible against such a notice (EU Network 
of independent experts 2005, p. 75-76).
46 See for example Hungary where the detention of asylum seekers depends on “accidental circumstances 
and arbitrary decisions o f the a u th o r itie s If the asylum seeker is able to file an application for asylum 
before he is apprehended by the border guards, he will not be detained. However, if the border guard 
apprehends him before he can do so, he will be detained and an alien policing procedure will be started 
against him before he can possibly submit an application for asylum. Although the pending expulsion will 
be suspended as soon as he submits an application, it will keep sewing as the basis for continued 
detention (FPP-CR-Hungary, par. 3.5.). Malta has mandatory detention policy for asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants alike, but whereas for the latter group, the maximum length is 18 months, asylum 
seekers may not be detained for over 12 months. However, these limits are merely administrative 
practice, and are not laid down in any binding legislation (Commissioner of Human Rights. Follow -Up 
Report on Malta. 2006). In Greece, not all asylum seekers are detained, but those that file an application 
w hilst in immigration detention (i.e. on the grounds of illegal entry or stay) remain in detention until a 
decision on their applications is given, or until the time limit of three months expires (FPP-CR- Greece). 
In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of those detained have applied for asylum at one stage or 
another (FPP-CR United Kingdom; and Gil-Robles. 8 June 2005).
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“detention is resorted to on the basis that a bed is available in a detention centre,” rather 
than considering the “necessity, legality and appropriateness” o f detaining asylum 
seekers47
Furthermore, widespread discrimination on the grounds of nationality exists, as 
some states routinely detain certain nationalities (or ethnic groups),48 whereas others 
seldom or never end up in an immigration prison. Although some countries only allow  
for the detention o f asylum seekers i f  it is ordered by a judicial authority,49 in many 
other countries, the decision to detain is taken administratively.50 In that case, extensive 
discretion often exists for individual immigration officers to decide about the detention 
o f asylum seekers,51 and sometimes automatic judicial review is absent,52 or it can take 
a long time.53 It should be noted that most countries’ legislation allows for the detainees 
themselves to contest the lawfulness o f  the detention through judicial review, habeas 
corpus proceedings or bail.54 Nonetheless, even in such cases, the possibility o f
Amnesty International EU Office (2005). See also Jesuit Refugee Service (2004). p. 4.
4H I.e. Roma in the United Kingdom. See Weber (2003).
49 Estonia, Germany, and Sweden.
50 Finland (where the decision to detain is taken by the police but needs to be reviewed by a judge within 
four days); France (where the decision to detain is taken by the préfet, and must be reviewed within 48 
hours); Hungary (where the administrative decision to detain must be review ed within five days); Latvia 
(where the administrative decision to detain pertains to a maximum period of ten days, and prolongation 
may only be given by a judge); Lithuania and Poland (where detention of more than 48 hours can only be 
ordered by a court, and where in the former country , the foreigners presence is mandatory during the 
Court’s hearing); The Netherlands; Belgium; Austria; Greece; the United Kingdom; Portugal; and Ireland 
(where asylum seekers that are detained must be brought before a judge as soon as practicable ( Kelly, 
2005. p. 29).
51 UNHCR Executive Committee (4 June 1999). p. 168. See Gil-Robles (8 June 2005) and Weber (2003) 
with regard to the situation in the United Kingdom.
5: Greece and the United Kingdom. If automatic judicial review is absent, the detention may be subject to 
periodical automatic administrativ e review’ as is the case in the latter country (Gil-Robles, 8 June 2005).
53 In the Netherlands, automatic review by a court of the lawfulness of the detention is provided, but it can 
take up to 7 weeks until it actually takes place. See Baudoin (2004).
54 With die important exception of Malta, where no proper form of judicial review exists, although there 
is the possibility to appeal to an administrative board, which can only order release in a limited number of 
circumstances (FPP-CR-Malta). In theory, the habeas corpus procedure from the criminal code is 
applicable, but lias never been used (Gil-Robles. 12 February’ 2004). In the United Kingdom, immigration 
detainees can apply for bail.
effectively contesting one’s detention is frequently non-existent due to the lack of 
information provided to the detainees, or insufficient access to legal aid.53
In addition, the detention o f refugees in particular may also prejudice their legal 
position as persons applying for international protection, as they are not always 
informed about the possibility of applying for asylum while in detention, and sometimes 
they are even impeded from access to the asylum system as a result o f their detention.56
1.1.2.3. Detention and removal
The last category that I will address is the detention as a result of a decision to 
deport or expel the foreigner.57 If a third-countiy national58 has been ordered to leave
55 Often one encounters similar problems as were discussed above with regard to detention upon arrival, 
see in particular footnote 36. At times, the official regulations themselves provide well enough for the 
right of access to information about the reasons for detention and additional information about rights 
when held in detention, but in practice, detained asylum seekers are often not fully informed of their 
position and the full extent of their rights (See Kelly, 2005, p. 35; and Gil-Robles. 8 June 2005, p. 18).
56 In France, for example, asylum application forms have to be completed in French since August 2004, 
and foreign nationals that apply for asylum while in administrative detention have to pay for an 
interpreter themselves. The result is that it is made very difficult for asylum seekers to claim for asylum 
while tliey arc detained, as was observed by a European Parliamentary delegation that visited the 
administrative detention centre of Mesnil-Amelot, about 50% of the asylum applications that wFere filed 
by persons held there were immediately rejected on the grounds of technical shortcomings, w'hilc the 
content of the applications was not examined at all (European Parliament. Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, 22 March 2006). In Italy, in Lampedusa Temporary' Holding Centre, almost no 
asylum claims are made, and migrants títere arc not given information about the possibilities to claim 
asylum open to them under Italian law. Besides, there arc allegations that there have been consular 
authorities of third countries cooperating in identification procedures to determine migrants' nationalities, 
a situation that carries great risks for potential asylum seekers (European United Left/Nordic Green Left. 
2005, p. 10). Furthermore, anyone failing to observo the rules on absence in the closed Italian 
identification centres for asylum seekers is regarded as having withdrawn his asylum application (Gil* 
Robles, 14 December 2005, p. 35. Amnesty' International has expressed concern that the Greek authorities 
may be impeding refugees access to asylum through their inability to communicate in Greek, especially in 
border areas. In addition, persons have told Amnesty7 International that upon arrival in the places of 
detention, they liad been persuaded to sign papers that they could not understand (Amnesty International. 
12 October 2005; and CPT, 20 December 2006, p. 38)
57 We have already seen that it is not alw ays possible to make a watertight separation between detention 
upon arrival and detention within the asylum procedure. Similarly, detention as a result of the decision to
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national territory, immigration legislation o f most EU countries provides for the 
possibility of administrative detention.59 In theory, this type o f detention is neither a 
punishment, nor a means o f directly coercing the foreigner leave the country, but it 
serves to safeguard removal, such as expulsion or deportation 60 Thus, the sole fact o f 
irregular residence does usually not provide a sufficient justification for detention in the 
EU Member States61 Nevertheless, foreigners are frequently kept in detention for 
significant periods of time before their deportation is practically arranged 62 In addition, 
although various national laws require that detention is to be necessary (often with a 
view to public policy or national security interests),63 in everyday practice, national 
authorities detain without due regard to the necessity and proportionality o f the
expulse or deport can also affect asylum seekers if their claims have been rejected or declared 
inadmissible. In the United Kingdom for example, asylum seekers who were detained in ‘fast track 
centres' and whose applications are rejected, can remain in detention until they arc removed (FPP-CR- 
United Kingdom CR, p. 34).
58 Detention of irregular migrants that are EU citizens should be highly exceptional practice according to 
EC law, only to be resorted to if they constitute a genuine threat to public policy. See ECJ. Case C- 
215/03, Sal ah Oulane v. M inister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, 17 February 2005, par. 40-44.
59 Such as (not exhaustive) Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; Czech Republic; France; 
Germany; Greece; Hungary'; Latvia; Luxembourg; Poland; United Kingdom; Portugal (although it is 
unusual practice); Slovenia; and Sweden.
60 See FPP-CR-Germany, p. 33. Nonetheless, there are countries that have provisions in their legislation 
that suggest the coercive nature of detention; in Ireland, the purpose of detention is to ensure that the 
person will co-operate in making arrangements, such as securing travel documents (FPP-CR-Ircland. p. 
22).
61 Guild (2006), p. 5.
6~ As is the case in Lithuania and the United Kingdom (EU Network of Independent Experts (2005). p. 
73). With regard to Hungaiy, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has 
expressed concern that irregular aliens are detained for up to 12 months on the sole ground that they hav e 
been found on Hungarian territory without a valid residence (Commissioner of Human Rights, Follow-Up 
Report on Hungaiy', 2006, p. 20). Hungary' also has the possibility' of enforcing detention even if the 
deportation order is suspended (FPP-CR-Hungary). In addition, some countries, such as Hungary and 
Germany provide for the possibility of detention in preparation of deportation procedures, therewith 
including verification of the identity of the foreigner and clarification of his residence status (FPP-CR‘s- 
Gcrmany and Hungary').
63 For example Swcdca where tlie legislation provides for detention if a decision to expel has been taken 
and the person is likely to abscond or engage in criminal activity (FPP-CR-Sweden).
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detention, often as a result of wide discretionary powers conferred by them by domestic
law s64
Even injudicial procedures where the legality o f the detention is challenged, the 
question as to whether the administration has employed its discretionary powers in 
accordance with these otherwise important principles is often not addressed.65 It remains 
to be seen whether this situation will change if  Article 14 of the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and o f the Council on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals becomes part of 
EC law.66 According to this provision, immigration detention of third-country nationals, 
who are or will be subject to a return decision or a removal order, is only to be resorted 
to if  there is a risk of absconding and where it would not be sufficient to apply less 
restrictive measures.
6A UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioners Programme (4 June 1999). See Weber 
(2003) with regard to the situation in the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, the public order criterion 
of Article 56(1) is interpreted so widely in policy guidelines that the required balance of interests almost 
always results in an outcome in favour of the executive (van Kalmthout, 1995b, p. 326). In addition 
Article 56(2) of the Aliens Act 2000 provides for detention "required by public order’ on the sole ground 
that the necessary papers for removal are available.
65 See for example Afdcling bcstuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 6 September 2005,200507112/1, 
JV 2005/452, where the highest administrative court in the Netherlands (Raad van State) ruled that it is 
not for the judge to assess whether less restrictive measures could have been applied in order to safeguard 
the aim of removal. In the United Kingdom, according to paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to tire Immigration 
Act 1971, a person may be detained under the authority of an immigration officer pending his removal. 
The House of Lords opinions that “ ‘pending ' in paragraph 16 means no more than ‘until The word is 
being used as a preposition, not as an adjective. Paragraph 16 does not say that the removal must be 
"pending", still less that it must be ‘impending ’. So long as the Secretary o f Slate remains intent upon 
removing the person and there is some prospect o f achieving this, paragraph 16 authorises detention 
m e a n w h ile See House of Lords, Regina v. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department (Respondent) ex 
parte Khadir (FC) (Appellant), 16 June 2005, [2005] UKHL 39, par. 32.
66 European Commission ( I September 2005).
21
i  n n i
Many countries have the duration of this type of detention limited by law 67 In 
this case, irregular migrants are released from administrative detention if expulsion has 
not been effected within the legal period for detention.68 However, as they are often not 
able to leave the country, they remain illegally on its territory, and are apprehended and 
detained over again. As a result, in many countries, irregular migrants may spend very 
long periods in detention with small breaks of freedom that are followed by detention 
again.69 This actual situation is neither apparent from legal provisions that lay down 
time limits, not is it reflected in statistics that record the duration of detention 70
Concerning the legal position of the immigration detainee who is to be expelled 
or deported, similar remarks can be made as were made with regard to the two types o f  
detention discussed above.71 Often extensive administrative discretion exists with
67 In Belgium, detention for removal is normally imposed for a maximum of two months, but it may be 
extended to five months. Further extension up to the absolute maximum of eight months is only permitted 
if it is necessary for the protection of public order or national security. In Czech Republic, irregular 
migrants can only be detained when an administrative decision on expulsion is imposed, but it is subject 
to a time limit of 180 days. In Estonia, if expulsion is not possible within the legal time limit to  
administrative detention of two months, an administrative court can prolong the detention for a maximum 
of up to four months (the average time of this type of detention is also 4 months in Estonia). In Finland, 
there is no time limit laid down in legislation, but the courts order release after three months. A French 
law passed on 26 November 2003 prolonged the maximum duration of administrative detention from 12 
to 36 days. In Greece, if the foreigner is not expelled within three months, he must be released 
immediately. In Hungary, detention in preparation for expulsion may not last longer titan 30 days, but 
detention in order to expulse is subject to a legal limit of twelve months. In Latvia, administrative 
detention may not exceed twenty months. In Malta, before 2005, there was no legal limit to the duration 
of the detention, and it was not unusual for persons to be detained for several years. A change in the law 
set a general time limit of 18 months, but in practice, release does not take place automatically after 18 
months, and it may take many more months, even if this is against Maltese laws. In Poland and Slovenia, 
the total time spent in detention may not exceed twelve months. Sec FPP, the respective country reports.
68 In Spain, if it is foreseeable that expulsion is not possible within the 40 day limit to the detentioa the 
judge lias to be notified immediately so that the detainee can be released.
69 See for example Greece (FPP-CR-Greece. p. 21).
70 A different situalioa but with similar results, is the case of Belgium, where courts and tribunal have 
decided that whenever a detainee resists an attempt to actually remove him. the detention begins over 
new. and time previously spent in detention is not counted for the duration of the detentioa (Jesuit 
Refugee Serv ice. 2007). See also EClHR. Ntumba Kabongo c. Belgique (inadmissible). 2 June 2005.
71 See in particular footnotes 36 and 50-55. Opondo and Harrell-Bond (1996) argue that the m ajor 
difference that exists in the United Kingdom between the legal position of criminals and that o f
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regard to the decision to detain; countries that provide for periodical and automatic 
judicial review of the detention are the smaller part; and the possibility to appeal to a 
judicial authority against the deprivation of liberty, if  provided for by law, is often 
difficult to exercise due to a lack o f (understandable) information regarding the right to 
challenge the legality of the detention or insufficient access to legal aid for detainees.72 
Often the basis for detention is not adequately explained, and at times, also the 
immigration status of the persons detained remains unclear to them 73
I will conclude this overview of state practice with some brief observations 
regarding the conditions of detention with a view to deportation or expulsion.74 The 
CPT has repeatedly held that “a prison is by definition not a place in which to detain 
someone who is neither convicted not suspected of a criminal offence”’5 and has urged 
Contracting States to put an end to holding immigration detainees in ordinary law 
enforcement agency detention facilities 76 Even so, many Member States keep detaining 
persons that are subject to a removal order in ordinary prisons or police custody 
facilities, sometimes as a result from a lack of available places in special centres, but 
often it is common policy 77 Furthermore, persons subject to an expulsion order are at
immigration detainees is that the latter can be detained for an indefinite period of time without a 
judgment.
See CPT (21 July 2005), pp. 31-32; HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2006a), pp. 25-26; Kelly (2005), 
pp. 40-42; and Gil-Robles (9 November 2005), p. 36.
73 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2006a), p. 26.
74 These observations are in many cases also applicable to the previous two categories of detention.
75 See for example CPT (18 September 2003), par 69. Also the UN Working Group on Arbitrary' 
Detention is of the opinion that custody should be effected in a public establishment specifically intended 
for this purpose. If this is for practical reasons not possible, immigration detainees should in any case be 
separated from persons who are imprisoned under criminal law UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 
December 1999).
76 CPT (20 December 2006), p. 24.
77 In Estonia, one expulsion centre opened in 2003 following a visit by the CPT. Detention in police cells 
for those to be expelled can only be resorted to for a maximum of thirty' days (FPP-CR-Estonia. pp. 20- 
21.) Finland lias one special custody unit for aliens as referred to in the Finish aliens act with a capacity of 
40 places. When the custody unit is full, an alien may exceptionally be placed in police detention 
premises, in which case the detention may not exceed four days. In France, there are 18 administrative 
detention centres and many more local facilities specifically designed for foreigners on which no 
information is available. However, foreigners w ho are under measures or procedures of removal may be 
detained w ith prisoners who are detained under criminal law, (FPP-CR-Francc). In Austria, detention for
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times kept in transit zones. The latter situation calls for extra scrutiny as some states 
argue that in these situations it is not depriving individuals of their liberty at a ll78
Even in the case that special holding centres exist for immigration detainees, 
conditions are at times worse than in ordinary prisons,79 with circumstances reminding 
of high security prisons and regulations that are not appropriate to the legal status o f the 
inmates and the low security risk that they pose.80 In addition, many o f these centres
the purpose of removal is often practised in normal prisons (FPP-CR-Austria, p. 24). In Germany, special 
institutions for administrative detention under immigration legislation are to be found only in a few 
federal states. Most cases of administrative detention of foreigners is carried out in penitentiary' 
institutions and prisons (FFP-CR-Germanv p. 33). Greece lias only a few administrative detention centres. 
Thus, every detention facility o f police stations all over the country constitutes de facto institution fo r 
administrative detention, where a vast majority of the immigration detainees are held (FPP-CR-Grecce, p. 
19). In Ireland, solely ordinary prisons are used (Kelly 2005). Also Hungary' resorts to immigration 
detention in ordinary' prisons. In that case, however, the immigration detainees arc kept separate from  
those that are held under criminal law (FPP-CR-Hungaiv). Latvia has one administrative detention 
facility', to which foreigners must be transferred if they have spent ten days in police detention facilities 
(FPP-CR-Latvia). Similarly, in Lithuania, foreigners can be kept in police facilities, but they must be 
transferred within 48 hours to the one centre for immigration detainees (FPP-CR-Lithuania). The 
Netherlands have special places for administrative detention, but detention is regularly carried out in  
police custody facilities or prisons (Baudoin, van de Burgt, Hendriksen 2002, pp. 211). In Sweden, 
special centres under the authority o f the migration board exist for immigration detention. Placement in  
penitentiary institutions is only permitted only in the case o f special circumstances (FPP-CR-Swedcn, p. 
17). In Portugal, irregular migrants may be placed in prisons with convicted prisoners or in transit zones 
of the international airport (FPP-CR~Portugal).
78 Belgium for example, argues that in this case, the foreigners in question have no right of residence in  
Belgium, are subject to deportation orders issued by the Office for Foreigners and that by being placed in  
the transit zone, they are not being detained, but simply escorted to Belgium's border and are free to leave 
by catching a flight to their country' of origin or a third country'. See Amnesty International (1 September 
2004).
79 In Latvia and Fiance, the rules concerning the detention of illegal immigrants are more restrictive than  
those applied to persons convicted for criminal offences (FPP-CR’s-Latvia and France).
80 See for example Travis (2005), reporting in the Guardian about a weapon commonly carried by prison 
officers in British removal centres, despite the fact that their use is banned in low' security prisons. In  
some Austrian detention centres, detainees are only able to communicate with their visitors through a  
glass partitioning, which the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture did not deem in  
accordance with tlx: low security risk of the persons detained (CPT, 21 July 2005, p. 32) In Germany, the 
CPT was alarmed by the existence of violent and inappropriate security measures tliat could be used in  
the immigration detention centre o f Eissenhiittenstadt (CPT, 12 March 2003. p. 32.) The Council o f
suffer from problems resulting from serious overpopulation, inadequate medical and 
hygienic care and limited possibilities for contact with the outside world.81 In view of 
these problems, it is to be welcomed that the proposed directive on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
Europe Commissioner of Human Rights has called on the Maltese authonties to stop using militan' 
methods of searches of immigration detainees (Commissioner of Human Rights, Follow-Up Report on 
Malta. 2006, p. 12) and to abolish the practice of systematically handcuffing migrants when they are 
taken to and from the hospital (Gil-Robles, 12 February' 2004, p. 8). In the Netherlands, the regulations 
for immigration detainees are comparable and sometimes identical to those applicable to persons who 
have been convicted of criminal offences. Van Kalmthout (2005a) argues that by subjecting the 
immigration detainee to restrictions that do not bear any relationship to the aim of the detention, the 
human rights o f the immigration detainee are unnecessarily and disproportionately interfered with. It is 
significant that in the Netherlands, administrative courts arc excluded by law (Articles 60 and 69 of the 
Paritaire Beginselenwet) from assessing the conditions and regulations applicable to immigration 
detention. See Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State, 28 April 2005, 200410273/1, JV 
2005/308. Nevertheless, there arc also exceptions, see for example Finland, where detainees liavc access 
to better and more relaxed living conditions than normal prisoners and wire re the possibilities for 
receiving visits by friends and family are not limited (FPP-CR-Finland, pp. 20-21).
81 In Luxembourg, restrictions on the visits to immigration detainees are more severe than those 
applicable to normal prisoners (Gil-Robles. 8 July 2004, p. 11.) The CPT in its visit to the Czech 
Republic in 2002 criticised conditions of detention and was alarmed by allegations of ill-treatment and 
vcibal abuse in some of the facilities (CPT, 12 March 2004, pp. 20-29). In Poland, the CPT observed that 
health care and psychological and psychiatric support for immigration detainees were not adequate. In 
addition, no regimes of activities appropriate to lire detainees' legal status and the length of the stay were 
available (CPT, 2 March 2006, pp. 22-27). See CPT (20 December 2006), pp. 22, 31-39; and Amnesty 
International (5 October 2005) for documentation about veiy poor conditions and allegations of ill- 
treatment in the detention facilities for illegal migrants in Greece. In Dougoz v. Greece (ECtHR, 6 March 
2001, par. 48). the Court in Strasbourg considered that the conditions of immigration detention at the 
Alexandras police headquarters and the Drapetsona detention centre, “in particular the serious 
overcrowding and absence o f  sleeping facilities, combined with the inordinate length o f the period during 
which the applicant wax detained in such c o n d itio n s amounted to degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3 ECHR. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe called the conditions in 
the administrative holding centre for men under the Palais de Justice in Paris “disastrous and unworthy o f  
France” and urged its closure because a place of this kind at the heart of the French judicial system was 
unacceptable (Gil-Robles, 15 February' 2006. p. 62, and for similar criticism see also European 
Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 22 March 2006)
25
nationals82 lays down requirements regarding the conditions of temporary custody. 
According to Article 15 o f the Proposal, immigration detainees shall, upon request, be 
allowed without delay to establish contact with legal representatives, family members 
and competent consular authorities as well as with relevant international and non­
governmental organisations. In addition, it stipulates that temporary custody shall be 
carried out in specialised temporary custody facilities,83 and that Member States shall 
ensure that international and non-governmental organisations have the possibility to  
visit temporary custody facilities in order to assess the adequacy o f the temporary 
custody conditions.
82 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards an d  
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. European 
Commission (1 September 2005).
83 Where a Member State cannot provide accommodation in a specialised temporary- custody facility an d  
has to resort to prison accommodation, it shall ensure that third-country nationals under temporary- 
custody are permanently physically separated from ordinary7 prisoners (Article 15. par. 2).
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1.2. A i m  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  a n d  p l a n  o f  r e s e a r c h
The aim of this study is threefold First it argues that the particular development 
of sovereignty, neither a natural nor a self-evident notion but the result o f historical 
contingencies, has led to a situation in which the use o f force against outsiders is 
justified in a way which is fundamentally different from the way in which the use of 
force against insiders is scrutinised.
The second argument, strongly related to the first, posits that the contemporary 
application o f human rights has not been able to formulate adequate answers to the use 
of force in the instances that the national state wishes to verify and enforce its 
sovereignty against those who have violated its material or symbolic boundaries. We 
will see that this so-called blind spot of human rights protection, which is nowhere more 
visible than in the contemporary practice of immigration detention, is due to an 
enduring perception of territoriality as a self-evident and innocent concept for the 
organisation of the global political system.
At the heart of this second argument is the premise that the concept of territory 
and the idea of rights are firmly linked and that the international legal discourse regards 
the jurisdictional content of sovereignty in a way that fundamentally differs from the 
way in which it considers its territorial frame. However, it is important to be aware from 
the outset that sovereignty’s form and content are necessarily intertwined. Both play an 
equally significant role with regard to the definition o f political community, although 
their relationship within the context of political organisation has varied over time.
Before the advent o f the modem state, political power was based upon personal 
relations. After the Peace o f Westphalia in 1648, this structure began to change slowly 
into a system where clearly demarcated and independent territorial units formed the 
basis for political power. The fact that the foundation o f political power has over time 
shifted from the personal to the territorial does not entail that power over people has 
diminished in importance, nor does it mean that territory was politically insignificant 
before the emergence of the modem state. It means that at present, jurisdiction is 
exercised over individuals because of their presence in a certain territory instead of on 
account of their specific position in the body politic. In addition, the state uses its spatial 
powers to protect its territorial borders. The enormous growth of state power during the 
last few centuries has been accompanied with increasing demands for safeguards
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against the state abusing its jurisdiction over people, resulting in a multifaceted system 
for the protection of individual liberties.
However, in this study I will argue that with regard to the state’s spatial powers 
and sovereignty’s territorial frame, a corresponding development through which the 
individual interests that are involved in it are accounted for, is lacking. This has led to  
what I call a “territorial blindness” on the part of constitutional principles in the 
domestic as well as in the international sphere.
The administrative detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers is one o f  
the ways in which European states protect their territories from unwanted immigration: 
in essence these states want to sustain the above-mentioned territorial blindness o f  
systems of individual rights protection. However, immigration detention is special 
amongst the other instruments and policies by which these states try to stem the flows o f  
migration. In the first place, it is special because deprivation o f liberty is the sharpest 
technique by which the state protects that blindness. We will see that personal liberty 
and sovereignty are conceptually intertwined: the protection o f the former is the reason 
for the existence of the latter. In societies based upon the mle o f law there is no m ore 
serious interference with an individual’s fundamental rights as depriving him of his 
liberty.
Secondly, immigration detention is not only a way in which states violently 
guard the territorial blind spots of individual rights protection, but as a practice itself it 
attempts to make ultimate use of these same blind spots. Thus, territorial blindness o f  
the rule of law, a blindness that states seem only too eager too protect, has made the 
detention of thousands of people, simply because they crossed boundaries, not only 
possible but also commonplace.
The second argument thus presents the administrative detention o f foreigners as 
a legal anomaly in societies that are otherwise based upon respect for the mle of law. 
However, this study will not merely portray immigration law enforcement in the form 
of detention as illiberal practices of liberal regimes, made possible by a structural 
feature of contemporary political organisation. In addition, it hopes to introduce a 
complementary but more hopeful approach by showing how the administrative 
detention of foreigners, however deplorable as contemporary political practice, may also 
provide opportunities to erase the artificial distinction in the modem version of the m le 
of law between the state’s exercise of jurisdiction within a given body politic and the
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territorial frame in which this power is exercised, and thus to deconstruct the narrow 
linkage between territoriality and personal rights.
Drawing on Roberto Unger’s idea of “destabilization rights”,84 the third aim of 
this study is to argue that the capacity of the destitute, the refugee and the citizen of 
dictatorships, while interned by European states on European territory, to resort to 
traditional rule o f law guarantees, however marginal such guarantees may be in their 
specific cases, has the potential to destabilize the institution of territorial sovereignty, 
and therewith it may in time strike at the conceptual innocence and perceived neutrality 
of territorial borders in constitutional discourse, domestically as well as internationally.
This study sets out with an investigation into the conceptual background of 
immigration detention from the perspective of the sovereignty paradigm. What is 
sovereignty (Chapter 2), and whether and how can it be limited (Chapter 3) are 
questions which will be dealt with in the first two Chapters. Subsequently, a general 
contextualisation of immigration detention will be provided by exploring the 
development and nature of the international legal framework regulating international 
freedom of movement (Chapters 4 and 5).
Thereafter, I will specifically deal with the limits that have been set to the use of 
immigration detention by human rights law. First, I will address the way in which these 
limits are formally given shape in various general human rights instruments (Chapter 6). 
Subsequently, I will analyse in depth how the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as the constitutional court for Europe applies fundamental rights to cases of 
immigration detention (Chapter 7). These two Chapters intend to determine whether the 
limits that are set to the use o f detention in immigration policy are satisfactory when 
regarded in the light o f other contemporary discourses about limiting the violence 
potentially inherent in sovereignty. Where I find that this is not the case, I maintain that 
the reason for the fact that immigration detainees receive inadequate protection is 
related to the idea of territoriality. I argue that the problem is not so much territoriality 
in itself, but has to be sought in the fact that the territorial frame of sovereignty does not 
have the same history of being subjected to critical scrutiny as its jurisdictional content.
Although territorial sovereignty has so far remained largely immune to 
traditional forces of domestic and international correction, in the conclusions to this 
study (Chapter 8), I contend that the international human rights discourse has the
84 Unger (1987). See also Sable and Simon (2004).
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capacity to change the meaning of territorial borders and mitigate the exclusive effects 
of modem sovereignty. Paradoxically, the practice of immigration detention, instead of 
being only illiberal practice, may hand us the tools to transform the international legal 
order such as to make it into one that is more true to some of its underlying 
universalistic ideals.
1.3. C o n t e n t  o f  t h i s  s t u d y
Deprivations of liberty on a massive scale constitute the ultimate example o f  the 
use o f force by the state. Apart from a concrete manifestation of state violence, 
immigration detention camps are also an expression of the state’s claim to determine 
where the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ lies. Immigration detention is one of 
the possible outcomes of the conflict between the sovereign claim to determine that 
boundary and the individual’s ideal o f freedom of movement. Thus, apart from looking 
into how sovereignty has generally legitimised the use of force by the state over time, in 
Chapter 2, special attention will be paid to the inside/outside distinction that the modem 
notion of sovereignty has brought about by use of the concept of territoriality: the 
linkage of political power to clearly demarcated territory. Territoriality shaped the 
notions of nationality and nation state, of belonging and membership in a historically 
specific way. The result is that at the heart of the modem state we find the two 
conflicting forces of “the universalism o f an egalitarian legal community and the 
particularism o f  a community united by historic destiny” 85 A thorough understanding 
of this tension is essential in order to comment on the practice o f immigration detention.
In addition, Chapter 2 will discuss the external aspects of modern sovereignty in 
the Westphalian state system in order to contribute to a proper evaluation of legal norms 
dealing with international migration in later chapters (Chapters 4 and 5).
Thus, Chapter 2 addresses sovereignty’s territorial form and its jurisdictional 
content within a given body politic, as well as its underlying tension between 
universalism and particularism. Chapter 3 weaves further upon these two lines. This 
Chapter treats the various ways that have been devised to limit the use of force by the 
state. Citizenship, constitutionalism and international human rights law are all
83 See Habermas (1998). pp. 405-406.
discourses that intend to limit the use o f force of the state internally. All o f them are 
characterised by the same tension between a rights-based universalism and the political 
particularism that we discern at the heart of the modem state.
We will see that citizenship is the most problematic of these discourses when the 
use of force is employed in order to defend a certain inside/outside distinction, because 
in addition to protecting against sovereign power, citizenship strongly participates in 
sovereignty’s claim to determine a certain inside from the outside. Constitutionalism as 
the theory and practice of the limits of power as a more general, inclusive discourse is 
also addressed.
International human rights as the most recent way of posing limits to state 
violence will receive particular attention in Chapter 3, since the raison d’être of modem 
human rights law is to overcome the particularism of traditional rule of law guarantees. 
However, we will see that also here the assumed naturalness and neutrality of the 
concept of territoriality poses limits to human rights’ capacity to become truly universal 
guarantees for human dignity. In addition, Chapter 3 will briefly deal with the 
international law o f war and humanitarian law. These areas of law receive attention 
because they also exemplify that the notion of territoriality is pivotal in international 
law and they exemplify its aim of maintaining the territorial order.
In Chapters 4 and 5, international freedom of movement is investigated. Where 
Chapters 2 and 3 can be seen as presenting the conceptual framework of these elements 
o f contemporary political organisation that are fundamental to understanding 
immigration detention, Chapters 4 and 5 flesh out this framework in the particular 
direction of individual movement crossing international borders.
Chapter 4 addresses historical perspectives on the right to leave and the 
international legal framework regulating exit is analysed in detail. We will see that the 
right to leave is a right that the national state can no longer restrict, except for a few 
narrowly defined exceptions. In other words, sovereignty decreased in importance when 
it comes to matters concerning exit, a process that found it culmination in the 
codification of the right to leave in international law in the twentieth century.
Regarding the entrance o f non-nationals, Chapter 5 shows that sovereignty has 
made a reverse development. This Chapter first traces the historic development of the 
common assumption that the entry and sojourn of foreign nationals are matters that fall 
largely within the sovereign discretion of the national state alone. Subsequently, it 
closely examines international legal exceptions to this assumption, such as flowing from
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general international law, the prohibition of inhuman treatment, the international 
refugee regime and the right to family life. Chapter 5 will argue that, exempting the 
norm of non-refoulement flowing from the prohibition on inhuman treatment, all the 
legal exceptions to the state’s exclusionary powers fit within a territorial image of 
political order. Instead of denouncing the way in which responsibility, rights and 
territory are linked, most rights bearing upon a right to enter or stay attempt to fix the 
inevitable gaps in such a system, and by doing so, they reinforce it. However, we will 
see that the application of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment in the 
immigration context shows that territory and rights can be decoupled, if it were not for 
states’ ever growing attempts to resort to extra-territorial measures of immigration 
control.
Chapter 5 pays specific attention to immigration law enforcement as well. A 
perception of the state’s undeniable right to control aliens' entiy into and residence in its 
territory surely must have an impact on the assumed appropriateness of the violence that 
is used to exercise such control, such as deportation and detention. We will see that 
deportation and detention are not merely the results of an exclusionary immigration 
policy, but that they constitute practices which possess a separate socio-political logic o f 
their own.86 Instead of just one of the many options available to national states, 
deportation and detention o f unwanted foreigners are presented as the natural and 
singular response o f  the modem state to those who have violated its territorial 
sovereignty. This is reflected in the fact that the detention centre as an organizational 
structure to administer entry and deportation of foreigners increasingly prevails over 
other forms o f administration in contemporary European societies.87 We will see that 
the state practice o f detention in particular constitutes the litmus test for the present 
regime governing cross-border movement and the unyielding impact of territoriality on 
the individual’s life.
Chapters 4 and 5 taken together show that the regime regulating trans-national 
freedom of movement brings to light some striking ambiguities and inherent tensions in 
the international legal order. Chapters 2 to 5 will have made clear that most o f these 
inconsistencies derive from two premises. The first is that the assumed naturalness of 
territorial borders has led to a conceptual distinction between the jurisdictional content
86 De Genova and Pcutz (forthcoming).
87 Challenge (11 April 2006).
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and the territorial form of sovereignty. As a result, international law, although it has 
increasingly conceded that the sovereign state’s jurisdiction over people cannot be 
without limits, has so far simply refused to take account of the individual interests that 
are involved in territorial sovereignty.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the sharp distinction in 
international law between the jurisdictional aspect and the territorial aspect of 
sovereignty is artificial. Both aspects of sovereignty play an equally important role in 
the state’s construction of political community; and ultimately it is the latter concept 
that is the rationale for most restrictions on fundamental rights of the individual.
The second premise is that the international order based on sovereign 
independent states does not only regulate the behaviour of states amongst each other, 
but it also functions as a mechanism to determine who belongs where. Territorial 
sovereignty in this system is a principle that allocates the responsibility for separate 
populations amongst distinct territorial units. The asymmetries within the international 
legal framework regulating the movement of individuals can only be understood when 
we take into account these two premises that underpin the international legal system.
The state’s assertion of its territorial sovereignty leads to practices such as 
immigration detention. Chapters 6 and 7 will address the way in which international 
human rights discourse has constrained this specific instance o f state violence resulting 
from a historically contingent conception of sovereignty. In Chapter 6 ,1 sketch a broad 
outline of the human rights discourse regulating the administrative detention of irregular 
immigrants and asylum seekers. This Chapter gives an overview of various human 
rights instruments that are relevant for the practice of immigration detention. Case law 
concerning immigration detention of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional 
Protocol88 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)89 
receives particular attention.
Chapter 7 treats the protection afforded by article 5 of the 1950 Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in cases of 
immigration detention. It consists of a detailed analysis of the case law by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Article 5 ECHR. In this Chapter, I will 
argue that in the ECtHR’s case law on immigration detention, one can discern a serious
88 See UNGA Res. 2200A (XX) of 16 December 1966
89 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
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lack in proportionality and as such the Court endorses detentions which are unnecessary 
and therefore in contradiction with the core of the protection of Article 5 EC HR. When 
compared to case law concerning the deprivation o f liberty in other cases, serious 
inconsistencies can be identified in the ECtHR’s approach to immigration detention. We 
will understand these inconsistencies once we are conscious o f an obdurate and self- 
reinforcing notion o f territorial sovereignty. I argue that the ECtHR in most of its case 
law dealing with immigration detention defers to international law ’s distinction between 
the state’s exercise o f jurisdiction over persons and the alleged neutral and pre-given 
territorial framework in which this jurisdiction is exercised. As a result, it is unwilling 
to address interferences with the right to personal liberty in immigration law in the same 
manner as it addresses interferences that occur in a purely domestic context where the 
territoriality of the modem state is not a factor to be reckoned with.
Thus, Chapter 7 argues that the main international mechanism for protecting 
human rights in the European context is characterised by a blind spot when it comes to 
limiting the state’s power to resort to violence in the form of immigration detention. The 
discourse o f human rights in this context proves to be a limited discourse. In the 
conclusions to this study in Chapter 8, I will conclude that international constitutional 
discourse in general suffers from a serious blindness whenever a state presents the 
exercise of power as being predominantly based on sovereignty’s territorial frame. This 
blindness can be characterised as what Hilary Chariesworth in a different context has 
called a “silence within the law”, which is not the same as a lacuna that can be filled 
with some “simple construction work” .90 Indeed, this territorial silence is integral to the 
whole structure o f international (and domestic) law, “a critical element of its stability” .91
However, I will argue that “a shift in its stabilisation”92 may be brought about by 
a new role for human rights, more in keeping with their proclaimed status as universal 
standards based on the dignity o f  the individual. I contend that in order for the system of 
human rights to function effectively, the nation state needs to be held responsible for the 
exercise of its power on account of its territorial sovereignty, instead of allowing it to 
present sovereignty’s territorial frame as a predisposed and neutral given. By taking into 
account the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s frame international
90 Hilary Charlcsworth with regard to international law’s silence o f women. Charlcsworth (1999). p. 381
91 Ibid.
9" Korhonen (2002). p. 213. See also Charlesworth (1999).
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human rights may become what Roberto Unger calls destabilization rights931 will draw 
on the work of Charles Sabel and William Simon, who apply the idea of destabilization 
rights to public law litigation, in order to explain how the application human rights in 
immigration detention may induce a transformation of sovereignty’s territorial frame in 
a process in which it must respond to what was previously an excluded stakeholder: the 
individual94
The fact that this process, as a result of its destabilizing impact on legal 
structures, have far-reaching political effects need not deter courts whose function it is 
also to provide individual with the protection of their fundamental rights. What Roberto 
Unger calls “the halo of reasoned authority and necessity upon the institutionalised 
structure of society”95 should not deter lawyers from imagining alternative possibilities 
for organising that structure, quite the contrary. I will argue that the way in which 
constitutional courts such as the ECtHR apply fundamental rights in cases of 
immigration detention could help this process on its way.
93 Unger (1987).
94 See Sabel and Simon (1994). p. 1056
95 Unger (1996), p. 96.
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Chapter 2 Sovereignty, people and territory
2.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
The discursive practice of sovereignty profoundly influences the way 
immigration is perceived and it strongly affects the question of the legitimacy o f the 
instruments that the state uses to deal with unwanted immigrants. In the specific context 
of immigration detention, I believe that in certain respects sovereignty has become one 
of these discursive practices that Rob Walker so powerfully describes as having “turned 
an historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present.”96 
The practice o f immigration detention, in its broader context of freedom of movement, 
is capable of bringing to light insights in the relation between the institution of 
territorial sovereignty and individual rights that normally remain concealed in 
commonly accepted notions about political power, political community and the 
organisation o f the global state system.97 As such, it may expose shortcomings in the 
modem version o f the rule o f law, embodied in the discourse of international human 
rights.
However, before I turn to these issues in later Chapters of this study, it is first 
necessary to understand sovereignty’s fundamental claims and their underlying 
assumptions. In this Chapter, I take a close look at the notion of sovereignty with the 
particular practice o f  immigration detention and its context o f international migration in 
mind. This means that certain implications o f sovereignty will not be touched upon at 
all, whereas other aspects will be emphasised. In this introduction, I explain why I deem 
an inquiry in the concept o f sovereignty essential in order to comment upon 
immigration detention and I will indicate which o f its aspects will receive particular 
attention in my analysis.
96 Walker (1993), p. 31
97 See Unger (1996) for a more general version o f this argument about the relation between individual 
interests on the one hand and institutions on the other hand, and its implications on legal analysis.
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The most common differentiation made within sovereignty’s various functions is 
that between its external and internal aspects. Internally, the function of sovereignty is 
to ensure that there is no higher authority within the territorial limits of the state than the 
state itself -  within its borders the state has exclusive and ultimate authority. In the 
course of history, such exclusive and ultimate authority came to entail both power over 
people and power over territory. Internal sovereignty is bound up with the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as well as with its claim to determine what 
constitutes the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’98.
External or Westphalian sovereignty entails the exclusion o f external authority 
from the territory of the state. We will see below that, although sovereignty was initially 
thought of as a concept to conceptualise and justify ultimate political authority within 
the state, it inevitably came to bear upon relations amongst states as well. The internal 
and external sovereign claims that the contemporary state makes with regard to people 
and territory -  the monopoly on the use o f violence; the determination of the boundary 
between inside and outside; and those related to the Westphalian structure that all states 
form part of -  touch immediately upon immigration detention and its broader context of 
international movement of people.
In the first place, deprivations of liberty on a massive scale of asylum seekers or 
other immigrants clearly constitute the use of force by the state. Only states can 
legitimately resort to the imprisonment of individuals and in order to understand 
immigration detention, we need to understand the sovereign state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence.
In the second place, we need to take into account the particular context in which 
this specific form of imprisonment takes place. In contemporary Europe, that is a 
context of an immigration policy which is focussed increasingly on the restriction of 
individual rights and which finds its justification in the language of crisis and threat. 
Sovereignty’s claim to determine the inside from the outside is employed to portray 
migration mainly as a security issue, in response to which the use of force is assumed to 
be justified because “the process of demarcation of friends and enemies, delineation of 
boundaries of order versus disorder has been the prerogative of the sovereign state, 
provider of security within its boundaries and preserver of ‘law and order’.”99
98 Walker (2003). p 22; and Werner and Wilde (2001). p. 288.
99 Aradau (December 2001).
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Thus, national responses to international migration do not only illustrate the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but perhaps even more importantly, 
they also exemplify the sovereign claim o f the state to determine its boundaries. These 
boundaries can be concrete and tangible, such as territorial borders, but they can be 
implicit as well, contained as they are in concepts such as nationality and citizenship. 
Both sets of boundaries constitute the sphere where sovereignty’s claim to distinguish 
the inside from the outside and the individual’s ideal of freedom of movement conflict. 
Immigration detention is at once a concrete manifestation of this claim by the state, and 
a possible outcome o f such a conflict between state and individual. We will see that the 
stance taken by the contemporary sovereign state with regard to immigration epitomizes 
that internal sovereignty is about the unity o f the body politic and the definition of 
political community. The state uses both its territorial sovereignty and its jurisdiction 
over people in order to attain or maintain such unity.
However, we will not be able to understand the international legal regulation of 
international migration if  we merely focus on the internal sovereign claims of the nation 
state. States do not exist in a vacuum, but they form part o f a system of sovereign states 
and international migration engages precisely this system. Thus, the role and place of 
the notion o f sovereignty within this system, as opposed to its mere internal functions, 
needs to be taken into account as well, in order to place the domestic practice of 
immigration detention in the wider context o f international rules that regulate movement 
of people between states, as will be done later in this study (Chapters 4 and 5).
Above, I have briefly outlined these aspects o f sovereignty that are relevant for 
achieving an adequate understanding o f the contemporary practice of immigration 
detention. Accordingly, the following inquiry will pay particular attention to the 
following matters: the manner in which the use o f force by the state has been 
legitimised; the way in which the modem state distinguishes between inside and outside 
by the use o f concepts such as nation state, political community and identity; and the 
global structure o f a territorial system o f  sovereign states in which these concepts 
operate. It should be mentioned at the outset that immigration detention and its context 
o f international migration also show unambiguously that all aspects of sovereignty are 
interrelated and that conceptual separations between them do not always reflect reality.
Indeed, we will see in this study that sovereign states’ responses to international 
migration exemplify that the actual content o f sovereignty, i.e. jurisdiction over persons, 
is necessarily intertwined with the territorial frame in which it operates. In a similar
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fashion, such responses illustrate that the internal and external aspects of sovereignty 
cannot be understood in isolation from each other. As all aspects of sovereignty are 
profoundly related to and mutually influence each other, it would not do justice to 
reality to classify their respective developments in distinct categories. For that reason, 
the structure of this Chapter does not accurately reflect the distinctions made above. 
Rather, I hope that by using these various aspects of sovereignty as red lines running 
through my inquiry of the sovereignty paradigm, they will bring out those aspects o f our 
understanding o f the modem state and the system that it forms part of that are essential 
in order to comment on the practice o f immigration detention in contemporary European 
states in later Chapters o f  this study.
The structure o f this Chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2., I give an overview of 
the development of the concept of sovereignty, as a legitimating discourse for ultimate 
political power within the body politic. The account of this development is divided in 
two parts. Section 2.2.1 treats the emergence of a theory of sovereignty against the 
historical background o f gradual territorialisation of political organisation; and Section
2.2.2 addresses the theory of popular sovereignty. Subsequently, in Section 2.3., I deal 
with the manner in which the modem state has construed its understanding of inside and 
outside by using territory and identity. We will see that territorialisation, the process by 
which political authority came to be linked to clearly demarcated territorial units, 
influenced the way in which the modem state conceives of identity and political 
community.
Thus, Sections 2.2. and 2.3. make a division within the concept of sovereignty 
by treating respectively the way in which the exercise of power in a given body politic 
has been legitimised and the way in which understandings of inside and outside have 
been constructed. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, we will see that the historical 
processes that gave rise to these two aspects of sovereignty cannot be neatly separated 
as relating solely to the one or the other. On the one hand, it will become clear that the 
way in which the theory o f popular sovereignty has legitimised political authority has 
strongly influenced the manner in which modem states have drawn their boundaries. On 
the other hand, we will see that the process of territorialisation facilitated the emergence 
of the very notion o f sovereignty as legitimation of ultimate power within the body 
politic.
The conclusions to this Chapter in Section 2.4. will pay attention to the impact 
of both the development o f the notion of sovereignty and the process of territorialisation
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on the legitimacy o f violence. The interrelatedness of all sovereignty’s aspects is briefly 
reiterated with specific regard to national responses to international migration.
2.2. Sovereignty: legitimisation of political power within the body politic
2.2.1. Development of the modern notion of sovereignty
With regard to freedom of movement, Michael Walzer asserts that emigration 
and immigration are morally asymmetrical; arguing as he does that restraint on entry 
serves to protect a group of individuals who are committed to each other, whereas 
restrictions on exit imply replacing commitment with coercion.100 It is only in Chapters 
4 and 5 that questions regarding freedom o f movement will be addressed, but the reason 
that I refer to W alzer’s views here is that I find the last part o f his statement intriguing. 
Does he mean to say that replacing commitment with coercion is not acceptable? Yet 
we don’t seem to think that it is always objectionable that coercion by the state takes the 
place o f commitment on the part of the individual if the latter is lacking: i f  we do not 
provide our children with the care that our society deems appropriate they may be 
separated from us, and if  we refuse to pay taxes we could end up in prison. Although 
coercion may not be the only thing that state power is about, it is certainly a very 
important aspect o f it.
“Ultimate violence may not be used frequently. There may be innumerable steps in its 
application, in the way of warnings and reprimands. But if all the warnings are disregarded, even 
in so slight a matter as paying a traffic ticket, the last tiring that will happen is that a couple of 
cops show' up at the door with handcuffs and a Black Maria. [...] In Western democracies, with 
their ideological emphasis on voluntary compliance with popularly legislated rules, this constant 
presence of official violence is underemphasized. It is all the more important to be aware of it. 
Violence is the ultimate foundation of any political order.”101
Amongst other things, sovereignty entails a claim to hold a monopoly on the 
legitimate use o f force. Some authors feel that the term “legitimate use o f force” is a
100 Walzer (1983), p. 39-40.
101 Berger (1963) p. 69.
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contradiction in terms: “It seems contrary to common sense and logical precept that an 
institution should be able to project its moral injunctions through acts of brute force.”102 
Although the discussion of what constitutes legitimate political power has a much 
longer history, my analysis starts with the early emergence of sovereignty during the 
late middle ages. We will see that the manner in which men have since then attempted 
to legitimise the exercise of political power, thereby turning it into authority instead of 
mere force, have varied from appeals to religion and the natural order to the notion of 
the people. Many thinkers about sovereignty have included the use of force explicitly in 
their perception of political power, either on the grounds of raison d’Etat, or because in 
their theory subjects surrendered their right to self defence to the sovereign, whose task 
it then became to protect them, or because sovereignty is logically impossible without 
complete control and free disposal over the means of violence.
Thinking about sovereignty predated a world in which independent territorial 
units were the main building blocks for political life.103 In medieval Europe, political 
power was not characterised by territoriality, but different territorial entities overlapped 
each other, and power structures were complex and hierarchical in varying degrees. 
Political power manifested itself in personal relations rather than with regard to 
territory, and these relations could be manifold. However, by the end of the fifteenth 
century, monarchical power had grown enormously in almost all of Europe at the 
expense of medieval institutions, such as feudalism, free city states and the church, the 
latter perhaps the most conspicuous of all medieval institutions. The role of the 
Reformation in the breakdown of the medieval order should not be underestimated, for 
before the Reformation Europe was perceived as a single community, even if  only in 
theory: the Res Publica Christiana with its head as the agent of God.104
The gradual consolidation of power and territory under a single and supreme 
ruler, especially in France, but also in Spain and England, changed modes of political 
thought and it provided the opportunity for the notion of sovereignty to re-emerge from 
Roman imperial law and from the theory of divine right.105 In order to see how the 
notion of sovereignty was able to secure its fundamental place in political thought, it is 
instructive to take a brief look at the writings of Machiavelli, and not only because it
102 Hoffman (1988), p. 73.
K'3 Murphy (1996). p. 82; Hinsley (1986). p. 21; and Werner and Wilde (2001), p. 289.
1,(4 Phil pot t (1997). p. 28-33.
105 Sec Hinsley (1986) about earlier manifestations of sovereignty.
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was mainly these writings that created the meaning that is still attached to the term state 
in political usage.106
Machiavelli (1469-1527) was living exactly at the time when the medieval 
political order, defined by a hierarchy o f authorities started to change slowly into to the 
modem decentralised system of independent political entities defined by territory. The 
move in Europe from the medieval to the modem was not smooth and peaceful -  on the 
contrary, it was accompanied by civil wars and chaos caused by competing claims to 
political power. It is no coincidence that many thinkers about sovereignty have been 
preoccupied with political stability and the unity o f the body politic. Machiavelli, 
although he did not develop a theory on sovereignty and merely hinted at the notion, 
was no exception. He was deeply disturbed by the particularly chaotic state Italy found 
itself in at the end of the fifteenth century; for although medieval institutions had broken 
down there was no power strong enough to unite the whole o f Italy and bring order and 
stability to the region. According to Machiavelli, preservation and continuance of the 
state is the aim of politics. Every prince must seek to maintain his state and “a wise 
prince is guided above all by the dictates of necessity.” 107
“When the safety of one’s country' wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention 
should be paid cither to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, o rto  its being praiseworthy or 
ignominious. On the contrary, every other consideration set aside, that alternative should be 
wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and presen e tire freedom of one’s country'.”108
Thus, it appears that Machiavelli perceived the polity as an abstract entity, and 
its ruler is placed outside and above the legal and moral framework that applies to the 
ruled. Linked to  his perception o f the ruler, is Machiavelli’s conception o f the supreme 
importance of the legislator in a society. However, he never developed his belief in the 
omnipotent legislator into a general theory o f sovereignty or absolutism. Although he 
was aware of the idea of the body politic as an instrument in the hands of the ruler in the 
interest of the political community, he did not conceive of a theory in which the prince
106 Sabine (1941), p. 351; and Bobbio (1989), p. 57. 
10 Skinner (1981), p. 38.
108 Machiavelli (1987), p. 515.
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and the community were tied together in a body politic which itself would possess 
sovereign power.109
Jean Bodin (1529-1596) was the first to make a systematic statement of the 
modem idea o f sovereignty. He did so in his Six Livres de laRépublique (1576), a work 
written in and clearly influenced by the disorder of a secularising France in the late 
sixteenth century. According to Bodin the existence of a sovereign power -  ‘la 
puissance perpétuelle et absolue d ’une république’ -  is necessary in the interests of the 
community. Sovereignty for Bodin is indivisible and consists o f an unlimited power to 
make law. However, his views on that limitless quality of sovereign power are not 
altogether clear. For although he states that sovereignty cannot be limited in function, 
time, or law, he also maintains that the sovereign is bound by divine and natural law, as 
well as by the fundamental and customary laws of the political community and the 
property rights o f the citizens.110
For Bodin, government is not possible without sovereignty; without the 
existence of a sovereign power, there will just be anarchy. Sovereignty is the essence o f 
the state; the latter cannot exist without the former. This led him to conclude that the 
character of the political community made it necessary that this power be legally 
recognised as sovereignty.111 Thus, the existence of sovereign power does not need to 
be justified with an appeal to God, but rather it is explained by the nature of political 
community. Bodin distinguished between different forms of body politic, depending on 
where the sovereign power was located, but he himself preferred that form in which the 
sovereign power resided in one person, a monarchy.
The originality o f Bodin consisted in his partial detachment of the notion o f 
sovereignty from God, Pope, Emperor or King and by presenting it as a legal theory 
logically necessary in all political associations.112 Although theories of sovereignty have 
evolved significantly since Bodin’s introduction of the concept, its rudimentary 
conceptual foundation has remained largely the same. We will see that contemporary 
sovereignty, just as it was for Bodin and subsequent theorists, is still concerned with the 
unity of the body politic.
109 Hinsley (1986). p. 113.
1,0 Allen (1926). p. 56; Bobbio (1989), p. 93-94; andHinsley (1986). p. 123.
111 Hinsley (1986), p. 121; and Pot and Donncr( 1995). p. 15.
112 Allen (1926), p. 59. But see also Engster (1996) for a contrary opinion.
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In medieval Europe, political society was conceived as an order instituted by 
God, in which ruler and people were distinct from each other, each with their own 
position, rights and duties. The implications o f this belief remained tangible even in the 
seventeenth century; there was little awareness of a conception of the ruler as the 
personification of the body politic, o f the people as more than a collection of 
individuals, let alone of the idea that the body politic could in itself be a sovereign entity 
in which ruler and people were linked.113
The separateness of ruler and ruled in the thoughts of most men in this period 
caused them to think that sovereignty had to be vested in one and only one of the two. 
Thus, on the one hand, there were monarchists who used Bodin’s theory of sovereignty 
to strengthen the theory of Divine Right. On the other hand, a thinker such as Johannes 
Althusius (1557-1638) insisted that sovereign power belonged exclusively to the people, 
basing his ideas on popular sovereignty equally upon the legislative foundations of 
sovereignty laid by Bodin.114 There were inherent contradictions in both positions, and 
writers such as Grotius (1583-1645), who in De Jure Belli ac P ads , attempted to 
reconcile both positions in a single theory, were not successful.115 The notion o f 
sovereignty did not attain logical coherence until Hobbes (1588-1679), using some 
elements already present in Bodin’s legal theory, based it on radically new premises.
In Leviathan, written in 1651, Hobbes takes as a starting point for his theory o f 
sovereignty a state of nature in which people are only driven by instincts of self- 
preservation and a will to power which is never satisfied. People have no natural rights 
and there would accordingly be war of all against all. This image of the state of nature 
was completely at odds with the portrayal of mankind in medieval Christendom.
Moreover, natural law had always been linked with God and normative concepts 
such as justice, while Hobbes regarded (human) nature as nothing else but a system o f 
causes and effects. Since even the weakest can under circumstances be a threat to the 
life of the strongest, nobody can ever be safe in Hobbes’ state o f nature. As this means 
that everybody is equal in the state o f nature -  which is with Hobbes clearly not a 
normative statement -  no one will enter into conditions o f peace if not upon equal 
terms. Yet, even in the case that all would agree to respect each others ‘rights’; it would
Hinsley (1986). p. 130.
114 London Fell (1999), p. 113.
115 Hinsley (1986), p. 139.
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not be rational for the individual to keep such an agreement. Relations of power will 
always be temporary, a stable order is impossible. To establish such an order, a 
conscious choice is necessary, made by all, unconditionally and upon equal terms, to 
surrender completely their freedom to one power, the sovereign.
In the sovereign, the will of all is united; it is a supreme power whose only 
command is complete obedience, sanctioned with his complete and exclusive control 
over the means of violence. Only at the moment of surrender does a mere collection of 
individuals become a people; the multitude constitutes only the people by the will of the 
sovereign. There cannot be any distinction between state and society, just as the 
distinction between state and government is an illusion. If there is no state, there can be 
neither government, nor a society. Sovereignty is indivisible and unlimited. The 
multitude enters into a covenant with each other in which they agree to surrender to the 
sovereign, but the latter is not a party to it. For if  he could be bound, the absolute power 
would lie elsewhere, and accordingly he would not be sovereign. Questions of 
legitimacy of government do not play a role for Hobbes at all -  a government is a 
government by its capacity to govern and a tyranny is merely a government disliked. 
Whereas for Bodin sovereign power had meant the power to make law, for Hobbes it 
was to be understood as the exclusive control over coercive force:116
“In substance his theory amounted to identifying government with force; at least, the force must
always be present in the background whether it lias to be applied or not.” 117
After the turmoil and civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
European monarchies were increasingly able to consolidate their powers and the idea o f 
sovereign monarchical power became commonly accepted.118 Related to this was the 
conception of an independent territorial state system, for which the Peace of Westphalia 
provided the first formal step.119 The ruler was seen as the personification of the state, 
and in him was absorbed the personality of the people.
However, there was no writer in Europe who defended the absolutism of the 
sovereign power that was for Hobbes a logical consequence o f the very idea of
116 Poggi (1990). p. 44. See also Sabine (1941). p. 468.
,l7 HinsIcy (1986). p.468.
118 Pot and Donner(1995), p. 21.
1,9 Murphy (1996), p. 86.
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sovereignty. Defenders of Divine Right concurred that divine and natural law placed 
constraints on the sovereign ruler. A natural lawyer such as Pufendorf (1632-1694) 
insisted that even though to be sovereign meant to be absolute and supreme, sovereignty 
was not equivalent to absolutist power in relation to the society that was subjected to 
it.120 The question was now howto reconcile the notion of sovereignty with the idea that 
the ruler is responsible to the community that he governs.
The notion o f popular sovereignty was to provide the answer to this question. 
The idea that sovereignty rests with the people who have conferred it by means of a 
contract to the ruler was not a new one. Nonetheless, the clarity that Hobbes had given 
to the very notion o f  sovereignty combined with the wish o f most thinkers to refute the 
absolutist implications of Hobbes’ theory, made a new version of social contract 
theories unavoidable.
2.2.2. The people as the source of legitimacy
In his Two Treatises o f Government, Locke (1632-1704) attempted to counter 
Hobbes’ arguments for the logical necessity o f political absolutism with a theory of 
constitutional government.121 In the first Treatise, the theory of Divine Right of Kings is 
rejected, whereas the second analyses why governments exist at all. Locke’s thinking 
illustrates the approaching enlightenment: instead of a medieval fixation on the spiritual 
world, he thinks that the use of empirical experience and reason will learn and enable 
man to live a good life. Like Hobbes, he too takes the state of nature as a starting point 
for his theory of government
However, unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that in the state o f nature, natural law 
governed, the content o f which could be known by reason. If, in the state o f nature, 
someone would transgress this law, entailing that no one ought to harm another, nor in 
his life, nor in his liberty or possessions, the inflicted party had a right to redress the 
injury, but only in a manner that was proportionate to the infraction. Only if natural law 
would be altogether ignored, would a situation comparable to Hobbes’ state of nature be
1:0 Hinsley (1986), p. 151. 
1:1 Sabine (1941), p. 524.
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brought about, but this would be an exceptional situation, no longer to be called the 
state of nature but the state of war.
Whereas medieval thinking had emphasised the duties of a mankind that was 
divided into a natural (divine) order, Locke instead accords a central place to the unity 
of mankind and sees natural law as a claim to inalienable rights inherent in each 
individual.122 Modernity marked a different way of thinking about power: legitimacy of 
power was no longer based on a divine or natural order, but on the assumed will of 
individuals. Locke argues that a government is necessary in order to guarantee 
individual rights and with this presumption, the limits of governmental power are 
simultaneously established. The state is created by a society of contracting individuals, 
but sovereignty remains with the people who have the right to revolt against a 
government, to which they have delegated their supreme power, if it fails to protect their 
rights. In order to make the idea o f individual consent plausible, Locke resorted to a 
fiction, whereby every member of society gives his consent to be a member of the body 
politic by making use o f its government or alternatively, by simply agreeing to be in its 
territoiy.
Locke’s theory on sovereignty is also a theory on constitutional government -  
the theory of popular sovereignty explains the foundation for political power, but its 
important normative assumptions at the same time establish clear limits on the exercise 
of sovereign power. However, it is important to keep in mind that the question o f the 
legitimisation of the foundation for political power is different from the question of the 
legality o f its exercise. This Chapter deals only with the former question; theories of 
individual rights, the doctrine of government by law, and related concepts will be dealt 
with in Chapter 3.
The theory of popular sovereignty found a clear expression in the French and 
American Bills of Rights. However, revolutions were needed before these bills o f rights 
were established, revolutions that would change thinking about the state and power 
radically and which would anchor the principle of popular sovereignty firmly in 
Western political thought and practice. But in the eighteenth century, established 
government still strongly resisted claims that the community was free to decide how
Pot and Dormer (1995). p. 24; Sabine (1941), p. 525.
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much power to give up to government and how much to retain for itself, and insisted 
that the Ruler, as the personification o f  the community, was the sovereign.123
In Du Contrat Social, Rousseau (1712-1778) dismisses this absolutist 
interpretation and presents a radical new version of the concept of popular sovereignty. 
Rousseau in fact adopts Hobbes’ absolutist implications o f the notion of sovereignty, 
but transfers absolute power unconditionally and permanently to the people. In order to 
arrive at this position, Rousseau starts with the state o f nature as well, but in contrast to 
the usual account of it, he reverses the situation completely by arguing that in the state 
of nature people were good and innocent. It was, according to him, civilisation with its 
constant appeal to reason that had spoiled mankind. In a sense, Rousseau breaks 
radically with the ideals o f the enlightenment; not by progress and the use of reason will 
men find out how to live the good life, but they need to return to nature with which he 
means the common sentiments with regard to which people hardly differ at all.
Rousseau emphasised the importance of community, and he opposes the 
systematic individualism on which the theories of Hobbes and Locke were built. People 
do not really exist if  not within a community, “for apart from society there would be no 
scale of values in terms of which to judge well-being.”124 The ideals of the 
enlightenment with their emphasis on the individual have created the kind of civilisation 
in which man cannot find his true self. A return to the liberty and equality of the state of 
nature is only possible when every man submits himself completely to the community. 
The state is the community, but as the people possess exclusive and omnipotent 
sovereignty that is inalienable, government is merely the executor of the general will o f 
the community.
Whereas Locke had accorded the people a right o f revolt under certain 
conditions -  that is, in the case when the government had not kept the terms o f the 
contract -  for Rousseau such a construction is unthinkable because the government 
always has to respect the general will and can thus be dissolved at any moment should 
the community wish so. The ‘volonté générale’ is not the same as the sum o f all 
individual wills, nor is it the will of the majority, for in both cases Rousseau’s theory 
would equally be based on the individualism which he attacks. The general will of a 
community is a collective good, with its own life and destiny, which is not the same as
123 Hinsley (1986), p. 152-153.
124 Sabine (1941). p. 588.
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the private interests of its members together.125 Man becomes man only as a member of 
the community and accordingly it is unthinkable that rights can ever be exercised 
against the community but instead they are something to be enjoyed within it.
Since Rousseau’s time the doctrine of popular sovereignty lias frequently been restated. But it 
will be found that while Rousseau’s statement of it can be modified in detail, it cannot in 
essence be outdone. Since the American and French Revolutions toward the end of the 
eighteenth century it lias sooner or later come to be the prevalent doctrine, at least in all the more 
advanced political societies,” 126
Rousseau wanted to eradicate the distinction between state and community by 
extracting a unitary state personality out o f the abstract notion of the general will, and 
the problem was that this left the people without a possibility for governance with actual 
power over them.127 As a result, although his account of popular sovereignty has 
prevailed, the practical need for governance has made it necessary to accommodate it. 
Indeed, while the modem notion of sovereignty has created congruence between ruler 
and ruled, it has not been able to resolve the disparity between people and state. And 
although his problem has remained without a solution, there have been ways to deal 
with the tension between the principle of the executive state as merely the agent of the 
people’s will and the reality that it has the potential to turn into Hobbes’ absolute 
sovereign.
One of these is the abstract notion o f the sovereign state, based on the 
constitutionalism that liberal democracies have resorted to, for if  the popular will can 
only be expressed through representation, safeguards for the individual against the 
power of the executive and the danger of tyranny of the majority have to be built in. 
These safeguards, first embodied in constitutionalism and the discourse of citizenship, 
and later also in the international human rights regime, will be looked at in depth in the 
next Chapter that investigates formal and material limits to government. In concluding 
this Section, I want to emphasise that the modem notion o f sovereignty distinguishes 
itself from all earlier notions on political authority by its very abstraction. The modem 
states distinguishes itself from earlier forms of political organisation in that factual
125 Ibid. p. 588.
1:6 Hinsley (1986). p. 154. 
127 Hinsley (1986). p. 155.
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relations between individuals do no longer provide the basis for political authority; 
instead the abstract notion o f the people and the concept o f territoriality have assumed 
that role. The way in which these concepts relate to each other will be discussed in the 
next Section.
2.3. The state, its territory and identity: political particularism
2.3.1. The sovereign claim to distinguish inside from outside
“The present approach to the determination of ownership o f territory is exclusive, partial and 
silencing. [...] Territorial boundaries have become barriers. They detennine and identify those 
within and those without the boundary, based on a particular conception of sovereignty.”128
In the previous two Sections, I have explored how a theory of sovereignty 
became a conceptual necessity in order to legitimise the state’s exercise o f  political 
authority within the body politic. Different theories on the source of sovereignty were 
addressed and we have seen that popular sovereignty has become the prevalent way in 
which to legitimise ultimate political power within the body politic. However, the 
important question of how the body politic is to be defined, which is a fundamental 
question when we take into account the unity with which sovereignty is ultimately 
concerned, has not been dealt with in the preceding Sections.
Sovereignty by its very nature draws a clear distinction between inside and 
outside.129 Here we see the partial overlap between internal and external sovereignty, for 
in international relations, Westphalian sovereignty refers to the linkage of independent 
political authority to inviolable and sharply delimited space. The sovereign claims of 
each and every state operate in a global structure of mutually independent territorial 
units with supreme and exclusionary authority within their domain. Nonetheless, the 
internal sovereign claim o f the modem state to distinguish between the inside and the 
outside is not only based on territorial boundaries, but in addition, it is deeply related to 
matters of identity and political community.
128 McConquodale (2001), pp. 145,152.
129 Giddens (1985), p. 88.
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Therefore sovereignty’s content (the state’s exercise of jurisdiction over people) 
and its form (the fact that this jurisdiction is exercised within a territorial frame) are not 
separate notions that operate independently from each other. When focussing on the 
political significance of clearly delimited space in the discourse of sovereignty, the 
abstract concepts o f  nationality, citizenship and political community cannot be ignored. 
On the contrary: territorial boundaries that are in themselves no more than arbitrary and 
imaginary lines on the surface of the earth, acquire their meaning in precisely these 
concepts and the practices resulting from them; practices that are brought about both by 
the state’s exercise of jurisdiction over people and the particular territorial frame in 
which this jurisdiction is exercised.
This Section will seek to understand the way in which sovereignty’s claim to 
distinguish the inside from the outside is construed. It will become clear that 
sovereignty’s two claims -  to determine the boundary between inside and outside and to 
ultimate political authority -  are inextricably linked to each other. The discourse of 
popular sovereignty legitimises political power by tying community, authority and 
territory together. I will argue that this particular conception of sovereignty, which 
effectively ties people to territory, is the result of specific historical processes that led to 
the structuring of the global political system in territorial nation states.
It should be borne in mind that my account on the formation of nation states is 
largely inspired by the experiences of some few Western European states, and there are 
many nation states which took shape in a very different fashion. However, precisely the 
experiences of the early nation states as France, England and Spain, have led to the 
formulation of durable concepts such as nationality, citizenship, and territoriality, which 
today are relevant to all nation states and the system they form part of.
In order to achieve an understanding of the way in which the modem state 
distinguishes between inside and outside, this Section is divided in three parts. Above, 
some attention has already been paid to the fact that, in the period stretching from the 
sixteenth until the eighteenth century, the idea of territoriality gained ground due to 
increasing power of the European monarchs. Apart from touching upon the context of 
this historical process of consolidation o f exclusive territorial rule, Section 2.3.2. will 
describe how medieval ideas o f allegiance, under the influence o f changing ideas about 
the nature and location o f sovereignty, transformed and acquired new significance in the 
concept of nationality. Subsequently, in Section 2.3.3. we will see how the interplay 
between territoriality and the notion o f popular sovereignty led to the formation of
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exclusive political identities. As theories of popular sovereignty fail to define what is 
meant with the concept of the people, the notion o f territoriality and its accompanying 
notion o f Westphalian sovereignty profoundly influenced the answer to this question. 
The result was that the universaliStic ideals on which theories o f popular sovereignty 
were based, translated into a particularistic practice. The tension between the universal 
and the particular has remained at the heart of the modem state, and its implications for 
the way in which the modem state distinguishes the inside from the outside is discussed 
in paragraph 2.3.4.
2.3.2. Emergence of territorial states and changing perceptions of allegiance and 
loyalty
In medieval Europe, the feudal system had determined the relation of people to 
territory. However, relations of authority, as command over loyalties, were based more 
on personal ties than on territorial considerations. Feudal concepts of fealty were not at 
all comparable to nationality in the modem sense, and social groups had complex and 
multiple relations to each other, some based on speech, some on religion and some on 
administrative loyalty. The governance of any such a group could depend on many 
different authorities and the idea of rule was certainly not determined by “a conception 
of permanent borders within which such rule applied and outside of which it did not 
apply.” 130 The overlap between (political) identities entailed that there was no clear or 
uniform mechanism by which to distinguish “us” from “them ”, “inside from outside” . 
We have seen above that the medieval order characterised by pluralism under the 
umbrella of universal Christendom changed slowly because of the consolidation of 
monarchical power and the influence o f  the Reformation.
The process of state formation in Europe was exclusionist practice: before 
territorial boundaries hardened, attempts were already made by states to homogenise 
populations by expulsing peoples, such as religious minorities whose allegiance one 
could not be sure of.131 Monarchs increasingly tried to reduce regional differences in 
their territories, fashioned distinctions between insiders and ‘aliens’, and encouraged the
130 Caporaso (2000), p. 22.
131 Linklater(1998), p. 28.
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use of standardised languages in order to create stronger loyalties between the 
inhabitants of their territories, something that was deemed necessary in order to engage 
their subjects in the waging of war against other emerging states.
The emerging territorial state struck the right balance between possession of the 
means of violence and capital accumulation so that this form of political organisation 
became the dominant one during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.132 Sovereign 
states survived because their size was ideal for the fighting of wars: they were large 
enough to withstand attack and small enough to enable administration from a central 
point.133 Territory started to play a bigger role in political life, but initially the 
perception that relations of authority were decidedly personal, remained. This was only 
logical in view of the fact that sovereignty was seen as vested in the king. As the 
sovereign was the state, ‘nationality’ -  better described as subjecthood -  had implied 
allegiance to the King, not to a certain demarcated territory, and certainly not to a 
particular social group.
When the feudal order started to transform gradually into absolutism, everybody 
became, in addition to his status in the hierarchical feudal order, a subject of the King. 
In time, the doctrine of perpetual allegiance developed, entailing that none of his 
subjects could unilaterally renounce his obligations towards the King. Subjecthood was 
generally acquired by birth and could not be changed afterwards. As the will of the King 
was the source of allegiance, it was also the King who decided who would be conferred 
with subjecthood. Ideologies such as nationalism, alluding to a deeper relationship 
between people and territory, or other ideological convictions tying the notions of 
people and their state to each other in a more profound way were not yet conceivable. 
Formally, people were subjects by virtue of their being subjected to the sovereign, and 
not because they had a special relation with each other or with the territory in which 
they lived.
In practice, however, territorialisation led to a situation in which the people over 
whom the sovereign ruled were defined by virtue of their location within certain
I3" Tilly (1992). pp. 30-31.
133 Linklater (1998), p. 27. Of course t lie re were many more factors influencing the establishment of the 
modem system of states. See Ruggie (1993), pp. 152-166. However, I will not go into these: here it 
suffices to observe tliat the modem state system developed as the result of specific historical 
circumstances. See also Kaldor (1999), p. 11-20.
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borders.134 This situation became a structural aspect of political organisation after 1648, 
the year when the Peace of Westphalia, by establishing external sovereignty as a 
principle o f international relations, ascribed to each territorial state the exclusive 
government o f  the population within its territory.135
During the Enlightenment, earlier attitudes with regard to allegiance and 
political authority started to change. Due to changing perceptions about the location and 
nature of sovereignty, the object and foundation o f allegiance altered. On the one hand, 
allegiance becam e a less stringent condition, for this duty, finding its source in the tie 
between sovereign and subject established at birth, “an implied, original and virtual 
allegiance, antecedently to any express promise”,136 was replaced by a notion that, as we 
saw above, deducted political obligations from consent or voluntary contract:
“ ‘Tis plain then, ...by the Law of right reason, that a Child is bom a Subject of no Country, or 
Government. He is under his Fathers Tuition and Authority, till he come to the Age of 
Discretion; and then he is a Free-man. at Liberty wliat Government lie will put himself under, 
what Body Politick he will unite himself to.”13"
However, according to Locke, after an individual had consciously chosen to be a 
member of society, he could never again possess the liberty he would have had in a state 
of nature. Thus Locke’s lifelong contract still implies perpetual allegiance. Later 
thinkers, such as Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), extended the scope of Locke’s initial 
voluntary choice to a choice on an ongoing basis. Unsurprisingly, it was precisely the 
American Revolution that challenged the principle of perpetual allegiance. This was not 
only caused by political problems that the Revolution brought about,138 but it was also 
the result of the very ideals that inspired the Revolution.139
134 Pliilpott (1997), p. 19.
135 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
136Blackstonc (1865), p. 369.
, r  John Locke (1961), pp. 345-346.
138 The doctrine o f perpetual allegiance led eventually to war between Britain and America in 1812 as 
Britain had been stopping ships on the high seas to impress British bom seamen, despite their claims of 
American citizensliip. See Dowty (1987). p. 45.
139 On the outbreak o f the Revolution each inhabitant of America was given tlx: choice whether he wanted 
to remain a British subject or become an American citizen. Plcndcr (1972), p. 13.
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As already mentioned, these Enlightenment ideals did not only challenge the 
foundation o f the principle of allegiance, but they also changed its object. The idea that 
allegiance was owed to the kingdom instead of the King gained in importance, 
explainable by altering perceptions on the location of sovereignty. When sovereignty 
had passed from the King to the people, allegiance acquired a completely different 
meaning: it was replaced by the abstract notion of nationality, the bond expressing the 
fact of a person’s belonging to a certain state.
“La notion de nationalité, lien de droit public qui assujettit un individu à un Etat a succédé à la
veille idée féodale d’allégeance, lien personnel unissant le souverain à son sujet.” 14t>
Nonetheless, even if the concept of nationality can be seen as the successor to 
the feudal notion of allegiance in the sense that they both unite the sovereign with its 
subjects, important distinctions between the two concepts make them otherwise 
disparate. Apart from changing ideas on the location and source of sovereignty, which 
altered perceptions of allegiance, the process of territorialisation led to a situation in 
which the individual’s relation to the sovereign was factually determined by territory, 
and not longer by any personal attribute o f the subject, as it had done in the feudal 
order. States were able to establish to a large degree exclusive control over their 
territories and the populations within it. The resulting internal sovereign claim 
corresponds with the state’s external sovereignty in the Westphalian structure through 
which each territorial state was ascribed the exclusive government of the population 
within its territory. The concept of sovereignty, linking territory, political community 
and political power plays a fundamental role in the division of humanity into distinct 
national populations, with their own territories and states. The precise way in which the 
modem theory of sovereignty has merged these concepts together will be addressed 
below.
1411 Boulbes (1956), p. 16.
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2.3.3. Popular sovereignty and the discovery of the nation: inconsistent 
universalism
The secularisation of political theory, combined with other, more practical 
circumstances, which resulted in the consolidation o f exclusive territorial rule, led to  
perceptions o f  the state as a unified force, with supreme and exclusive authority over the 
population within a certain territory.141 The modem territorial state began to take shape, 
and with its emergence, identity became a clear matter of inside and outside:
“Legitimations of identity gave way to legitimations of difference, with difference here 
becoming a matter of absolute exclusions. The principle of identity embodied in Christian 
universalism was challenged by the principle of difference embodied in the emerging territorial 
state. This was perhaps not much more than a change in emphasis. But this change in emphasis 
had enormous repercussions. From then on, the principle of identity', the claim to universalism, 
was pursued within states.” 142
With the emergence of the territorial state, there came to be clear demarcations 
by which to differentiate, and those were not only territorial ones. The modern state, 
apart from claiming exclusive territorial jurisdiction, also asserts a specific national 
identity. Its borders are “inscribed both on maps and in the souls of citizens.”143 Yet, it 
should be noted, the formation of the territorial state and the building of the nation were 
different, although convergent, processes.144
How does nationalism -  the idea that every nation should have its own state -  
relate to the Westphalian state system? Is nationalism, as some argue, solely the product 
of the struggle for state power: monarchs attempting to homogenise their populations in 
order to augment and facilitate their rule? Or, instead, is it only logical that pre-political 
communities -  people related to each other by shared culture, language, and history -  
wish to choose their own sovereign?145 In other words, do state and nation exist apart,
141 Plcndcr(1972). p. 10.
14: Walker (1993). p. 117.
143 Xenos (1996), p. 239.
144 Habermas (1996), p. 283
145 Caporaso (2000), p. 3.
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and is it possible to distinguish between the various collective bodies of human beings, 
which are called nations, on other grounds than common government146
A different, although related, question is how nationalism and the political 
philosophy that accompanied the emergence of independent territorial states, relate to 
each other. At first sight they seem to contradict each other, for it is difficult to see how 
one can reconcile the universalistic ideals of eighteenth century enlightenment thinking 
-  expressed in the theory of popular sovereignty -  with the formation of exclusive 
political communities during that same era.
We will not find an answer to these questions in early liberal theory itself, for 
that failed to address the inconsistency between “universal man, which is its point of 
departure and the citizen or subject o f a state, which is its point of arrival.”147 For 
Hobbes the body politic is not a natural body, but it is created by men from the state of 
nature. Community does not pre-exist the body politic -  indeed, we saw that in his 
theory, it is artificial to make a distinction between society and state: the idea of 
community is dependent on the notion o f the sovereign power. But his theory leaves 
unanswered the question why particular communities exist instead of one universal 
community. This could be explained by the fact that Hobbes’ writings were occasioned 
by civil wars and internal chaos, and his Leviathan was a fiction to explain and justify 
the kind of political power that he deemed logically necessary in a given body politic as 
well as a practical necessity in his own country.
But also Locke fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem caused by 
territorial particularism in the face of universal humanity. While for Hobbes there is no 
community at all without the body politic, for Locke there exists a universal community 
o f mankind in the state of nature, in which all men are free and equal: a moral statement 
flowing from natural law. We saw how Locke explained why men would want to make 
a contract with each other in order to opt out this state of nature but he does not clarify 
why this contract is not made between all members of the natural community o f  
mankind instead of just between members of particular communities. Social contract 
theories failed to explain how, if  pre-political humanity was one, anyone could be made 
sovereign if it were not with the universal consent of all humanity.148
146 Vcil-Brause (1995). p. 63.
,4" Seth (1995). p. 44.
148 Seth (1995). p. 48: and Linklater (1998), p. 105-106. Samuel Pufcndorf was in this respect an 
exception among the early liberalists. According to him people liave a natural right to create separate
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Nevertheless, although nationalism and the theory o f popular sovereignty -  in 
fact, modem ideas concerning equality of mankind in general, seem to contradict each 
other, the two must somehow be connected. Nationalism is not some “primitive and 
tribal idea”, which survived despite modernity.149 On the contrary, nationalism is 
modem, and wherever theories of popular sovereignty emerged, nationalism appeared. 
This tension at the heart o f modernity cannot be explained by a simple cause but it is 
instead the result of the conflictive and ambiguous processes that led to the formation o f  
the territorial state based on popular sovereignty.
The French Revolution and the radically new notion of citizenship to which it 
gave birth, illustrate these ambiguities very well. The revolution was inspired by the 
ideal of universal mankind, but the spreading of revolutionary ideals over Europe lead 
to demands for national rights of people, not to claims concerning the universality o f  
mankind.150 If  we look at the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, we see that 
it declares that the source o f all sovereignty resides in the nation. Thus, all of a sudden, 
the concept o f the people in the theory of popular sovereignty was defined as the nation. 
The struggle for control of state power was surely no longer a matter o f Divine Right, 
but nor was it solely an issue of natural rights for the people: instead, it had shifted to 
the area of national identity.151 What had caused to the concept of the people to be 
translated in the notion of the nation?
Part o f the answer to that question is to be found in the fact that political 
reformers inspired by enlightenment ideals were operating in a pre-existing territorial 
framework. They were rebelling against a monarch whose struggle for power had 
gradually led to  the breakdown of the medieval Christian order and to the establishment 
of the territorial state. In this struggle, boundaries were gradually drawn,152 and attempts 
to homogenise populations were made, in order to secure loyalties. Extended periods o f 
war, which had consolidated the territorial state during the sixteenth, seventeenth and
societies, for they need to associate only with those with whom they share special inclinations; where 
possible political boundaries should converge with an existing harmony of dispositions. See Linklater 
(1998). p. 51.
149 Deudney (1996), p. 129. See also Seth (1995), p. 54; and Veit Brause (1995), p. 61.
150 Kristeva (1991), p. 151.
151 Xenos (1996), p. 238.
152 Although it would take a long time before these boundaries actually hardened.
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early eighteenth centuries, had sowed feelings of identity and patriotism,153 All this had 
caused the Christian ideal of universal humankind to lose ground during the seventeenth 
century, and its revival in the eighteenth century did not take place in a vacuum, but in a 
certain political environment.
Thus, the ideals of popular sovereignty were elaborated upon in an emerging 
system of territoriality where political rule was defined by territory. They were 
unavoidably shaped by that very framework. If there had not been absolutist, centralised 
government on the scale that the territorial state provided, it is doubtful whether 
political philosophy would have developed as it did. But more importantly, territoriality 
was a fact by the time that ideas of popular sovereignty were brought into practice.
A brief look at France will illustrate the consequences of the fact that the 
political ideals had to be executed in the framework of the territorial state of which the 
boundaries had already been drawn before. Before the Revolution there was no other 
bond uniting Frenchmen with each other than their common allegiance to the 
monarch.154 After the Revolution, governance became impersonal, based on abstract 
ideas of equality instead of based on the personal ties as it had always been. Two 
different processes were necessary in order to realise the ideal of equality. First, 
privilege and feudalism were abolished. Individual political equality, by the use o f the 
concept of citizenship, was gradually realised, although important exceptions to this 
ideal did never disappear completely. Second, the different parts of the territorial entity 
that was France, formerly joined by personal chains o f command that had been vertical, 
had to be integrated into the abstract idea of the body politic based on popular 
sovereignty.
A new idea was needed to imagine this new abstract idea of the body politic, 
governed by the people, just as a new political identity had to be devised to give 
expression to political equality. The nation became the all-compassing political entity 
that was the source of equality, and citizenship indicated membership in this political 
community. The people became the people by their transformation of subjects of the 
King to citizens o f a nation. That a universaliStic ethic came to be construed in the 
particularistic language of nation and national citizenship was caused by the fact that it
153 Hough (2003). p. 8.
154 Fitzsimmons (1993). p. 29
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was not within a universal empire but within the territorial state that enlightenment 
ideals were politically translated.
We see the same mechanism at work in the concept of citizenship. In m ost 
accounts o f  citizenship, its rights and equality aspect is emphasised. However, it should 
not be overlooked that citizenship is not only a complex package of rights with which 
the free and equal individual is endowed, but that he is endowed with them precisely 
because of his membership in a certain polity. This aspect of citizenship has been called 
“the gatekeeper between humanity in general and communities of character.”155 The 
French Revolution merged the two aspects together, and in the same way as with regard 
to the concept of the nation, identity is thus constructed by “straddling the claims of the 
universal and the particular ”156
Also here, territoriality played a major role: the Treaties of Westphalia, long 
before modem ideas of equality became politically significant, firmly anchored the 
principle o f  sovereignty in ‘international* relations, by establishing mutually 
independent territorial political units with supreme and exclusionary authority within 
their territories. The resulting division o f ‘humanity’157 into distinct populations defined 
by territory was largely a fact at the time that the modem reformers brought their 
political ideals in practice.
So, it may be, as Julia Kristeva observes, regrettable to find the duality o f 
man/citizen at the heart of the maximal demand for equality that the French Declaration 
of the Rights o f Man and Citizen was.158 However true this is in the light o f later 
developments as we will see in Chapter 3, the drafters o f the Declaration could not 
foresee the consequences which identification of the citizen with man could give rise to. 
Citizenship was intended to provide equality to all those subject to the power o f the 
state, and the distinction between man and citizen in the eighteenth century did not pose 
the kind of problems that would arise in later times.159
Practical circumstances, of which the organisation o f political life on the basis o f 
territoriality constitutes the most important, may explain the birth of a concept such as
155 Kratochwil (1996), p. 182.
156 Jarvis and Paolini (1995), p. 10.
157 The term humanity is misleading in more than one sense in the context of modernity as the whole 
discourse was exclusively European.
158 Kristeva (1991), p. 150.
159 Feitajoli (1996).
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the nation, but they do not explain the importance that that concept subsequently 
acquired. Nationalism has proven to be a strong force. The romantic reaction against the 
enlightenment played a crucial role with regard to the importance that nationalism as an 
ideology gained in later times. But it has also been argued that it is liberal theory itself 
that makes the turn to nationalism possible, although at first sight this does not seem 
logical. For not only is there a tension between the universaliStic ethic of early liberal 
theory and the particularistic attitude nationalism takes, but in addition it is difficult to 
see how the self-interested, rational individual on which theories of the modern state are 
based would want to fight and ultimately die for a political community called the nation.
In order to understand the appeal of nationalism we need to understand the veiy 
abstraction of the concept of popular sovereignty. The principle of order and legitimacy 
in pre-modern political entities, whether they were kingdoms, empires or city-states, 
was based on “inequality, difference and complementarity.”160 As already mentioned, in 
the medieval world all individuals had their own position, rights and duties, which 
unified them personally with the sovereign in an order instituted by God. The unity o f 
the modem state is based on an opposite principle; individualism expressed in a contract 
based on equality. According to Arthur Melzer, this individualism and.the concept o f 
equality has lead to the identification that is the root of all nationalisms.161
In addition, the spread of popular sovereignty, by introducing the abstract and 
intangible concept of the people, changed understandings of political community that 
are not self-evident.162 In the words of Bernard Yack, it has, on the one hand, led to the 
nationalisation of political community, exactly because liberal theory has no 
justification for the existence of territorial boundaries, boundaries that were a fact when 
liberal theory came about. As a consequence, it facilitates imaginations of a national 
community that is pre-political. Yack explains how on the other hand, theories o f 
popular sovereignty have given rise to politicisation of national communities.163 
Sovereignty implies exclusionary control over territory, and popular sovereignty insists 
that this control be exercised by the people. The exclusiveness of territorial control in 
the concept of sovereignty in general, when applied to popular sovereignty in particular, 
means that there can only be one ‘people’ that controls a certain demarcated territory.
160 Melzer (2000). pp. 126.
161 Melzer (2(X)0).p. 125-126.
,6- Yack (2001), p. 518
163 Yack (2001), p. 523-530.
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And although this concept o f the people in liberal theory is certainly not a national 
community, the problem is, once again, that liberal theory does not show us how to 
define the concept o f the people. Accordingly, it invites "assertions of national 
sovereignty by justifying the right o f peoples to de-establish and reconstruct the 
authority of the state.”164
I have argued in this Section that the interplay between territorialisation and 
liberal theory led to the formation of political identities that hold a large potential for 
political particularism. By the time that the Napoleonic Wars had swept over Europe, 
the abstract concepts of national citizenship, nation state and territoriality were 
established concepts in political thought. Independent sovereign territorial entities had 
become the building blocks for political life, their borders defined the identity of 
individuals, and their territorial integrity was seen as essential to prevent destruction and 
violence. Subsequent changes in the Westphalian system during the nineteenth and 
twentieth century were not so much caused by changes in its underlying premises, but 
more by alterations in emphasis, as we will see below .165
The tension between the universal and the particular has remained at the heart of 
the modem state, and if  anything it has become more acute in our present societies. Its 
implications for the way in which the contemporary discourse of sovereignty has 
distinguished the inside from the outside will be addressed in the next Section.
2.3.4. Nation and the territorially defined population as foundations of sovereignty
As the nineteenth century advanced, nationalism thus largely lost its early | 
implications o f individual freedom and rights. It was no longer about encouraging the 
integration of diverse populations and classes into one nation, based on the idea o f an 
inclusive political community, as it had been for the French Revolutionaries. Instead, it 
became a tool for states’ exclusionist practices. The trend that accorded national I 
identity, as a criterion by which to distinguish between "us” and “them”, unique 
importance was initiated by the reaction that took place against the Enlightenment. 
Romanticism placed emphasis on tradition, emotion and community. I already
Yack (2001). p. 528.




discussed the thought o f Rousseau with regard to the location and nature of sovereignty. 
The volonté générale is, as we saw, not a construct based on rationality and self-interest, 
but it is something that is inherent in the concept of community. The cosmopolitanism 
of the Enlightenment, according to Rousseau, was an empty promise, and ties that 
resulted from a common feeling of belonging were infinitely more important than 
abstract ideas of universal mankind. Hence, he warns of cosmopolitans “who seek far 
off in their books duties which they fail to accomplish nearby.”166 For Rousseau, man 
becomes human by his membership in a community: “We begin properly to become 
men only after we have become citizens.”167 Community in Rousseau's sense is not 
necessarily the nation, but it is not difficult to see how his thoughts could be applied to 
the newly emerging idea of the nation, which was exactly what subsequent thinkers, 
such as Hegel ( 1770-1831) would do.
In Hegel’s philosophy there is no distinction between community, state and 
nation. The significant unit is neither the individual, nor just any group of individuals, 
but it is the nation. If for Rousseau sovereignty is expressed in the general will, for 
Hegel state sovereignty is the fundamental expression of the national will. If, up until 
contemporary times, nationality is the primary political identity, leaving all other 
loyalties and ties far behind, that trend was started by Hegel, by whom the state is 
continually represented as standing for the highest possible ethical value.168 Increasing 
nationalism noticeably changed the role o f the state: just as in Hegel’s philosophy the 
state became identified with the nation.
In addition, nationalism reinforced the “sovereign territorial ideal”.169 By the 
end o f the nineteenth century, sovereignty, territory and the identity of the political 
community had become inextricably linked. Cultural and “ethnic” homogeneity in a 
state was something to be aspired. It was nationalism that, if  not exactly gave birth to, at 
least nourished “the intimate relationship between identities and borders”170. People 
were bound to each other and their territory by virtue of their nationality.
In the period between the two world wars, national identity had become the 
highest political priority; states generally did not recognise any other identity or loyalty.
166 Kristeva (1991), p. 143.
167 Sabine (1941), p. 582.
168 Sabine (1941), p. 639.
169 Murphy (1996). p. 97.
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The national state had a monopoly control on violence, it was the highest court o f  
appeal and it had an exclusive right o f representation in the international sphere.171 T h e  
structural importance of clearly demarcated and inviolable territory, ruled by the nation  
as a discrete social unit, was strengthened by the Treaty of Versailles. People w e re  
defined by virtue of to which state they belonged. Political community becam e 
increasingly closed in upon itself, and more and more hostile to outsiders, due to  
nationalistic forces and new state structures that intensified the totalising project. 
These outsiders were not only people belonging to other states, but also those belying a  
different identity within the state.
It was however, not only nationalism that changed conceptions of th e  
relationship between people, territory and state. After the First World War, m any 
regimes proclaimed a collectivist ethic. Instead of the ethnic or cultural homogeneity th e  
nationalists strive after, collectivism aims at social homogeneity. Collectivism m aintains 
that the will o f the individual coincides with the will of the state -  the interests o f th e  
individual are identical to the interests of the state. In practice, this meant that th e  
aspirations o f  the individual were completely subordinated to those of the state.
Although the Second World War made clear the dangers of unbridled 
nationalism, nationalism as an acceptable political ideology was not discarded, as w as 
shown by decolonisation and the transformation o f former USSR republics into nation 
states. The tendency to fuse the meanings of state and nation is evident up until today, 
and the perception of the territorial state as a “container of society”173 is a persistent 
one. The territorial state is seen as the proper unit for organising political life, and "the 
categories through which we have attempted to pose questions about the political are 
precisely those that have been constructed in relation to the state.”174 Thus, the exercise 
of citizenship has become inseparable from belonging to the nation: a very specific kind 
of membership in a territorially defined political community.175 Territorial boundaries 
are to be guarded jealously and strictly, especially with regard to the movement o f  
persons, because the territorially fixed population has become one of the foundations o f  
the concept o f  sovereignty: “when the rules for differentiating between the inside and
171 Carr (1946). p. 228.
172 Linklater (1998), p. 4.
13 Agnew and Corbridgc (1995). pp. 82-92. Sec also Murphy (1996), p. 103; and Tully (1997). p. 187.
1 4 Jarvis and Paolini (1995). p. 7.
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the outside become blurred and ambiguous, the foundations of sovereignty become 
shaky.” 176
O f course, in some areas there are exceptions to this fundamental place of the 
territorial nation state in politics, most notably the case in the European Union. Within 
the Union, Member States are limited in their use of territorial borders to maintain a 
strict divide between inside and outside. However, with regard to the Union’s external 
frontiers, no such movement away from a traditional conception of sovereignty can be 
discerned. The external frontiers o f The EU have the long-established meaning that 
territorial boundaries have in distinguishing between "us” and "them”. They may even 
have reinforced the importance of such distinctions.177 The fact that the EU in this sense 
is not as novel as some would like us to believe is perhaps illustrated best by the denial 
of EU citizenship for long term residents of the EU. Nationality, territory and 
community become increasingly decoupled for insiders, but for outsiders their linkage 
remains as strong as ever.
The successful elimination of internal frontiers will of course accentuate in a symbolic way (and 
in a very real sense too) the external frontiers of the Community [...] In one way, the more that 
these external borders arc accentuated, the greater the sense o f internal solidarity [...] in the very 
concept of European citizenship a distinction is created between the insider and the outsider that 
tugs at their common humanity.178
2.4. Conclusions: Borders, violence, and sovereignty’s claims
In this Chapter we have seen how territorialisation, “a historically specific, 
contradictory, and conflictual process rather than a pre-given, fixed, or natural 
condition” 179, has led to the current perception of sovereignty as a self-evident and 
natural abstraction that links state power, people and territory. Sovereignty, understood 
as the state’s claim to ultimate political authority within its territory is based on two
176 Doty (1996). p. 122.
1?' Sec Balibar (2002); and Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004). p. 6.
178 Weiler ( 1992). pp. 65.68.
179 Brenner (1999). p. 12.
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pillars: the state’s asserted monopoly on the legitimate use o f violence and its claim to  
determine the inside from the outside.
I have attempted to show that the question o f the legitimacy o f political pow er 
cannot be seen separate from the modem state’s claim to determine its boundaries. O n 
the one hand, the process o f territorialisation facilitated the emergence of the abstract 
notion of sovereignty as legitimation o f ultimate power within the body politic. On the  
other hand, the way in which the theory o f popular sovereignty subsequently legitimised 
ultimate political authority within the body politic has in turn led to an exclusive ideal 
of political community. In addition, the territorial aspect o f the modem state’s claim to  
determine its boundaries cannot be understood properly when we fail to take into 
account the Westphalian structure in which each and every state necessarily operates.
However, the historical and factual link between all these aspects of sovereignty 
is often ignored, which in turn leads to a reification o f territoriality as an organising 
principle for politics.180 We will see later in this study that the result is the near 
immunisation of sovereignty’s territorial frame against forces of political and legal 
correction. W hile the content of sovereignty has always been open to debate, contention 
and change from various perspectives over time, its territorial form has acquired a status 
of neutrality and innocence. Such self-evidence and uncritical acceptance o f  
territoriality obscures the transformative possibilities in the concept of sovereignty as a 
whole, and the opportunities for change that may emerge from the relation between our 
thinking about “ ideals and human interests and thinking about institutions” .181 In order 
to make this argument at a later stage, this conclusion will first provide some further 
insights in the relation between the legitimacy of violence on the one hand, and the way 
in which the territorial state has distinguished between inside and outside on the other 
hand. After that, the interrelatedness o f sovereignty’s aspects in the specific context o f 
international migration is briefly touched upon.
Charles Tilly aptly expresses the link between violence and the state, when he 
writes that the state made war while war made the state.182 Tilly refers to factual 
circumstances o f armed conflict that caused the territorial state to become the dominant 
form of political organisation. However, we have also seen how the religious wars of
180 Agnew and Coibridge (1995). p. 82. See also Walker (1993); and Anderson and Bigo (2002), p. 17.
181 Unger (1996), pp. 3-7.
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the seventeenth century gave a strong impulse to the theory of sovereignty as the 
foundation for ultimate political authority in the body politic. The notion of sovereignty 
was partly formulated as an answer to the violence that ravaged Europe. An essential 
feature of the consolidation o f the European state system was that the state's monopoly 
on the use of force was vigorously institutionalised.183 With the advent of popular 
sovereignty, one o f the tasks of the modem state was to provide security, and one o f the 
reasons why the modem state was successful in establishing its monopoly on the use of 
violence, was its very ability to provide citizens with security.
From then on, individuals had no longer the right to use force between each 
other. We have seen that most theorists on sovereignty were primarily concerned with 
its internal claims, but in international relations the concept came to bear upon the 
relations between states as well. Also the external aspect of exclusive territorial 
sovereignty, for which the Treaties of Westphalia provided the first step, was perceived 
as a necessity in order to prevent recurrence of the violence that had devastated Europe 
during the Thirty Years War.
The way in which the modem state distinguished, from then onwards, between 
inside and outside, by use of territorial boundaries and later by the assumption o f a 
“necessary alignment between territory and identity, state and nation,"184 influenced the 
question of legitimate violence profoundly. In fact, through the process of 
territorialisation, which was initiated by the monarchical consolidation of territorial rule 
in the fifteenth century, a new structure by which to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate violence could materialise.
Before the modem state with its rigid link between clearly demarcated territory 
and political power came into existence, it was difficult to distinguish between war and 
mere crime within the widespread violence that Europe continually suffered. The 
absence of a clear mechanism to determine “us” from “them”, due to the overlap 
between identity-based boundaries, made it impossible to make a distinction between 
those forms of violence that were legitimate and those that were not. It was only 
when the territorial state had taken shape that distinctions o f this kind could be made 
within the concept of violence. War was legitimate if it was waged by the authority that
183 Hough (2003). p. 7.
184 Campbell (1996). p. 171.
185 Mansbach and Wilmer(2001), p. 56.
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had the right o f  waging it: the state.186 W ar was thus distinguished from mere crime by 
defining it as something that only sovereign states engaged in.187 In nineteenth century 
conceptions o f  international law, the right of a state to wage war in order to settle 
disputes with other states was regarded as a fundamental aspect o f that state’s
É 1 oo
sovereignty.
These issues will receive further attention in the next Chapter, but for now it is 
important to see how the very process o f territorialisation has shaped the norms 
delimiting legitimate from illegitimate violence, and thus cannot be seen separate from 
the exercise o f political authority. In addition, the Peace o f Westphalia made a sharp 
distinction possible between internal and external violences. Internal violence was 
regulated by the sovereign state alone, consistent with the idea of sovereignty as 
supreme legitimate authority over the population within a certain territory. Violence 
between states, on the other hand, was regulated by the articulation of international 
norms, which were again based on strong territorial assumptions as will be dealt with 
extensively in the next Chapter.
I have already mentioned that the lack of attention for the relation between the 
exercise of state power through political institutions and the clear spatial demarcation of 
the territory on which this power is exercised has led to a reification of the principle of 
territoriality.189 If we look at early modem Europe, we see that in definitions of political 
authority, personal power relations preceded power that found its basis in territory. 
Nonetheless, at present, the linkage o f political power to clearly demarcated territory is 
seen a natural way of organising the global political system and it has led to a 
framework where the legitimacy o f violence is largely dependent on territorial 
demarcations. The result thereof is that the territorial form that sovereignty has assumed 
over the course o f  history is often perceived as separate from its jurisdictional content.
However, we have seen in this Chapter that such a distinction between content 
and form of sovereignty fails to do justice to reality. The territorial frame in which the 
modem state operates and the jurisdictional claims over persons that it makes within 
this frame do not make sense if analysed in isolation from each other. Indeed, the 
territorial basis o f the state intends to  “fix and enforce boundaries of identity so that the
186 Rifaat (1979). p. 12.
187 Van Creveld. (1991). p.41.
188 Brand (2002), p. 287; and Steiner and Alston (2000), p. 114.
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distinction between inside and outside [becomes] defensible.”190 These boundaries of 
identity have everything to do with the unity of the body politic and the definition of the 
political community. The state uses both form and content o f sovereignty to protect and 
maintain such unity and community. The vague and overlapping identities of medieval 
Europe gave rise violence, chaos and destruction, but we will see later in this study that 
the way in which the modem state perceives, construes, and protects political 
community gives rise to its own sorts o f violence.
National responses to international migration exemplify that the Westphalian 
distinction between the state's internal and external sovereign claims is blurred and 
similarly they illustrate the interrelatedness o f the territorial frame and the jurisdictional 
content of sovereign power. The movement of people across borders engages the 
external sovereign claims of national states in a Westphalian structure that divides 
humanity in distinct and separate entities. At the same time, international migration 
engages the internal sovereign claims o f  the national state in a policy area where its 
identity-based boundaries and its territorial borders converge. A state who regards 
immigration as a threat, attempts to guard its territorial boundaries, inter alia with the 
use of military patrols to intercept illegal migrants at the border, and military police to 
carry out expulsions. Simultaneously, it establishes controls within society, ranging 
from obligatory language courses for foreigners to checks on ‘bogus* marriages, to 
ensure that its identity remains unthreatened. Immigration is thus perceived as both a 
“ resistant element to a secure identity on the inside” as well as a territorial “threat 
identified and located on the outside o f the state through a discourse of danger that 
contains elements applicable to both.”191
In this study, I will argue that the doctrinal separation between the jurisdictional 
content and the territorial frame within the notion o f sovereignty, resulting from the 
reification o f territoriality as a neutral framework in which the abstract notion of 
sovereignty operates, has led to a structural blindness for the involvement of personal 
interests whenever the state bases its claims on the sovereignty’s territorial frame.
It is evident that such blindness is exacerbated whenever the very individuals 
who are affected by the state’s sovereign power are rendered invisible, either because 
they are far away and unknown or alternatively because they are very different from
190 Mansboch and Wilmer (2001), p. 56. See also Newman (2001). p. 139 and 145.
191 Campbell (1996), p. 169. See also Balibar(1998). p. 220.
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“us”. Indeed, we will see that the tension between the universal and the particular at the 
heart of the modem state is made more acute by a strict separation between form and 
content o f sovereignty. The distinction between the state’s territorial framework and its 
resulting spatial powers on the one hand, and its jurisdiction over people within a 
certain territory on the other hand obscures the fact that constraints on individual 
behaviour and freedom are always motivated on account o f the notion o f political 
community and the unity of the body politic. Just as its jurisdictional content, the 
territorial frame of sovereignty has enormous repercussions for individual behaviour 
and freedom, as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5 that deal with international movement 
o f individuals. However, before turning to the way in which both the external and 
internal sovereign claims of the national state influence questions of international 
migration, the next Chapter addresses constraints on the exercise of political power by 
the sovereign state, most o f which are motivated precisely by the concept o f individual 
freedom.
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Chapter 3 Limits on sovereign power
3.1. Introduction
In the previous Chapter, I have investigated how the concept of sovereignty 
legitimised the state’s exercise of political power within its territory. In the modem 
state, political power is expressed as a legitimate claim to a monopoly of violence, and 
coercion is a defining element in the construction o f state and sovereignty.192 Due to the 
way in which it determined boundaries, and later also because it turned into popular 
sovereignty, sovereignty became a legitimate site of violence. However, that is not to 
say that it is an unproblematic site o f  violence. As a response to the growing power of 
the modem state and its particular notion of sovereignty, ways have been devised to 
circumscribe the power o f the state to resort to its means o f coercion. This has been 
done because, even though the modem notion of sovereignty attempts to attain 
congruence between ruler and ruled, it has not been able to resolve the disparity 
between people and state, a disparity that results from the very abstractness o f the 
modem notion o f sovereignty. Many o f the limits on the power of the modern state 
result directly from this distinction between state and society: as it is the sovereign state 
that is in possession of the legitimate means of coercion, certain safeguards for the 
people are necessary. These safeguards, first embodied in so-called constitutionalism 
and the rule of law and the discourse o f citizenship, and later also in the international 
human rights regime, will be the subject of this Chapter.
In this Chapter, I will argue that in the legal discourses that aim to limit state 
violence, we can discern both universality and particularity. The modem tension 
between the universal and the particular that we encounter in the very concept of the 
territorial nation state has not been extinguished in the instruments developed to protect 
against the sovereign power of that specific form o f political organisation. In some of 
these discourses the balance tends to fall more towards an ideal of universality, whereas
192 Bobbio( 1989), p. 75.
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in others political particularism is explicitly emphasised. I will argue that the reification 
of the territorial form of sovereignty poses limits to the universality o f all these 
discourses, including, and with particular emphasis on, the modem version of an 
international rule of law.
W e will see in later Chapters of this study that the practice of immigration 
detention provides an outstanding example o f the implications on the life of the 
individual o f such immunisation o f sovereignty’s territoriality against domestic and 
international forms of legal correction. Immigration law and policy is one of the areas in 
which the tension between the universal and the particular is bound to come out most 
distinctly, as it is a field that is defined by the very distinction between “us” and “them”.
In addition, as we saw in the concluding remarks o f last Chapter, the field of 
immigration shows distinctly that the territorial form of sovereignty and its 
jurisdictional claims are intertwined, and that the state bases its claims on both aspects 
of sovereignty in order to preserve the unity of the state and protect its political 
community. Thus, in this Chapter, the tension between the universal and the particular 
as well as the conceptual division within sovereignty between its territorial form and its 
content will be recurrent themes in my investigation of the various instruments that have 
over time sought to protect the individual against the power o f the modem state.
This Chapter is structured as follows. First, I address a general theory of 
constitutionalism and the rule o f law in Section 3.2. Many of constitutionalism’s 
fundamental guarantees have become institutionalised in the concept of citizenship, 
which will be dealt with in Section 3.3., where we will see that the process of 
territorialisation caused a political particularistic reality to  triumph over citizenship’s 
original universalistic ideals. After that, in Section 3.4., I investigate the way in which 
international law regulates state violence. In this Section, not only the protection of the 
individual against the sovereign power of the modem state will be addressed, but also 
the regulation of inter-state violence receives attention in order to understand 
territoriality’s impact on international law as a discipline. Particular emphasis will be on 
the emergence of modem human rights law, as this relatively recent area of law 
emerged as an explicit attempt to overcome the traditional political particularism in the 
field o f individual rights.
Section 3.5. explores the implications of modern human rights law for 
sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside from the outside, a claim that is 
traditionally based, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, on territory and identity. In
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Section 3.6., I will conclude that the notion of territoriality impedes the realisation of 
the self-proclaimed universality of human rights. In fact, just as they did with regard to 
citizenship, the territorial borders of the modem state have principally kept their role in 
delimiting the universality o f fundamental rights.
3.2. Co n stitu tio n a lism  and the  ru le  of law
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over mea the great difficulty lies 
in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed: and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is. no doubt, the primary control on 
government: but experience lias taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary protections.”193
3.2.1. The theory and practice of the limits on political power
At no point in history has sovereignty meant absolute rule without 
accountability, and arbitrary use of power by the sovereign has never gone 
unchallenged. Certainly, it would have seemed strange to Bodin that the sovereign 
could be bound by law -  for him that would have meant that the sovereign is bound by 
his own will, something he found inconceivable.194 Nonetheless, we have seen that also 
in his theory, sovereign power is subject to limits, albeit not embodied by any human 
law, but incorporated in the law o f God and nature. Even Hobbes’ sovereign is not 
absolute once it is appreciated that his power is only absolute if it is effective: he needs 
to provide his subjects with security: hence his monopoly on the means of violence.
We have seen that in the modem state, the foundation for the legitimacy of 
political power is provided by the idea o f popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty 
itself is based on ideals of individual liberty and equality. Consequently, not only the 
foundation, but also the exercise of political power has to be based on the same 
principles of liberty and equality. If government is necessary to guarantee each 
individual’s natural rights, it follows that, apart from an obligation to protect these 
rights against violations by other individuals, the state is obliged to protect these
193 Madison, Hamilton and Jay (1987). p. 319-320. 
,9J Allen (1967). p. 50.
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principles also against the state itself. In order to render such protection effective, it is 
necessary to limit, as well as control, the powers o f the state. In the modem state, this is 
achieved through constitutionalism’s fundamental principles o f limited government 
(governments only exist to serve specified ends) and the rule of law (they should only 
govern according to specific rules)195.
Already before the modem state came into existence, there were theories about 
the limits to political power. However, compared with traditional constitutional 
doctrines, the constitutionalism of the modem state, based on popular sovereignty and 
each citizen’s equality, is better capable o f imposing effective and consistent limits on 
political power.196 In modem constitutionalism, individual rights determine the limits, 
scope, and aim of governmental power, and the prohibition on the arbitrary use o f 
power is shaped by the idea of equality. Modem constitutionalism poses the issue o f 
limits to political power in terms o f the relation between power and law.197 By 
stipulating that the state itself is bound by the law -  requiring that its powers be 
exercised in accordance with the law -  constitutionalism and the doctrine o f the rule of 
law intend to prevent the arbitrary use o f power by the state. v*
3.2.2. The ru le  oflaw  through institutional design and form al limits on governm ent
Constitutionalism, as the theory and practice o f the limits to political power, 
“finds its fullest expression in the constitution that establishes not just formal but also 
material limits to political power.”198 As mentioned, modem constitutional ideals of 
limited government find their origin in the enlightenment era. In most states, their 
consolidation in law generally took place during the nineteenth century.199 I will first 
pay attention to the formal limits which the rule of law places on the power o f the 
modem state, after which I will investigate its material limits, embodied in theories of 
fundamental rights.
195 Schochet (1979), p. 1. In the following paragraphs I will use the terms rule of law and 
constitutionalism interchangeably.
196 Ibid. p. 3-4.
197 See Bobbio (1989), p. 89.
198 Ibid. p. 97.
199 Ommeren (2003), p. 11; and Zoethout (2003), p. 69.
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First o f  all, the rule o f law prevents arbitrary use o f state power through its 
requirement that the exercise of power by the state is in accordance with, and finds its 
formal basis in, the law. Ultimately, the legal basis for political power is to be found in 
the constitution, which “constitutes” the various branches o f government, their tasks and 
the limits of their powers.200 With regard to the principle that power should solely be 
exercised in accordance with the law, the principle of equality compels these laws to 
consist of general rules, equally applicable to every citizen.
Secondly, inhibition o f arbitrary exercise of state power is also achieved through 
rules o f institutional design. John Locke argued in his Second Treatise that, as the 
supreme power of the people had to be delegated, it would be best for political power to 
be divided amongst several independent spheres of right in order to prevent abuse. This 
line of thought was developed further by Montesquieu (1689-1755), whose name is 
mostly associated with the idea of separation of powers, an idea he alleged to have 
discovered by a study of the English constitution 201 Montesquieu was afraid that the 
despotism of the French monarchy, which in his eyes equalled law with the sovereign’s 
will, had so damaged the traditional constitution of France that freedom had become 
forever impossible.202 For him, personal liberty was the most important value, and 
would be secured best if the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of the state were 
to be divided amongst different branches of government, which would then be able to 
control each other.
The idea o f separation of powers was not a new one, but Montesquieu made it 
into a coherent legal system of checks and balances between the different parts o f the 
constitution,203 a legal doctrine that is still a central feature of the contemporary 
Rechtsstaat. Each power is accorded its own status and tasks, but all powers are to a 
certain extent dependent on each other, which leads to a system of checks and balances 
in which the different branches can exercise a degree of control on each other. Different 
legal systems have differing systems of checks and balances, but essential to the 
doctrine o f separation of powers is that restrictions on individual freedom can ultimately
2110 Zocthout (2003). p. 60.
21,1 Although at the time that Montesquieu was studying the English constitution the Civil Wars had 
destroyed the remnants of medieval mixed government and the Revolution in 1688 had settled 
Parliamentary supremacy. Sec Sabine (1941). p. 560.
202 Sabine (1941), p. 552.
203 Sabine (1941). p. 558. See also Bobbio (1989), p. 96.
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only be enacted by the legislature, that actions o f the executive are bound by the rules 
which are laid down by the legislative, and the existence o f an independent judiciary 
that ensures that the executive acts within the limits that are set by the legislature.
Judicial review o f the exercise of political power is thus inherent to the idea o f 
the separation of powers. However, as an independent judiciary takes such a central 
place in the theory of constitutionalism,204 I address judicial review by independent 
courts separately, as a third requirement o f the Rechtsstaat. An independent judiciary is 
indispensable to ensure that the other requirements o f the rule of law are actually put 
into practice. First, an independent judiciary is in the best position to make sure that 
action by the state is in accordance with the law, and in conformity with its legal basis.
Furthermore, in ensuring the fair application o f the law and its strict 
enforcement, an independent judiciary guarantees the principle of equality. Most 
importantly of all, individual rights, which, as we will see below, pose material limits to 
the exercise o f power, are only capable o f bringing about such limits when they are 
effective. Individuals need to be able to secure the protection of their fundamental 
rights, which should occur at an altogether different plane as at which these rights were 
infringed upon or restricted. Fundamental rights protection is unthinkable without the 
existence o f an independent judiciary. In paragraph 3.2.4., I will address the manner in 
which they interact in further detail.
3.2.3. Individual rights as material limits to political power
The rule of law is not confined to matters of procedure or questions of 
institutional design. Individual liberties are intrinsic to the idea of the rule o f law as 
precisely principles relating to each man’s freedom and equality constitute the basis for 
the idea o f limited government. The way in which the constitution establishes material 
limits to political power is “well represented by the barrier which fundamental rights -  
once recognised and legally protected -  raise against the claims and presumptions of the 
holder o f sovereign power to regulate every action of individuals or groups.”205
Gordon (1999), p. 43. 
205 Bobbio (1989), p. 97.
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We already saw that the idea o f inalienable rights was the ratio behind social 
contract theories. We find a first impulse towards such an idea of rights in the Christian 
tradition, although in the medieval feudal order, individual rights were not perceived as 
such, but they consisted of privileges, split off feudal authority. Instead of a conceptual 
foundation that spoke of rights inherent in men because they were men, those rights had 
a contractual character.206 A famous example of such contractual guaranteeing of rights 
is the Magna Carta of 1215.
The modem idea of fundamental rights developed in the seventeenth century. 
We have seen that in the enlightenment tradition, natural law was seen as a claim to 
inalienable rights inherent in each individual 207 Fundamental rights are accorded to man 
by virtue o f his humanity and not because of his particular position in the body politic. 
This new conception of rights finds a clear expression in the Bill of Rights o f the 
American States and the French Revolution’s Declaration o f the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen, This notion of fundamental rights, a guarantee for the individual’s freedom 
independently from and antecedently of the existence any political community, 
constitutes constitutionalism’s material limits on state power. Individual rights in this 
sense are called classical fundamental rights, or civil rights, the most important of which 
are the right to life, liberty, physical integrity, and equality, and diverse freedoms such 
as freedom of thought, religion, and expression.
Later developments with regard to the regulation o f governmental power and the 
tasks of the modem state, led to the articulation of additional kinds of fundamental 
rights: political rights and social or economic rights. Political rights, such as the right to 
vote and to fulfil a public office, aim to ensure equal participation for every citizen in 
the body politic. Their purpose is to translate the ideal of popular sovereignty into 
political practice. The emergence of economic and social rights is directly related to 
changing conceptions at the beginning of the twentieth century about the role which the 
modem state should play in the life o f its citizens. Social demands were reframed in the 
language o f rights, when governments became obliged to promote actively the well­
being of their citizens. In the modem language of individual rights, civil, political and 
social rights are all accorded the status of fundamental rights. In political practice, the
2n6 Shafir (2004). p. 13; and Burkens (1989). p. 3.
:'-7 Pot and Dormer (1995). p. 24; Sabine (1941). p. 525.
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three groups o f rights and their exercise by the individual are related, most clearly 
illustrated in the concept of citizenship.
3.2.4. Judicial review, fundamental rights and the limits of the rule of law
Rules of institutional design are closely related to the protection o f classical 
rights, which aim to establish an area in which the individual is free from interference 
from the state. In some instances, it may not be possible or desirable that individuals 
exercise the full scope of their fundamental rights. One example is the case in which the 
fundamental rights of two individuals conflict with each other; another example is the 
case in which the state’s task o f providing security for all its subjects clashes with 
individuals’ unrestricted exercise of their fundamental rights. In these cases, the 
exercise o f fundamental rights can be restricted, provided that the essence of the right in 
question remains intact.
Interferences by the executive with the individual’s fundamental rights should 
be based on restrictions that are endorsed by the legislature. When his rights are 
interfered with, the individual has the right to have the interference reviewed by an 
independent judiciary. This accountability needs to real, which means that, when 
assessing whether an infringement of a fundamental right has occurred, judges should 
not merely examine whether the executive has acted in accordance with the rules laid 
down by the legislative, but in addition, they should assess whether the interference 
itself is not in breach with the core o f the right in question. Thus, also fundamental 
procedural rights and issues of fairness are associated with the rule of law 208
The rule of law thwarts assertions of sovereignty as power without restraint. 
Especially in the field o f  the rights of the individual, political power is clearly 
circumscribed, according to rules that simultaneously set formal and material limits to 
its exercise. Nonetheless, there are situations in which the normal constitutional 
guarantees of the state do not apply fully. In these situations, we can catch a glimpse o f 
sovereignty in its pure form as absolute power, both with regard to its territorial form as 
with regard to its content as power over people.
208 Dauvergne (2004), p. 593.
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Contemporary migration policy is one of the fields in which we are most likely 
to perceive pure sovereignty, associated as it is with the essence of the nation. Chapters 
4 and 5 will deal with the regulation o f international movement, and Chapters 6 and 7 
investigate restrictions on the right to liberty in the specific context of immigration law 
and policy. Those Chapters will show that in the field of immigration policy, extensive 
executive discretion and a traditional deference of the judiciary with regard to actions of 
the executive exist. Thus, with regard to the rule of law, the relevance of the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders is not only that outsiders generally enjoy a lesser degree 
of access to judicial protection,209 as the Section on citizenship below will describe. We 
will see that particularity of the rule of law goes further than that. Its territorial 
assumptions are illustrated with the fact that in the field of migration we encounter 
“power which does not conform to judicial or legislative modes of exercise.”210 The 
exact way in which migration law and policy may engage the exposed core of state 
power, where arbitrary exercise of political power is most likely to manifest itself, will 
be addressed in detail later in this study.
3.3. C it iz e n sh ip , individual r ig h t s  and territory
The rule of law and constitutionalism are products of specific historical 
processes, which, from the seventeenth century onwards, took place within sovereign 
states defined by territoriality. With regard to rules regulating institutional design, their 
embeddedness in the territorial state is logical and does not bring about serious 
inconsistencies. However, concerning individual rights, the consequences of their 
“particular historical institutionalisation in sovereign states”211 may turn out to be in 
contradiction with their underlying ideals of equality and dignity of universal 
humankind. The institutionalisation o f individual rights in the state has mainly occurred 
in the concept of citizenship, a concept that impinges significantly on the life outside 
constitutional affairs.212
:09DcirOlio (2005), p. 25.
210 Dauvcrgne (2004). p. 592.
211 Huysmans (2003). with regard to democratic forms of politics.
212 Tilly (1999). p. 253.
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My account of modern citizenship is divided in three Sections. Section 3.3.1. 
will deal with the factual circumstances that gave birth to modem citizenship. In 
addition, it will show that the very tension at the heart o f  the modem state between 
ideals based on a universal humankind and a political particularistic reality -  a tension 
that is, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, largely the result of territorialisation -  
is also present in the concept o f citizenship. Section 3.3.2. addresses the resulting 
implications o f this tension for the rights of the individual. We will see that universal 
rights have been actualised mostly within national states, and that national citizenship 
became a necessaiy condition for access to those rights that one supposedly has by 
virtue of belonging to universal humankind. Subsequently, in Section 3 .3 .3 ,1 will focus 
on citizenship’s role in a global structure o f sovereign states based on clearly 
demarcated territory, in order to argue that outsiders are not only denied access to 
fundamental rights on account of the internal sovereign claims of the national state, but 
that discrimination against them is also a structural aspect of the Westphalian state 
system.
3.3.1. Citizenship as an apparent paradox
The idea o f citizenship itself is much older than the existence of the territorial 
state. Since ancient Athens, theories o f citizenship have rested on some idea o f political 
participation. However, citizenship as a status which accords people, at least 
formally, a uniform collection of rights and duties, by virtue of their membership of the 
polity is a modem idea, which developed in the framework o f the emerging nation state. 
In all accounts o f citizenship as it emerged after the French Revolution, two notions are 
emphasised. The first represents membership of the polity, which, as marker o f identity, 
creates a clear boundary between inside and outside, and the second connotes a legal 
status, endowing the individual with a set of rights and responsibilities. Most writers 
about citizenship have depicted these two elements of citizenship as conflicting with 
each other, the tension which exists between them making their synthesis in a single
2)3 Rubenstein (2003), p. 160.
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concept seem a paradox. Partly this tension is explained by the fact that modem 
citizenship fused two ways of thinking about liberty.214
The first, dating much further back than the second, relates to the extent in 
which the individual can partake in political affairs. Citizenship of ancient Greece was 
based on such a conception of liberty. The idea of political participation in the modern 
state is determined by the collective right to exercise popular sovereignty.21'The second 
way of thinking about liberty is a modem one, and its appearance on the political state 
dates from the enlightenment era. Instead of a political concept, it is a legal notion, 
which is based on equality and characterised by the rights of the individual.316
When these two ways of thinking about liberty are merged in the single concept 
o f citizenship a certain tension will surface. For to lay claim to a right based on 
universal equality o f mankind one does not need any further qualifying conditions than 
to be human, but in order to claim a part in collective decision making about the future 
of the polity, one has to form, by definition, part of that collective. Precisely this is what 
Pietro Costa refers to when he writes that citizenship is a seemingly successful synthesis 
between two very different traditions, the first being the one based on the unbreakable 
ties between individual and the body politic and the second embodied by the natural law 
paradigm in which the individual is the symbol of sovereignty and the immediate 
titleholder of rights.217
However, there is more to it. Ties between the individual and the body politic 
are not stable and are not necessarily unbreakable. Furthermore, they need not be based 
on criteria that are exclusive. But modern citizenship developed simultaneously with the 
modem state. Inevitably, then, it is influenced by the ambiguities inherent in the modern 
state. Indeed, citizenship’s innate tension is the same as that which we find in the 
territorial nation-state, as was described in Chapter 2. There it was portrayed as the very 
tension that lies at the heart of modernity, between ideals concerning the universality of 
mankind and particularistic claims of distinct communities, in casu distinguished by 
varying national origins, however understood. Nationalism determined which ties 
between people and state are politically relevant, and as such, by putting citizenship on
2,4 Lange (1995).
215 Ibid. p. 97.
216 Ibid. p. 98.
217 Costa (2002). p. 218-219.
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a par with nationality, it has magnified the potential for conflict between the different 
idea’s that underlie citizenship.
More than in contemporary nationalism per se, which by definition has become 
a particularistic claim, the paradox between universal humanity and political 
particularity is still deeply ingrained in the discourse of citizenship. In the words of 
Andrew Linklater, much of the moral capital that has accumulated in the course of 
resistance to the growth of state power is embodied in the concept o f citizenship.218 But 
at the same time, by its equation w ith nationality, the same concept of citizenship is 
employed to defend a certain distinction between the inside and the outside.
“The citizenship project is about the expansion of equality among citizens. But as equality is 
based upon membership, citizenship status forms tlie basis of an exclusive politics and 
identity.”219
Chapter 2 made clear how the universal ideals inspired by the French Revolution 
developed into particularistic realities. I will briefly reiterate, with specific regard to 
citizenship, some o f the issues that w ere touched upon there. As the Revolutionaries 
wished to abolish all titles o f distinction that were current during the old regime, the 
concept of equality of all members o f the body politic required expression in the new 
notion of citizenship. Before the French Revolution, certain parts of Europe had known 
urban citizenship, providing those who were fortunate enough to possess it with 
autonomy, control of guild institutions and even social welfare entitlements at the local 
level.220 However, after the Revolution a new kind of citizenship spread over Europe. 
Particular rights and duties based on a notion o f universal humankind found their place 
in a political discourse that would keep its relevance in the future as it could be adapted 
to fit all kinds of struggles for equality on a national scale. Fitzsimmons captures how 
the new idea o f equality related to  the concept o f the nation, when he writes that 
“membership in the nation, rather than privilege mediated through the monarch, became 
the basis for political rights in the polity.”221
218 Linklater (1998). p. 169.
219 Rubenstein (2003), p. 163.
220 Hanagan( 1997), p. 398; and Marshall (1950).
221 Fitzsimmons (1993), p. 32.
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The concept o f citizenship played an important role with regard to the new mode 
of legitimation of political power. Theories of popular sovereignty were the driving 
force behind the transformation of subjects of a King to citizens of a nation. The French 
Declaration o f the Rights o f Man and Citizen expresses the ideal o f equality of universal 
mankind in the concept o f citizenship. For the early Revolutionaries the distinction 
between man and citizen was not problematic: The title o f French Citizen could be 
accorded to foreigners, living in France or abroad, who “in various areas of the world, 
[had] caused human reason to ripen and blazed the trail of liberty”222.
However, citizenship was affected by the changing character of the concept of 
the nation. As we have seen in Chapter 2, that concept, originally founded on equality 
and liberty, acquired a different meaning in the nineteenth century. Its emphasis shifted 
from ‘demos’ to ‘ethnos’. Citizenship became a tool in an exclusionist philosophy, 
instead of a principle for realising on a small (territorial) scale ideals concerning 
universal humankind. But before turning to these changing connotations of nation and 
citizenship, the beginning of which were marked by the Revolutionary Wars, it is 
necessary to add some additional observations regarding the emergence and 
development o f citizenship.
We have seen how ideals of popular sovereignty led to citizenship. However, the 
“moral capital” which accumulated in the notion of citizenship was not just a result o f 
political ideals and a discourse that was based on universalistic conceptions of justice. 
Certainly, sovereignty in the form of direct rule based on representation required the 
notion of citizenship, in order to solve the legitimation problem posed by the abstract 
notion of popular sovereignty and to realise ideals of equality. But in addition to the 
ideals of the Revolutionaries, which made citizenship as a concept ideologically 
conceivable, it was direct rule, exercised by the modem state based on popular 
sovereignty, which made citizenship practically possible and necessary. More 
prosaically, the content of modem citizenship is the result of war, coercion, and 
violence.223
This link between citizenship and state power is emphasised in the work of 
Charles Tilly, who describes the role played by warfare, state expansion and direct rule
222 Kristeva (1991), p. 156. See also Ferrajoli (19%). p. 153.
223 Tilly (1995).
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with regard to the emergence of citizenship.224 When, in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, states were in need of ever bigger armies, they did not rely so much 
any more on mercenaries, but started to draw troops from their own populations. 
Taxation of the population was the way in which they financed increasing military 
activity. Resistance by domestic populations to these practices led to citizenship:
(...) both ordinary* people and their patrons fought war-impelled taxation, conscription, seizures 
of goods and restrictions on trade by means ranging from passive resistance to outright rebellion, 
put down with varying combinations of repression, persuasion and bargaining. Tire very7 acts of 
intervening, repressing, persuading and bargaining formed willy-nilly the institutions of direct 
rule. Out o f struggle emerged citizenship, a continuing scries of transactions between persons 
and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by 
virtue o f the persons’ membership in an exclusive category, a categoiy o f native bom or 
naturalized people.”" 5 ,
Thus Tilly emphasises the role played by warfare and state expansion: “the 
causal chain from military activity to citizenship”. In a similar vein, Andrew Linklater 
regards citizenship as a reaction to the totalising project. W ith the totalising project he 
refers to efforts made by central governments to homogenise communities and their 
creation of a clear mechanism to distinguish inside from outside, in order to meet the 
challenges o f war.226 As such, he argues, states’ totalising practices led to the 
elaboration o f citizenship rights, because as subjects were confronted with the extension 
of state power and the increasingly demanding and restrictive character of political 
communities, they were forced to organise political and legal rights.227 In addition, he 
stresses the importance of capitalism and production processes in the process of 
establishing direct rule and the expansion of citizenship’s moral potential228
I have briefly paid some attention to these more factual roots o f  citizenship 
because it is essential to understand that citizenship is not only a concept which was 
conjured up in an age dominated by ideals regarding equality and universality of 
mankind, but that it is very much linked to the actual process of state formation. In
" 4 Ibid.
" 5 Ibid. p. 230.
" 6 Linklater (1998). p. 6.
"  Ibid. p. 146-147.
" 8 See also Marshall (1950).
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addition to examining citizenship’s place in political thought and discourse, one needs 
to be aware that it is to a large degree formed by the actualities of political power. As 
such, it is able to transform and keep its relevance, as it can be adapted to support all 
kind of struggles for equality. Marshall’s classic account of citizenship, depicting the 
evolution of civil to political to social rights, exemplifies this clearly.229 In his account, 
citizenship’s potential for equality and universality, clearly surfaces. But as already 
mentioned above, there is also a particularistic side to citizenship, one that was 
emphasised by the role which the nation assumed on Europe’s political stage during the 
nineteenth century and onwards.
We have seen in Chapter 2 that by the time that the Napoleonic wars had swept 
over Europe, territoriality and sovereignty were firmly anchored political concepts. 
Citizenship became inextricably linked to these concepts. Citizenship was territorial 
because the population over which the state exercised its rule was territorially defined. 
But the role that nationalism was to play in the subsequent century with regard to the 
setting of boundaries to the political community, shaped citizenship’s political 
particularism in an even more decisive way. Nationality and citizenship developed into 
interchangeable terms, in a manner that could not have been foreseen by the 
Revolutionaries who drew up the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
Chapter 2 described how nationalism in the nineteenth century caused the 
discourse of sovereignty to become a particularistic one, excluding a universal approach 
based on the idea o f a common humanity. These tendencies reached their zenith in the 
twentieth century, in the period between the two World Wars.230 Citizenship became an 
indicator as well as an instrument of exclusion and provided protection only for those 
who ‘belonged’.
The conflicting tendencies of the modem state are thus exemplified by the role 
and content of citizenship during this period. The contraction of the political community 
in the twentieth century was synchronous with the extension o f citizenship rights 
internally. These may seem contradictory tendencies, but perhaps it is more accurate, 
following Linklater, to depict them as trends that reinforced each other.231 When welfare 
rights became part of the citizenship package, states acquired more influence in the
229 Ibid.
230 Linklater (1998). p. 161.
231 Ibid. p. 150.
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everyday lives o f their citizens. The totalising project thus received new impetus, 
national feelings were strengthened, and as a result, trans-national loyalties weakened. 
On the other hand, it was also nationalism that shaped the conditions for unprecedented 
levels o f social and political mobilisation.
Hence, the interaction between nationalism and citizenship is complex and 
cannot be regarded as only leading to a more exclusive notion o f citizenship. Be that as 
it may, citizenship’s political particularism was undoubtedly enhanced by nationalism. 
The hostile way in which national governments responded to the problems regarding 
displaced people after the First World W ar and concerning large migration flows in the 
latter half o f the twentieth century emphasised the new function citizenship had 
assumed since its invention in the nineteenth century.
In this Section, I have elaborated upon the development of citizenship. I have 
discussed the factual circumstances gave rise to the birth o f citizenship. In addition, we 
have seen that the universal ideals that originally underpinned that concept were 
gradually overshadowed by the instrumentalist use that the modem state made of the 
concept in order to distinguish the inside from the outside. Before the national state 
came into existence, states also defined their social boundaries in terms of who is and 
who is not included in the community. However, when government was not yet based 
on popular sovereignty, membership had just meant that one was subjected to the 
authorities o f that state.233
Popular sovereignty, social contract theories and the idea o f natural rights 
changed the meaning of membership that was not self-evident. In order to understand 
territoriality’s fundamental role in the particularistic connotations that citizenship has 
acquired in the course of history, one needs to understand that the initial question of 
membership itself cannot be settled by social contract theories. Instead, whether one 
does or does not belong to the people can ultimately only be determined by territoriality 
and jurisdiction, instead of by any (implied) contract.234 The specific implications of 
citizenship’s particularism for the rights o f the individual will be dealt with below.
232 Ibid. p. 145.
233 Habennas (1996), p. 285.
234 Kratochwil (1996), p. 183.
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3.3.2. National citizenship as a condition for access to universal rights
Whereas in the eighteenth century citizenship was meant to provide equality to 
all because the distinction between man and citizen was not seen as problematic, 
presently we live in an age in which this distinction has become a highly significant 
one. In this Section we will see that universal rights have been actualised mostly within 
national states, and that citizenship became a necessary condition for access to those 
rights that one supposedly has by virtue o f belonging to universal humankind. In order 
to understand this process properly, we need to take into account the political forces that 
shaped the nation state and take a closer look at the development o f the concept of the 
Rights of Man and their subsequent implementation in political reality.
When the Rights o f Man were reinvented in the enlightenment era, they were 
proclaimed as inalienable. They did no longer flow from religion, nor were they 
privileges granted by the King or any other ruler, but man itself was their source. 
Nevertheless, at the same time they became linked to the right of the people to self- 
government, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Thus, man had for the first time in history 
just appeared as an individual who carried rights without reference to a larger order, 
when these rights almost immediately came to be identified with the rights of peoples, 
guaranteed by the concept of the nation.235 As Julia Kristeva observes, “the man 
supposedly independent of all government turns out to be the citizen of a nation.”
The explanation for the duality of man/citizen at the heart of the French 
Declaration is the interdependence of sovereignty and rights. And if  on the one hand, 
the modem state based on popular sovereignty was an effective and powerful vehicle 
for the protection and implementation o f the Rights o f Man, that state at the same time 
set obvious limits to the universalism of those rights.237 Equal rights and freedoms were 
secured through membership in a nation, which was constituted by the ‘people1. Even 
though the French Revolution, with its emphasis on universal humankind, is hostile to 
any pre-constitutional concept of the people,238 we have seen in the previous Chapter 
how theories of popular sovereignty open the door to particularistic nationalist claims, 
due to the fact that liberal theory fails to define what is meant by a concept as intangible
235 Arendt (1976), p. 291; and Xenos (1996), p. 233.
236 Kristeva (1991), p. 150.
237 Shafir (2004). p. 24.
238 Bmnkhorst (2000), p. 51.
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as the people. These nationalist claims are facilitated in a system where the organisation 
of political life on the basis of clear territorial demarcations is a fact.
Nationalism played an ambiguous role in the development o f citizenship: 
without it the political mobilisation that led to the extension and expansion of 
citizenship would perhaps not have been possible, because for that an appeal was 
needed that was stronger than the somewhat abstract ideas on human rights and popular 
sovereignty. However, the result was that only national citizenship seemed to be able 
to secure access to the rights o f man. Hannah Arendt depicts this process 
unambiguously:
“ The whole question of rights [...] was quickly and inextricably blended with the question of 
national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's own people, 
seemed to be able to ensure them. As mankind, since the French Revolution, was conceived in 
the image o f a family of nations, it gradually became self-evident that the people, and not the 
individual was the image of man.240
The disastrous consequences o f this identification o f the rights o f man with the 
rights o f  citizen, according to Arendt, became clear only in the twentieth century. 
Nationalism had by then long lost its original function o f integrating diverse social 
strata and peoples in one nation, but it had led to an exclusive ideal of the nation state, 
purportedly constituted by a people whose bonds to each other and to its territory were 
pre-political. The plight of the refugees and the stateless, and the sufferings o f the 
victims o f the totalitarian governments showed that “the Rights of Man, supposedly 
inalienable, proved to be unenforceable -  even in countries whose constitutions were 
based upon them -  whenever people appeared who were no longer citizen o f any 
state.”241
Without belonging to an organised political community of a particular sort - the 
territorial nation state - rights had become illusionary: the loss of national rights in 
practice meant the loss of human rights. The attempts o f the stateless and the minorities 
to fight for their own national states only strengthened the perception of a natural and 
necessary link between the territorial state, citizenship and individual rights. In a similar
239 Habermas (1996), p. 285. 
24(1 Arendt (1976), p. 291.
241 Arendt (1976), p. 293.
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manner was such a perception of the link between national sovereignty and rights 
reinforced by the minority treaties concluded after the First World War, which were 
deemed necessary to protect the rights of minorities that did not have a state of their 
ow n242
After the Second World War the dangers inherent in a system in which the rights 
of man had “no reality and no value except as political rights, rights of the citizen“241 
was recognised. The idea of natural rights based on truly universal humankind received 
new impetus, and although the nationality-territory link still grants unconditional access 
to many entitlements, formal citizenship status and rights have to a certain extent 
become disconnected in contemporary political societies. Human rights discourse and 
constitutional norms underlying Western liberal democracies, have led to what some 
scholars describe as post-national citizenship, an approach to rights which is allegedly 
not linked to territorial or national exclusivity. This notion of so-called post-national 
citizenship will receive attention in Section 3.5.2, after I have looked at the emergence 
and development o f human rights in international law in Section 3.4.4.
3.3.3. Citizenship’s structuring role in a world of nation states
However, before turning to international law, there is another aspect of 
citizenship that deserves our attention. Whereas most accounts of citizenship focus on 
the relation between the individual and the state, the role of citizenship on a global scale 
in the Westphalian state system is often ignored. Banry Hindess is a scholar who turns 
away from this wholly internalist perspective on citizenship, but instead examines its 
global role. He argues that discrimination is a requirement of the modem state system, 
and not only a result o f the internal sovereign claims that contemporary states make on 
behalf of their own populations.244
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that, by establishing external sovereignty as a 
principle of international relations, the Peace of Westphalia ascribed to each territorial 
state the exclusive government of the population within its territory.24' States w ere able
242 Shafir (2004). p. 23.
:43 Balibar (1994). p. 212. See also Edwards (2001).
:44 Hindess (2000) and (1998)
:45 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
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to establish to a large degree exclusive control over their territories and the populations 
within it. The important point made by Hindess is that the modem state system as such 
does not only regulate the conduct of states amongst each other but that it 
simultaneously constitutes “a dispersed regime o f governance covering the overall 
populations o f the states concerned.”246 This regime of governance is dependent on the 
division of humanity into distinct national populations, w ith their own territories and 
states.
The notion of citizenship serves as an instrument o f such a system o f global 
governance that determines who belongs where. Thus, citizenship’s particularism is not 
only the result of the internal sovereign claim o f the state to determine its own 
boundaries. Distinctions between nationals and foreigners are also an inevitable 
outcome of the Westphalian state system that partitions “humanity into citizens of a 
plurality of states (and a minority who are both displaced and stateless).”247
By looking at citizenship’s structural role in the territorial state system, 
important insights surface, which are lost when we depict citizenship solely as a 
national project that gradually turned the privileges o f the few into the rights o f the 
many. In our contemporary global system, citizenship is an important tool for an 
ongoing construction of territory as a political concept. It is a fundamental notion in 
order to maintain a global political system based on territoriality, as it perpetuates “an 
image of a world divided into ‘national’ populations and territories, domiciled in terms 
of state membership.”248 The notion o f the nation state as a container of society plays an 
important role: the assumption that various sovereign states constitute a world system of 
separate, closed and homogenous units.249
The era after the Second World War gives a clear example of the process by 
which identity and territory are linked and by which the latter is inscribed with strong 
political meaning. Massive population transfers based on ethnicity were tellingly called 
‘repatriation’ and those people without a nationality were termed ‘displaced’.
An internalist account o f citizenship ignores the structural role of citizenship in 
the Westphalian state system. Citizenship can be understood as a project that gradually 
led to turning the privileges o f the few into the rights of the many only if  the national
246 Hindess (1998). p. 65.
24' Hindess (1998), p. 66.
248 Walters (2002), p. 282.
249 Tully (1997), p. 187.
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state is perceived as a closed container, in which the only relevant political processes 
take place. If, however, we perceive territorial boundaries not as natural and self- 
evident, but as features o f political life that have grown out of particular historical 
contingencies, then it becomes, to say the least, doubtful whether citizenship has really 
turned the privileges of the few into the rights of the many. The borderline between the 
privileged and the rightless may simply have shifted when the territorial state came into 
existence.
In addition, by focussing on the citizens of the most prosperous and democratic 
countries, most theoretical accounts of citizenship ignore the fact that all human beings 
are supposed to be citizens of some kind of political community.250 It is exactly with 
regard to individuals whose national rights do not match the standard account o f 
citizenship, that citizenship’s particularism becomes truly problematic. People detained 
in waiting zones at European airports, or those intercepted at the Mediterranean, 
certainly are citizens of one state or another. But instead of being a guarantee for social, 
political or economical rights in their home countries (the absence of which in many 
cases constituted the very reason for their departure), the discourse of citizenship denies 
these people the possibility to pursue these rights elsewhere. By allocating populations 
to specific states, the global institution o f national citizenship implicitly endorses the 
view that only national self-emancipation is suitable for securing the Rights of Man.
Hence, the two aspects of citizenship that I have discussed here -  citizenship as 
a condition for access to rights and citizenship as a tool for allocating populations to 
specific territories -  interact to reinforce the ideal of national sovereignty and 
territoriality. Hannah Arendt explains the lack of attention for the concept of human 
rights during the nineteenth century by arguing that such rights were supposed to be 
embodied in the notion of citizenship, and in theory, all members of humanity could 
achieve citizenship rights.
All human beings were supposed to be citizens of some kind of political community; if the law s 
of their country did not live up to the demands of the rights of Man. they were supposed to 
change them, by legislation in democratic countries, or through revolutionary action in 
despotisms.251
250 Hindess (2000), p. 1495.
251 Arendt (1976), p.293.
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The idealisation o f national sovereignty and the interconnectedness of the 
concept o f rights and territoriality, which are both inherent in such a perception of 
citizenship, are apparent when we realise that the words with which Hindess condemns 
the contemporary international discourse of citizenship, essentially express the same 
idea:
The teleological discourse of citizenship promises the poorest of the world that, if  only they 
would stay at home and learn to behave themselves, they too could be citizens like us.252 
As such, for many people citizenship offers far less than protection against 
sovereign power: it justifies their exclusion and it sustains inequality on a global scale. 
In Section 3.5., I will investigate whether post-national citizenship has severed the link 
between nationality, rights and territory so as offer a more inclusive protection against 
sovereign power. Post-national conceptions of citizenship, based upon a notion of rights 
that is no longer nationally exclusive, partly emerged in response to developments in 
international law. The Section below will address these developments.
3.4. I n t e r n a t io n a l  l a w  a n d  v i o l e n c e
3.4.1. Sovereignty and international law
In this Section I will investigate the way in which international law has set limits 
to the use o f violence by the state. However, before turning to these limits, some 
preliminary remarks about the relationship between sovereignty and international law 
are necessary. Realists have often portrayed the Westphalian system as providing law 
and morality solely within states, whereas outside these states anarchy and chaos reign. 
The international environment is seen as a permanent Hobbesian state of nature. And 
how else could it be, these realists ask, in the absence o f an international Leviathan: a 
‘supra-national’ authority that manages the relations between sovereigns? In the eyes of 
thinkers such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Morgenthau, the concept of state sovereignty 
necessarily entails anarchy in international relations. And certainly, in view o f the sheer 
number o f international conflicts, “the history of international relations since the days of
252 Hindess (2000), p. 1496.
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the Westphalia treaties provide overwhelming evidence that [theirs] is a reasonable 
accurate depiction of the dynamics of relations between states.”253 Admittedly, the 
concept of sovereignty as elaborated upon in Chapter 2 precludes an ‘international 
sovereign’ who rules over sovereign national states. A realist account of international 
relations is inevitable in Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty, where government is identified 
with force and it is a logical impossibility for the sovereign to be bound.
However, contemporary international reality also demonstrates that restrictions 
on the liberty of states to manage their affairs are legion.254 To understand these it is 
essential to be aware that sovereignty is not only a monopoly over the legitimate means 
o f coercion, nor merely ultimate authority, but that these aspects of sovereignty are 
exercised exclusively within a certain territory. Westphalian sovereignty entails the 
exclusion o f external authority within the territory of the state. Thus, although 
sovereignty was initially thought of as a concept to conceptualise and justify authority 
within the state, its territorial form inevitably came to bear upon relations among states.
International law thus developed alongside the emergence of the system of 
sovereign states. Nevertheless, in spite of the normative and regulating character of 
international law, it should be clear from the outset that there are limits to what 
international law can achieve. Some authors have found the reason for these limits 
generally in the configurations of state interest and the distribution of state power.255 In 
this study, I argue more specifically that the existence of these limits, expressed in an 
almost structural immunisation of territorial sovereignty against international forms of 
correction, are due to the reification of territoriality as an organising principle for the 
modem state system.
We will see that even the modem version of the international rule of law 
embodied in the concept of international human rights suffers from what I will call a 
“territorial blind spot” . In order to properly evaluate the alleged novelty of the modem 
version of the rule of law embodied in the human rights discourse, in that it breaks with 
traditional, exclusive and silencing notions of international law, we need to understand 
the importance of territoriality in classical international law. Therefore, this Section will 
first picture the development of traditional international law with regard to the
253 Holsti (1995). p. 6.
254 Brow nlie (2003), p. 369; and Tamanaha (2004), p. 131.
255 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 13.
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regulation o f violence, after which it will focus on modem human rights law as it 
developed after the Second World War.
In international law, the regulation of violence and territorial boundaries are 
connected to each other by much the same logic as which binds people, territory and 
authority within the nation state. Similarly, the same tension that exists between 
particularism and universal ism in the idea o f the nation state and its accompanying 
concepts, such as citizenship, comes to  the fore in international law, albeit in a different 
fashion. Here the tension between universalistic ideals and a reality which is in a high 
degree particularistic is expressed in differing conceptions about who are the subjects o f 
international law. The way in which this tension is resolved, has profound implications 
for which kinds of violence have becom e a matter of concern for international law. 
Whether one believes that “only states have international legal personality” or assumes 
that, on the contrary, “individuals are the true and exclusive legal persons”236 makes an 
enormous difference, especially in this area of international law.
In Section 3.4.2., I will argue that until recently, this tension has been resolved 
in favour o f the national territorial state. Subsequently, Section 3.4.3. will address 
different sorts o f violence that classical international law deals with. The consequences 
of the ideal o f the national territorial state dominating the international legal discourse 
regarding state violence will be illustrated with examples relating to the regulation of 
interstate violence, diplomatic protection and the treatment of minorities under 
international law. Lastly, in Section 3.4.4., I will concentrate in detail on international 
human rights law. I will seek an answer to the question whether the state based 
approach o f classical international law, based upon the same obdurate link between 
sovereignty, territory and identity as that we find in the citizenship discourse, has been 
abandoned there.
3.4.2. The national territorial state as the true and only subject of international law
International law emerged at a time when the state was not yet the decisive 
political entity it was later to become, and in early international law, the individual was 
fully included. The influence o f ideas which had their roots in the Res Publica
~56 Nijman (2004), p. 6. See also McCorquodale (2004).
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Christiana were for a long while palpable in international law, such as the notion that 
the rights of individuals were morally prior to the rights o f the body politic to which 
they belonged. Early theorists o f international law were natural lawyers and argued that 
assertions of what is now called Westphalian sovereignty are subject to limits. Vitoria 
(1480-1546) and Suarez (1548-1617) grounded international law in the divine order, in 
which the individual had its own place. Grotius (1583-1645) modernised the law of 
nations, as he maintained that its content could be based on reason. For him, 
international law was still natural law, but no longer divine. In Grotius’ law of nations 
the individual featured as a subject, inevitably, in view of the foundation for his ins 
gentium ; a society o f sovereigns and their subjects who were united in the natural bond 
o f mankind.257
Chapter 2 described that the emergence of the modem state with its reliance on 
territory and the concept of the nation caused the universaliStic ideals from the 
enlightenment era to translate in a political particularistic reality. Similarly, with the 
emergence of the modem state, the tension in international law with regard to its 
subjects gradually begins to be decided in favour of the nation state, and the individual 
loses much of his relevance as a subject of international law. Enlightenment ideals 
influenced this process twofold.
First, as we have already seen, indirectly, as the modem territorial state based on 
nationality clearly differentiated between inside and outside. A consequence was that 
the nation state was gradually perceived as a unified force, with supreme and 
exclusionary authority within a clearly demarcated territory. The manner in which this 
conception of the state influenced international law is aptly illustrated by the work o f 
W olff (1679-1754). Still a natural law theorist, instead of according natural rights to 
individuals, he ascribes them to states, in his eyes the exclusive subjects of international 
law. One o f the natural rights o f states was the right to non-interference by other 
states.258
A second trend that contributed to the demise of the individual in international 
law was the emergence of empiricist theories during the enlightenment. Instead of 
deriving international law from absolute principles, it was reinterpreted in terms of what
25 Nijman (2004), p. 46-47 
258 Nijman (2004). p. 82.
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actually happened between states.259 The work o f  Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) 
marks the transition from natural law theories in international law to an approach that 
identified the law  o f nations with positive law between sovereign states. To him, as to 
Wolff, the exclusion o f external authority, as a characteristic o f sovereignty, was one of 
the cornerstones o f the law of nations. Under the influence o f legal positivism in the 
eighteenth century, the law of nations came to rely fully upon national sovereignty, and 
legal personality in international law was dependant on absolute sovereignty.260
In this way, the role o f  the state in international law was doubly emphasised. 
Eighteenth century ideals of individualism and human equality did not lead to a 
strengthening o f  the position of the individual in international law. On the contrary, just 
as they had contributed towards nationalism and hostility towards outsiders within the 
nation state, they consolidated the importance of the sovereign state in international law 
as the sole bearer o f rights. In the nineteenth century, this tendency in international law 
was reinforced, as idealised concepts such as nation and state were romantically 
perceived as one. As a result, the idea o f  the individual as a subject of international law 
had become unthinkable in the late nineteenth century, with its Hegelian glorification of 
the state and national sovereignty. In short, a positivist approach which obscured the 
natural law origins o f international law, combined with the mythic dimension the state 
had acquired, by use of idealised or constructed concepts such as territory and 
nationality, led to  a perception of international law as law solely for and by states.261
In those few cases where the individual featured, his position was derived from 
and dependent on the will o f the sovereign state,262 as we will see below. This situation 
would last until 1945, although already before that time voices were heard to make the 
international legal system more inclusive, by deconstructing the “artificial and absolute 
separation” that existed between the state and its citizens in international law.263 We will 
see below that a perception o f the territorial state as the sole subject of international law
259 Shaw (1997), p. 22.
260 Nijman (2004), p. 111.
261 In addition, sovereignty did not only function as a shield between the individual and the international 
legal system, but by defining it as something exclusively European, it excluded for a long time non- 
western states and indigenous communities from international law. See Orford (2004). p. 470.
262 Harding and Lim (1999), p. 5.
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has had a strong impact on the regulation and legitimisation of violence by international 
law.
3.4.3. Sorts of violence regulated by classical international law
Here I will outline the forms o f violence that traditional international law 
regulates, and the way in which it does that. Far from being an in-depth investigation o f 
this field of international law, this outline serves to further elucidate some aspects of the 
relationship between (illegitimate violence, sovereignty, territory, and people. As a 
result, we will see that the way in which international law offers protection against 
violence, and how it determines whether the use of force is legitimate or not, is to a 
large degree determined by the concept o f national sovereignty and the meanings 
ascribed to territorial boundaries.
Although the relevance of inter-state violence, humanitarian law, diplomatic 
protection and the treatment of minorities may not seem directly apparent for the subject 
under consideration in this study, these issues illustrate that the international legal 
regime dealing with violence is decisively shaped by the way in which territorial 
boundaries are drawn in the past, and by the meanings that were subsequently ascribed 
to them. Only a thorough understanding o f this structural characteristic of international 
law, will make it possible to evaluate the alleged novelty of international human rights. 
Thus, as already mentioned, emphasis will be on classical conceptions of international 
law, as the law between sovereign states. Developments o f a more recent date will be 
addressed in Section 3.4.4. that deals with international human rights law.
3.4.3.1. Inter-state violence
We have seen in Chapter 2 that the emergence of a territorial state system led to 
a new structure delimiting legitimate and illegitimate violence. Before territorial 
demarcations became the foundation for political authority, the absence of a clear 
mechanism to determine “us” from “them” made it impossible to make a distinction 
between war and mere crime,264 even though there were religious theories justifying the
264 Mansbach and Wilmcr (2001), p. 56.
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use o f violence in specific instances, such as the doctrine of just war. Through the 
establishment o f  the Westphalian order, war could be distinguished from mere crime by 
defining it as something that only sovereign states engaged in.265 In nineteenth century 
conceptions o f  international law, the right of a state to wage war in order to settle 
disputes with other states was regarded as a fundamental aspect of that state’s 
sovereignty.266 State interest was a legitimate reason for resorting to violence against 
other states, i f  only conditioned by the requirement that it should be a last resort.
Thus, territorialisation diminished the importance o f non-state actors twofold: as 
we have seen above, only the sovereign state was in possession of international legal 
personality, and only violence waged by the sovereign state was regarded as legitimate. 
The result was that whenever the individual featured in the laws of war, his position was 
derived from the state’s right to resort to  force. Regulation o f violence was monopolised 
by national states in a very literal sense: fighters that did not fight for a national army, 
such as religious minorities and sub-state rebels, were not accorded rights, just as 
indigenous peoples were not protected, by the laws o f war.267
After the First World War, the attitude in which the right to wage war was 
perceived as inherent in sovereignty changed. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 
renounced w ar as an instrument of foreign policy except in self-defence. This attitude 
was reinforced by the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials in which the Japanese and German 
were prosecuted for planning aggressive wars, so-called crimes against the peace, The 
prohibition on the use of force is forbidden in contemporary international relations, 
pursuant to Article 2(4) of the Charter o f the United Nations.268 Territorial integrity of 
sovereign states is a cornerstone o f contemporary international law.269 Nevertheless, 
even if  the right to wage war is no longer regarded as inherent in sovereignty, the 
language o f w ar has principally remained the language of the state. This is illustrated by
265 Van Creveld. (1991), p. 41.
266 Brand (2002), p. 287; and Steiner and Alston (2000), p. 114.
267 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p. 61.
268 UN Charter Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use o f force against the territorial integrity o r political independence o f any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with tlx; purposes of the United Nations.”
269 See ICJ. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
U.S. A.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Reports 4, 27 June 1986.
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the way in which international law has formulated exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use o f force and the present framework o f international humanitarian law.
The two exceptions to the prohibition on the threat or use of force are both 
clearly modelled on the ideal of the Westphalian state system, consisting of independent 
territorial entities with exclusive rule within their territories. Chapter 7 of the Charter o f 
the United Nations permits the collective use of force and sanctions the right o f self- 
defence solely in the case of an armed attack on a state’s territory. More recent 
developments in international law with regard to humanitarian interventions, where 
purely internal situations are capable of being deemed a threat to the peace, are related 
to  the emergence of an international human rights regime, which will be dealt with later.
Although contemporary international law has somewhat weakened the strict 
assumption o f sovereignty as precluding any legal interference in domestic politics, 
international laws o f war remain largely constructed against the background of the 
Westphalian state system. Norms regarding international responses to civil wars are less 
developed than those that regulate interstate wars, humanitarian law regulating internal 
conflict offers less protection than that which pertains to interstate wars, and only states 
can become parties to the Geneva Conventions.270
3.4.3.2. Diplomatic protection and the treatment o f  minorities
In Chapter 2 we have seen how the Westphalian structure did not only lead to a 
new  structure by which to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate violence, but 
it also resulted in a division between internal and external violence. Violence that was 
resorted to by the state within its own territory has long remained within the exclusive 
sphere of domestic jurisdiction, consistent with the idea of sovereignty as supreme 
legitimate authority within a territory. However, although international law has largely 
ignored the question o f violence by the state within the state,271 the treatment of 
minorities and foreigners constitute exceptions to this notion o f domain réservé in 
classical international law.
Chapter 2 demonstrated how in the course o f history ties of allegiance, 
nationality and citizenship have provided the basis for the legal community o f the
270 Fitzpatrick (2002); and Kaldor (1999). p. 116.
271 Mansbach and Wilmcr(2001), p. 63; Donelly (1994), p. 8; and Henkin (1999). p. 4.
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state.272 The protection of the rights o f aliens in international law demonstrates the 
relevance of the same ties in international law. International law’s recognition o f the 
significance o f these ties has led to the paradox that “ the individual in his capacity as an 
alien [enjoyed] a larger measure o f protection by traditional international law than in his 
character as the citizen of his own state.”273 Generally speaking, international law 
decrees that foreigners may not be unlawfully discriminated against, have the right to  
respect for their life and property, and most importantly, that they are entitled to judicial 
protection to vindicate their rights in the host country.274
Although the significance o f the individual in this field of international law is 
obvious, the traditional stance with regard to international legal personality is not 
abandoned here: only the sovereign state is actually accorded rights. Individuals 
wronged by a foreign state cannot appeal to  international law; solely national states can 
claim compliance with international rules to the benefit o f their nationals residing 
abroad, which is the right to exercise so-called diplomatic protection. Neither can 
individuals under classical international law claim a right to seek and obtain diplomatic 
protection o f their national state; legal entitlements to such forms of protection are a 
matter of domestic law alone.
Diplomatic protection with respect to nationals in foreign countries has existed 
since the Middle Ages, but practice with modem features appeared in the late eighteenth 
century.276 During the nineteenth century issues o f  diplomatic protection increased 
enormously because more people resided outside their national states than ever 
before.277 From that time onwards, the place that diplomatic protection occupies in 
international law  is determined by two features o f the modem state: a strong linkage o f 
identity and sovereignty internally, and a powerful assertion o f sovereignty externally. 
VatteFs argument that an injury to an alien is an injury to  his state,278 illustrates the
r - Brownlie (2003), p. 497.
: 3 Lauterpacht (1968), p. 121.
* 4 Cassesc (2005), p. 121. Diplomatic protection can only be invoked when the individual has exhausted 
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assumption by international law that one’s state interference with another one’s national 
may constitute a breach of the sovereignty of the former state. “In taking up a case o f 
one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic protection or international judicial 
proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure 
in the persons of its nationals respect for the rules of international law.”279
In the discourse concerning limitations upon a state’s treatment of foreigners we 
can distinguish two different approaches: one which argues that it is sufficient for 
foreigners to be treated as nationals; the other maintaining that their treatment should 
live up to a minimum standard of civilisation: the international minimum standard 280 In 
the latter discourse, a purely state centred discourse is abandoned in favour o f an 
approach based on the dignity o f the individual. And as the latter approach prevailed, it 
can be contended that, even though international law does not confer individuals 
directly with rights regarding their treatment by a foreign state, universaliStic ideals 
based on the dignity of the individual came to play an important role in this field of 
law.281
The fact that the modem state is based on ties of allegiance, nationality and 
citizenship, and its linkage of sovereignty and identity, provide a rationale for the 
existence of a right o f diplomatic protection in international law. The weight which 
international law attaches to the meaning of these ties is proven by its insistence that the 
presence of such ties is not merely a formal question. In the Nottebohm Case, the 
International Court o f Justice declared Liechtenstein’s claim against Guatemala, 
concerning the treatment of one of its nationals, inadmissible. It was of the opinion that 
Mr. Nottebohm’s nationality could not be validly invoked by Liechtenstein against 
Guatemala, as it did not correspond to a factual situation.282 The Court reaffirmed that 
matters concerning nationality are within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, which 
settles, by its own legislation, the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality.
However, the issue to be decided by the Court did not pertain to the domestic 
legal system of Liechtenstein, but instead it dealt with the international effects of 
naturalisation. International law can only recognise naturalisation if it constitutes a legal
279 Panavczys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania). 28 February 1939. Ser A/B No 76 (1939).
280 McDougal. Laswell. and Chen (1976), p. 443.
281 Although the two approaches often reflect conflicting economic and political interests. See Casesse 
(2005). p. 120 and Brownlie (2003), p. 503.
282 ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 6 April 1955.
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recognition o f  a person’s factual membership in a state’s population. Such membership 
is expressed, according to the Court, by adherence to the state’s traditions, its interests, 
way o f life and by assuming the obligations and rights of its citizens. The concept of 
diplomatic protection in international law as such is consistent with the structural role of 
citizenship, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. The way in which international law affords 
protection to the individual is by regulating the relations between sovereign powers and 
allocating to each their specific responsibilities concerning those that allegedly “belong” 
to them.
The allocation to the sovereign of those that “belong” is mostly based on 
territorial demarcations made in the past. Minorities occupy a special place in the 
discourse that distinguishes the inside from the outside of the modem territorial state, 
and their protection has always been a concern for international law. Chapter 2 argued 
that the Treaties o f Westphalia anchored the notion o f  external sovereignty in 
international relations, by establishing mutually independent territorial political units 
with supreme and exclusionary authority within their domains. By doing so, it gave the 
sovereign the right to determine the religion within his territory.
Yet, this is not a complete account of the Treaties.283 They also contained 
restrictions on the sovereign’s right to regulate religious affairs in his territory by giving 
minority religious groups the right to practice their religion, and by prohibiting religious 
discrimination to  a certain extent.284 Thus, although the Peace of Westphalia established 
sovereignty as a principle governing international relations by ascribing a fixed territory 
to the sole jurisdiction of a sovereign and categorising populations as belonging to one 
state or another, at the same time these Treaties impinged significantly on the supreme 
right o f the sovereign, by placing him under an obligation to protect and respect certain 
religious freedoms within his territory.
The enforcement mechanism for these rights was largely effective, as it 
consisted of “a clear and easy-to-implement threat o f retaliation: protestant states would 
conduct reprisals against their own minority population and vice versa.”285 Here we can 
discern a parallel with diplomatic protection. Sovereign states would regard 
coreligionists living in another state as a matter o f their concern, just as they consider
283 Krasner (2001).
284 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 113.
285 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 155.
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the treatment of their nationals by another state as not falling entirely within the 
domestic jurisdiction o f the latter state.
After WWI, the issue o f minorities was brought to the forefront of international 
law and the protection o f minorities was placed under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations. The design of a system of minority protection by the League of Nations was 
prompted by the fact that many claims of self-determination of national groups in 
Europe were not satisfied. This system was built on the basis of several documents, 
which regulated the situation of specific states and certain population groups living in 
these states 287 Obligations on minority protection did not amount to a closed system of 
international law, as they were only imposed on certain states, and only concerned some 
o f the minorities living under their jurisdiction.288
The Permanent Court of International Justice, in an advisory opinion, formulated 
two general principles, which form the basis of the minority protection by the Treaties. 
First, nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities were to be “placed 
in every respect on a footing of perfect equality respect with the other nationals of the 
state.” Secondly, these minorities had a right to “the preservation of the racial 
peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics.” 289
The cases of minority protection and diplomatic protection constitute an 
exception to the assumption that the deployment of internal violence is a matter for the 
sovereign state alone, in which classical international law has no role to play. 
Nevertheless, international laws that protect minorities and aliens do not depart from a 
traditional understanding of sovereignty which links authority, territory and people and 
makes a strict distinction between inside and outside. By providing ‘outsiders’ -  
foreigners and minorities -  with protection against sovereign power, international law in 
this area reinforces the ideal of the nation state with its perfect link between identity and 
territory.
Such an ideal led to a perception in which “only nationals could be citizens, only 
people of the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions,” 
and in which “people of a different national origin needed some law of exception.”290 In
286 Henrard (2000), p. 4.
287 Ibid. p. 4-5.
288 See Arendt (1976), p. 272.
289 PCIJ, Minority Schools in Albania, Advisor)' Opinion of 6 April 1936.
290 Arendt (1976), p. 275.
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addition, it should be noted that the Minority Treaties had a clear geopolitical aim which 
consisted of maintaining the territorial ideal: “the system o f protection of minorities 
(...) is also intended ( ...)  to ensure that States with a minority within their boundaries 
should be protected from the danger o f interference by other powers in their internal 
affairs.”291 Accordingly, just as in the discourse of citizenship and the regulation of 
interstate violence, in these fields of international law, we see once more affirmed that 
“the relationship between identity and borders underlies both the process o f norm 
articulation and the kinds of violence identified as problematic”.292
3.4.4. In ternational human rights
We have seen above that the rise o f  territorial concentrations o f power in the 
Westphalian era has been checked by developments in two different areas.293 These 
developments took place along separate lines and each followed a different logic. 
Internally, the growth of state power led to the demand for citizenship rights, offering 
protection to the people against the arbitrary use of power by the state. Externally, the 
state was to undergo constraints formulated by international law.
The separateness of the discourses regulating internal and external restraints on 
state power led to a gap between national and international law. International law was 
the law between sovereign states, in which the regulation o f violence was determined by 
strong territorial assumptions and in which the individual as such did not feature. The 
treatment by a state of its territorially defined population usually did not involve any 
question of international law, with its acceptance of sovereignty’s exclusive link 
between power, territory and population. Internally, the concept of fundamental rights, 
based on the dignity of the individual, became linked to national sovereignty, which 
involved a similar exclusive linkage between territory, nationality, and citizenship. 
Accordingly, within the nation state, the original universality of citizenship rights 
gradually turned into a particularistic conception o f rights, based on national belonging.
291 League of Nations Official Journal. Volume 9.1928. p. 942.
292 Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p 56.
293 Linklater (1998), p. 213.
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When, during the period between the two world wars, sovereignty’s narrow link 
-  internally as well as externally -  between power, territory, identity and rights, was at 
its firmest, the existence of the gap between international and domestic law resulted in 
the absence of any enforceable rights for large groups of individuals. The terrible 
consequences thereof became clear during the Second World War, exemplified as they 
were in factual spaces of rightlessness, such as the concentration and extermination 
camps and, to a lesser degree, the internment camps for displaced people and refugees.
After 1945, the welfare of the individual, irrespective of his nationality, was 
increasingly considered as a matter o f international concern by the international 
community 294 The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials prosecuted individuals on the novel 
charge of crimes against humanity. Crimes committed against a state’s own population 
became a general matter of concern for international law. The Nuremberg Trials did not 
break completely with the territorially defined “process of norm articulation and the 
traditional kinds of violence identified as problematic”, seeing that crimes against 
humanity could only be committed in connection with war crimes or crimes against the 
peace. Thus, the treatment of Germany’s Jewish population by the Nazi’s prior to 1939 
was not adjudicated. Howevér, the Trials marked an important first step in 
deconstructing sovereignty’s function as a barrier between the individual and the 
international legal order. Although the criminalization of aggression in the Trials 
amounted to erecting “a wall around state sovereignty”, the effect of criminalizing 
certain acts carried out against a state’s own population was “to pierce the veil o f 
sovereignty,”295 Indirectly, the enactment of ‘crimes against humanity’ constituted the 
recognition of individual rights in international law that are superior to the law o f the
■ 296sovereign state.
The emerging human rights regime captured in various legal documents carried 
this process further. In the Charter of the United Nations, human rights were explicitly 
listed as a matter of concern for the new organisation, and it imposed on its members
~EM Oda (1968), p. 495.
295 Luban (1994), p.336.
296 Lauterpacht (1968), p. 38. As I am concerned with individual rights and protection against violence 
employed by the state. I will not look into developments which deal with individual criminal 
responsibility under international law . These developments, however, give also a clear indication of the 
diminishing importance of sovereignty as shielding the individual from the international legal system.
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the obligation to  respect such rights, irrespective of nationality 297 The post-war period 
saw an immense proliferation of international institutions and norms dedicated to 
protecting human rights. Many of these norms acquired binding legal force as they 
became embodied in multilateral frameworks for the protection of human rights298 
Apart from treaties that were open for signature to all states, irrespective o f their 
geographic location, human rights w ere also incorporated into international law on a 
regional scale.299
In addition, certain rights o f individuals have become customaiy international 
law. Irrespective o f  the fact whether a state has entered into specific treaty obligations 
with regard to  the rights of the people under its jurisdiction, the prohibition on torture, 
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, extra-judicial killings and disappearances have 
acquired the status o f customary international law, or even ins cogens.300 International 
law no longer permits states to defend violations o f these rights as legitimate exercises 
of national sovereignty. The status o f international law in this area is confirmed by the 
fact that states, even when violating basic human rights norms, generally do not assert a 
legal entitlement to do so; instead, they deny that such violations took place.301
Not only the development o f individual rights was suddenly taking place beyond 
the nation state, aspects relating to their enforcement and implementation were in some 
cases transferred to the international sphere as well. International institutions, such as 
the United N ations’ Commission on Human Rights, acquired monitoring tasks with 
regard to member states’ human rights obligations, and in case of violations, the
29 Donnelly (1994), p. 8; and Lauteipacht (1968), p. 347.
298 The most important of which: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Session., Supp. No. 51, 
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/708 (1984); Convention on the Elimination o f  all Forms o f  Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, 
U.N. Doc. 34/46/ (1980); International Convention on the Elimination o f  AU Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature on 7 March 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; 1CCPR; International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on 
the Prevention and  Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
299 ECHR; American Convention on Human Rights, 1969; African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. 1981.
3U0 McCoiquodale (2004), p. 486; and Aceves (2002), p. 261. See also the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
Case, 5 February 1970.
391 Fox (1997), p. 115-116.
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individual in some cases can appeal directly to an international body.302 Nonetheless, 
real enforcement and implementation o f universal human rights, going further than 
monitoring and pressure procedures, have largely remained national.303
This does not mean that the real effect of international law is nugatory in this 
area. First o f all, in the absence o f effective international institutions, national judges of 
liberal states have assumed an important role with regard to the enforcement o f 
international human rights norms, as will be looked into more closely below304 
Secondly, there is an indirect effect o f international human rights law in domestic 
systems, even when that law concerns so-called soft law: national judges may interpret 
national law in conformity with standards laid down in international instruments, even 
when those are not binding, or not ratified.305 Thirdly, the existence and 
acknowledgement o f international norms with regard to the dignity of the human person 
have important normative consequences: demands can now be framed in the language 
of law, which make them more powerful, and lends them a legitimacy they might have 
been lacking before.306
The regional record with regard to the implementation and enforcement o f 
human rights shows a diverse picture.307 Asia and the Middle East lack 
intergovernmental regional human rights organisations, whereas Africa, Europe and the 
Americas have established international mechanisms to ensure the protection o f 
fundamental rights. By far the most effective and extensive of these is the protection of 
human rights in the framework of the Council of Europe.
The ECHR covers mainly civil and political rights, and is ratified by all forty- 
one Member States of the Council o f Europe. Its influence is not only felt in the 
domestic systems of the Member States, the majority o f which have incorporated it into 
national law, but also the European Union, although not a party to the ECHR, has
302 See the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
303 Donnelly (1994), p. 9.
304 Sec also Aceves (2002).
305 Gurowitz (2004), p. 144.
306 Gurowitz (2004), p. 149; Martin (1989); and Tamanaha (2004), p. 131.
307 Donnelly (1994), p. 9.
3IJ8 And accession to the ECHR in the near future is unlikely, see ECJ, Opinion 2/94, Accession by the 
Community to the European Comment ion fo r  the Protection o f Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
28 March 1996.
undertaken to respect the fundamental rights as guaranteed by it.309 The ECHR accords 
the individual a right of appeal to an international body, the European Court o f Human 
Rights (ECtHR), in the case o f an alleged breach o f the fundamental rights protected by 
the Convention. Contracting parties to the ECHR have undertaken to abide by the 
judgements o f the Court, which has, in the case that it finds a violation of one of the 
rights enumerated in the Convention, the right to oblige a state to pay just satisfaction to 
a victim, or to  take other measures. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe supervises the execution o f judgements, and makes recommendations with 
regard to general measures, in the case that domestic legislation or administrative 
arrangements make subsequent similar breaches o f the ECHR foreseeable. Member 
States o f the Council o f Europe generally comply with the judgments of the European 
Court, encouraged as they are by a number o f pressures and interests.310
By its transfer to the international sphere o f constitutional principles, which had 
thus far only featured in the domestic sphere, international human rights law intends to 
close the aforementioned gap between national and international law. Perhaps this is 
best illustrated by the way in which human rights are protected in the framework of the 
Council of Europe, with the ECHR as an “instrument of European public order’1,311 in 
which individuals are not only accorded international rights, but in addition, are able to 
secure the protection of these rights on the international plane.
In order to understand the way in which international human rights affect the 
modem state, it is helpful to distinguish between the internal and external effects of 
international law  in this area. Externally, the sovereign state can no longer maintain that 
the treatment o f  its population is a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The individual has 
become a subject of international law, and it has been said that “the development of 
international law  in this century is likely to be framed and judged not so much by the 
way international law defines relations between states, as by the way it defines relations 
between persons and states.”312 Within the nation state, national citizenship can no 
longer legitimately be the only foundation upon which rights are determined, as
309 Article 6 TEU. See Spielmann (1999), p. 759-760.
3,0 For an exceptioa see the case o f Loizidou vs. Turkey, Judgments of 23 March 1995 (preliminary 
objections); and 18 December 1996 (merits); and 28 July 1998 (just satisfaction). See Ovey and White 
(2002), pp. 431-435.
311 The ECtHR in Loizidou v. Turkey, (preliminary' objections). 23 March 1995, §75.
312 Brand (2002), p. 280.
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international law guarantees fundamental rights irrespective o f a person’s nationality. 
The ‘piercing of the veil of sovereignty’ in these two directions engages the sovereign 
claim of the modem state, as it results in incapacity of the modem state to maintain a 
strong distinction between the inside and the outside. The precise implications o f 
modem human rights law on the sovereign claims of the modem state will be dealt with 
in the next Section.
3.5. Closing the gap: A more inclusive protection through human rights?
3.5.1. Legitimacy and sovereignty
We have seen above that in traditional international law, Westphalian 
sovereignty entailed that the state was able to maintain a distinction between inside and 
outside, inter alia by designing certain areas as falling under its domestic jurisdiction, 
where international law had no role to play. The treatment o f the individuals under its 
power, apart from some exceptions (in which the status o f individuals under 
international law was derived from the sovereign status o f the state), constituted one o f 
the areas of domestic jurisdiction. Presently, international law has changed in this 
respect: incorporation of norms concerning human dignity in international law results in 
an inability of states to argue that national sovereignty entails that the treatment of the 
individuals under their jurisdiction is not a matter for international law.
Thus, contemporary international law has caused congruence between the ideas 
underlying Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. Internally, sovereignty has always 
been “authority, not might ”313 Externally, however, it was actual power and not legal 
authority, which constituted the basis for Westphalian sovereignty, where statehood was 
determined by effective control over a defined territory and a permanent population. 
W ith the recognition of human rights (and before that, the prohibition on the use o f 
force) in modem international law, this standard o f material effectiveness has been 
diluted, as the international community can refuse recognition of statehood when
313 Mcllwain (1969), p. 30.
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effective control within a territory is established in violation with fundamental human 
rights, the principle of self-determination, or the prohibition on the use of force.314
Also in this respect we see that sovereignty is no longer capable of bringing 
about a strict divide between the domestic and the international. Formerly, such a divide 
entailed a territorialisation o f the rule o f  law, containing the legal within the territorially 
defined state where authority is defined and bound by the rule of law, and defining the 
international as a space that lacks a constitutional order (at least with respect to the 
individual)315
Consequently, human rights law has instituted a constitutional order over and 
across national boundaries, and as a result, a blurring between domestic and 
international law has occurred in the field of individual rights. International human 
rights norms add a new dimension to the rule of law within the constitutional state, with 
particular repercussions concerning its practice o f judicial review. As such, human 
rights can simultaneously be seen as a tool to close the gap between national and 
international law, and as an attempt to overcome the tension between particularism and 
universality o f a global structure o f sovereign states that each have jurisdiction within 
clearly demarcated territories. W hether it succeeds in establishing a guarantee for 
individual freedom that is not trapped within “the image o f  the sovereign, the territorial 
state and its traditional [...] institutions’1316 will be investigated below.
In addition to the domestic -  international divide, we have seen that sovereignty 
traditionally distinguished the inside from the outside through two related claims: the 
first concerning territory; the second regarding matters of identity. I will start 
investigating the effect o f the blurring between domestic and international law on 
matters of identity with specific regard to individual rights in Section 3.5.2. We will see 
that distinctions regarding inside and outside that are based on national identity have 
lost much of their former importance. Due to international human rights norms, post­
national conceptions of citizenship have developed within the state.
3,4 Warbrick (2003), p. 205; and Nollkaemper (2004), pp. 116-118. Examples are the resolutions of the 
U.N. Security Council in which the establishment of the South African homelands (violation of the 
prohibition of apartheid), and the establislunent of North Cyprus by Turkey (violation of the prohibition 
on the use o f force) were deemed in violation of international law. S/Res/181 and S/Rcs/182 (1962) and 
S/Res/541 (1983).
315 Huysmans (2003), p. 215-216. Sec also Fox (1997), pp. 113-114.
316 Huysmans (2003). p. 223, who poses this question with regard to trans-national democracy.
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With regard to the modem state’s territorially based claims, which will be 
looked at in Section 3.5.3., however, the picture is more ambiguous, and I will argue 
that territoriality as an organising principle has not been weakened by international 
human rights norms. On the contrary, we will see that the limits to the validity of these 
norms are often determined precisely by territoriality.
3.5.2. Identity and rights in the contemporary state: post-national citizenship
I have described in Section 3.3.1 how citizenship and nationality acquired 
identical meanings when the meanings o f statehood and nationhood coincided.317 Just 
like nationality, the institution of national citizenship was centred on exclusive 
allegiance,318 and legal personhood became linked to nationality. Individual rights were 
in reality national rights, and the result was that non-citizens fell in a gap that existed 
between national and international law, without real possibilities for enforcement o f 
those rights that were proclaimed as inalienable when they were formulated during the 
enlightenment.
However, the linkage of nationality and citizenship does not need to be 
“ indispensable, inevitable or necessary.”319 On the contrary, we have seen that the 
bundling of the rather diverse elements in the single institution of citizenship came 
about as a result o f specific historical processes. In this Section, I argue that 
contemporary developments indicate, in some respects a gradual weakening of the 
linkage between nationality and citizenship, if  not with regard to citizenship as a formal 
status, than at least with regard to citizenship as a normative project. According to 
Saskia Sassen, the tension between citizenship as a formal status or as an increasingly 
comprehensive social membership, have been fuelled by “globalisation and human 
rights, therewith furthering the elements o f a new discourse on rights ”
Thus, not only the increased prominence of the international human rights 
regime features in Sassen’s analysis o f how globalisation destabilizes the particular 
bundling of diverse elements in the institution of citizenship, and how it "brings to the
3 r Preufi(1996), p. 128.
318 Sassen (2004). p. 194.
319 D eir Olio (2005). p. 13.
320 Sassen (2004). p. 198.
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fore the fact itself o f that bundling and its particularity."321 In addition to international 
human rights, Sassen accords a crucial role to various forms o f globalisation, such as 
economic deregulation and the subsequent prominence o f the markets. Important as 
these developments are, I will not address them when examining the changing 
connotations o f social membership. The scope o f this study allows only for 
investigation o f  the influence o f human rights norms on the discourse o f rights within 
the nation state.
Moreover, I take the opportunity to point out that in this Section, I will not 
investigate the way in which international human rights norms involve a right of non­
citizens to be present on the territory o f  the state. Although an important aspect when 
examining how international human rights norms limit state sovereignty and how they 
have the capacity to transform citizenship as a normative project, questions with regard 
to the right to cross national boundaries and the right to remain in the national state’s 
territory will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Under the influence of human rights norms, formal membership in the 
territorially exclusive nation-state ceases to be the only ground for entitlement to rights. 
Although, as w e will see in later in this study, international law is largely silent with 
regard to the national state’s discretion to admit or refuse aliens, once these aliens are 
present within the territory of the national state, international human rights norms 
impose important obligations upon the state with regard to non-citizens. As 
governments are obliged to guarantee some fundamental rights irrespective of 
nationality, rights based on universal personhood have broken the state’s monopoly on 
granting membership rights.322
At this point, it is important to reiterate the blurring which human rights law has 
caused between national and international law. The international human rights regime 
operates partially within the nation state, as adherence to the rule of law within the 
nation state, as discussed in Section 3.2., ensures that international human rights norms 
are grounded in national institutions and practices. As a result, these norms have 
changed the domestic constitutional order by their implication that an individual is 
protected by the law as an individual, and no longer because of formal citizenship 
status. In addition, most of the enforcement of human rights norms takes place within
3:1 Sassen (2004), p. 191.
3”  Murphy and Harty (2003), p. 181.
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the nation state, with domestic courts playing an especially important role.323 These 
courts have become obliged to extend basic legal protection to anyone falling under the 
state’s jurisdiction.324 Consequently, any tension between sovereignty as absolute power 
and international human rights should not be perceived as a conflict between a clear-cut 
inside and the outside,325 but this tension may surface purely within the national state.
In the case of rights protection for non-citizens, the tension between 
international human rights and sovereignty acquires an additional dimension, as human 
rights interests in that case do not compete merely with states’ jurisdictional 
independence, but with another central element of sovereignty that I have addressed in 
the previous Chapter: the right to determine who belongs to the community.326
Under the influence of human rights norms, a blurring has occurred between the 
position of nationals and long-term or legal residents within the nation state. I will not 
deal with the question whether this gradual increase in rights for aliens is the result o f 
international developments,327 or rather due to the “liberalness of liberal states” and the 
way domestic courts in these states have been guaranteeing rights for aliens over the 
past year, as Christian Joppke argues 328 As already said, the human rights discourse 
operates both within and without the nation state, which is one of its defining 
characteristics. The fact that extension o f rights to non-citizens has taken place mostly 
in Western states under the rule of law through domestic judiciaries, does not 
necessarily diminish the importance of an international dimension to human rights, but 
it could instead underscore the unique quality of these norms when compared to other 
forms of (international) law.
Human rights norms have secured civil and a certain amount of political as well 
as social rights for non-citizens, who as a result become part o f the community of the 
state. Even if  these non-citizens do not acquire citizenship as a formal status, their 
position in the nation state is anchored in an explicit discourse on rights and belonging, 
which has been called post-national citizenship.329
3:3 See Aceves (2002), p. 277; Martin (1989), p. 564; and Sassen (1999), p. 181.
324 See McDougal, Lasswell. and Chen (1976), pp. 461-463.
325 Sassen (1996), p. 61.
326 Bosniak (2004), p. 329.
327 See for example the HRC in Gueye et al. v. France. 3 April 1989.
328 Joppke (1998). see in particular pp. 292-293.
329 Soysal (1994). See also Jacobson (2001) and (1996), who instead talks about the decline of citizenship.
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However, w ith regard to discourses on post-national citizenship, it is important 
to make a distinction between the various categories o f fundamental rights, as not the 
full range o f political and economic rights forms part of the post-national citizenship 
package. Furthermore, with regard to non-citizens’ status in the nation state, lawful 
residents should be distinguished from persons who do not have the authorisation o f the 
state to be present on its territory. Accordingly, even more so than with regard to 
national citizenship, the content o f post-national citizenship is impossible to define, as it 
is a scale on which diverse factors determine the extent o f  rights and the degree of 
belonging for each individual.
International human rights instruments oblige the state to respect classical 
individual rights, such as the right to life, liberty, physical integrity, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, etc, to anyone under their jurisdiction, without regard to 
nationality. Thus, anyone present on the territory of the state -  citizen, legal resident and 
illegal immigrant alike -  is entitled to the enjoyment o f fundamental civil rights. 
Especially in the case of undocumented migrants, international norms, such as laid 
down in instruments such as the ECHR and the ICCPR are frequently invoked, as those 
people have no formalised status within the state to rely on.
However, with regard to their entitlement to rights, important differences exist 
between documented and undocumented migrants. The way in which human rights 
norms weakened the link between nationality and social membership is most distinctly 
illustrated in the case o f legal, long-term residents. In addition to civil rights, most 
European states grant long-term legal residents many social rights on an almost equal 
footing with their own citizens. The gradual expansion of social rights to this class of 
non-citizens is emphasised by Sassen, who argues that concerning social services, 
citizenship status is o f minor significance in Europe: “What matters is residence and 
legal alien status.”330 In contrast, the status of illegal immigrants within the nation state, 
although not devoid o f access to rights, can hardly be described as approaching 
something like citizenship status.
With regard to political rights, the distance between post-national citizenship of 
legal residents and national citizenship remains greatest. Notwithstanding the fact that 
in many European countries, long-term residents have the right to vote in municipal 
elections, foreigners, when they do not naturalise, are by far not accorded the full range
330 Sassen (1996), p. 95.
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of political rights within the national state. A clear example of the universality of civil 
rights versus the enduring particularity of political rights is provided by the ECHR. 
Most rights which this Convention guarantees are civil rights thus to be secured to 
anyone under the jurisdiction of one of the Contracting Parties, as is required by Article 
1 ECHR. However, with regard to Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, respectively securing 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association -  freedoms that consist 
of the exercise of political rights -  Article 16 ECHR expressly stipulates that nothing in 
these provisions shall be regarded as preventing the Contracting Parties from imposing 
restrictions on the political activity of aliens. The fact that political rights are only to a 
very limited extent included in the post-national citizenship package is due to the direct 
link of such rights with the concept of popular sovereignty, and as such with a 
resounding particularistic connotation o f the concept of the people.
With specific regard to post-national citizenship, it is once again important to 
stress the importance of the existence o f the rule of law domestically, in order for 
human rights norms to reach their full potential and as such to transform the traditional 
domestic legal order. I have remarked already several times upon the fundamental role 
which domestic courts play with regard to the enforcement of such norms. The judiciary 
in a state based upon the rule of law is able to mediate between the international and the 
domestic legal order. Sassen contends that, as domestic courts have to accept the 
existence of undocumented migrants making rights-based claims, a new social contract 
comes into being between these aliens and society at large.
The same holds true, even more so, for immigrants that have acquired legal 
residence status. Such a new form of social contract may partly make up for the lack of 
political rights for non-nationals. David Jacobson and Galya Ruffer claim replacement 
o f the traditional democratic route o f voting, civic participation and political 
mobilization, by the concept of judicial agency: “Through this new mode of political 
engagement, litigants challenge legislative and executive authority as they cross 
organizational and even national boundaries.”332 In line with Sassen’s argument, they 
contend that judicial agency, which term designates individual access to a dense web o f 
judicially mediated rights and restraints, changes the connotations of the traditional
331 Sassen (1996), p. 96.
332 Jacobson and Ruffer (2003), p. 74. See also Stacy (2003), p. 2050, who argues that the human rights 
regime causes political requests to be framed in the language of rights.
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social contract, for also outsiders can avail themselves o f such access, and as such 
become part o f the organised political community. Exclusive measures taken by the 
executive are challenged at the level o f the nation state, where the judiciary assesses 
their legality in light o f international human rights obligations of the state. Conflicting 
forces between the judiciary and the executive lead to a ‘‘shift of power towards formal 
commitment to human rights” ,333 which thwarts executive but also legislative attempts 
to exclude non-nationals from the enjoyment of rights which were originally retained 
for nationals.
Any account o f post-national citizenship is incomplete when it ignores 
citizenship of the European Union, the only formal constitutionalisation of post-national 
citizenship. The Treaty on the European Union, which was agreed upon and signed by 
the Member States in Maastricht in 1992, introduces the concept of citizenship of the 
European Union. Article 17 EC Treaty provides that every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen o f the Union, which citizenship shall 
complement and not replace national citizenship.
The most important right which European citizenship enshrines is the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory o f all Member States (Article 18 EC Treaty), 
but it should be emphasised that the right to reside in another Member State for a period 
exceeding three months is granted only to certain classes o f Union citizens 334 Citizens 
of the Union who reside lawfully in the territory of another Member State have the right 
to equal treatment within the material scope of community law, giving them in effect 
much the same social and economic rights as nationals of that Member State. Freedom 
of movement and the prohibition o f discrimination on the grounds of nationality in 
Article 12 EC Treaty were codified long before the notion o f Union citizenship came 
into being. Indeed, as these principles constitute cornerstones o f EC law, the concept of
333 Jacobson and Ruffer (2003), p. 79.
3iA Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of April 29, 2004, (to be 
implemented by April 30, 2006), on the right o f the citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory' of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 
1612/68 and repealing directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC. 73/148/EEC, 74/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC, and 93/96/EEC, [2004], O.J. L I58/77, grants a right of residence 
for a period longer titan three months to Union citizens w ho are workers or self-employed, who have 
sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host state, students and 
family members of these citizens. See Lenaerts. Van Nuffel and Bray (2005), p. 548.
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citizenship of the Union formalised already existing community law in the field of 
socio-economic rights. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the approach which the ECJ 
has taken to the concept o f citizenship has the effect of significantly extending access to 
fundamental rights for EU citizens, sometimes even contrary to secondary Community 
legislation335
Furthermore, citizenship o f the Union entails more than the right to move and a 
prohibition on discrimination on the ground of nationality. Every citizen of the Union 
has the right to petition the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman. In 
addition, in the territory of a non-Member State in which their Member State is not 
represented, Union citizens are entitled to protection by the diplomatic authorities of 
any Member State, on the same conditions as nationals of that State. Moreover, every 
citizen of the Union has the right to vote and stand as candidate for municipal and 
European Parliament elections o f the Member State in which he or she resides. 
Although to a limited extent, Union citizenship is thus complemented with political 
rights.
The impact o f Community law in this respect extends outside the Community 
legal framework into other areas o f international law, which more specifically aim at the 
protection of human rights proper. In Piermont v. France, France relied on the 
aforementioned Article 16 ECHR to restrict the freedom of expression of a German 
national who was present in French Polynesia.339 Contending that neither European 
citizenship, nor the status of Ms Piermont as a member o f the European Parliament was 
relevant, France argued before the ECtHR that Ms Piermont came within the scope o f 
Article 16 ECHR, as anyone did who was not a national of the country in which he 
intended to exercise the freedoms of Article 10 and 11 ECHR. However, according to 
the Court in Strasbourg, although not taking into account the concept of European 
citizenship as the Community Treaties did at the material time not recognise any such
335 See Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d ’aide social d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Newe, 20 
September 2001; Case C-209/03. Bidar v. London Borough o f  Ealing. 15 March 2005; and Case C- 
456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public D 'Aide Sociale de Bruxelles, 7 September 2004.
336 Article 21 ECT.
337 Article 20 ECT.
338 Article 19 ECT.
339 ECtHR. Piermont v. France, 27 April 1995.
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citizenship, EU M ember States were precluded to raise Article 16 against anyone in 
possession of the nationality of one o f the Member States.340
Nonetheless, Union citizenship is traditional in the sense that it maintains a 
strong link between the very concept o f nationality and rights. Only individuals who 
possess the nationality of one o f the Member States are endowed with Union 
citizenship. Long term residents that do not possess the nationality of one o f  the 
Member States -  those that according to Yasemin Soysal benefit from access to rights 
on the ground o f  post-national citizenship -  do not benefit from the right o f free 
movement and other Union citizenship rights, save the right to petition the Parliament 
and the Ombudsman. So although discrimination on grounds of nationality becomes 
increasingly prohibited with regard to persons that posses the nationality o f one o f the 
Member States, such discrimination is permitted with regard to the large numbers of 
non-European citizens present on the same territory.341 Council Directive 
2003/109/EC342 attempts to improve the status of third country nationals, but essential 
differences remain. Even if voices are heard to base Union citizenship on residence 
status,343 in light o f  individual Member States’ reluctance this will probably not happen 
in the near future.
If EU membership were to be truly post-national, the link between territory, 
nationality and rights would have to be disconnected more radically. From the outside -  
in the eyes of individuals who do not possess the nationality of one of the Member 
States -  with the establishment of Union citizenship, the EU as a whole acquired the 
characteristics o f the traditional territorial state. Indeed, Union citizenship even 
enhanced national citizenship,344 as could be confirmed by those outsiders who are 
subject o f expulsions organised by EU joint charter flights. Rainer Baubock contends 
that taking Union citizenship seriously entails that such citizenship should be accessible
340 Ibid, par. 64.
341 Boclaert-Suominen (2005), p. 1015.
342 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long term residents, O.J. L 16 of 23 January 2003, p 44.
343 See for example European Parliament. Working Document on the Fourth Report o f  Citizenship o f  the 
Union (1 M ay 2001 ~ 30 April 2004), Committee on Civil Liberties. Justice and Home Affairs. 30 June 
2005: and also the Parliamentary' Assembly o f the Council of Europe. Recommendation 1714 (2005), 
Abolition desRestrictions au Droit de 1 ote, text adopted by the Assembly on 24 June 2005.
344 See Dcll’Olio (2005).
under fair conditions to all long-term residents in the Member States. The fact that 
nationality laws of Member States are not harmonised, and in addition are illiberal and 
exclusionary, is “a matter o f concern to the Union as a whole as it is through them that 
membership in the Union is regulated.”345 The status o f third-country nationals is de 
facto determined by Member States’ national immigration rules,346 which matter will 
receive closer attention in Chapter 5.
We have seen that the internalisation of international human rights norms within 
the nation state has led to a shading of the distinction between inside and outside. Inside 
and outside can no longer be separated by drawing an unambiguous line between 
nationals and foreigners, but instead the extent of inside and outside can be expressed in 
terms of degrees. Wholly inside are those who posses the nationality of the nation state, 
entitled to the full range of civil, political and social rights. Wholly outside are those 
that do not find themselves under the jurisdiction of the nation state. Inside, albeit to a 
lesser degree than nationals, are foreigners who are in possession of a formal residence 
status that secures their entitlement to civil rights, a range o f social and economic rights, 
and in some cases a limited amount of political rights. Partially inside and partially 
outside are foreigners who are illegally present on the nation state’s territory: their 
entitlement to rights concerns mainly civil rights.
The erosion of the link between nationality and citizenship is exemplified by this 
shading of the distinction between inside and outside. Apart from the erosion of this 
once necessary linkage, it should also be noted that under the influence of international 
law, issues related to the concept o f nationality itself no longer fall exclusively under 
the national state’s domestic jurisdiction. Although international law still largely allows 
each state to determine whom it regards as its citizens,347 it is possible to discern 
developments at the international plane, indicating that the state no longer enjoys an 
unlimited discretion with regard to all matters relating to nationality. These 
developments relate mostly to the prevention of statelessness and issues of dual 
nationality, and should not be overstated 348 Nonetheless, with regard to these issues, 
international law treats questions of nationality increasingly from a rights-oriented 
perspective. As such, they may signal a departing from international law’s traditional
345 BaubOck (2003), p. 6. See also Lange (1995). pp. 109-110.
346 Boelaert-Suominen (2005). p. 1049.
347 Rubenstein (2003). p. 168-169.
348 See for a detailed discussion: Spiro (2003).
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approach to nationality law, which consisted of a “matter of human geography 
confronted on the same terms as territorial geography” , predicated to the maintenance of 
international order instead o f directly accounting for individual interests349 Kim 
Rubenstein argues along the same lines, suggesting a movement away from the 
centrality o f the state in international law  towards a rights-based, individualized focus: 
“as international law becomes more flexible in its use of nationality so too it becomes 
part of citizenships progressive project.”350
This Section has argued that international law has increasingly taken account of 
the individual interests that are involved in the exercise of jurisdiction over people by 
the state within its territory. International human rights have factually led to a 
weakening of the tie between formal citizenship status and individual rights within the 
nation state. In this sense, one can speak o f what I will call the ‘denationalisation of the 
rule of law’. The next Section will investigate how human rights have affected 
territoriality: what is their impact on the territorial claim of the modem state to 
distinguish inside from outside? Are human rights norms capable of transforming the 
territorial form o f  sovereignty in a likewise manner as they have affected its content, so 
as to be able to speak of a ‘de-territorialisation of the rule of law ’?
3.5.3 Sovereignty, territory, and individual rights
In the previous Section, we have seen that human rights norms have led to an 
extension of citizenship status, i f  not formally, than at least with regard to citizenship as 
a status indicating membership and access to rights in the organised political 
community. However, although this has certainly been beneficial for large groups of 
individuals living in states which are not their own, in this Section I will argue that 
advancing human rights norms have not led to a truly radical new approach to 
citizenship, one that is able to abandon the decisive distinction between universalism 
and particularism. We will see that formal citizenship status remains of fundamental 
importance for a territorial regime of governance and access to fundamental rights for 
the individual.
349 Spiro (2003), p. 94-95.
350 Rubenstein (2003), pp. 185-186.
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“ While it may be true that advancing human rights norms increasingly commit countries to 
granting the same civil and social (though not political) rights to those merely resident in their 
territories as accorded their full citizens, this development does not necessarily signal the 
“decline of citizenship” for most people. These arguments primarily concern the access to rights 
only of immigrants, not of the main stock of the populations that constitute and replenish the 
bodies o f citizens that constitute states. Such arguments tend to overstate the significance of 
what are, in fact, relatively marginal phenomena. From this point of view, it seems quite 
exaggerated to claim that, “in terms of translation into rights and privileges, [national 
citizenship] is no longer a significant construction.”35'
We have seen that within the nation state, the status o f legal residents and 
undocumented aliens differ in important respects. According to Linda Bosniak, it is the 
state’s claim to territorial sovereignty that accounts for this difference in treatment. She 
argues that with regard to undocumented immigrants, the state’s territorial sovereignty 
has been breached, which explains why the state accords these persons far less rights 
than legal residents.
The way in which the modem state perceives and wishes to maintain its 
territorial sovereignty, has a direct link with individual rights, and as such also with its 
capacity to exercise power over people. Nevertheless, the territorial form of sovereignty 
and its actual content as jurisdictional claims over people within a certain territory are 
often perceived as separate from each other because the former has acquired an image 
o f  neutrality and self-evidence. Whereas we have seen that international law has 
increasingly conceded that the content of sovereignty implicates individual interests, 
acknowledgement of the fact that the territorial form of sovereignty involves individual 
interests as well is rare.
In this Section, my first argument will be that territoriality exerts a limiting 
influence on the universality of human rights. To make this point, I will first confirm the 
importance of territoriality in this respect by examining the territorial scope of human 
rights obligations of national states and the way in which access to rights is factually 
guaranteed to the individual in Section 3.5.3.1. Secondly, I will contend that human 
rights norms have made very few inroads whenever the states bases its claims on its 
territorial sovereignty in Section 3.5.3., which investigates the way in which 
fundamental rights limit the state’s spatial powers or its assertions of territorial
351 Torpey (2000), p. 156.
352 See for a detailed discussion Bosniak (1991). pp. 753-756.
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sovereignty. I will conclude that international law regards the notion of territoriality and 
sovereignty’s territorial frame essential to the preservation o f a particular international 
order. The result is that the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s form 
are still only marginally accounted for, a proposition that will be investigated further in 
Chapters 4 and 5.
3.5.3.1. Territorial scope o f human rights protection: Duties beyond borders?
“The concept of universal human rights is antithetical to the [...] geographic distinctions that 
cause the protection of humanitarian law and the Constitution to be variable and 
unpredictable.”353
Most human rights instruments provide that the state is to ensure individual 
rights protection to anyone under its jurisdiction.354 Thus, in any case, actions o f states 
within their national territory may not violate any fundamental rights. With regard to 
actions of states outside national territory, the situation is more complex. Concerning 
European states’ human rights obligations, the admissibility decision of the ECtHR in 
Bankovic355 has led to ambiguity with regard to how the notion o f jurisdiction in Article 
2 ECHR is to be interpreted and the Court’s approach to this issue has been criticised as 
fundamentally flawed.356 Before considering the implications o f Bankovic and other 
recent case law, I will discuss the approach that the Strasbourg organs have traditionally 
taken towards extra-territorial application o f the Convention, as well as the way in 
which other international human rights bodies have dealt with the question o f extra­
territoriality.
Taking into account the object and purpose of human rights obligations of 
national states, there is no a priori reason why they should not be held responsible for 
those violations attributable to them that occurred outside national territory.357 Both the 
European Commission for Human Rights and the ECtHR have repeatedly held that in
353 Fitzpatrick (2002), p. 334.
354 Article 1 ECHR, Article 1 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 ICCPR.
355 ECtHR. Bankovic and others v. Belgium and others (inadmissible), 12 December 2001.
356 Altiparmak (2004); Mantouvalou (2004); Rüth and Trilsch (2003); and Happold (2003).
357 Meron(1989), p. 78.
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certain instances the national state can be held responsible for actions of its authorities 
outside its national territory, as the term jurisdiction is not limited to the national 
territory of the contracting states.358 According to the Commission, “it is clear from the 
language [...] and the object of [Article 1] and the purpose of the Convention as a 
whole, that High Contracting Parties are bound to secure the said rights and freedoms to 
all persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is 
exercised within their own territory or abroad.7’359
Apart from the situation in which it has occupied foreign territory,360 a state can 
be held responsible for violations o f the Convention rights and freedoms of persons who 
were in the territory o f another state, but who were “found to be under the former state’s 
authority and control through its agents operating -  whether lawfully or unlawfully -  in 
the latter state.”361 Before the Bankovic Case, the case law of both the Strasbourg 
Commission and the Court show that in order to engage a state’s liability under the 
ECHR, overall exercise o f jurisdiction is not always required and even a specific act 
committed abroad is capable of bringing a person within the jurisdiction of the state to 
which that act can be attributed.362
nationals of a State are partly within its jurisdiction wherever they may be, and authorised 
agents of a State not only remain under its jurisdiction when abroad, but bring any other person 
"within the jurisdiction" of that State to the extent that they exercise authority over such persons.
358 ECtHR, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain. 26 June 1992. EcommHR. Hess. v. United 
Kingdom, Decision of 28 May 1975. In particular, actions by a state’s consular and diplomatic 
representatives may involve the liability of a national state under the ECHR. See EcommHR, A*, v. 
Germany, Decision of 25 September 1965; and Lush (1993), p. 898. In Drozd and Janousek, the Court 
accepted that France had limited its jurisdiction ratione loci by a declaration under Article 63, but it 
concluded that it exercised jurisdiction ratione personae, Lush (1993) concludes that the Convention thus 
seems to be "hybrid, not without a measure o f internal consistency.*'
359 EcommHR. Cyprus v. Turkey, Decision of 26 May 1975 and EcommHR, A', and 1'. v. Switzerland, 
Decision of 14 July 1977.
360 And exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. See ECtHR, Loizidou v. 
Turkey, (preliminary7 objections). 23 March 1995, par. 62 and 18 December 1996 (merits), par 52.
361 EcommHR, A f v. Denmark, decision of 14 October 1992; and lllich Sanchez Ramirez v. France. 
decision of 24 June 1994. p. 155.
362 EcommHR. 11’. v. Ireland, Decision of 28 February 1983, par. 17. Altipannak (2004), pp. 233-244.
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Insofar as the State's acts or omissions affect such persons, the responsibility of that State is
engaged.”363
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Committee take a similar approach in order to establish extra-territorial responsibility 
for human rights violations 364 According to these bodies, the meaning of the term 
jurisdiction is not to be equated with territorial competence, but it should also cover 
extra-territorial acts by the state or its agents that violate the fundamental rights 
protected by respectively the IACHR and the ICCPR outside national territory.365
This broad interpretation o f the term jurisdiction, taking as a starting point the 
“relationship between the person affected and the state concerned, not [...] the 
geographical location of the violation”366 may perhaps not reflect the ordinary meaning 
of jurisdiction in international law, but it is consistent with the object and purpose of 
international human rights documents. When the term jurisdiction is used in 
international law to discuss the relationship between states amongst each other, it is 
clear that its scope is limited by the sovereign (territorial) rights of other states. The 
concept of jurisdiction in human rights documents in contrast should be understood as 
having a direct relationship with the rules concerning state responsibility in international 
law, which determine that responsibility derives from control.367 This line o f reasoning 
is confirmed by the Commission’s observations in Stocké:
“An arrest made by the authorities of one State on the territory of another State, without the prior 
consent of the State concerned, does not [...1 only involve State responsibility vis-à-vis the other 
State, but [it] also affects that person’s individual right to security under Article 5(1) . The 
question whether or not the other State claims reparation for violation of its rights under 
international law is not relevant for the individual right under the Convention”
363 EcommHR, Stocké v. Germany, Report o f 12 October 1989, par. 166-167. See also EcommHR,
Chrysostomides and others v. Turkey, Decision o f 4 March 2003,
364 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Coard et al. v. The United States, decision of 29 
September 1999, par. 37, 39, 41; HRC, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, par. 12.3 and HRC, 
Celiberti de Casariego Uruguay, 29 July 1981, par. 10.3.
365 Lush (1993).
366 Altiparmak (2004), p. 239.
367 Lawson and Schermers (1999), p. 603. See also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, International 
Law Commission (2001).
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Thus, although a state’s jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial, 
responsibility for violations of fundamental rights is not restricted to national territory. 
Case law of the Strasbourg organs, the IACHR and the HRC make clear that 
responsibility ratione personae for extra-territorial acts, although it may not be as
t  ' l / 'Q  t
straightforward to establish as responsibility raiione loci, is not exceptional. This 
approach is in fact required by the idea of the modem rule of law, which wishes to 
overcome the particular, territorially defined, universalism of traditional constitutional 
discourses. In the words of the IACHR, “no person under the authority and control of a 
state, regardless o f his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal protection for his or her 
fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”369
However, in Bankovic, the ECtHR seemed to depart from some of the principles 
that were deemed established jurisprudence by both the Commission and the Court. The 
application originated in the 1999 NATO bombing o f Radio Televizije Srbije in 
Belgrade and was lodged by one individual who had been injured by the bombing and 
five surviving relatives of those killed by it. They alleged that by bombing the Serbian 
Television Station, the respondent States had violated Articles 2, 10 and 13 of the 
Convention. The Court declared their application inadmissible as it was not satisfied 
that the applicants and their deceased relatives were within the jurisdiction of the 
respondent states on account of the extra-territorial act in question.370 Although it has 
been argued that the Court’s conclusion can be supported on the ground that the NATO 
did not at any moment assert authority or exercise control over the individuals,371 the 
decision of the Court was framed in much wider terms that certainly signalled a 
departure from the stance that the Strasbourg bodies have previously taken towards the 
question of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
In the first place, the Court referred to the 1969 Vienna Convention in order to 
ascertain the “ordinary meaning” of the term jurisdiction. It went on to state that, from
368 In addition to the cases quoted above see also IACHR, Salas v. The United States. 14 October 1993 
and; the Haitian Centre fo r  Human Rights et. Al. v. United States, decision of 13 March 1997.
369 i^CHR. Detainees in Guantanamo Bqv, Cuba; Request for Precautionary Measures, March 13, 2002.
3 0 Bankovic v. Belgium (inadmissible). 12 December 2001. par. 82.
371 Happold (2003). p. 90 who calls it the right decision for the wrong reasons. The right decision as there 
was no structured relationship between the NATO and the victims of the bombing, who were rather 
unfortunate enough to be in a building targeted by NATO forces.
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the standpoint o f  international law, the jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily 
territorial. If extra-territorial jurisdiction is exercised, the suggested bases o f such 
jurisdiction are, according to the Court, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights o f other states372 It concluded that “Article 1 of the Convention must be 
considered to reflect this ordinary and essential territorial notion o f the term jurisdiction, 
other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the 
particular circumstances of each case.”373
In reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to its previous case law, which 
“demonstrates that the recognition o f the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction is 
exceptional: [the Court] has done so when the respondent state, through the effective 
control o f the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military 
occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence o f the Government o f that 
territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally ascribed to that 
government374 It is unfortunate that the Court did not refer to decisions o f the 
ECommHR, such as the above cited Stocké Case, where the question as to whether the 
extra-territorial act occurred with or without the consent of the state on whose territory 
it took place was deemed irrelevant for the interpretation of Article 1.
The Court’s adherence to the ordinary meaning in international law of the term 
jurisdiction in Bankovic375 is problematic for a number of reasons, such as involving a 
danger “to embroil the Court in disputes as to whether a state has acted lawfully or 
unlawfully”.376 More fundamentally, it adheres to an understanding of the territorial 
frame of sovereignty that thwarts international human rights law’s underlying 
principles. That it is no longer the sovereignty o f the violating state that constitutes a 
barrier to claim rights that are supposed to  be inalienable, but instead the sovereignty of 
the state on whose territory the violation took place, does not matter much from the 
viewpoint of those whose rights are violated.
In the second place, the Court’s interpretation o f previous cases that were 
decided or pending is problematic. It stated that in the admissibility decisions in the
37: Bankovic v. Belgium, 12 December 2001. par. 60.
373 Ibid. par. 61.
374 Ibid. par. 71.
375 Its approach was repeated in Gentilhomme and Others v. France, 14 May 2002, §20.
376 Happold (2003). p. 83.
126
cases of Issa,377 Ocalcm,378 and Xhavara,379 the Respondent States did not raise the 
jurisdiction issue.380 Apart from the fact that the absence of claims by the parties 
concerning admissibility has not impeded the Court from addressing the issue of 
admissibility, the circumstance that the respondent states refrained from raising 
admissibility objections that were related to the jurisdiction issue at least indicates state 
practice that does not adhere to the ordinary meaning of the term jurisdiction.
But it is the Court’s referral to its judgment in the Cyprus v. Turkey Casem  that 
is perhaps most unsettling. Its observation in the latter case that there was a need to 
avoid “a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection” in Northern 
Cyprus was to be read in the territorial context of that case:
the inhabitants of Cyprus would have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the 
Convention safeguards and system which they had previously enjoyed, by Turkey’s effective 
control of the territory and by the accompanying inability of the Cypriot government, as a 
contracting state, to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken under the Convention.”382
It went on to state that the desirability of avoiding a vacuum in human rights 
protection has so far be relied on the Court in order to establish jurisdiction solely with 
regard to territories that would normally be covered by the Convention. Accordingly, 
the Court excluded the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the legal space in which 
contracting states have to ensure respect for the Convention, even in respect of their 
own conduct. This analysis has been criticised as turning an argument that was 
originally intended to expand the court’s jurisdiction into one that limits extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.383
377 EClHR. Issa and others v. Turkey (Admissible), 30 March 2000.
378 Ocalan v. Turkey (Partly admissible), 14 December 2000.
379 Xhavara and others v. Italy and Albania. 11 January 2001.
380 Bankovic v. Belgium, 12 December 2001, par. 81. It also mentioned the admissibility decision in the 
case of Ilascu. In the latter case, the Court stated that responsibility under tire Convention may also arise 
when a state exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory as a consequence of 
military action. Howev er, the Court did not draw any conclusion on the jurisdiction issue as it found it too 
closely bound up with tire merits of the case that it would be inappropriate to determine them at tire 
admissibility stage. Sec Ilascu and Others v. Moldov a and Russia (admissible), 4 June 2001.
381 Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001.
382 Bankovic v. Belgium. 12 December 2001, par. 80.
383 Ruth and Trilsch (2003). p. 172.
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In fact, the Court’s approach in Bankovic illustrates that it is at times decisively 
and unnecessarily influenced by territoriality and the resultant (territorial) division of 
humanity as falling under the responsibility o f one particular state, even though this 
construction may obstruct the important principle o f effective protection o f the 
Convention Rights and Freedoms, so often invoked by the Strasbourg Court itself.384
When deciding on the merits o f  the Issa Case,385 the Court seemed to mitigate 
its restrictive interpretation of the term jurisdiction again. This time it did refer to some 
of the cases decided by the HRC and former decisions of the ECommHR, and it 
declared that a state may be held accountable for violation of Convention rights of 
persons “who are in the territoiy of another state but who are found to be under the 
authority and control o f the former state through its agents operating -  whether lawfully 
or unlawfully -  in the latter state.”386 However, the Court concluded that the applicants 
came not within the jurisdiction of Turkey as they could not prove that the Turkish 
armed forces had conducted operations in the area were the alleged violations took 
place.387
Also in its judgment on the merits in the Ôcalan case, the Court referred to the 
ECommHR decision in Stocké 388 According to the Court, the Ôcalan case was to be 
distinguished from Bankovic as the “applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey 
by Turkish officials and was subject to their authority and control following his arrest 
and return to Turkey.”389 When it decided on the merits in the Ilascu Case, the Court 
again stressed the ordinary meaning o f  the term jurisdiction in public international law 
and referred to Bankovic to stress the prevalence o f the territorial principle in the
38-1 See for example ECtHR in Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, par. 72.
385 Issa and others v. Turkey, 16 November 2004. Worth noting that the Turkish Government submitted 
post-admissibility observations contending that in Bankovic the Court had departed from its previous case 
law on the scope of interpretation of Article 1. See par. 52 of the judgment
386 Ibid. par. 71.
387 Ibid. par. 81.
388 Oca!an v. Turkey, 12 March 2003, par. 88,
389 Ibid. par. 93. See also ECtHR, Hussein v. Albania and others (Inadmissible). March 2006. where the 
Court decided that the arrest of Saddam Hussein in Iraq did not fall within the jurisdiction of tlte 
respondent European States as he had not substantiated any evidence of a jurisdictional link between 
liimself and those States.
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application of the Convention. However, it added that the concept of “jurisdiction” is 
not necessarily restricted to the national territory of the contracting states390
Thus, we may conclude that if a state acts extra-territorially, in certain cases, 
whether they are deemed exceptional or not, it is theoretically bound by its international 
human rights obligations. Everyday reality, however, poses limits to extra-territorial 
responsibility that are perhaps even more difficult to overcome than those formulated in 
a court of law. We will see in Chapter 5 that especially in the field of immigration 
policy, European countries resort to a range of extra-territorial measures to prevent 
immigrants reaching their territory, actions that may result in breaches of fundamental 
rights. In practice, these measures are seldom challenged judicially, not least because 
persons affected by them are not likely to be able to bring their cases to court, an 
observation that brings us to a further issue to be investigated in order to understand 
territoriality’s influence on the modem version of the rule of law.
Apart from looking at the territorial scope of human rights obligations as laid 
down in various instruments, one needs to investigate the way in which access to those 
rights is factually guaranteed in order to comprehend the importance of sovereignty’s 
territorial frame for the notion' o f individual rights. This leads back to Torpey’s 
scepticism concerning the decline of citizenship in a world where territory is exclusively 
divided amongst nation states. Indeed, we need to investigate citizenship once more, but 
now  in terms of a global system of governance, to become aware o f the fundamental 
role which space as a political construct plays in determining access to rights.
Human rights and their realisation depend on the state system, a global structure 
in which governance is still largely undertaken on a territorial basis.391 Celebrations of 
post-national citizenship overlook the territorial aspect o f the global political system, 
and thus fail to appreciate the importance of territory in the practice of fundamental 
rights protection392 As such, accounts of post-national citizenship, just as traditional 
accounts of citizenship, take an internalist perspective. Citizenship is investigated as a 
process taking place within the nation state as a closed container, territorially defined:
39t> Jlascu ami others, 8 July 2004, par. 310-314.
391 Henkin(1999), p. 7; and Shafir (2004). p. 23.
392 See Murphv and Harty (2003). who make the same argument with regard to what they call models of 
post-sovereign citizenship and self-determination of sub-state nations.
129
“The state under the rule of law is one of the key institutional arenas for the 
implementation o f human rights o f  all individuals regardless o f nationality.”393
From a wholly internalist perspective, it makes sense to claim that nationality is 
no longer determining the status of an individual. In other words, nationality is no 
longer decisive for the extent o f access to  rights, but only as long as an individual is 
present within the territory of the nation state. However, from a global perspective, 
taking into account the numerous individuals living in states not governed by the rule of 
law, nationality, citizenship and fundamental rights are still firmly linked. In practice, 
rights are “territorially limited at the level o f the nation state”394
The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) states that 
fundamental rights are to be guaranteed, not only without distinction to the personal 
characteristics o f  an individual, but in addition without distinction on the basis o f the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a 
person belongs. However, the concept o f  territoriality, continuously confirmed and 
reinforced by international law,395 leads to a different reality. We saw that the ECtHR 
has stated unambiguously that Article 1 ECHR sets limits on the reach o f the 
Convention.396 Even apart from the question o f responsibility for extra-territorial acts, 
these limits in general can only be explained in a system that divides responsibly and 
population on the basis of territory, and they constitute the very limits on the 
universality of human rights generally. As long as political community is based on 
space; in other words, when the “territorial compartmentalisation o f the globe remains 
based on the existing pattern o f sovereign states,”397 true universality of human rights 
remains mere theory. In this context, Gershon Shafir argues that human rights can only 
be really effective if  they are transformed in membership in a global community, which 
has its own distributive and enforcing institutions.398
It goes beyond this study to design feasible instances o f citizenship that are not 
dependent on territorially demarcated units such as the nation state, the enforcement
393 Sassen (1999). p. 194 
i9A Chandler (2003). p  332.
395 McCorquodale (2004). p. 480.
396 Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995, par. 62.
39' Newman (2001), p. 138.
398 Shafir (2004), p. 24. See also Erikscn (2003), pp.369-370.
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capacity of which is presently so important for the realisation of human rights.399 What I 
have attempted to do in this Section is show how territoriality impedes the realisation of 
the universal aspirations of the human rights discourse.
Even though within the territory of the nation state, citizenship as a normative 
project and nationality become increasingly decoupled, I have argued that outside its 
territory, the two remain doctrinally linked. Although, as Sassen asserts, the ascendance 
o f human rights may strengthen the tendency to move away from nationality as an 
absolute category, the territorial borders of the nation state at the same time determine 
the exact limits o f this tendency. Hence, I disagree with her argument that human rights 
equally contribute to a move away from national territory.400 Similarly, I contest the 
claim made by Yasemin Soysal, who argues that, as national belonging per se is no 
longer the basis for rights, we witness the emergence of a new “model of membership, 
anchored in deterritorialized notions of person’s rights.”401
On the contrary, it may well be that a reassertion o f territorial sovereignty is the 
modem state’s answer to the growing significance of individual rights protection -  
irrespective of nationality -  within its territory. In a system where presence on territory 
is decisive for the extent o f rights to be enjoyed, states may actually benefit from 
keeping people out o f their territories. Whether there are limits to such assertions of 
territorial sovereignty will be investigated below.
3.5.3.2. Limits to the sta te 's spatial powers
Dora Kostakopoulou and Robert Thomas argue that the British asylum regime 
cannot be understood without reference to a specific understanding of territoriality, 
which is modelled upon private ownership law.402 According to these authors, the idea 
o f  territoriality is conducive to the formation of what they call a geo-authoritarian 
culture, which culture does not only impede the recognition of duties beyond borders, as 
we have seen above, but also increases the spatial powers of governments 403 Asylum 
and matters relating to freedom o f movement more generally will be addressed in the
399 Sec Lipschutz (2004), pp. 45; and Shafir (2004). p. 24 
40(1 Sassen (1999), p. 185.
401 Soysal (1994). p. 3.
402 Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004). p. 7.
403 Kostakopoulou and Thomas (2004). p. 7.
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next two Chapters, but here I will sketch the context in which the state is able to make 
use of its spatial powers when dealing with these issues.
First, it has become clear in the Sections of this Chapter dealing with citizenship, 
be it national or post-national, that territory is the means through which governments 
compartmentalise and control populations404 Furthermore, we have seen in the Section 
on international law that inviolability o f national territory is one o f the key principles of 
international law. In international law, sovereignty stands for ownership of territory, and 
international law functions as a distributive mechanism for determining which state can 
exercise sovereignty over a certain territory.405 International law organises power and 
authority into territorially defined sovereign units, and inviolability of national territory 
and the maintenance o f the territorial status quo are its elemental principles. In this 
particular context, David Luban discusses what he calls Nuremberg’s “equivocal and 
immoral legacy” . He argues that, although the veil o f sovereignty was pierced by 
criminalizing certain acts which are carried out by the state against its own population, 
the criminalization o f aggression in the Trials amounted to erecting a wall around state 
sovereignty, resulting in the old-European model of unbreachable nation states.406
It follows that that international law makes a difference between the 
sovereignty’s territorial form and the exercise of its jurisdiction within this territorial 
framework. Although the state is no longer permitted to employ the latter in whatever 
way it pleases, the maintenance of the integrity of its territorial boundaries remains its 
exclusive prerogative. It seems that human rights norms have transformed international 
law, but only with regard to the sovereign state’s jurisdictional claims over persons 
within a given territory. Regarding territorial sovereignty, international law is still the 
law for and by sovereign states alone,407 and its main aim is to serve the narrow interests 
of the stability o f international order and those o f already existing states408
404 Newman (2001), p. 144.
405 McCorquodate (2001), p. 142
406 Luban (1994), p.336.
407 It may be countered that humanitarian considerations in contemporary' international law sometimes 
justify violations o f national territory . In the case where a purely internal situation is deemed a threat 
against the peace, international law may authorise a breach of territorial sovereignty. However, although 
such interventions clearly violate territorial sovereignty , their justification lies in the state’s abuse of 
jurisdiction over people in a given body politic, not in the use of its spatial powers. In addition, and 
perhaps more significantly, the example of humanitarian interventions proves that human rights norms 
play an important role in maintaining the system of sovereign states based on territoriality- if the modem
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Perhaps the prohibition on the use of force can hardly be used as an example to 
demonstrate that the state’s spatial power -  its territorial sovereignty -  is not limited by 
international law. However, as we have seen in Section 3.4.3., the notion of war, 
legitimate violence, and territorial boundaries are intertwined. They mutually influence 
each other in a discourse that attempts to reduce every trans-national problem to a 
territorial solution. And, as Mary Kaldor writes, “the stylised notion of war [...] as a 
construction of the centralised, ‘rationalised’, hierarchically ordered, territorialized 
modem  state, dominates, even today, the way policy makers conceive of 
security.”409
Accordingly, the nearly absolute value of territorial integrity extends far beyond 
the language o f armed force between national states, while it is at the same time 
decisively shaped by that language. In this respect, international law still regards 
territorial sovereignty through much the same eyes as the United States Supreme Court 
did in the Chinese Exclusion Case, which was decided in 1889;
“to presen e its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is 
the highest duty o f every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations arc to be 
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from
the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in
„.»■ 110 upon us
With regard to freedom of movement of persons, Chapters 4 and 5 will more 
specifically explore the relationship between the regulation of the permeability of the 
national border and international law. In Chapter 5 , 1 will examine in closer detail the 
allegation that “human rights norms have seen states yielding jurisdiction, but not 
territory, which remains doctrinally enclosed.”411 There, I will investigate with specific 
regard to individual rights and international movement whether human rights norms
state respects human rights there are no reasons to doubt its territorial claims. Just as in the cases of 
diplomatic protection and the protection of minorities, international law's exceptions seem to prove the 
territorial rule
408 See McCorquodalc (2001), p. 138.
409 Kaldor ( 1999), p. 15.
410 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case). 130 U.S. (1889) 581. at 606.
411 Panglangan(2001). p. 165.
133
have nevertheless contributed towards a development in which account is taken of the 
individual interests that are involved in the territorial form of sovereignty.
In this Section, I have investigated the link that exists between territory and 
rights. I have argued that territoriality impedes the realisation o f human rights’ universal 
aspirations. At the same time, it seems that human rights have not made any significant 
inroads in the state’s assertion of its territorial sovereignty, a provisional conclusion that 
will be examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to territorial sovereignty, 
international law seems to be still largely the law for and by sovereign states alone. In 
this respect, it seems justified to conclude that human rights have failed to establish a 
constitutional order over and across physical borders.
In addition, it can be argued that human rights norms perhaps even have a 
reifying effect on territoriality, as the progressive development of these norms has 
“formally enshrined modem ideals of legitimate statehood in the normative fabric of 
international society.”412 When we regard human rights from this perspective, it seems 
that they form an inherent part of the modem discourse o f legitimate statehood, a 
discourse that still seeks to justify territorial particularism on the grounds of ethical 
universalism 413
3.6. Conclusions: A particularist universalism?
In this Chapter, I have explored the ways in which, over time, the use of 
violence by the state has been limited by various discourses. We have seen that in the 
general concept o f  the rule of law we can discern material and formal limits on the 
exercise o f political power. The former are constituted by fundamental rights, whereas 
with regard to the latter, the separation o f powers and an independent judiciary deserve 
special attention.
It is important to bear in mind that there exists a difference between the 
legitimacy of the exercise of political power (legality), and the legitimacy o f its 
foundations. The latter question is decided by the concept of sovereignty as the 
construction o f a particular legal order; an intrinsically political concept the foundations
4i:Reus-Smit (2001), p. 531.
413 Reus-Smit (2001), p. 522, with regard to the proliferation of new sovereign units and decolonisation.
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o f which cannot be cannot be assessed with reference to that same legal order. In 
contrast, the exercise of state power within a constitutional framework can be subjected 
to the requirements of the rule of law, and can accordingly be judged as to its legality or 
legitimacy. Consequently, at the moment that the rule of law or the normal 
constitutional guarantees of the modem state do not fully apply, we can observe 
sovereignty’s undisguised claim to distinguish the inside from the outside, a claim that 
is, as we have seen in Chapter 2, based on both territory and identity. The emergence of 
the exposed core of state power in this sense is likely in the field of migration, 
associated as it is with the “essence o f the nation”414 and the unity of political 
community in contemporary Western states, and which is indeed an area where we 
discern extensive executive discretion and widespread judicial deference, as will be 
shown later in this study.
We have seen that citizenship’s potential for universalism was nipped in the bud 
on account o f territorialisation, both by the resulting Westphalian order as a global 
structure (the structural dimension o f citizenship) and by the ensuing internal sovereign 
claim s of the territorial state. This led to a construction by which membership in the 
territorially defined state became a necessary condition for access to those rights that 
were supposed to be universal : the loss of national rights in practice entailed the loss of 
human rights. Citizenship’s internal and structural dimensions interact to reinforce the 
ideal of national territorial sovereignty, and it presents the link between rights and 
territorial belonging as natural and necessary.
However, it is not only citizenship’s linkage between rights and identity, which 
shows how territorial boundaries drawn in the past, influence the question of which 
kinds of state violence are prone to correction through the law. Also international law’s 
regulation o f state violence is strongly shaped by the way in which territorial 
demarcations were brought about. The result is that in international legal regulation of 
state violence, matters o f identity and territorial boundaries are connected to each other 
by the same sovereign logic as which binds together people, territory and authority 
within the nation state. And just as a tension exists between the universal and the 
particular within the nation state, the same tension is present in all accounts of 
international law, expressed in differing conceptions of who are the subjects o f 
international law.
414 Dauvcrgnc (2004). p. 592.
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A stubborn conception o f the territorial state as the sole subject of international 
law has had a strong impact on the regulation and legitimisation o f violence. 
International law, until the advent of international human rights, has largely ignored 
domestic violence, but it has attempted to regulate those kinds of violence that crossed 
national boundaries. When in the course of the twentieth century, territorial integrity 
became a cornerstone o f international law, sovereignty in international law no longer 
entailed a right to  wage war as an instrument o f foreign policy. Nonetheless, the old 
language of war, a state-based discourse with emphasis on the territorial component o f 
sovereignty that is firmly rooted in the Westphalian state system, still decisively shapes 
the way in which we conceive of sovereignty, political community and the state 
prerogatives with regard to its territorial boundaries.
Even classical exceptions to the rule that internal violence is a matter for the 
sovereign state alone affirm a particularistic conception o f the modem state and the 
system it forms part of. As these rules only confer states with rights, they are consistent 
with citizenship’s structuring role in the global world, in which national sovereignty is 
supposed to embody a perfect link between territory and identity. In addition, 
international law ’s exceptions concerning the treatment o f minorities and foreigners 
prove and reinforce the rule that decrees that territorial belonging is essential in order to 
enjoy rights that were supposed to be universal and inalienable.
The way in which both citizenship and classical international law afford 
protection against state violence is thus profoundly shaped by sovereignty’s claim to 
distinguish the inside from the outside. The argument by Richard Mansbach and Franke 
Wilmer that “the relationship between identity and borders underlies both the process o f 
norm articulation and the kinds of violence identified as problematic”415 thus proves to 
be true, not only in the international arena, but equally with regard to the domestic 
order.
Thus, different discourses traditionally regulated internal and external state 
violence. The existence o f the notion o f domain résen 'é  in international law, 
exemplified the separateness o f  the domestic and international orders. Even though not 
directly apparent, the strict separation between international and domestic law that was 
brought about by the territorial state and the system it forms part of made a theoretical 
division within the concept o f sovereignty possible. Sovereignty’s claim to distinguish
4l- Mansbach and Wilmer (2001), p 56.
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the inside from the outside is based on both power over territory and power over people; 
nevertheless, in due time sovereignty’s territorial frame became conceptually distinct 
from the exercise o f jurisdiction over people within a body politic. The state’s 
jurisdiction within a clearly demarcated territory was regulated by domestic law only. 
Matters relating to the territorial frame of sovereignty were dealt with by international 
law, as external violence was perceived as engaging the territorial sovereignty o f the 
modem state in an area where only the interests of states were legally recognised. The 
result was that the exercise of power through political institutions and the clear spatial 
demarcation of the territory on which this power was exercised, became distinct aspects 
in the definition o f the state,416 and the intrinsic bond that existed between them was 
seldom accounted for.
After the Second World War, the international community recognised the 
inherent dangers o f the old system. Human rights law was intended to close the gap 
between national and international law. From then onwards, international law decrees 
that all individuals present within the territory of the nation state, citizens and non­
citizens alike, are entitled to protection of their fundamental rights. Human rights law 
has thus to a certain degree caused convergence between national and international law. 
Internally, citizenship can no longer be the only foundation for access to rights, and the 
domestic judiciary in the constitutional state plays an important role with regard to the 
implementation of international norms protecting human dignity. Externally, the 
individual has become a subject of international law, and the treatment by the national 
state of persons under its jurisdiction is no longer a mere matter of sovereign discretion.
Nevertheless, even though human rights have caused convergence between 
national and international law with regard to the rule of law, they have not succeeded in 
abolishing the conceptual distinction between content and form of sovereignty, which in 
turn results in the immunisation of the territorial component of sovereignty against legal 
forces of correction. In order to see this clearly, I have investigated the way in which 
modem human rights law affect sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside from the 
outside.
We have seen that human rights norms have significantly limited the state’s 
claim to decide matters of inside and outside within its territory by reference to identity. 
Nevertheless, when sovereignty’s claim to distinguish the inside and the outside is
416 Agnew and Corbridge (1995).
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based on territory, human rights law has not achieved a similar transformation. In spite 
of notions o f post-national citizenship, the modem version o f  the rule of law remains 
territorially limited for two reasons.
In the first place, in most cases, access to fundamental rights is factually 
determined by presence on territory. National states refuse to be held accountable for 
actions that took place outside their national territories, an attitude that in the European 
context may be facilitated by ambiguous recent case law o f the ECtHR that seems to 
revert to a territorial version of the legal space in which the EC HR applies.
In addition, territori al isati on ensures that territory and rights remain linked in a 
more structural way. Celebrations o f post-national citizenship suffer essentially from the 
same shortcoming as any theory that presents citizenship simply as a project that 
gradually turned the privileges o f the few into the rights o f the many. The viewpoint 
from which they investigate citizenship is the territory of the national (liberal) state. 
When the territorial basis of the global state system is disregarded or taken for granted, 
it makes sense to claim that nationality and rights have become untangled. However, the 
internal perspective that such theories take, conceal the fact that this is only the case 
within the territory of the liberal, Western democracy. Outside its territoiy, questions o f 
identity and rights remain firmly linked. Thus, territoriality causes the stateless, the 
refugee and the citizen of dictatorships to remain largely beyond the fundamental rights 
protection o f the constitutional state.417
In the second place, I have provisionally concluded that human rights law does 
very little to limit the exercise of the state’s spatial powers. Territorial integrity is a 
cornerstone of international law, and protection of its territorial boundaries has 
remained the exclusive prerogative of the national state. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at 
these issues, but for now it is important to reiterate that the way in which the notions o f 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries interact is still decisively shaped by a state- 
centred discourse which adheres to the sanctity of territorial boundaries in order to 
maintain a stable order of sovereign states, instead o f a just community of individuals. 
In addition, we need to be aware of the possibility that in a situation in which presence 
on national territory automatically leads to entitlement to fundamental rights, the 
sovereign state may wish to keep people outside its territory in order to not have to 
accord them these fundamental rights.
457 Isaac (1996). p. 162.
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Hence, in spite of its increasing ‘denationalisation*, the modem rule o f law 
remains territorially limited, and it seems that the status o f sovereignty’s territorial 
frame in international law has remained largely the same as it was before the advent of 
modem human rights law. Nuremberg’s “equivocal and immoral legacy” combined 
with the reification of territoriality has led to a structural blindness for the involvement 
of personal interests whenever the state bases its claims on the notion of territorial 
sovereignty, a proposition which will be investigated in further detail in the next two 
Chapters. There we will see that such blindness is exacerbated whenever the individuals 
who are affected by such claims are rendered invisible, either because they are far away 
and unknown or alternatively because they are very different from “us” and that the 
territorial blind spot o f the modem version of the rule of law affects individual rights 
most obviously and disadvantageously in the global context o f immigration from poor, 
underprivileged citizens of non-Westem countries into the Western, liberal 
democracies.
A version of the rule of law that keeps the content of sovereignty within a 
territorially defined body politic and its territorial form apart, scrutinising the former 
aspect while it is largely silent with regard to the latter aspect, obscures the fact that 
constraints on individual behaviour and freedom are always motivated on account of the 
notion of political community and the unity of the body politic, interests that concern 
both form and content of sovereignty. The fact that the modem version of the rule of 
law has not acknowledged the interrelatedness between the nation state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over people within a given body politic and the territorial framework in 
which those jurisdictional claims take place is a particularly serious concern when it 
comes to the national state’s perception of and responses to “new threats”418, such as 
immigration. In later Chapters, we will see that international movement of persons 
constitutes a field that by its very nature engages sovereignty’s territorial frame as well 
as its jurisdictional content as we will see in later Chapters.
See Bigo (2001).
139
Chapter 4 The extent of the right to leave
4.1. Introduction
“Theoretically, in the sphere of international law. it had always been true that sovereignty is 
nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigratioa naturalization, nationality and expulsion; 
the point, however, is that practical consideration and the silent acknow ledgement of common 
interests restrained national sovereignty until the rise of totalitarian regimes.”419
In the previous Chapter, I have looked at the way in which the sovereign power 
of the state has been restrained by the use o f various discourses. I have argued that the 
notion o f  territoriality has exerted a limiting influence over all these discourses, 
bringing to light the tension between universalism and particularism within each of 
them. Citizenship is the most obvious example of these potentially “explosive 
tensions”420, but the way in which a political particularistic reality has triumphed over 
universal ideals in classical international law as well is for a large extent the result o f the 
Westphalian territorial constellation. Until the advent of international human rights, the 
few instances in which international law concerned itself with the interests of 
individuals were those when the territory-identity-population ideal of the sovereign state 
was most clearly not reflected in reality, as in the case of minorities and resident aliens.
Another significant anomaly in a territorial world that international law cannot 
afford to overlook is the phenomenon of international migration. People between 
borders expose the construction, as opposed to the naturalness, of territoriality’s ideal. 
This Chapter and the next (Chapter 5) will explore the development and the nature of 
the legal framework regulating international freedom of movement. I will argue that the 
decisive impact o f  territoriality upon the rule o f law and the resulting immunisation of 
territorial sovereignty against international legal correction is unambiguously expressed 
in international law ’s regulation of international migration.
419 Arendt( 1976). p. 278.
420 Costa (2002), p. 218.
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Many studies dealing with questions directly related to contemporary 
immigration policies do not concern themselves with the way in which the issue of exit 
is regulated by legal norms. Nicholas De Genova has argued that, whenever 
immigration law is addressed, a detailed empirical investigation o f its actual operations 
is often not provided.421 The result is that existing laws appear to provide merely a 
neutral framework 422 In this study, I do not intend to carry out empirical research on the 
way in which immigration law affects the lives of individuals. Nonetheless, its actual 
operations will be more closely looked at by including the issue of exit. In this way, I 
hope to demonstrate that immigration laws do anything but provide a neutral 
framework. Instead, they are a result o f changing perceptions of political authority, and 
intimately linked to the way in which we perceive the nation state. Indeed, states’ 
monopolisation o f the right to regulate movement, therewith comprising both the right 
to enter and  the right to leave, has been intrinsic to the very construction o f the 
territorial state 423
By looking at the overall framework regulating international movement, one of 
territoriality’s most significant implications on the rule o f law will be exposed: the 
artificial distinction between sovereignty’s territorial frame and its jurisdictional content 
within a given body politic. A further reason to include the right to leave in a study 
dealing with the detention of immigrants in Europe is provided by the fact that 
questions o f emigration are greatly affected by current immigration policies, which have 
increasingly externalised, as we will see in Chapter 5.
Accordingly, this Chapter deals with the right to leave, leaving questions of 
immigration to Chapter 5. Section 4.2. presents an overview o f the way in which over 
time perceptions on the issue of exit have developed. We will see that at various times 
in history, emigration was looked upon in the same way as immigration is at present: it 
had to be directed in channels which the authorities deemed favourable in the national 
interests 424 After the Second World War, however, the possibility of an individual to 
leave his or her country became recognised as a fundamental right in international law. 
Section 4.3. deals with the international legal norms regulating emigration in detail, 
with particular emphasis on the permitted restrictions on the exercise o f the right to
421 De Genova (2002), p. 432.
422 Ibid. p. 424.
423 Torpey (2000). p. 6.
424 See Christie Tait (1927).
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leave. In the conclusions to this Chapter, in Section 4.4., I will briefly touch upon the 
way in which contemporary immigration policies o f Western countries have an impact 
on individuals’ actual exercise of the right to leave, a matter that will be further 
elaborated on in Chapter 5.
4.2. The right to leave in its historical context
The right to leave one’s country is the ultimate form of self-determination. Not 
to be able to leave a country factually amounts to deprivation of liberty: imprisonment 
within imagined lines on the surface o f the earth instead o f incarceration by concrete 
walls. Centuries ago, the right to leave was already recognised in the Magna Carta of 
1215:
In future it shall be lawful for any man to leave and return to our kingdom unharmed and w ithout 
fear, by land or water, preserving his allegiance to us. except in time of war, for some short time, 
for the common benefit of the realm.1125
Thus, the M agna Carta qualified the right to leave: it was made subject to the 
condition that allegiance to the Kingdom was guaranteed and it provided for restrictions 
on exit in times o f war. The latter sort o f limitation is still to be found in present 
formulations of the right to leave, which I address in Section 4.3.2. At this moment, it is 
the qualification “preserving his allegiance to us” which deserves closer attention, for it 
clearly illustrates the changes that the medieval feudal order was undergoing under the 
influence o f the growing powers o f European monarchs.
In medieval Europe, the extent o f freedom of movement had been determined by 
the feudal order. Many people were tied to territory because o f their obligations to their 
feudal lord. The system of serfdom granted no individual freedom of movement 
whatsoever as serfs were not allowed to leave their place of employment426 
Nonetheless, movement was free for those whose status was free. National borders 
“were insignificant to the individual traveller, though state boundaries were of warlike
42' Chapter 42 of the Magna Carta of 1215.
426 However, serfdom in Europe was an economic relationship between lord and serf which implied that 
serfs could in theory and sometimes also in practice buy their freedom. Sec Dowty (1987), p. 25.
142
concern to rulers.”427 In the restriction on the right to leave as formulated in the Magna 
Carta, only granted to free men, an early shift from feudalism to absolutism can be 
discerned. In Chapter 2, we saw how the doctrine o f perpetual allegiance developed 
when everybody, in addition to their status in the feudal hierarchy, also became a 
subject of the King. Consequently, permanent emigration, as we know it now, was 
theoretically impossible, for it was assumed that a subject could always be recalled to 
his duties to his King.
The recognition o f the qualified right to leave in the Magna Carta of 1215 was 
only short-lived. It is not to be found in later versions of that document, due to the 
assertion by later kings of their absolute powers to control exit. The situation was not 
different in other European countries. From the fifteenth century onwards, feudalism 
was no longer the defining hierarchical relationship. Henceforth, it would be the 
relationship between the sovereign and its subjects that determined the extent of actual 
freedom of movement. In the era stretching from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, 
the relationship between people, territory and authority was determined by 
“mercantilism in the service of absolutism”428 and the right to leave was virtually non­
existent. Population was considered a scarce economic and military resource, and rulers, 
in their efforts to maximise economic growth en military power, prohibited emigration 
almost entirely.
Nonetheless, in this era, the prohibition of emigration was mainly instrumental 
in securing a concrete state interest. Conceptions of freedom of movement had nothing 
to do yet with ideologies such as nationalism, alluding to a deeper, symbolic 
relationship between people and territory, or other ideological convictions, tying the 
notions of people and their state to each other in a more profound way. This was 
reflected by the fact that immigration was in most cases welcomed; European monarchs 
even attempted to acquire populations from what was for them the outside world.429
Chapter 2 showed that at the end of the seventeenth century, the absolute power 
o f  the sovereign came under attack by the idea of natural rights and changing ideas 
about the location o f sovereignty. Whereas before emigration had been considered a 
matter entirely subject to the discretion o f the sovereign, theorists of international law
427 Dummet and Nicol (1990). p. 11.
428 Dowty (1987). p. 29.
429 ZoIberg( 1992). p. 37.
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increasingly perceived the right to emigrate as a natural right.430 This was only logical if 
the idea of political society as a voluntary contract was to be taken seriously. For if 
every individual must, by free choice, be able to determine whether he wants to be a 
member of that society, he should also be free at any time to  break his ties and leave.431
Nonetheless, actual practice o f the new regimes that were inspired by 
enlightenment ideals was not always consistent with the same ideals. In France, 
restrictions were imposed on freely leaving the country on grounds of national security 
soon after the Revolution, even though the revolutionary regime had abolished the 
passport, and in spite o f the fact that the right to leave was recognised in the French 
Constitution o f 1791.432 Officially, American governments did not even recognise the 
right o f voluntary expatriation until 1907 433
However, liberal ideals continued to penetrate governments so that at the end o f 
the nineteenth centuiy it had become possible to leave almost any European state.434 
Very few countries required passports or other documents in order to exit their 
territories. Their liberal attitude in this regard was not only due to enlightenment ideals 
that had influenced daily political practice; also the fact that under-population was no 
longer a problem in these states made those states regard emigration without concern. 
All European and American states, except Russia, in practice regarded the right to leave 
as a basic right which was inalienable.435 When serfdom was finally entirely abolished 
throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, thousands of people left their homes to sail 
for the Americas, Australia or Asia. Nonetheless, freedom o f movement was typically 
not granted to inhabitants of the colonies. It was clearly in the interests o f the imperial 
powers that these citizens should not leave the colonies. As in many other instances, the 
rulers applied liberalism at home, but in Africa and Asia they held on to medieval ideas.
The First World War signalled the end of the liberal era regarding freedom of 
movement and caused passports to reappear on the international stage. During the 
twentieth century, possession o f  these documents would develop into a requirement for
430 Jagerskiold (1981), p. 169.
431 Whelan (1981), p. 650.
43: See about the rather complicated issue of freedom of movement during the Revolutionary years; 
Torpev (2000). p. 21-56.
433 Dowty (1987), p. 49.
434 Dowtv( 1987), p. 46.
435 Dowty (1987), pp. 54, 82.
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lawful exit.436 In the twenties and thirties, more and more European countries restricted 
their citizens’ possibilities to leave437 Various factors contributed towards this 
narrowing down o f  the right to leave. Countries were no longer as open to immigration 
as they had been, due to xenophobia and racism o f their populations and their own 
nationalistic aspirations, and the losses caused by the First World War combined with 
reduced birth rates made population once again a scarce resource. The restrictions on 
freedom of movement however, were not comparable to those in the mercantilist era.
The difference is found in altering conceptions of the relationship between 
people, territory and state. Chapter 2 described how nationalism led to a perception of 
sovereignty as entailing an unbreakable and self-evident link between territory, 
population and authority. National identity became an instrument to distinguish between 
us and them. People were defined by virtue of where they belonged, and cultural or 
ethnic homogeneity in a state was something to be aspired. It was nationalism which, if 
not exactly gave birth to, at least nourished “the intimate relationship between identities 
and borders”438. People were bound to each other and their territoiy by their ethnicity. 
For the nationalistic mind a liberal attitude to emigration is inconceivable: it cannot be 
possible to choose freely one’s allegiance with a state or abandon it at will, if such 
allegiance is conceived as belonging to a community of individuals bound to each other 
and ‘their’ land by common identity, history and ‘blood’.
Moreover, the collectivist ethic proclaimed by many regimes after the First 
World War also contributed to a restrictive view on the right to leave. Instead of the 
ethnic or cultural homogeneity that the nationalists strive after, collectivism aims at 
social homogeneity. Likewise, the collectivist state cannot regard emigration without 
suspicion. Leaving the society will inevitably be an act of disloyalty, even treason.439 In 
addition, it becomes difficult to maintain that the interests of the citizens are the same as 
those of the state when these citizens are leaving the countiy en masse. Finally, a regime 
sustained by coercion or in which there is no room for dissent can presumably only 
survive by restricting exit.
436 Hofmann (1988), p. 3; and Torpey (2000), p. 21.
437 Christie Tait (1927), p. 31
438 Lapid (2001), p. 10.
439 Dowty (1987). p. 60; and Torpey (2000), p. 124-125.
440 Dowty (1987), p. 60.
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After the Second World War, the idea of natural rights revived, as we have seen 
in the previous Chapter. Human rights, as they were called now, were codified and one 
of them was the right to leave. Over time, the right to leave was laid down in many 
different binding human rights treaties, as we will see in Section 4.3.1. Judging from the 
codification o f the right to leave in all major human rights instruments, one could safely 
assume that, during the period following the Second World War, it had become a right 
generally recognised in international law. However, perhaps the most conspicuous 
effect o f this promise made by international law was that the practice o f a substantial 
number o f  countries was only the more striking. The most obvious violators of the right 
to leave were the Communist countries: while the collectivist ethic inspired by the 
extreme right had not survived the Second World War, its counterpart on the other side 
of the political spectrum had expanded.
None o f  the countries united by the Warsaw Pact recognised the right to leave as 
a human or constitutional right.441 Instead, it was regarded by these countries as a 
favour, the granting o f which fell wholly within the sovereign state’s discretion. This 
did not mean, however, that policies regarding exit permits were the same in all these 
countries; neither were they equally restrictive.442 The erection of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 was the ultimate illustration of the Communist view on freedom of movement. In 
time it became easier for citizens o f the East-Bloc countries to visit other countries of 
the ‘socialist w orld system’, but permission for this kind o f travelling was by no means 
obtained as a m atter o f course.443 Moreover, although travel to the West increased over 
time, the right to leave was definitely not recognised as such for the purpose of visiting 
Western countries or for emigration. The German Democratic Republic was, according 
to its penal code, able to persecute those seeking official permission to emigrate for the 
crime o f  “ incitement hostile to the state.”444 Its constitutional legal doctrine justified the 
lack of a basic right to emigrate by the socialist government’s concern for each o f its 
citizens: Allowing a citizen to emigrate to the West “was tantamount to delivering him 
up to an imperialist, aggressive and anti-social system of exploitation” 445 In addition, 
East German policy o f prohibiting its citizens to visit Western countries was defended
441 Brunner (1990), p. 204.
442 Dowty (1987). pp. 111-127; and Hannum (1987), pp. 95-105.
443 Brunner (1990), p. 208.
444 Turack (1978), p. 55.
445 Brunner (1990), p. 217.
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on the grounds that the Federal Republic did not recognise the citizenship o f the 
German Democratic Republic.446
In Russia, the right to leave had never been recognised, not even before the 
Communist era.447 After serfdom was abolished in 1861 in Russia, the former serfs had 
lived in village communities, from which no-one could leave without communal 
permission. Communist ideology strengthened traditional restrictive notions concerning 
the right to leave to such an extent as to equal it with treason. For other East-Bloc 
countries, restrictive views on the right to leave were a result both of their ideologies 
and economic considerations. These countries had an interest in population building in 
general, and having educated professionals at their service in particular. The fact that 
these countries were closely linked to Western Europe and had in the past been 
relatively open, would have made it easier for their population to cross borders in 
pursuit of more rewarding opportunities then it was for Soviet nationals.448 If these 
countries had permitted free immigration, presumably a large part of their population 
would have left for the West.
Despite the international obligation of countries to permit citizens and others to 
leave their territory as laid down in inter alia the ICCPR and the UDHR, the reality o f 
East-Bloc practice was acknowledged in the Helsinki Accord.449 The Helsinki Accord 
proclaimed that the participating states should act in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the UDHR, and that they should fulfil their obligations as set forth in 
international human rights instruments by which they are bound. It seems to be in direct 
contradiction with this statement that the Helsinki Accord then, instead of recognising a 
general right for citizens to leave their country permanently, requires the signatories 
solely “to facilitate freer movement on the basis of family ties, family reunification,
446 The Federal Republic maintained that an all German nationality still existed and accorded West 
German identity papers to all East-Germans who applied for such documents. See Turack (1979), p. 110- 
111.
447 Dowty (1987, p. 208) argues that Communist countries applying restrictive exit policies are copying 
from the Soviet Union policies that are not so much Communist as Russian. This would explain the 
relative absence of such strict policies in countries with related ideologies but less political links to the 
USSR if compared to those countries heavily under Soviet political influence, such as the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact.
448 Dowty (1987), p. 116. Evidently, this was especially so with regard to emigration from East Germany 
to West Germany. See also Rcinke (1986), p. 665.
449 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe o f 1975 (1975). p. 1292.
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proposed marriages and personal or professional travel.”450 Furthermore, the document 
merely enumerates certain ‘obligations’451 for states to achieve this aim, which are not 
exactly far-reaching, and do certainly not reflect what states committed themselves to 
under the ICCPR.
The Helsinki Accord could be described as realpolitik in view of the East-West 
relationship during the Cold War, seeking to improve practice of the Communist states 
in the area o f human rights in a manner open to political compromise.452 Nevertheless, 
Western countries continued to express indignation over the denial of the right to leave 
in diplomatic relations. The United States did so by according most-favoured-nation 
treatment only to  those non-market countries which did not deny or make impossible for 
their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate 453 Western countries continued to 
undermine East-German practice o f restricting exit by insisting that access to West 
Berlin should be free on the western side of the border wall, i.e. possible without 
passport or customs control 454 Most people who managed to leave Communist 
countries were accepted as political refugees by the Western democracies, although 
many o f them were motivated by economic considerations instead of purely political 
reasons.
Other countries which breached their obligations with regard to the right to  leave 
after the Second World War were developing countries and dictatorships. After 
decolonialisation, the former colonies embarked on a process of nation building, a
450 Turack (1978), p. 44.
451 The legal status o f the Helsinki Accord was unclear, as it was not a treaty, and could not be registered 
as such. See Schcrmcrs(1977), p. 801; and Martin (1989), p. 556.
452 Reinke (1986), p. 658; and Martin (1989), pp. 556-557, who argue that such a strategy' of realpolitik 
was effective in securing increased protection of individual rights in this area.
453 Turack (1979), p. 104; and Lillich (1984a), pp. 149-150. The consequence for a country which denied 
its citizens the right or the opportunity to emigrate w as not only that it was not eligible for most-favoured­
nation treatment, but it could neither receive US credits, credit guarantees, investment guarantees, nor 
conclude a US commercial agreement. The legislation led to the end of the first period of détente between 
the US and the Soviet Union as the latter regarded it as an interference in its internal affairs (Gabor, 1991, 
p. 853-854). but at the same time it caused liberalisation of China’s emigration policies (Dowty, 1987, p. 
234).
454 Turack (1979). p. 113. This practice was defended by the view of France, Britain and the US that 
Berlin was under joint command o f the Allies and should not be a divided territory. The GDR also 
insisted that East Germans were not required to have an passport in order to enter West Germany because 
the frontier between the two states was not an external border. See Torpey (2000), p. 147.
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process perceived as necessary in view of the fact that the territories of many of these 
countries were determined by boundaries which did not reflect cultural, linguistic or 
ethnic divisions. The policies o f the ruling class to strengthen national unity often 
consisted in targeting these groups that did not fit in with their image of national unity. 
This inevitably caused conflict, internal struggle and civil war, which in turn produced 
refugees and displaced persons. Developing countries however, while on the one hand 
producing great numbers of refugees, were on the other hand not always happy to lose 
parts of their population, especially if  these consisted of educated people seeking a 
better future in the developed world. Thus, in some of those countries, restrictions on 
exit were put into place and justified by invoking the problem of so-called brain-drain. 
Their policies of restricting exit -  while at the same time carrying out forced 
expulsions455 -  could be explained by the ruling elite’s wish to sustain their illegitimate 
rule, economic motivations and their ideas of nation-building. However, there are many 
developing countries that, although they have repeatedly expressed concerns over brain 
drain, do not resort to prohibiting emigration. Countries that deny the right to leave, 
such as for example Butma under military rule, and Iran under the Shah and the 
Ayatollahs appear to do so more as a result of their ideology and dictatorial practices.456
The Cold W ar also influenced the exercise of the right to leave for numerous 
citizens of Western States. Since 1918 it had been illegal to leave the United States 
without a passport, the issuing of which fell under the competence of the State 
Department. In the 1950’s it was usual for the State Department to deny passports on 
the basis o f individual political beliefs. Refusals were frequently not sufficiently 
motivated and the Internal Security Act of 1950 even prohibited the issuing of passports 
to members of the Communist Party.457 The State Department held that its decisions, 
being an exercise o f governmental foreign policy powers, could not be reviewed by the 
judiciary.458 Consequently, during this period, the right to leave the United States lost its 
character as a fundamental right, and factually assumed the character of a favour, the 
granting of which fell wholly within the discretion of the State Department.
However, decisions of the State Department were regularly challenged in court, 
and the Supreme Court ruled in 1958 that the right of exit is a part of the “liberty” o f
455 A famous example is Idi Amin's expulsion of 40.000 Asians from Uganda in 1972.
456 Hannum (1987), p. 127. Sec also Dowty (1989), p. 184-187.
457 Dowty (1987), p. 128; and Toipey (2000). p. 148.
458 Dowty (1987). p. 128.
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which is a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment 459 In 1964, that same Court ruled that political belief alone was not a 
sufficient reason for the denial of the right to leave and it held that the Section o f the 
Internal Security Act which forbade the issuing of passports to members of the 
Communist Party was unconstitutional.460 Nevertheless, the decision of the Secretary o f  
State to revoke the passport of a former CIA agent who disclosed information 
concerning US intelligence activities was upheld by the Supreme Court, stating that 
national security and foreign policy considerations were superior to the freedom to 
travel abroad and that the latter right could therefore be made subject to reasonable 
government regulation.461 Furthermore, the restriction o f travel to certain areas by 
invalidating passports for travel to specific countries was not deemed illegitimate by the 
Supreme Court, if  it was justified by considerations of national security or foreign 
policy 462
In 1989, a revolution, peaceful in character but nonetheless a revolution in view 
of the deep and abrupt transformations it brought about, changed the political landscape 
of Central and Eastern Europe. One o f the first manifestations o f these changes was the 
exercise of the right to leave.463 Hungary was the first nation that demolished a part o f 
the Iron Curtain on its Austrian border. When Hungary, in September 1989, allowed 
East Germans to  leave to the West through that border, East Germans had for the first 
time since 1961 a real possibility to leave their country. Consequently, thousands o f 
them reached West Germany through Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where the Iron 
Curtain had been dismantled as well. In view of this exodus, Honecker decided to ease 
travel restrictions in East Germany, hoping that i f  East Germans were openly given the 
possibility to emigrate, many might choose to stay.464 However, East Germans 
continued to leave by the thousands and after Honecker’s resignation, the new 
leadership in East-Germany confirmed the right o f free and unrestricted travel. As the 
Berlin wall had been “the foremost symbol o f the denial o f the basic human right of
459 U.S. Supreme Court, Kerttv. Dulles (1958), pp. 125-127.
460 U.S. Supreme Court. Aptheker v. Secretary o f  State (1964), pp. 505-514.
461 U.S. Supreme Court, Haigv. Agee (1981). See Dowty (1987), p. 130; and Hannum (1987), p. 53.
462 U.S. Supreme Court, Zemel v. Rusk (1965).
463 Gabor (1991), p. 854.
464 Palmer and Colton (1995), p. 1021.
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self-determination”,465 its opening up on 9 November 1989 can be seen as symbolic o f 
the reassertion o f this right for the people living in the former East-bloc countries.466
Similar changes in the Soviet Union were not waited upon for a long time. 
Already under Gorbatchov’s policy o f glasnost, traditional Soviet views on emigration 
were changing. Such altering views were most obviously expressed in the easing of 
travel restrictions for one group of Soviet citizens who had perhaps suffered most 
seriously under the denial of the right to leave, the Soviet Jews.467
Yeltsin brought about the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and under 
his rule the Soviet Union dissolved into various republics. These new states formally 
recognise the right to leave. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
which organisation found its origins in the Helsinki process, has paid considerable 
attention to the right to leave, also after 1989, and the importance of freedom of 
movement was confirmed by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.468 The revolutions 
o f  1989 in East and Central Europe and the changes in the Soviet Union reasserted 
ideals that had been proclaimed as the Rights of Man in the past and that were now 
called human rights.
The preceding paragraphs have briefly recounted that, in the course of history, 
restrictions on exit have been justified by considerations about the nature o f political 
authority, and later, more specifically by conceptions o f sovereign territorial state. From 
modernity onwards, views on a right to leave were grounded in secular ideologies, such 
as allegiance to the King, nationalism, and in the era after the Second World War, 
collectivism in the name of communism. As all these ideologies have been officially 
discarded, it has been argued that the only secular ideology of contemporaiy relevance 
is the belief in human rights.469 In the Section below, I will examine how contemporary 
international human rights law regulates the issue of exit.
465 Gabor (1991), p. 855.
466 See Turack (1993, pp. 292-302) about the changes in the practice of these countries.
467 The Jews in the Soviet Union were not completely denied tlie possibility to leave at all times since the 
Second World War, but it was very difficult and at times impossible to get permission to emigrate to 
Israel. This policy seems not to have been motivated only by Soviet ideology, but also by the Soviet 
Union's wish to maintain good relations with the Arab states.
468 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. 21 November 1990, Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe and Supplementary Document to give effect to certain provisions of the Charter (1991), p. 199.
469 Gaete (1993).
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4.3. I n t e r n a t io n a l  l e g a l  f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h e  r i g h t  t o  l e a v e
4.3.1. The right to leave as an international human right
The right to leave any country, including one’s own, is laid down in the UDHR, 
the first international document in which human rights were codified after the Second 
World War. The right to leave was also codified in human rights instruments o f a later 
date with binding force, such as the ICCPR; the Convention on the Elimination o f 
Racial Discrimination;470 the ECHR; the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights; and the American Convention o f  Human R ights471 In the following paragraphs, 
main emphasis will be on the legal framework of the right to leave as established by the 
ICCPR and the ECHR.
Article 12 ICCPR and Article 2 o f Protocol 4 ECHR guarantee the right to leave 
in identical terms. They read as follows:
Everybody shall be free to leave any country, including lus ow a
The right to leave should be protected for nationals and non-nationals alike. 
Furthermore, the right to leave puts obligations on both the state of residence and the 
state of nationality because often possession o f a passport is a requirement for lawful 
exit. Accordingly, the state o f nationality is under a positive obligation to provide a 
passport, whereas the state of residence is under the (mainly) negative obligation to
• • 472permit exit.
470 In this treaty the right to leave is not guaranteed as such, but Article 5 states that the right to leave 
should be enjoyed without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.
471 There are more international binding documents which have a bearing on the right to leave, such as the 
1951 Convention on Refugees, the 1961 UN Convention on the Elimination or Reduction of 
Statelessness. See Nanda (1971), pp. 112-113. Another example is the European Social Charter: in Article 
18 §4 the Contracting Parties recognise the right to leave of their nationals who w ish to pursue an activity 
on the territory7 of the other Parties.
4,2 HRC in Vida!M artins v. Uruguay, 23 March 1982, §7; Pereira Montera v. Uruguay, 31 March 1981, 
§9.4; Uchtensztejn v. Uruguay, 31 March 1983, §8.3; and Varela Nunez v. Uruguay. 22 July 1983, §9,3.
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4.3.2. Restrictions on the right to leave in the ECHR and the ICCPR
Neither the ICCPR, nor the ECHR accord the individual an absolute right to 
leave. Certain circumstances may justify restrictions on the right to leave. However, 
according to the UN Human Rights Committee, these are exceptional circumstances, 
and restrictions may not impair the essence of the right.473 In a similar vein, the CSCE 
Declaration o f the Copenhagen Meeting of 29 June 1990 states that restrictions on the 
right to leave must be very rare exceptions, only necessary if they respond to a specific 
public need, pursue a legitimate aim, are proportionate to that aim and are not abused or 
applied arbitrarily.474 The Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return 
emphasised that restrictions on the right to leave must be construed narrowly.475 
Moreover, it declared that such restrictions should be subject to international scrutiny, 
in which the burden of justification lies with the state.
When examining the permissible restrictions on the right to leave, it will become 
once more apparent that the scope of that right relies on the relationship between 
people, territory and authority. Whereas human rights in general can be described as 
claims of the individual concerning his or her relationship to authority, the right to leave 
has a very direct bearing on that relationship. After a person has left, the state is in most 
cases neither capable nor competent to exercise jurisdiction over that person. That 
specific characteristic of the right to leave in particular, taken together with the fact that 
freedom of movement in general may have great impact on social and economic 
circumstances in a country, in many cases constitute the ratio behind possible 
restrictions.476
473 HRC, General Comment 27 (Sixty-seventh session 1999), at 11*13.
4 4 Article 9.4 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference of the Human Dimension 
o f  the CSCE (1990). See also Article 20 and 21 of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in 1989 (1989); The Draft Declaration on Freedom and 
Non-Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country', including his Own and to 
Return to his Country, by tlx? Special Rapporteur Mubanga-Chipoya. (hereinafter The Draft Declaration 
on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, 
Mubanga-Chipoya (1988b)); and Article 6 of The Right to Leave and Return, A Declaration adopted by 
the Uppsala Colloquium on 21 June 1972 (Uppsala Colloquium, 1974).
475 Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, Adopted by the Meeting of Experts on 26 
November 1986, International Institute of Human Rights (1987).
476 See Casscse (1975). p. 222.
Paragraph 3 o f Article 1 2 ICCPR:
The above mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those wliich are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognised in the present Covenant.
In Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol ECHR, the limitation clause 
with regard to the right to leave is framed in a slightly different manner, similar to the 
way in which exceptions to fundamental rights are generally formulated by the ECHR:
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such are in accordance 
with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the maintenance of “ordre public”, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of 
health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In spite o f  obvious differences in wording, it can be assumed that both limitation 
clauses have the same scope and effect477 The denial or seizure of a passport or other 
necessary travel documents constitutes a direct interference with the right to leave and 
in order to be legitimate such interference needs to satisfy the requirements for the 
permissible restrictions 478 Also indirect limitations on the right to leave, such as 
restrictions on the export of foreign currency or high costs for obtaining the necessary 
documents need to  satisfy the requirements of Article 12 ICCPR or Article 2 Protocol 4 
ECHR.479
Restrictions on the right to leave need to be in accordance with (ECHR), or 
provided for by (ICCPR) law: the source of the restriction should be a general ru le480 
This requirement should be understood as to refer to substantive law. Instead of 
embodying a purely formal requirement it also calls for a certain qualitative standard of
477 Nowak (1993). p. 212.
4 8 EClHR, Baumann v. France. 22 May 2001. §§63-67; and ECtHR, Napijalo v. Croatia. 13 November 
2003, §73.
4,9 But see ECommHR, S. v. Sweden. Decision of 6 May 1985, p. 224. in which it was decided that the 
right to take property out o f a country' is not embodied in the right to leave.
480 Jagerskiold (1981), p. 172.
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the laws in question, which should be accessible and foreseeable.481 The so-called 
legality requirement arises from the claims of a society based on the rule of law and 
serves to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory practices.482
The prohibition of discrimination in general plays an important role with regard 
to freedom of movement, and there will clearly be a violation of Article 12 ICCPR or 
Article 4 Protocol 2 ECHR, if there is not an objective justification for differences in 
treatment between persons exercising their right to leave 483 It is not accidental that the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities has paid 
considerable attention to the right o f freedom of movement484 The emphasis on 
discrimination in this area is understandable: contemporary history has shown time and 
again that the extent of the right to leave depends on sovereignty’s link with matters of 
identity.
The ECHR and the ICCPR allow only for exceptions on the right to leave that 
are necessary in a democratic society. The ICCPR does not use the words “democratic 
society”, but it can be assumed that the word necessary refers to that concept.485 The 
most important component of the necessity-requirement is that restrictive measures 
must abide by the principle of proportionality: They must be appropriate to achieve the 
legitimate aims enumerated in the provisions; they must be the least intrusive measure
481 ECtHR, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 26 April 1979, §49; ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, 24 
April 1994, §29-36; ECtHR, Groppera Radio AG and others v. Switzerland, 28 March 1990, §65-68; and 
ECtHR, S.IT. v. the United Kingdom, 22 November 1995, §35.
482 See the Study of Discrimination in Respect o f the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country', Including 
His O w a and to Return to His Country, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur J.D. Inglés on 23 
November 1962 to the Commission on Human Rights. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities (1963) (hereinafter Inglés (1963), p. 47.
483 Higgins (1973), p. 343 and p. 353; and UN Commission on Human Rights, Mubanga-Chipoya, C, 
Analysis of the current trends and development regarding the right to leave any country, and some other 
rights or considerations arising there from (Hereinafter Mubanga-Chipoya, 1988a), p. 27-28.
484 The first substantive study that was requested by the Sub-Commission focussed on discrimination with 
regard to freedom of movement. See Ingles (1963). See also the Draft Report of the Special Rapporteur: 
Study of discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave any country, including his owa and to 
return to his country', Draft Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur. J.D. Inglés on 13 December 
1961, (hereinafter Inglés (1961)).
485 Partsch (1975). p. 261. The requirement that restrictions on tire right to leave are compatible with other 
rights guaranteed by the Covenant supports this assumption.
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available to achieve those aims; and they should not place a disproportionate burden on 
the individual concerned when compared with the aim to be achieved 486
Proportionality should not only be guaranteed in the laws dealing with 
restrictions on the right to leave, but administrative and judicial authorities are also 
bound to  respect this principle, which implies inter alia that proceedings relating to the 
exercise of the right are expeditious and that subsequent decisions are sufficiently 
motivated487 Necessity has also been interpreted as to imply a pressing public and 
social need, for example by the Special Rapporteur in his Draft Declaration on the Right 
to Leave.488 It is not hard for a state to maintain that restrictions on the right to leave fall 
under one o f the enumerated state interests, but the requirement of proportionality 
prevents a too extensive use o f these state interest in order to justify interferences.489 In 
addition, in the ICCPR, the requirement that limitations on the right to leave must be in 
accordance with the other rights guaranteed in the ICCPR could well be adopted in 
order to avoid such extensive use o f the permissible grounds for restriction that 
codification o f  the right to leave would in effect be rendered meaningless.
Problems of interpretation have played a role especially with regard to the 
concepts of national security and public order, while to a much lesser extent with regard 
to the protection o f health and morals and the rights of others 490 It is argued that 
national security as a general ground for restricting exit should only be invoked in the 
case o f a political or militaiy threat to the entire nation.491 However, the drafters o f the 
ICCPR seem to have been primarily concerned with the control over military
486 ECtHR, Riener v. Bulgaria. 23 May 2006, §118-130; and HRC, Miguel González del Rio v. Peru, 28 
October 1992, par. 5.3.
487 HRC, General Comment 27 (Sixty-seventh session 1999) at 15.
488 Article 7(c) o f the The Draft Declaration on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in Respect o f the Right 
of Everyone to Leave any Country, Mubanga-Chipoya (1988b).
489 The fust draft o f Article 12 ICCPR contained an exhaustive list of all grounds of restriction. Nowak 
(1993), p. 206; and Jagerskiold (1981), p. 171
490 Higgins (1988), p. 9.
491 Article 4(d) o f the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return. International Institute of 
Human Rights (1987); Article 7(d) of the Draft Declaration on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in 
Respect of tire Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Mubanga-Chipoya (1988b). p. 51-52; and 
Nowak (1993), p. 212.
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personnel.492 Also other persons with access to “sensitive” information regarding the 
military or security of the state may be subjected to wider restrictions with regard to 
freedom of movement than ordinary citizens.493
Furthermore, a person may be prevented from leaving the country with the 
purpose of ensuring security against the international spread o f diseases, a restriction 
based on public health considerations, which must be temporary.494 It is difficult to 
think of permissible restrictions on exit based on morality,495 although public health and 
morality can be of significance with regard to internal freedom of movement, an issue 
that is also regulated by Article 12 ICCPR or Article 4 Protocol 2 ECHR. The rights and 
freedoms o f others can also constitute a ground on which the right to leave can be 
restricted. Restrictions of this kind will be justifiable if someone is not willing to fulfil 
contractual obligations or trying to escape family maintenance obligations by leaving 
the country.
Public order or ‘ordre public’ is the most elusive of all the permissible grounds 
for restriction. It is a broad conception o f public order which applies in Article 12 
ICCPR and Article 2 Protocol 4 ECHR, entailing “all those universally accepted 
fundamental principles, consistent with respect for human rights, on which a democratic 
society is based.”497 The grounds of public safety and the prevention of crime in the 
ECHR are included in the concept o f public order as understood by the ICCPR. 
Someone who is suspected of or sentenced for committing a crime may be prevented
492 Jagerskiold (1981). p. 172 and 178. See also ECommHR, Peitonen v. Finland. Decision of 20 
February 1995, p. 38.
493 Hofmann ( l988), p. 3 11; and Sohn and Buergenthal (1992), p. 77.
494 Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a), p. 55.
495 Nowak (1993), p. 216. Prevention of traffic in persons for the purpose o f prostitution is said to fall in 
this category. See Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a), p. 56; Jagerskiold (1981), p. 179; and Hofmann (1988), p. 
312. However, it would make more sense to use the more tangible grounds such as prevention of crime 
for restriction in this case.
496 Jagerskiold (1981), p. 179; and Hofmann (1988), p. 312.
497 Article 4(e) of the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, International Institute of 
Human Rights (1987); and Article 6(e) of the Draft Declaration on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in 
Respect of tire Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Mubanga-Chipoya (1988b). See also Mubanga- 
Chipoya (1988a), p. 11; Daes (1990). p. 121 and 126-127; Aybay (1977), p. 126-127; and Ingles (1963), 
p. 48.
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from leaving the country,498 just as persons who are detained with a view of bringing 
them before the competent legal authority.499 However, in the case that those judicial 
proceedings are unduly delayed, restrictions on the right to leave cannot be said to serve 
public order.500 The lawful detention o f persons for other reasons, for example in a 
labour institution, also constitutes a permissible ground for restricting the right to 
leave.501 The legality of restrictions on exit on the grounds o f outstanding public debts, 
such as taxes, is questioned by some authors.502 It is argued that, since imprisonment for 
inability to fulfil contractual obligations is not allowed in international human rights 
law, it can neither be a reason for prohibiting exit. However, this argument loses sight 
o f the fact that the international legal protection o f  the right to personal liberty differs 
from the international legal protection o f the right to freedom o f movement. 
Furthermore, as the proportionality o f restrictions on exit o f this kind can be easily 
reviewed, I would not necessarily conclude that they are illegal.503
Much more difficult to assess are restrictions based on considerations of a 
general character about the well-being o f the state, such as economic considerations or 
grounds connected to migration and population policies.504 Restrictions on exit to 
prevent brain drain is one example of a broad application o f  the concept of public order. 
The fact that restrictions must always be justified on the grounds of proportionality and 
necessity in each individual case makes it difficult to maintain that far-reaching 
restrictions on such general grounds are permitted. Caution is particularly warranted in
^ECommHR, A' v. Federal Republic o f Germany, Decision of 14 December 1970, p. 69; ECommHR, C. 
v Federal Republic o f  Germany, Decision of 2 December 1985, p. 198; and Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a). 
p. 54.
499 ECommHR, A', v. Federal Republic o f  Germany. Decision of 16 May 1977, p, 190.
5tXt HRC, Miguel González del Rio v. Peru v. Peru, 28 October 1992. at 5.3.
501 ECommHR, A', v. Federal Republic o f  Germany, Decision of 5 February 1970, p. 688.
5o: Jagerskiold (1981), p. 179; and Nowak (1993), p. 214.
503 Cf. the travaux préparatoires eft. Article 12 ICCPR; see Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a), p. 53, 54.
504 See Hofmann (1988), p. 43; and van Dijk en van Hoof (1998). p. 670. The majority of the Committee 
of Experts on Human Rights preparing the ECHR Protocol was against the inclusion of a provision 
permitting restrictions on the ground of economic welfare. Sec Explanatory Report, par. 15, 16 and 18. 
Similarly, grounds such as general welfare and economic and social well-being of the state were proposed 
by some representatives in the Commission of Human Rights when drafting Article 12, but they were 
rejected because they were considered to be too far-reaching. Inglés (1963), Annex IV, Development of 
Article 12 of the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, p. 2.
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these cases, precisely because measures o f this kind are only meaningful if they target a 
whole group, instead o f  one individual. We have seen that interferences with the right to 
leave must be narrowly interpreted exceptions to a general rule permitting exit and that 
discriminatory practices are forbidden. In addition, the outflow of professionals from 
developing countries often has to do with the lack of adequate possibilities for them in 
these countries. There is lack of effective demand for educated professionals in 
developing nations, although an almost unlimited need exists.505 Hence, restrictions on 
exit in such a situation do not seem to provide a solution to the problem of brain drain, 
and their necessity can be doubted.506
A very topical issue is a proposal by the British Delegation in the Human Rights 
Commission in 1948, entailing that the right to emigrate may be restricted in order to 
help neighbouring states to fight illegal immigration.507 It is highly doubtful whether the 
concept of public order in both the ICCPR and the ECHR can be understood in such a 
way as to allow one state to restrict rights in order to protect such a general and 
ambiguous aspect of the public order o f another state. In addition, it is difficult to 
evaluate such measures in the light of their proportionality vis-à-vis each individual.508 
The way in which the right to leave interacts with contemporaiy immigration policies is 
complex and ambiguous and will be addressed in the next Chapter.
Remarkable is the decision by the European Commission of Human Rights in a 
case involving detention with a view to deportation.509 The Commission decided that a 
person whose deportation has been ordered and is detained with a view to enforcement 
o f  the order may not avail himself of the right to freely leave the country.510 Here the
505 Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a), p. 84. See also the Recommendation of the Meeting of Experts on The 
Right to Leave and Return to One’s Country', Attached to the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to 
Leave and to Return. International Institute of Human Rights (1987), p. 483-484.
506 Jagcrskiold (1981), p. 178; and Higgins (1973), p. 354. According to Special Rapporteur Inglés, 
restrictions of this kind are only justified in times of war or national emergency, but not in normal times. 
Inglés (1961), p. 31.
507 Report of the Third Session o f the Commission on Human Rights at Lake Success, 24 May to 18 June 
1948 (1948), p. 26.
508 Which is the important difference with the case that restrictions on the right to leave based on public 
order are applied to persons who constitute a serious danger to the country' to which they intend to travel. 
See Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a). p. 54.
509 ECommHR. A' v. Federal Republic o f  Germany, Decision of 26 May 1970. pp. 1028-1035.
5,0 Ibid. p. 1034.
Commission is handling the concept o f  public order rather contradictorily: if someone is 
detained because public order requires his removal from the country, it can not at the 
same time be argued that on account o f his detention, public order does not allow him to 
leave the country. The paradoxical w ay in which the Commission addresses the relation 
between immigration detention and the right to leave in this case indicates that 
immigration detention possesses a political logic of its own, a subject that will receive 
close attention in the next Chapter.
4.4. Conclusions: the right to leave and the visibility of sovereignty’s
CONTENT
Few rights have been so widely proclaimed, and of few rights has their violation 
been regarded so plainly as a symptom of tyranny, as the right to leave one’s country. 
Yet, it should be borne in mind that a right to leave is a relatively recent notion that is 
immediately linked with ideas on popular sovereignty and the nature o f the sovereign 
territorial state. If in liberal theory the conceptual basis for the body politic is a 
voluntary contract, then a fundamental right to leave has to be recognised. In this light it 
is understandable that non-liberal governments, underpinned as they are by very 
different ideas on the nature o f political authority, have consistently refused to recognise 
an individual right to leave.
However, not only illiberal states have regarded the issue of exit as a favour, the 
granting of which was within their sovereign power alone. W e have seen that even after 
the Second World War, when the right to leave was already codified in various 
international instruments, also W estern governments have at times regarded the 
question of exit as a matter falling entirely under the discretionary power o f the 
executive. The stance of the United States’ federal government in its fight against 
communism w as particularly contradictory: while insisting on the right to leave for 
citizens of the communist countries, it maintained at the same time that its own 
decisions on exit were not for the judiciary to review as they constituted acts of foreign 
policy. The US Supreme Court, however, considered the right to leave to be a 
fundamental right, the interference o f  which should be subject to judicial scrutiny.
Indeed, recognising that the issue of exit is a fundamental right does not entail 
that its exercise may never be limited. We have seen in Chapter 3, that at times the
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sovereign state’s duty to provide security for all its subjects clashes with individuals’ 
unrestricted exercise of their fundamental rights. The rule o f law requires in these 
situations that interferences are endorsed by the legislative power and that there is a 
possibility of review by the judiciary. Maintaining that the right to leave is a matter 
solely up to the executive is an assertion of sovereign power without restraint. Such 
assertions o f sovereign power with regard to exit are at present expressly forbidden by 
the ECHR and the ICCPR.
In the first place, these documents stipulate that interferences with the right to 
leave are to be laid down by law. In the second place, the Articles 13 ECHR and Article 
2(3) ICCPR require an effective remedy before a national authority if  the individual can 
present an arguable complaint that his right to leave is violated. Hence, even when 
national security is at stake, a field that is typically determined by traditional 
conceptions o f sovereignty with emphasis on wide executive powers, the rule of law 
requires that measures interfering with the right to leave are subject of review by an 
independent and impartial body. In the third place, restrictions must be justified on the 
grounds of a number of limited state interests and they need to be proportionate to the 
aim they purportedly serve.
According to the Human Rights Committee, the right to leave encompasses the 
right of the individual to choose the state o f destination.511 This also means that an alien 
who is expelled from one state is allowed to determine to which state he or she will be 
expelled.312 However, it is significant that the Committee adds that the right of the 
individual to decide freely where to go is dependent on the consent of the state that he 
or she wishes to enter. In his study on the right to leave, Chama Mubanga-Chipoya 
considered that it is the need for this consent that makes international movement 
problematic in the contemporary world, rather than the question o f exit in itself.513
However, western states’ immigration policies in themselves have clear 
repercussions for the very exercise of the right to leave as well. Indeed, we seem to be 
witnessing the re-emergence of a notion that in the past was reserved for countries
511 Cf. EcommHR in Peltonen v. Finland' Decision of 20 February 1995.
5.2 HRC, General Comment 27(Sixty-scvcnth session 1999), at 8; and HRC, General Comment 15 
(Twenty-seventh session, 1986) at 9.
5.3 See Mubanga-Chipoya (1988a), p. 15. Cf. the Working paper on the right to freedom of movement and 
related issues prepared by Mr Vlodymyr Boutkevitch in implementation of Decision 1996/109 of the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Boutkevitch (1997).
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inspired by the Soviet model.514 The term ‘illegal emigration’ is becoming 
commonplace again, but now as a tool in the fight against unwanted immigration.515 
The fact that it is a concept that has, as we saw, no legal basis and is in most cases in 
violation o f a fundamental right, appears to make little difference. Or else, how can we 
possibly explain that the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Mustafah Sahel, visiting his 
French counterpart Nicholas Sarkozy, could proudly declare that in 2004 his country 
succeeded in curbing by 27% the number of candidates to illegal emigration?516 And 
how, in the light of this Chapter, are we to interpret the statement made by the recent 
Conference o f the Interior Ministers o f the Western Mediterranean (CIMO) o f May 
2006, “welcoming the efforts made by the countries on the southern shore o f the 
Mediterranean to limit illegal emigration towards Europe”?517 Furthermore, the notion 
of illegal emigration turns up increasingly frequent in newspaper articles, reporting for 
example that Libya succeeded in arresting more than a thousand candidates for illegal 
emigration during the second half o f  July 2006.518 The Moroccan Minister o f the 
Interior announced publicly that Moroccan authorities arrested 383 “illegal emigrants” 
in the same period, the majority of whom were Moroccan citizens.519
In the next Chapter it will become clear that a world completely divided up into 
territorial states cannot guarantee the right to leave adequately if  it holds on to the view 
that matters relating to the entry and stay of non-nationals fall wholly within the 
sovereign prerogative of the sovereign state. But even more significantly, we will see 
that the sovereign right to decide on entry and stay o f non-nationals is often defended 
with much the same arguments that were used to submit matters relating to exit to the 
sovereign discretion of the nation state in the past. Thus, I will argue that both leaving a 
country and entering it engage sovereignty’s content as well as its form. We will see in 
the next Chapter that international law ’s differentiation between the two is caused by 
the fact that with regard to the right to leave, the content o f sovereignty in the form of 
jurisdiction over persons in a given body politic has become visible and explicit, while
5H Rodier (2006).
5,5 Ibid
516 Source: Morrocotimes.com. 6 October 2005. The law of II November 2003 makes it possible to 
severely punish people who illegally leave Moroccan territory.
517 Quoted by Rodier (2006).
5,8 Le Soleil (Senegal). 8 August 2006
519 Source: Libération (Casablanca). 28 July 2006.
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with regard to the issue of entering or staying in a state that is not one’s own, 
sovereignty's content remains largely concealed on account o f the way in which the 
state presents immigration as predominantly engaging sovereignty’s territorial frame.
Chapter 5 The right to enter and immigration law enforcement
5.1. Introduction
“(...) the present international legal system is so determined to protect the interests of states and 
their territorial boundaries that any people who seek to move across those boundaries arc seen as 
intruders. If they can enter at a ll they enter at their own risk.”520
In the previous Chapter, I have dealt with the right to  leave, the international 
recognition o f  which constitutes an evident interference with the domestic competence 
of the state.521 The development o f  that right in particular shows that the reserved 
domain of domestic jurisdiction is not an absolute and invariable notion, but a relative 
one which varies with the development of political theory, international law and the 
extent o f obligations imposed and undertaken.522 It is not long ago that national 
executives attempted to restrain the right to leave with much the same motivations that, 
as we will see below, are used now to portray decisions on entry as discretionary. Both 
aspects of freedom of movement pose direct challenges to the concept of community, 
but while we find that concerning emigration, the jurisdictional content of sovereignty is 
emphasised while its territorial frame remains hidden, with regard to immigration the 
picture is just the other way around.
Immigration is described as the behaviour of individuals ‘‘disturbing the 
geographical sovereignty of states (as political refugees or otherwise).”523 In addition, 
refugees and large flows o f unauthorised migration are pictured as a threat to 
international stability and security because territorial boundaries are crossed without 
state consent, contrary to the rules and expectations o f the international legal system.524 
Thus, with regard to the state responses to immigration, sovereignty’s territorial
520 McConquodale (2001), pp. 145, 152
521 Vazquez (1982), p. 92-93.
522 Goodwin Gill (1978), p. 55.
523 Harding and Lim (1999), p. 18.
524 McCorquodale (2001), p. 151.
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frame is emphasised, and the fact that jurisdictional aspects are also involved when a 
state imposes immigration controls and restrictions, is often simply ignored. Such 
concealing of sovereignty’s content while drawing attention to its form is not difficult in 
the field of immigration because the individuals interests that are affected often remain 
invisible, alternatively because the individuals involved are far away and unknown, or 
because they are very different from “us”.
In this Chapter, which presents an overview of the historical development of the 
state’s exclusionary powers in immigration law and the present regulation of these 
powers by international legal norms, I will argue that the conceptual distinction within 
international law between sovereignty’s territorial frame and its jurisdictional content is 
the rationale behind the system of movement controls in our world. International law 
regards the former aspect as neutral and innocent, an attitude that differs fundamentally 
from the way in which it considers the latter aspect, a distinction that is brought about 
by the reification o f territoriality, as was argued in Chapter 3. The result is that modem 
human rights law suffers from a serious blindness for the personal interests that are 
involved whenever the state presents its claims as being based on sovereignty’s 
territorial frame, notwithstanding the fact that in reality the state always bases its 
decisions with regard to movement that crosses national borders -  be it entering or 
leaving - on both sovereignty’s form and its content.
In addition, we need to address a second implication of the contemporary 
reification of territoriality in order to fully understand the way in which international 
law  regulates international movement. This is its structural role of ascribing distinct 
populations to distinct territorial entities, which has resulted in an additional territorial 
bias in international human rights law.
International movement across borders has produced a growing feeling of crisis 
in many countries because of its association with the loss of control and sovereignty in a 
globalising world.525 National states make increasing use o f restrictive tools of 
migration management such as deportation and detention in order to demonstrate their 
continuing control over territorial boundaries. However, it seems that these tools, “in 
promising more than they can deliver, [...] only exacerbate the feeling of crisis, so that 
these extraordinary measures seem normal and justifiable.”526 This circle merely fuels
5-5 Mills (1996). p. 81.
526 Bloch and Schuster (2005), p. 509.
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the perception in which migration forms a threat to the territorial ideal that must be 
maintained at any cost. Contemporary illustrations of the impact of this perception on 
the real lives o f individuals are numerous and diverse. Their similarity lies in their 
testimony to human suffering. Accounts of how many persons died at Europe’s frontiers 
over the last years differ, but in any case they rate into the thousands. Every week 
newspapers recount novel occurrences o f shipwrecked migrants, drowned as a result of 
their attempts to  reach the coasts of European states. Because o f their desire for a better 
life and future in another place, countless women from poor countries fall victim to 
trafficking networks and are sexually exploited in rich democracies. Undocumented 
migrants are exposed to inhuman working conditions in states that apply sophisticated 
social legislation to those who are officially acknowledged to  be ‘present’. The debasing 
living conditions that sub-Saharan immigrants endure in the Moroccan forests around 
the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla make one doubt the political commitment to 
true universality o f human rights.527 The human dramas that unfold everyday are a 
result o f the common perception in which migration poses a problem to the global 
system based on territory and the social system of the nation state, which therefore 
needs to be prevented and contained by the use of violent dissuasive measures.528 
However, one can also drastically reverse the angle from which migration is regarded:
“Anthropologists understand humans as a ‘migratory species’ (Massey et al, 1998) and interpret 
migration as normal behaviour (Kubat and Nowotny, Hoerdcr, 2003). In that view, it is rather the 
way, the existing social systems are organised, that poses a problem for the principally mobile 
human species. In order to vision policies, which would be more adequate to the migratory 
species one could try' to put the entire debate upside down. And instead of analysing the reasons 
for migration, tackling what are perceived as migration crises, and combating illegal migration, 
one could alternatively analyse why the social systems fail to integrate mobile populations.”529
In line w ith Frank Diivell’s proposition above, in this Chapter I will argue that 
the self-evidence o f  territory as the foundation for political organisation accounts for the 
international legal system’s blindness for the individual interests of mobile populations. 
In order to do so, I will first present a historical overview o f the development o f the 
sovereign right to  exclude in Section 5.2. Subsequently, Section 5.3. deals with the legal
5r See documentation and w itness accounts reported by Médecins Sans Frontiers (2005).
528 See Dtivell (2004), p. 9; and Médecins Sans Frontiers (2005), p. 4.
529 Diivell (2004), p. 9.
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framework regulating the entry and stay of nationals in a state other than their own. In 
Section 5.4., the European Union is addressed in conjunction with immigration from 
third countries. Instead of a detailed analysis of the various EU policies and legislation, 
this Section is included in order to show how territoriality preserves its fundamental 
status, also in the allegedly post-national constellation o f the EU.
Immigration law enforcement strategies such as deportation and detention are 
separately addressed in Section 5.5., where I draw attention to their significance in 
maintaining the territorial system. In the conclusions to this Chapter, I engage my 
findings from Chapter 4 on the right to leave with those arrived at in the present Chapter 
in order to make clear territoriality’s distinct implications for freedom of movement in 
the contemporary world. I will argue that the importance that states attach to 
maintaining the territorial ideal is at bottom not so much about territoriality per se as it 
is about matters of identity.
5.2. Development of the assumption of a sovereign right to exclude
For a long time, it has been a commonly accepted position that matters 
concerning the entry and sojourn of aliens fall within the reserved domain of domestic 
jurisdiction of the national state, which possesses an almost absolute right of exclusion, 
unfettered by international law530
“It is an accepted maxim of international law, that even sovereign nation lias the power, as 
inherent in the sovereignty, and essential to its self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as 
it may seem fit to describe.”531
Before investigating the validity of this claim in contemporary international law 
in  Section 5.3., I will address the way in which historically, questions of entry and
530 Oppcnheim (1955), p. 692; Lillich (1984b), p. 35; Oda (1968), p. 481; Jean (1988). p. 33; Doehring 
(1992), p. 107-108 Fora summary' of these views see PIcnder, (1988) pp. 1-4. See also Judge Read in his 
dissenting opinion to the Nottebohm Case: “When an alien comes to the frontier, seeking admission, the 
State lias an unfettered right to refuse.” International Court of Justice, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 6 April 
1955, p. 46.
531 United States Supreme Court Nishimura Ekiu v\ U.S., (1892). p. 659.
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sojourn o f foreigners have become so explicitly bound up with an absolute notion of 
sovereignty. We have seen in Chapter 2 that the contemporary understanding of 
sovereignty accords crucial importance to territorial boundaries. These are to be guarded 
jealously and strictly, especially with regard to the movement of persons, because the 
territorially fixed population has become one o f the foundations o f the concept of 
sovereignty. But Chapter 2 also described how sovereignty became popular sovereignty. 
As a result of changing perceptions about the nature and source of the ultimate power of 
the state, the concept of sovereignty decreased in importance when it came to matters 
concerning exit: a process which found it culmination in the codification of the right to 
leave in international law in the twentieth century.
We will see that regarding entrance and, to a lesser extent, sojourn, o f aliens, 
altering views on the notion o f sovereignty have in general led to a reverse 
development. Extensive exercise o f  the right to regulate immigration is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, and the allegedly classical perspective that the right to exclude 
aliens is an essential attribute o f sovereignty may turn out to be a “late nineteenth 
century artefact” . 532
Indeed, early theorists of international law did not recognize an absolute right of 
the sovereign to exclude. Hugo de Groot, for example, was insistent on a right of 
foreign refuge for those who had been expelled from their homes, and in his eyes 
expulsion was only acceptable when it was justified by a due cause.533 Francisco de 
Vittoria as well, in his eagerness to establish as a fundamental human right the faculty 
of trading with residents of other lands, favoured the individual right of freedom of 
movement above a sovereign's right o f exclusion.534 Although it is his name that is most 
often associated with an absolute right o f exclusion, also Emmerich de Vattel (1714- 
1767) applies limitations to external sovereignty when it comes to entry or sojourn of 
aliens.535
In medieval Europe, when the nation state did not yet exist, it was not so much 
the possibility to enter territory that gave rise to problems. Instead, we have seen that for 
many individuals the right to depart from it was problematic, as a large part of the 
population was tied to territory due to the institution of serfdom. Nonetheless, for free
532 Martin (1989), p. 547.
531 Nafziger(1983), p. 811; and PIender( 1988), p. 63.
534 O'Connell (1970), p, 693.
535 Nafziger. (1983), p. 814; Goodwin-Gill (1978). p. 95; and McGrath Dale (1991), p. 365.
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people there was ample opportunity for freedom of movement and choice of residence, 
due to the imperatives of economic trade, even though medieval cities often controlled 
immigration strictly.536 Borders were of concern to rulers with regard to warfare but for 
the individual traveller they possessed little significance. Entry could be refused, and 
removal imposed, but such measures were usually directed against certain individuals, 
not against foreigners in general.537 Exile was an individual measure used against 
members of the polity, as a punishment, mainly for political offences, and in those cases 
that expulsion was a mass measure, it was directed at religious minorities, and not at 
foreigners as such. However, expulsion of these minorities was bound up with early 
attempts of monarchs to homogenise populations in order to fonm strong states, 
inhabited with a population whose allegiance they could be sure of.
“The fact that questions of religion and political loyalty are intertwined is clear by the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century'. Corporate expulsion can be seen as a tool of state formation occurring 
against the backdrop of the break-up of the universal church. Indeed, for some observers its 
frequency', and concentration in the western part of Europe is related to tlx: fact that it goes hand 
in hand with the emergence of the modem state system there.”538
Another example in which the ‘right to remain’ was infringed upon, apart from 
exile for those who had attempted to undermine the authority of the state and expulsions 
o f  religious minorities, was the practice in early modem Europe to restrict poor relief to 
the local poor. By placing deportation in a historical perspective, William Walters 
shows that the policing -  in the sense o f governing -  o f the foreign poor becomes, by 
the late nineteenth century, a major preoccupation of deportation policy.539 Yet, in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the foreigner is not yet defined in national terms, 
but it is the distinction local versus foreigner which is deemed relevant for the 
application of poor laws.540
The Westphalian system of territorial states, dividing and allocating populations 
to  specific territories, conflicts with the ideal of individual freedom of movement. We 
have seen that in the era of mercantilism, this friction came to the surface with regard to
536 Nafziger(1983), p,810.
537 Dummct and Nicol (1990), p. 11.
538 Walters (2002), p. 271.
539 Ibid. p. 270.
540 See also Torpey (2000), p. 19.
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the right to leave. However, the possibility to enter remained largely unaffected. States 
were happy to welcome immigrants, as immigration was a way to  increase population. 
At the time that the absolute power o f the sovereign ruler was being attacked, free 
movement across boundaries became the norm. Not only the right to emigrate was 
perceived as a natural right, also the freedom to enter was scarcely subject to 
restrictions. The French Constitution o f 1791 guaranteed “liberté de aller, de rester, de 
partir” . The Revolution with its cosmopolitan spirit was initially veiy welcoming 
towards foreigners. Refugees and exiles were received with encouragement, in the hope 
that cosmopolitan ideals and principles of human rights would “contaminate 
neighbouring people and incite uprisings against tyrants.”541
Nevertheless, during the Revolutionary Wars, the situation changed 
dramatically. Foreigners, especially those from countries with which France was at war, 
suddenly became suspicious individuals, who could be banished from the territory o f 
the French Republic. Measures that were directed at them at that time may remind one 
of some of the contemporary national policies in Europe:
“Many were imprisoned in totvn houses and requisitioned state buildings. It was proposed that 
‘hospitality certificates’ be created, which would be given by municipalities to those foreigners 
having successfully passed the ‘civics examination”; they would then wear an armband bearing 
the name of their country of origin and the word ‘hospitality’.542
Not only France adopted restrictive measures. Around the same time, similar 
developments took place in other European countries and in the United States.543 Here 
again one witnesses the inconsistency, already dealt with in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, 
between modem theory with its emphasis on universalism, and the actual practices 
inspired by it, characterised by territorial particularism. This inconsistency is magnified 
by the way in which the foreigner is treated. The meanings that are ascribed to territorial 
boundaries in general reveal modernity’s ambiguity as well: as we have seen above, 
around the same time restrictions were imposed on freely leaving the country.
However, liberal ideals continued to increase in importance, and during the 
nineteenth century freedom o f movement had become the norm. Millions of people left
541 Kristeva (1991), p. 156. Cf. Torpev (2000), p. 24.
542 Kristeva (1991), p. 158.
543 Plender(1988). p. 65.
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their countries in order to start a life elsewhere. Entry was generally an uncomplicated 
matter, due to an expanding economy in the Western countries, compatibility between 
source and destination countries, and the predominance o f liberal thought in general.544 
The International Emigration Conference passed a resolution in 1889 that affirmed the 
right of the individual to come and go and dispose of his destinies as he pleased. In 
1891, the Institute o f International Law rejected the idea that sovereign power entails an 
absolute right of exclusion and in 1892 it adopted the ‘International Regulations on the 
Admission and Expulsion of Aliens’, in which states were permitted to refuse entry 
solely in the public interest and for very serious reasons. It was stipulated that the 
protection of national labour in itself was not a sufficient reason for non-admission.545
Expulsions in this era were seldom specifically directed at foreigners as such, 
but they were seen as a means of social regulation in the case of criminals. Their 
punishment consisted of removal from the territory of their countries of origin and they 
were transported to colonies or other areas.546
However, from the late nineteenth century onwards, states gradually started to 
impose border controls. Even though the attitude towards freedom of movement 
initially remained fairly liberal, states commenced to make distinctions between aliens 
and nationals. The changing connotations o f nationalism, from freedom and equality for 
the people, to the particularistic language of national identity linked to territorial 
boundaries, and a common identity of the people, as elaborated upon in Chapter 2, 
expressed themselves in a growing hostility towards foreigners. Ethnic, racial or 
national fault lines became the markers for political order. This period saw the 
introduction o f racially, culturally and socially exclusive immigration laws.547 With the 
onset of World War I, passports became obligatory in order to enter another country, 
and the ‘foreigner’ had to be identified by means of documentation.548 Although these
544 Nafziger (1983). p. 815; and Torpcy (2000), p. 91-92.
545Institut de Droit International (1892), p. 218; O ’Connell (1970), p. 695; Nafziger (1983), p. 832; and 
Schindhnayer (2003), p. 113.
546 Walters (2002), p. 272.
547 Such as laws preventing the immigration of paupers or persons with ‘low morals’ and certain specific 
nationalities. Christie Tait (1927); and Fields (1932). Good examples of the latter are the US Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 (Act of May 6th, f  1882,22 Slat 58); restrictions on Jewish migration to the United 
Kingdom; and law s concerning “foreign poles” working in Prussia. See Walters (2002b), p. 571.
548 See Aybay (1977). p. 123; Plender(1988), p. 77; and Torpey (2000), p. 1.
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measures were initially seen as temporary, necessary in view  o f the war, the laissez fa ire  
era with regard to international migration had reached its definite end.549
We saw that the perception o f an unbreakable and necessary linkage between 
state, people, and identity reached its zenith in the period between the two world wars. 
Nationalism had changed citizenship’s connotations o f equality, freedom and self- 
government. National identity was the first political priority and had become 
synonymous with citizenship. International movement of people and the significance of 
territorial boundaries were greatly influenced by this shift in mentality. Most countries 
that had been welcoming towards immigrants before now imposed serious restrictions 
or even closed their borders completely.550
The idea that every nation should have its own state also influenced the right to 
remain. After the First World War and the break-up o f the last European empires, 
population transfers were seen as an acceptable way in which the ideal of the nation 
state could be achieved, especially in the new states that were formed after the 
disintegration o f  the Ottoman Empire.551 And although Nazi Germany later took these 
practices to their extreme, they were by no means exclusive to Hitler’s Germany, nor 
were they limited to the period between the two world wars:
“While today it might be associated with ethnic cleansing, for statespersons at the middle of the 
centuiy, population transfer was legitimated as an unpleasant but expedient and technical means 
of effecting national and international order. Hence population transfer did not end with the 
defeat of tlie Nazi regime. Under the Potsdam Protocol the Allies sanctioned a wave o f transfers 
that would culminate in the removal of more than 14 million ethnic Germans from such 
countries as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”552
Precisely due to the way in which national identity, territory, and rights had 
become linked in the beginning o f the twentieth century, an international refugee regime
549 Torpey (2000), p, 112; and Marrus (1985), p. 62.
550 See about the interwar situation: Christie Tait (1927), p. 27-29 and Fields (1932). Christie Tait 
provides some telling figures for the situation in the late 20’s: “in the months ending 30th June 1914, 
283,738 Italian immigrants entered the United States, the present quota for Italian immigrants is 3,845. 
(...) The corresponding figures for Greece are 35.832 and 100. for Spain 7,591 and 131, Romania 4,032 
and. for a larger area. 603.” Christie Tait (1927), p. 33-34.
551 Lillich (1984b), p. 33.
552 Walters (2002), p. 274. See also Arendt (1976), p. 276; Lillich (1984b), pp, 62 and 76; and Manus 
(1985), pp. 327-328.
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started to emerge around the same time. We will see below that international refugee 
law, on the one hand, and a system of sovereign states based on territoriality, on the 
other, are logically connected. The First World War with its break up of empires and 
subsequent revolution produced millions o f refugees and a whole new category of 
people, the stateless.553 Passports had become essential for international movement, but 
for many refugees it was impossible to obtain the proper documents. The League of 
Nations recognised the difficult situation these people were in, and efforts were made in 
order to make movement easier for them. The Nansen Passport, named after the 
League’s first High Commissioner for Refugees, was initially intended solely for 
Russian refugees, but later it was expanded to cover other groups, such as Armenians 
and minorities from the former Ottoman territories.
At first, these passports only facilitated movement: participating governments 
agreed to recognise those documents, but no state was obliged to receive refugees 
bearing such papers.554 Later, in 1926, some of the participating governments to the 
original agreement extended the right of movement to a right o f return to the state that 
had issued the document. The League of Nations, in the 1933 Convention Relating to 
the International Status of Refugees, accorded Nansen Passport bearers.some elements 
o f “ supranational citizenship” by giving the High Commissioner for Refugees the 
authority to perform certain consular functions on behalf of those refugees in possession 
o f such a document.555
Besides, the Convention provided that a refugee had to be admitted by a 
Contracting State if he came directly from a state where he feared persecution.556 The 
emergence of the Nansen passports can be seen as the birth of an international refugee 
law regime: no longer was the protection o f refugees a matter solely for the state that 
chose to afford them protection, but it became a concern o f the international community 
at large.
International law’s emerging concern with refugees after the First World War 
finds an interesting parallel with the way in which it dealt with the issue of national 
minorities during the same period, as was described in the previous Chapter. Refugees,
553 The refugees from Russia were probably the most prominent. A vast majority of them were 
denationalised after departing and thus became stateless. Torpey (2000). p. 124-125.
Lui (2002). at 36.
555 Toipcy (2000), p. 129.
556 Lillich (1984b), p. 36.
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just as minorities, did not fit the population-territory-identity ideal of the sovereign 
state. In addition, both endangered the stability o f  a state system based on territoriality. 
Geopolitical considerations in the refugee regime were made apparent by the fact that 
the League o f Nations gave attention only to those refugees from regions that were 
considered most disruptive to the European order.557
The previous two Chapters traced a changed perception of sovereignty in the 
period between the two World Wars, one that was “more jealous and absolute than 
anything known before.”558 We saw how that development caused citizenship to acquire 
new connotations, far removed from those by which it had previously been 
characterised. Citizenship became instrumental in determining and establishing who 
belonged and who did not. In its most extreme uses, such as by the Nazis, this 
instrumental use of citizenship affected the right to remain,559 The Nuremberg Laws of 
1935, which deprived Jews o f German citizenship, were the foundation for subsequent 
plans to expel all Jews from German territory.560 The newly emerged sovereignty, with 
its accompanying system of controls on movement embedded in national membership, 
made sure that the victims o f these measures could find refuge elsewhere only with 
difficulty. “Paper walls” had been erected around all Western democracies, and at the 
Evian Conference, which was organised in 1938 in order to address the problem of 
refugees from Germany and Australia, it was made clear by Western governments that 
they had little intention of changing their perception o f sovereignty as entailing an 
absolute right o f exclusion. This had already been illustrated by the fact that only eight 
states had ratified the 1933 Convention on Refugees.561
After the Second World War, the number o f displaced people in Europe finding 
themselves outside their countries of origin counted over 11 million. A refugee crisis of 
unprecedented magnitude presented itself, and a great part o f  the displaced persons over 
Europe were interned in camps. Already during the war, refugee relief operations were 
being planned. An international organisation, the United Nations Relief and
557 Lui (2002). at 38.
558 Polanyi (1944), p. 202.
559 Or the right to enter (return), as had already been shown by Soviet Russia, which, after the Revolution, 
denationalised a large part of the refugees that had left the country'.
560 See about pre-war Nazi plans for the mass departure of German Jews: Marrus (1985), pp. 211-219
561 Lillich (1984b). p. 36.
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Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), with the task of repatriating people, was 
established in 1943. Factually, the Allied Forces handled most resettlements.
In 1947, the UNRRA was succeeded by the International Refugee Organisation 
(IRO), intended to deal with the remaining one million displaced persons in Europe. 
The constitution o f the IRO stated that if  a displaced person had reasonable grounds to 
fear on returning to his country of origin, persecution because of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion, he could refuse repatriation. Indeed, many of the 
remaining displaced persons refused repatriation, especially those Eastern European 
refugees hostile to the Soviet regime and its expansionism. Thus, the IRO had to secure 
admission for them somewhere. When it became clear that most Western European 
countries were reluctant to grant admissions on a large scale, the IRO searched for other 
solutions, encouraging non-European States to open their borders by linking the 
economic needs of these countries with the labour potential of the DP population.562
The IRO in turn was succeeded by the UN High Commissioner’s Office for 
Refugees in 1949. Although initially concerned only with Europeans, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gradually adopted a global 
mandate, less explicitly focussed on the events of the war in Europe. Whereas during 
the pre-war period, with the emergence of the Nansen Passports, refugees had been 
defined according to their membership in a particular national group, the UNHCR 
adopted the view that refugees had rights irrespective of their nationality.563
These developments were reflected in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
o f  Refugees and the modifications made to that Convention by the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status o f Refugees. In spite of the fact that discretion over entry and 
admission of aliens were still seen as essential attributes of sovereignty, under the 
Convention governments accepted certain restrictions on their perceived unlimited 
discretion in this field. The nature and extent of these restrictions will be dealt with in 
the Section below.
During the late forties, many refugees from Eastern Europe started to come to 
the West, their departure prompted by harsh economic conditions combined by 
increasing political oppression. Before the communist countries closed their borders
562 Marrus (1985). pp. 344-345. Three quarters of the approximately remaining one million DP’s between 
1947 and 1951 went to the United States. Australia, Israel, and Canada. Only 170.000 were received by 
Western European states.
563 Torpey (2000), p. 144.
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completely to emigration, thousands o f Eastern Europeans left their countries, seeking a 
safe haven or a better future in the West, which initially did not open its doors 
spontaneously, nor welcomed these people warmly:
“ [...] escapees who reached the American zone of Germany stood a reasonable chance o f being 
jailed for illegal crossing of a frontier. By 1952, nearly 200.000 anti-Communist refugees were 
jammed into camps and centers in Berlin and West Germany, sometimes living in appalling 
conditions.”564
However, as the Cold W ar hardened, Western countries started to maintain an 
open admissions policy for almost anyone coming from a communist country, and 
refugee status was not reserved for the politically persecuted, but also afforded to those 
who were driven to emigrate by obvious economic motivations.565 This policy was on 
the one hand a tool in the ideological struggle: refugee law was used to stigmatise the 
Communist regimes.566 On the other hand, it was a consequence of Western insistence 
upon the acknowledgement of the right to leave by the Communist countries. 
Furthermore, firm control over exit by the Soviets and their Eastern European allies 
anyhow prevented truly massive flows o f people reaching the West. However, at the 
same time Cold W ar concerns made entry a more complicated issue as well for reasons 
of state and public security. In the case o f the Federal Republic of Germany, foreigners 
crossing the border could receive severe penalties if  they diverged from the route or 
destination prescribed in the visa.567
Because of shortages on the labour market, and in their efforts to rebuild post 
war Europe, Western European countries encouraged importation of foreign workers 
from the 1950s to the 1960s. These were mostly recruited from Mediterranean countries 
such as Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Morocco. Around the same time, refugees started 
to come to Europe from the developing world. As applications for asylum were
564 Mamis (1985), p.354.
565 See Ghoslial and Crowley (1983).
566 In addition, the common perception might have been that communist poverty is attributable to the 
government, whereas poverty in capitalist countries to the individual. The US for example openly 
recognised the economic considerations of refugees from communist countries, but refugees from non­
communist countries were sent back because they were economic refugees. See Han.L.Rev. (1985- 
1986). p. 463.
56’ Torpey (2000), p. 148.
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increasing steadily, restrictive measures were taken in order to stem these flows. The 
Western European countries were more sympathetic to the plight of Eastern European 
refugees than to that of those coming from the third world. Another post-war 
development was immigration to European countries from their colonies or former 
colonies. In the latter case as well, although initially fairly open to people from the 
overseas territories, former colonial powers in general closed their borders quite 
quickly, except to those who were perceived to have close ties to the European countiy 
in question.
From the 1970s onwards, due to economic concerns propelled by the 1973-1974 
oil crisis, Northern European countries actively attempted to stem immigration flows 
and wished to repatriate many of the guest workers they had so enthusiastically 
recruited in the previous two decades. It appeared that they were not always able to do 
so. Asylum laws could be, and indeed were, made more restrictive, but repatriation 
programmes failed and because family reunification had in most domestic jurisdictions 
become a legal right for resident immigrants, many new immigrants had to be admitted. 
The alarm caused by states’ incapacity to reduce immigration pressures called for more 
restrictive measures, which in turn produced illegal immigration.568 The circle was 
complete when governments responded to this phenomenon with ever more strict 
legislation concerning entry and sojourn o f non-nationals.
In addition, migration slowly came to be regarded not only as an economic 
concern, but also as a security issue.569 Political power in the twentieth century, 
especially with the advent of the welfare state after WWII, had come to be concerned 
with the wealth, health, welfare and prosperity of populations. As a result, immigration 
policy could, when the presence of aliens was perceived as an economic and social 
threat, become an instrument to defend and promote the welfare o f a nationally defined 
population. This trend, originating in the ethnically and socially exclusive immigration 
laws at the turn of the nineteenth century, has become much stronger since the 1970s. 
Since the late 1980s, immigration has become a major political concern. The problems 
associated with immigration are presently worded in a rhetoric of ‘threat, crisis, 
invasion, and flooding’, which leaves one without doubt about the link with traditional 
notions of sovereignty and security. National identity once again plays a distinct role in
568 Samers (2004) argues that illegal immigration is produced by migration and citizenship policy. 
5rt9 Melis (2001). p. 11.
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public discourse. The legal, individual rights based, system of asylum is far from 
immune from political influences.570 On the contrary, we will see later that an 
international system o f refugee protection is linked to the territorialisation o f political 
organisation, with all its concurrent emphasis on identity.
Generally speaking, since the early twentieth century onwards we have 
witnessed an ever more progressive assertion o f sovereignty as inherently entailing the 
right to exclude foreigners. The idea o f  fundamental rights has made some inroads in 
this powerful and unhampered use o f  sovereignty, which is most clearly illustrated by 
the rights of long-term legal residents in liberal democracies, as we have seen in the 
previous Chapter. Nevertheless, in the course o f the twentieth century, immigration 
control has become one of the ways to protect the essence of the nation, in whatever 
aspect one sees that essence expressed: population, borders, mythology or coercive
571power.
Certainly, there are exceptions to this development, mainly at the regional level, 
the most notable being the European Union. But the very novel and revolutionary 
character of its notion of supranational citizenship, with the accompanying rights of 
freedom of movement throughout the countries o f the Union, is perhaps all the more 
striking due to the fact that in general the development has been a reverse one. In 
addition, as was already remarked in Chapter 2, the European project has also 
emphasised the inside/outside distinction, notwithstanding the fact that the scales 
according to which who is labelled insider and who is an outsider have been shifting in 
important and unprecedented ways. W ith the abolition of internal borders in the EU, 
worries about the vulnerability about the external frontiers have risen equally, and much 
action is taken to strengthen these borders against unwanted immigration. Before I 
consider these issues and other questions specific to immigration policies in 
contemporary European states in greater detail, it is necessary to sketch the international 
legal framework governing the right to enter and remain. Which legal constraints does it 
formulate against an unlimited sovereign right to exclude?
570 Schindlmayer calls attention to the fact that refugees from countries which lack in geopolitical 
importance generally do not enjoy priority status. See Schindlmayer (2003), p. 119.
51 Dauvergne (2004), p. 592.
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5 .3 . T h e  right to enter and remain in international law
Only a brief glance at international law is sufficient to discover that the right to 
leave and the right to enter a country are not symmetrically protected. Whereas the right 
to leave a country should be guaranteed for any person irrespective of his or her 
nationality, a general right to enter a country in international human rights instruments 
is reserved for nationals of the country in question. The corresponding duty of states to 
admit their nationals is well established in international law, and as such it is regarded 
as the logical correlative of the right o f other states to expel non-nationals.372 In classic 
international law, this duty raised obligations only between states, but presently the 
right to enter one’s own state is incorporated in all major human rights instruments. 
With regard to a general right to remain; only nationals are in a sense m-expellable. 
However, the right to enter and remain for nationals does not fall within the scope o f a 
study dealing with the detention o f irregular immigrants and refugees, a category by 
definition consisting of non-nationals. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, I will 
focus on the international legal framework concerning the right to enter or remain in a 
state of which one is not a national.574
It is argued widely that there exists no right for aliens to enter the territory o f a 
foreign state, except in particular cases, resulting from treaties, and that states similarly 
possess a general competence to require aliens to leave.575 Often, exclusion seems to be 
regarded as an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Yet, we have seen in the previous 
Chapter that sovereignty is never unlimited, and that certain concerns in particular have 
caused concepts such as domestic jurisdiction or the domain reserve to undergo 
profound changes during the last century. Indeed, we will see that those instances in 
which an alleged sovereign right to exclude is limited generally flow from 
considerations regarding the fundamental rights of individuals: contemporary 
international migration law is largely rooted in human rights law.
572 Goodwin-Gill ( 1978), p. 137. See also ECJ, Case 41-74. Van Duvn v. Home Office. 4 December 1974.
573 For a contrary opinion, see Dochring ( 1992). p. 110. The right to remain is guaranteed for nationals by 
Article 3 Protocol 4 ECHR.
574 As in section 4.2.2., concerning the legal framework of the right to leave, I will be selective in my 
treatment of international law' in this area. Main emphasis will be on the ICCPR and the ECHR.
575 Dochring (1992), p. 108; O’Connell (1970). p. 707; and Fourlanos (1986). p. 61.
The extent to which such considerations put limits on the right to exclude is 
perhaps not so very wide if  only taking into account customary international law or ius 
cogens. However, in Chapter 3 , 1 have indicated that one misunderstands the discourse 
of fundamental rights, i f  one deems an investigation into their origin (however 
interesting) necessary in order to evaluate their impact on the sovereign claims of the 
modem state. Thus, be it treaty obligations or the case law of domestic courts that put 
limits on an alleged sovereign right to  exclude the foreigner, they are as much about 
restraining a particular assertion o f  sovereignty, as ius cogens or customary 
international law would be in the same case. This is especially so when we take into 
account the fact that the traditional perception of the sovereign power to exclude entails 
extensive executive discretion, with little or no room for the legislative or judiciary 
powers.
5.3.1. General limitations on the sovereign right to exclude
The main venues for legal migration into the Member States of Europe consist 
of immigration on humanitarian or human rights related grounds; family reunification or 
formation; and primary labour migration. Concerning the two former categories, 
international law plays a significant role that will be described in Sections 5.3.2. and
5.3.3. However, with regard to migration for employment or other general purposes, 
international law does very little to limit the national state’s discretionary powers, 
except to decree that its decisions may not be discriminatory. As a general rule, the 
principle o f non-discrimination contained in Article 26 ICCPR may play a role in 
limiting the power of states to exclude.576 The prohibition on racial discrimination can
5 6 The principle of non-discrimination plays an ambiguous role in international migration law as 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality is inherent to it. Additionally, it will often be difficult to 
prove discrimination precisely in view of the broad powers of the state. This problem is circumvented 
when the rights o f nationals are involved as well: see the decision by the HRC in the Mauritian Women’s 
Case, in which it decided that Mauritian practice of affording alien wives automatic residence rights 
while denying such rights to alien husbands was discriminatoiy with respect to Mauritian women 
(Amauruddyu-Cziffra et ai v. Mauritius, 9 April 1981, at 67.
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be seen as ins cogens*77 but states would also act in contravention of Article 26 ICCPR 
if  their decisions on requests for entry or applications for visa would be discriminatory 
on the grounds such as race, sex, language, religion, opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. While the principle of non-discrimination seems to be 
the only international principle bearing upon a general right o f the individual to enter, 
with regard to a general right to remain, international law offers more protection by 
imposing certain restraints on the circumstances in which a state may expel an alien 
from its territory.
It should be noted, however, that this extended protection is usually only offered 
to those individuals who were initially authorised to enter or stay in national territory. 
International law thus treats irregular residents on the same footing as those who never 
entered, therewith endorsing a view o f sovereignty as a right to decide on matters of 
exclusion, at least initially. The fact that international law’s main concern with the 
rights of aliens is only after authorised entry into national territory makes apparent once 
more the importance of territoriality for an international constitutionalism.
We have seen in the Chapter 3 that under international law, foreigners are 
entitled to treatment in accordance with a minimum international standard. Hence, such 
a standard applies equally to matters relating to their sojourn, and they should not be 
subject to arbitrary expulsions.580 Chapter 3 described that international law relating to 
the treatment o f foreigners accords rights to national states instead of bestowing 
entitlements on the individual. Thus, diplomatic protection is capable of posing some 
limits to the sovereign right to exclude, but not in favour of a right o f the individual.
However, the emergence of human rights enhanced international protection o f 
aliens, also regarding matters of their sojourn. First o f all, just as decisions pertaining to
577 See also the International Convention on the Elimination of All Racial Discrimination of 21 December 
1961, entry into force 4 January 1969. Although the non-discrimination provision in the ECHR cannot be 
invoked independently from a claim concerning one of the rights set forth in the Convention, racial 
discrimination may amount to degrading treatment, prohibited by Article 3 ECHR. See about the 
application of this provision to racially discriminatory immigration legislation: ECommHR, East African 
Asians v. The United Kingdom. Report of 14 December 1973. Protocol 14 ECHR, prohibiting 
discrimination in respect of the enjoyment of any right set forth by law is ratified by only 5 EU Member 
States.
578 Goodwin-Gill (1978), p. 81; and Cholewinski (2002), p. 51-52.
579 See Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Rankin v. Iran, 3 November 1987, par. 22.
580 Higgins (1973). p. 346; and Oda (1968). p. 482.
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entrance should not amount to forbidden discrimination; neither should removal from 
national territory be effected on discriminatory grounds.581 Secondly, a general principle 
of customary international law prohibits mass expulsions o f aliens.582 The prohibition of 
collective expulsion is closely related to the non-discrimination requirement. Expulsions 
do not violate international law merely because numerous aliens are expelled; instead 
the prohibition concerns the expulsion of them as group if it is not the result o f 
decisions based on the merits of each individual case.583 Codifications o f the prohibition 
on mass expulsion are inter alia  contained in the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR584 and 
the International Convention on the Protection o f the Rights of Migrant Workers and 
their Families585.
Thirdly, various provisions o f international law stipulate that certain procedural 
guarantees need to be satisfied before a state may expel a foreigner. Although these 
provisions are procedural in character, they serve to prevent arbitrary expulsions.586 
According to Article 13 ICCPR and Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR,587 an alien residing 
lawfully in a Contracting State’s territory may be expelled there from only in pursuance 
of a decision reached in accordance with the (domestic) law.588 Both provisions do not 
affect the substantive law governing expulsions, and the HRC in applying Article 13 
ICCPR does not deem it within its powers to evaluate whether national authorities have
581 HRC, General Comment 15 (Twenty-seventh session, 1986).
582 Henckaerts (1995); Plender (1988); and Cassese (2005), p. 121.
583 EcommHR, Becker v. Denmark, Decision o f 3 October 1976, p. 454.
584 Article 4 Protocol 4 ECHR (CETS No.: 046, entry into force 1968, ratified by all EU Member States 
save Spain and the United Kingdom).
585 Article 22 (Convention adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990: Entiy 
into force: 1 July 2003).
586 International laws that expressly give the individual a substantial guarantee against arbitrary 
expulsions are rare. See for example Article 19(8) of the 1961 European Social Charter, which decrees 
that migrant workers may only be expelled if they form a danger to national security, public interest or 
public morality.
587 Entry into force: 1998 (ratified by all EU Member States save Spain, The Netherlands and Greece).
588 Other important provisions in this respect are Article 3 of the 1955 European Convention on 
Establishment (CETS No.: 019. entry into force: 23 February 1965) and Article 22 of the International 
Convention on the Protection of tire Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families. Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Establishment also enumerates permissible grounds for expulsion Its provisions 
are only applicable to nationals of Contracting States who reside on the territory' of another Contracting 
Party.
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interpreted and applied the law correctly, unless it is established that they have not acted 
in good faith or there was abuse o f power.589 Thus, substantive power regarding 
exclusion is left to the national state alone, a fact that is emphasised by the fact that the 
procedural guarantees are only applicable in the case of ‘lawful residency*, which 
lawfulness similarly refers to domestic law.590 One inroad into this power is provided 
for by the HRC: when the legality of an alien’s entry or stay is in dispute, any decision 
resulting in his expulsion or deportation should be taken in conformity with Article 13 
ICCPR.591
Article 13 ICCPR and Article 1 of Protocol 7 ECHR592 accord lawful residents 
the right to advance reasons against the ordered expulsion and have their case reviewed 
by an authority that is capable of offering an effective remedy.593 The reviewing 
authority may be the same as who made the initial decision. Exceptions to these 
procedural guarantees are also provided for. In the ICCPR, compelling reasons of 
national security may justify the absence of appeal and the entitlement of review. In 
Protocol No. 7 ECHR, both public order and national security are grounds for 
derogation of these procedural rights. Nevertheless, according to the ECtHR, someone 
expelled on grounds of public order or national security does retain the right to invoke 
his procedural rights after expulsion. However, this can hardly be seen as an effective 
remedy.594
A national state, when invoking the interest of public order in order to avoid its 
obligations under Article 1 Protocol 7, needs to furnish prove that this is a necessary 
measure in the particular case.595 However, the advancement of reasons of national
589 HRC, Maroufuhu r. Sweden, 5 September 1979.
590 EcommHR, Voulfovitch and Oulianova v. Sweden, Decision of 13 January 1993, par. 3. Furthermore, 
aliens who arrive at ports or other points of entry are excluded from the protection of those provisions, 
just as ‘overstayers ' and those present on the territory awaiting a decision on a request for a residence 
permit. See the Explanatory Report to Protocol 7, Par. 9; and HRC, General Comment 15 (Twenty- 
seventh session, 1986).
591 HRC, General Comment 15 (Twenty-seventh sessioa 1986) at 9.
59" CETS No.: 117, entry into force 11 November 1988.
593 HRC, Hammelv. Afadagaskar, 3 April 1987, par. 19.
59A The ECtHR does not consider a remedy effective if it docs not suspend tire contested measure. ECtHR, 
Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986. §48.
595 See ECommHR. Afezghiche v. France, Decision of 9 April 1997.
security is sufficient, and no further justification by the national state is required.596 The 
HRC limits its own powers of review in a similar manner when reasons o f national 
security are advanced,597 therewith undermining the significance of the term compelling 
in Article 13 ICCPR.598 This is regrettable, as some sort of judicial check on invoking 
national security is desirable in order not to reduce the guarantees contained in Article 
13 ICCPR and Article 1 Protocol 7 to “the merely hortatory” .599 This lack in judicial 
protection may be remedied at the national level, where it is not exceptional for courts 
to adjudicate claims of national security in expulsion cases 600 It should be noted that 
where other rights are concerned, neither the Strasbourg organs, nor the HRC leave the 
assessment o f  whether a right balance is struck between national security concerns and 
individual rights solely to the national authorities601
That the HRC chooses to do so and the Strasbourg Court is obliged to do so in a 
case in which national security, the right to remain and the power to exclude are at 
stake, and in which no other fundamental rights are implicated, is perhaps not 
surprising: what could be a more suitable site for national sovereignty to emerge 
unrestrained by an internationally administered rule o f  law? Whether such judicial 
restraint fits within a system of protection of individual rights is another question 602
A proposal to include a similar provision in the European Convention system at 
an earlier date (in Protocol No. 4), in which it would also be for the national state alone 
to decide whether reasons o f public security exist, was refused. The Committee of 
Experts felt that this situation would prevent the exercise of powers vested by the 
Convention in the bodies that it instituted for the purpose of ensuring that Contracting
596 Explanatory Note to Protocol No. 7, par. 15.
59 “It is not for the Committee to test a sovereign state’s evaluation of an alien’s security rating.” 
VM.R.B. v Canada, 26 July 1988, at 8.4.; and J.R.C, v Costa Rica, 30 March 1989, at 8.4. 
m  Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2004), p. 383. 
s"  Martin (1989), p. 571.
600 See Martin (1989), pp. 570-571 and Goodwin-GiU (1978), pp. 282-310.
601 Although in the ECtHR’s case law, often a wide margin of appreciation is in such cases left to the 
national authorities. ECtHR. Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987; and ECtHR, Ktass v. Germany, 6 
September 1978. The HRC is generally more willing to adjudicate national securin' considerations. See
Sohn v. Republic o f  Korea, 3 August 1995, par. 10.4; Mukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994, par. 9.7.: and 
Kim v. Republic o f  Korea, 4 January 1999, par. 12.4 -12.5.
602 See tire ECtHR in A l Kashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002.
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Parties would respect their commitments.603 Another objection that was expressed at 
that time was the absence o f impartiality if review of the expulsion order could be 
effected before the same authority which took the initial decision604
In the traditional perception o f the power to exclude, judicial review does not 
play a large role on account o f the allegedly great extent of executive discretion. In a 
sense, the Strasbourg organs have sanctioned such a perception of the state’s power to 
decide on exclusion, as can be deduced from a number of decisions in which it was 
decided that the fair trial guarantees of Article 6 ECHR neither apply to the decision to 
deport an alien, nor to administrative proceedings on prohibition of entry. The European 
Commission for Human Rights and the ECtHR have both held that the right of an alien 
to reside in a particular country is matter of public law and the decision to deport him 
does not constitute a determination of his civil rights and obligations in the sense of 
Article 6 605 For the Commission, the discretionary nature of the powers of immigration 
authorities was decisive in reaching this conclusion 606
The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 expressly states that its Article 1 does 
not affect this interpretation o f Article 6 607 Whether the HRC entertains similar views 
on the application o f Article 14(1) ICCPR on exclusion cases is not clear. The English 
version of Article 14(1) ICCPR stipulates that a fair trial should be guaranteed to any 
person in the determination o f his rights and obligations in a “suit at law”, which refers 
to the nature of the right in question, instead of the status of the parties concerned or the 
particular forum where the right is to be adjudicated.608 However, the question whether 
a decision to deport an alien may amount to the determination of his rights and
603 Explanatory Note to Protocol 4 ECHR, par. 34.
604 Ibid
605 ECtHR, Maaouia r. France, 5 October 2000, §§36-37; and the ECommHR: Agee v. The United 
Kingdom , Decision of 17 December 1976, p. 164, par. 28; X  v. The United Kingdom* Decision of 18 May 
1977; and Kareem v. Sweden, Decision of 26 October 1996. p. 173. A recent conformation o f the 
approach taken in Maaouia can be found in ECtHR, Oner v. the Netherlands, 18 October 2006, §56.
606 EcommHR. Uppal and others v. the United Kingdom, Decision of 2 May 1979, p. 157; and A',}', and Z  
v. The United Kingdom, Decision of 6 July 1982, par. 4.
607 Explanatory’ Report, par. 9.
608 HRC, Y.L. i'. Canada, 8 April 1986, at. 9.1.; and HRC. General Comment 13 (21*1 Session. 1984).
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obligations in a suit at law was never answered by the Committee, although in the case 
of M adafferi v. Canada it left the possibility that it may do so open.609
Other important provisions in this regard are Article 13 ECHR and Article 2(3) 
ICCPR, granting the individual a right to an effective remedy before a national authority 
if he can present an arguable complaint that his rights as set forth in respectively the 
ECHR or the ICCPR are violated.610 The precise relation between these provisions and 
Article 1 Protocol 7 ECHR or Article 13 ICCPR, both pairs of provisions involving 
procedural guarantees, is unclear In this context, it is important to note that neither 
provision grants a right to review by a judicial authority. It is well possible that, should 
it be concluded that Article 1 Protocol 7 or Article 13 ICCPR is violated, no additional 
assessment o f a state's obligations under the more general procedural provisions would 
be considered necessary 611
In any case, seeing that nor Article 1 Protocol 7, neither Article 13 ICCPR 
involve any guarantee relating to substantive grounds o f expulsion, these grounds in 
themselves cannot become subject o f an effective remedy before a national authority by 
virtue of Article 13 ECHR or Article 2(3) ICCPR. The only way in which substantive 
grounds of exclusion can become relevant issues to consider in the framework o f these 
provisions is when they involve other rights or freedoms which are set forth in the 
ECHR or ICCPR. The way in which the substantive exclusionary powers o f the state
609 HRC, Madajferi v. Australia, 26 July 2004, at 8.7. The issue was also raised in V.M.R.B. v. Canada, 26 
July 1988; and Nartev v. Canada, 18 July 1997, but these complaints w ere declared inadmissible.
610 ECtHR. Boyle and Rice v. United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, §§52-55; Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 
2000, §157; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 2002, §112; and the HRC in Kazantzis v 
Cyprus, 19 September 2003, at 6.6.
611 Much of the European Court’s case law indicates that it considers Article 13 ECHR a lex generalis in 
respect of provisions that include separate procedural guarantees. See ECtHR, Foti and Others v. Italy, 10 
December 1982, §78; Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1992, §65; an d X  and Y. v. The Netherlands, 26 
March 1985. §36. However, a recent change in the Court’s view on the subsidiary character of Article 13 
ECHR may be apparent from its decision in Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000. The relationship between 
Article 1 Protocol 7 and Article 13 ECHR becomes especially interesting when the national states 
attempts to evade its obligations in the former provision on the grounds of national security as national 
security concerns should not lead to a state disregarding its obligations under Article 13. See A I Nashif v. 
Bulgaria, 20 June 2002, §136-138. Nonetheless, the scope of Article 13 ECHR depends on the rights and 
interests involved. ECtHR. Aksov v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §98.
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may be limited by rights and freedoms other than the mere concept of freedom of 
movement will be addressed in the two following Sections.
5.3.2. Refugee law and the prohibition of non-refoulement
When discussing international legal limits on the sovereign right to exclude, in 
the minds o f many, refugee law provides the most obvious instances of just such limits. 
However, it is important to be aware o f the fact that international refugee law does far 
more than that: it is an extensive body of international law, dealing with subjects 
ranging from the treatment of refugees on entry (such as detention) to diverse rights o f 
refugees who have permanently settled in their country of refuge, such as pertaining to 
housing, employment and education.
In this Chapter, I will only investigate the way in which international refugee 
law restrains the sovereign right to exclude. Factually, this restraint is not premised on 
the right of asylum, which is nothing more than a right of a territorial state to grant 
asylum to an alien,612 and which, on the international plane, implicates solely interstate 
relations. A provision such as Article 14 UDHR, declaring that everybody has the right 
to seek and enjoy asylum, is in fact merely an affirmation of the right to leave.613 
Although many domestic legal systems have legislation containing a right to asylum, 
national states have strongly resisted codification of such a right in international law.
An exception is provided by HU Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons 
as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content o f 
the protection granted 614 A person who according to this Directive qualifies for refugee 
status should be afforded a residence permit that is valid for at least three years and 
renewable unless reasons of national security or public order so require615 Moreover,
612 Lillich (1984a). p. 150; Plender (1988), p. 394; and Oda (1968), p. 490
613 Grahl-Madsen (1980). pp. 4-5.
634 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004.0.J. L 304, 30/09/2004, pp. 12-23. to be implemented 
by the Member States by 10 October 2006.
6,5 Article 24(1).
the EU Charter on fundamental rights appears to recognise an individual right to  
asylum 616
We will see that the way in which general human rights law constrains the
national state with regard to its decisions on exclusion is in many instances far more 
significant than international refugee law’s guarantees in this respect. The relationship 
between the two areas o f law is complex and at times confusing. Many o f their 
differences arc explained by the early twentieth century origins of modem refugee law 
and the fact that it has retained many classical international law characteristics, whereas 
human rights law is of a more recent date, and explicitly attempts to break away from 
traditional views on international law. In this Section, I will first deal with the way in 
which international refugee law may limit national exclusionary powers. Subsequently, 
I will investigate how human rights law has widened the scope of the cornerstone o f 
international refugee law: the principle of non-refoulement.
In Section 5.2., I have traced the development of an international regime 
concerned with the legal protection o f refugees. Refugee law was a response to the 
international legal dilemma caused by the denial of state protection for various groups 
in Europe during the early twenty century.617 In essence, the rationale for refugee law 
has remained the same: refugees become an issue of international law because they 
cannot invoke the protection of their country o f nationality,618 despite the fact that at 
present, the country of nationality is no longer the only entity capable of defending an 
individual’s interests on the international plane.
This view on the underlying principles o f refugee law is affirmed by the way in 
which the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees as amended by the 
Protocol o f 1967 (hereinafter the 1951 Convention) defines the refugee as someone 
who, owing to  a well-founded fear o f persecution, is outside his own country and is 
unable or unwilling to avail him self of the protection o f that country.619 Council
616 Article 18 o f the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
617 Hathaway (1991). p. 2.
618 Plendcr (1988), p. 393. See Nathwani (2003) who proposes of different (normative) rationale for 
refugee law.
619 Article 1 Refugee Convention: For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall 
apply to any person w ho: (2) owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country' of 
nationality', and is unable or. ow ing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
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Directive 2004/83/EC applies a similar definition of the refugee. There is ample legal 
scholarship concerning almost every single word constituting the core of the refugee 
definition 620 It goes far beyond this study to discuss this scholarship in depth, but some 
brief remarks concerning the interrelated issues of fear o f persecution and lack of 
protection are necessary in order to fully appreciate refugee law’s constraints on 
national exclusionary powers.
In the first place, only EC law has explicitly defined the concept of persecution, 
but also in general international law its relationship with human rights law is fairly 
obvious: just as in Directive 2004/83/EC, persecution can be said to consist of severe 
human rights abuses621 It is important to note that a well-founded fear of persecution is 
only relevant for the purposes o f the Convention (and similarly for those o f Directive 
2004/83/EC), if persecution occurs or would occur on the enumerated grounds of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
Especially the application and interpretation by national judiciaries of the ‘membership 
o f a particular social group’ ground has been “pushing the boundaries of refugee law”, 
as it is a plausible vehicle for claims to refugee status which do not fall under the other 
grounds set out in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention.
In the second place, the lack o f protection referred to in the refugee definition 
has been interpreted in various ways. Does it refer to the protection which the national 
state can offer within its territory, and thus impose an additional condition be satisfied 
in order to conclude that a risk of persecution exits, namely “scrutiny of the state’s 
ability and willingness to effectively respond to that risk”?623 Or, should the lack of 
protection be understood as a lack of external protection, thus denoting the diplomatic 
protection that the refugee, once he is outside his country of origin, cannot avail himself 
of, for fear o f a possibility of being returned to the countiy where the feared persecution 
could occur? The latter interpretation is certainly supported by a textual interpretation of
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of his country of his former habitual residence 
is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.
620 Steinbock (1999). p. 14; and Tiiik and Nicholson (2003). p. 38.
621 See Article 9 of the Directive; and UNHCR (2001). par. 17.
6"  Aleinikoff (2003). p. 264. See also Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2004)9 of the 
Committee of Ministers on the concept of membership of a social group in the context of the 1951 
Convention relating to the status of refugees (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30 June 2004).
623 Hathaway (1991), p. 135.
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Anicle 1 of the 1951 Convention and makes more sense from a general international 
law perspective.624 Irrespective o f the answers to these questions, both interpretations 
reveal the central place that the national state occupies in determining who is regarded 
as a refugee in international law. Precisely instances of persecution by non-state agents 
make clear that the question of persecution cannot be regarded separately from the issue 
o f lack of national protection. Some countries have consistently refused the application 
of the 1951 Convention to persons fleeing human rights violations committed by non­
state actors, although that situation seems to be changing.
In particular EU Member States will no longer be able to maintain such a 
distinction between persecution by non-state actors and persecution by the state, seeing 
that Directive 2004/83/EC explicitly enumerates non-state actors as possible actors of 
persecution 625 Lastly, with regard to the question as to who is regarded as a refugee, 
Article IF o f the 1951 Convention is o f importance, as this provision excludes from 
refugee status persons who have committed crimes o f great severity, such as war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or non-political acts o f cruelty. Council Directive 
2004/83/EC provides for exclusion on similar grounds.626
As already mentioned above, general international law does not contain a right 
to asylum, not even when an individual fulfils the 1951 Convention definition o f a 
refugee. There are only three provisions in the 1951 Convention that have a direct 
bearing on the exclusionary powers o f the national state in the case of refugees. Article 
32 prohibits expulsion of refugees who reside lawfully in national territory, save on 
grounds of national security or public order. Procedural guarantees comparable to those 
contained in Article 13 ICCPR are given if  expulsion should be ordered on these 
grounds, in which case the refugee shall be allowed a reasonable period during which to 
seek legal admission into another country. Article 31 stipulates that states may not 
impose penalties on refugees on account of unauthorised entry or presence in their 
territories. The latter obligation is qualified by two conditions: the refugees should have 
come directly from territories were they feared persecution, and they should present 
themselves to the authorities without delay. But by far the most important provision in
624 See Türk and Nicholson (2003). p. 40. and the sources quoted there.
625 Article 6 Council Directive 2004/83/EC.
626 Article 12.
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this respect is Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, containing the norm of non- 
refoulement:
Article 33 (1): No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.6“7
The second paragraph o f Article 33 allows for two exceptions to the principle of 
non-refoulement: i f  an alien presents a danger to national security or, having been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community o f the 
state of refuge. Identical grounds for derogation are laid down in Article 21 (2) o f 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC. Non-refoulement embodies the “humanitarian essence” 
of refugee law,628 and its significance exceeds the area covered by the 1951 Convention. 
Before turning to the principle of non-refoulement in general human rights law, I will 
make some brief remarks concerning its role in the narrow context of the 1951 
Convention.
In the first place, it is important to understand the way in which non-refoulement 
relates to the lack of a right to asylum in international law. The only way to reconcile 
these two seemingly conflicting issues is by presuming that i f  a country is not prepared 
to grant asylum to a refugee, it must act in accordance with non-refoulement, as in the 
cases of temporary protection or removal to a safe third country.629
A second question is whether refoulement is only prohibited concerning those 
refugees who are already inside the state’s territory, or whether the principle also 
applies to non-admittance at the border. A consistent interpretation o f the 1951 
Convention combined with various Conclusions of the Executive Committee of the 
United Nations High Commissioner o f Refugees (hereinafter ExCom) and other key 
instruments in the field of refugee protection support the view that non-refoulement also
6:7 According to Article 42 of the 1951 Convention, no reservations are permitted with regard to the non­
refoulement provision. The prohibition of non-refouleincnt of refugees is codified in several other 
instruments, for example Article 3 of the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum (UNGA 14 December 
1967).
628 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003). p. 107.
629 Ibid. p. 113. On temporary protection measures, see Council of Europe. Committee of Ministers. 
Recommendation No. R (2000)9 on temporary protection, adopted on 3 May 2000.
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applies to rejection at the border.630 However, an increasing number o f states are trying 
to escape their obligations with regard to non-refoulement by physically separating 
control of the border from the territorial border, as is shown by what Bigo and Guild 
call “police à  distance” :631 practices such as visa policies and aiiport carrier sanctions. 
Indeed, the way in which the principle of non-refoulement increasingly gives way to 
“policies o f non-entrée”632 is painfully illustrated by incidents such as Australia’s 
refusal to let the MV Tampa enter its territorial waters and U.S. detention o f Haitian 
asylum seekers on Guantanamo. W hether or not such policies are violating international 
law is not the interesting question p er se. What is much more fundamental is to find out 
how states make use of what they perceive as possible gaps in the law and the way in 
which these gaps are connected with the territorial component of sovereignty. These 
issues will receive closer attention in Section 5.6.3.
In the third place, the prohibition on refoulement applies irrespective o f the fact 
whether a person is formally recognised as a refugee or not.633 Thus, non-refoulement is 
an autonomous concept in international law, truly limiting the exclusionary powers o f 
the state, seeing that there is no reference to domestic law whatsoever contained in it. 
However, there is an important qualification to the limiting powers of non-refoulement 
in the 1951 Convention: if  a refugee constitutes a danger to the community or security 
of the country in which he is present, refoulement is permitted 634 Thus, however 
narrowly these grounds for derogation are to be interpreted,635 the core provision o f the
6301967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum (UNGA 14 December 1967); UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 
6 (XXVIII) 1977, par. (c); UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) 1979, at par. (b); and UNGA 
Resolution A/Rcs/55/74 of 12 February 2001.
631 Bigo and Guild (2003).
632 Hathaway (1992)
633 See Article 21 Council Directive 2004/83/EC; and Council o f Europe, Committee o f Ministers, 
Recommendation No. R (84)1 on the protection of persons satisfying the criteria in the Geneva 
Convention who are not formally recognised as refugees (adopted on 25 January 1984.) The according of 
refugee status is a declaratory act; thus unless otlterwise specified, refugees not formally recognised 
should benefit from the international legal protection offered by the 1951 Convention See inter alia 
UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII) 1977; and UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 79 (XLVII) 
1996. Council Directive 2004/83/EC is explicit on this in the Preamble (at 14).
634 Goodwin-Gill (1996a), p. 139.
635 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003), pp. 133-140.
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1951 Convention preserves some remnants of the state’s sovereignty in matters of 
exclusion.
It has been maintained that the norm of non-refoulement is a peremptory norm 
of international law. Some authors have countered such an assumption with the 
argument that it is difficult to see how the ius cogens nature o f the norm as contained in 
the 1951 Convention can be reconciled with the fact that it simultaneously provides 
grounds for derogation 637 However, contemporary human rights law has added 
momentum to the norm of non-refoulement so as to make a good case for its 
peremptory, or at least customary, character.638 Article 3 of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment (CAT) prohibits 
refoulement where there are substantial reasons for believing that a person would be 
subjected to torture 639 Furthermore, the customary prohibition against torture in effect 
amounts to an obligation on national states not to expel a person to a country where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he would face a real risk of 
being exposed to torture640 The HRC and the ECtHR have respectively construed 
Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 ECHR as containing a principle o f non-refoulement to a 
state where a real risk exists of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment641
Deducting a norm of non-refoulement from the prohibition contained in Article 
3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR does not entail extra-territorial application of human 
rights obligations. The real risk to violation of an individual’s rights is the result o f a 
decision made in the territory o f the Contracting State, with regard to a person within
636 Allain (2001), pp. 538-541. See also UNHCR ExCom Conclusions No. 25 (XXXIII) 1982 and No. 79 
(XL VII) 1996.
637 Hannikainen (1988), pp. 261-63.
638 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (2003), pp. 140-164.
639 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, Adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 39/46 on 10 December 1984 (CAT). The majority o f complaints under the CAT 
relate to Article 3. See among many CAT Committee decisions: A. R. v. The Netherlands. 14 December 
2003; Tala v. Sweden. 15 November 1996; and Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996. See also CAT Committee 
General Comment No. 1. See CAT (1997).
640 Bethlehem and Lauterpacht (2003), p. 140-162.
641 HRC, General Comment 20 (Forty-fourth session, 1992) at 151; HRC, C. v. Australia, 13 November 
2002; ECtHR, Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, §91; Cruz Varaz and Others v. Sweden. 20 
March 1991, §§69-70; and Vilvarajah and Others v. The United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, §103.
that territory.642 However, it cannot be denied that significant extraterritorial aspects are 
involved in cases such as these, which was affirmed by the ECtHR in the cases o f  
Loizidou and Bankovic 643
An important question is whether other rights than the right to be free from 
torture and other degrading treatment can be covered by the “real risk” situation. 
According to  the HRC, a real risk o f a violation can occur with regard to any of the 
rights guaranteed under the Covenant,644 although in practice only the right to life in 
Article 6 ICCPR has featured alongside Article 7 in refoulement cases645 The ECtHR 
allows for the possibility o f other human rights violations as a result of expulsion, such 
as denial o f the right to life and liberty or, exceptionally, the right to a fair trial.646 
However, it is difficult to see why a real risk o f  violations o f other, derogable, human 
rights such as the freedom of religion or speech could not lead to a prohibition on 
expulsion or deportation in principle, in spite o f obvious practical difficulties with 
regard to the assessment o f the human rights situation in the country of return 647 Hence, 
it can be concluded that the international case law on refoulement, rather than being led 
by a consistent interpretation of the relevant human rights treaties, is inspired by the 
1951 Convention, which prohibits refoulement solely to  territories where a refugee’s 
life or freedom would be threatened.
642 See ECtHR in Bankovic and Others v. Belgium  (inadmissible), 12 December 2001, §68; and Al-Adsani 
v. The United Kingdom , 21 November 2001, §39. This is also the line of argument used by the HRC 
although the construction is slightly different: “The foreseeability' o f the consequence [of refoulement] 
would mean that there is a present violation by the State Party .” Kindler v. Canada. Decision of 11 
November 1993, at 6.2.
643 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, §62; and Bankovic and Others v. 
Belgium (inadmissible), 12 December 2001. §68.
644 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, Decision of 11 November 1993, at 13.2.
645 HRC, Judge v. Canada, Decision of 17 July 2002, with regard to a breach of Article 6 ICCPR as a 
result o f extradition. In this case the applicant also claimed a breach of Article 14 ICCPR as a result of his 
extradition. Just as in Kindler v. Canada, the Committee’s reasoning seems to imply that it declares itself 
competent to consider arguments concerning a possible violation in a third country under this provision. 
Similarly, in G.T. v. Australia, Decision of 4 November 1997, the applicant claimed a foreseeable breach 
of Article 14 ICCPR as a result of deportation. This claim was not examined on its merits.
646 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium  (inadmissible), 12 December 2001, §68. See also EcommHR 
decisions: Aylor Davis v. France, Decision o f 20 January 1994, p. 164; Alia Raid! v. Austria, Decision of 
4 September 1995.
647 See Blake (2004), p. 437.
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If non-refoulement is applied as a component part of general human rights 
obligations of the national state, it affords a far wider scope of protection than Article 33 
of the 1951 Convention.648 The latter instrument protects from refoulement solely 
persons whom it defines as refugees, which protection is in addition subject to public 
order and security exceptions. The prohibition on torture or other cruel and degrading 
treatment, in contrast, should be guaranteed to anyone without exception. Indeed, if the 
norm of non-refoulement flows from this prohibition, “the activities of the individual in 
question, no matter how undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material 
consideration” 649
In addition, the state-centred, territorial focus, apparent in traditional refugee 
law, by which different states are accorded responsibility for separate populations, is 
much diminished. Whereas we see that such an approach to human rights is still held by 
the CAT Committee (inevitable in view of the definition of torture in Article 1 CAT),650 
the ECtHR and HRC have both held that treatment does not have to emanate from state 
agents in order to be contrary to the absolute protection offered by Article 3 ECHR and 
Article 7 ICCPR.651
Furthermore, it need not even amount to a breach o f classical human rights 
obligations proper, nor needs the source of the risk o f the proscribed treatment in the 
receiving country to engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public 
authorities of that country, or taken alone to infringe the standards o f Article 3.652 In the
548 See also UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 103 (LVI) 2005; and UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 74 
(XLV) 1994. at parl-o.
649 ECtHR. N. v. Finland. 26 July 2005, §§159, 166. See also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 
Recommendation (2005) 6 of the on exclusion o f refugee status (adopted on 23 March 2005) in which it 
is emphasised tliat exclusion from refugee status on grounds such as provided for in Article IF of the 
1951 Convention is not the same as removal.
650 G.R.B. v. Sweden. 15 May 1998: at 6.5.: “The Committee considers that the issue whether the State 
Party has an obligation to refrain from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering inflicted by a 
non-governmental entity, without the consent or acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope 
o f Article 3 of the Convention.” See also CLVA7. and H.N. v. Sweden, 15 May 2000, at 13.8; S.V. v. 
Canada 15 May 2001, at 9.5 andAf.P.S. v. Australia. 30 April 2002. at 7.4.
651 ECtHR. 1I.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997.
652 ECtHR. D. v. The United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, §49, in which the ECtHR held that the deportation of 
an  individual suffering from the final stages o f AIDS to a country where lie would not receive adequate 
medical treatment w ould amount to a breach o f Article 3 ECHR. See also ECtHR, 77. v. The United 
Kingdom  (inadmissible). 7 March 2000.
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words of the Court in Strasbourg: the absolute character o f Article 3 ECHR requires 
flexibility653
If refoulement is forbidden by international law, states can still resort to removal 
to a third country, provided that such removal would not amount to indirect 
refoulement. In this context, the application o f Article 3 ECHR also blocks the 
automatic allocating of responsibility for safeguarding the rights o f asylum seekers by 
the Dublin Convention: the receiving country is obliged to examine if  the responsible 
country offers enough safeguards against refoulement.654 In the case that national states 
allow an individual to stay on national territory, they usually grant so-called subsidiary 
protection, the content o f which is generally to be decided by each national state. 
Security o f residence for persons enjoying subsidiary protection is recommended by the 
Council of Europe 655
Council Directive 2004/83/EC requires states to issue a residence permit to 
persons qualifying for subsidiary protection, which should be valid for at least a year 
and renewable unless compelling reasons of national security o f public order otherwise 
require, as long as the circumstances which have led to the affording of subsidiary 
protection continue to ex ist656 It should be noted that although Directive 2004/83/EC 
allows Member States to exclude persons from subsidiary protection (on grounds 
comparable to those leading to exclusion of refugee status), they cannot act in 
contravention of their international obligations with regard to the principle of non­
refoulement.657
The principle of non-refoulement thus significantly limits states’ sovereign 
discretion in immigration decisions.658 Apart from restraining national states’ 
substantial powers of exclusion, does international law also put formal constraints on 
national decisions concerning issues o f refoulement? The answer to this question is 
important in order to assess the way in which national sovereignty, individual rights and
653 D, v. The United Kingdom, 2 May 1997.
654 T.Ï. v. The United Kingdom (inadmissible), 7 March 2000. See Steendijk (2001), p. 187.
655 Council o f Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No R (2001)18 on subsidiary 
protection, adopted on 27 November 2001, par. 14.
656 Article 24 (2) (residence permits) and Article 16 (Cessation).
657 Article 21.
658 Goodwin-Gill (1996b), p. 99.
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the rule of law relate in the field of immigration, having regard to the traditionally wide 
executive discretion in this particular area.
Non-refoulement decisions affect fundamental individual rights, arguably more 
so than for example a decision on the extension of a student visa. This state of affairs is 
reflected in state practice: most national states provide for a the possibility for appeal in 
asylum procedures, which possibility is often presented as an exceptional derivation 
from the ordinary rule decreeing that decisions relating to immigration fall within the 
royal prerogative or other national expressions of discretionary executive powers. 
However, the 1951 Convention leaves it to the state parties alone to shape the way in 
which decisions with regard to its Article 33 are given.639 This is unfortunate as in most 
domestic systems a trend can be discerned by which checks or balances on executive 
decision making with regard to immigration, also in the field of asylum, are increasingly 
under attack.660 Presently, the only international provisions that can be invoked in order 
to rely on rule of law guarantees with regard to decisions on admissibility or deportation 
are of a general character.
We have seen above that Article 13 ECHR and Article 2(3) ICCPR give 
individuals the right to an effective remedy if  one of their rights as guaranteed under the 
respective instruments is violated661 Drawing on case law of the ECtHR,662 the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation on the 
application of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 with regard to entry and removal 
o f aliens663 An effective remedy should be guaranteed when somebody seeking 
admission or leave to stay is to be expelled to a country about which that person 
presents an arguable claim that he or she would be subject to torture or other inhuman
659 Although it implies access to fair and effective procedures for determining protection needs. See 
UNHCR ExCoin Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII) 1997, under d(ii) and UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No.
103 (LVI) 2005, under (r).
660 A good example is the attempt by the government of the United Kingdom to restrict formal challenges 
to asylum decisions in a far-reaching ouster clause in the government bill that would eventually become 
the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004. The plan was met with fierce opposition, which raised several 
interesting constitutional issues, and was subsequently dropped by the government. See Rawlings (2005).
661 See also HRC, General Comment 31 (2004).
66“ Inter alia ECtHR, Soering v. The United Kingdom, 7 July 1989; and 1 'iivarajah and Others v. The 
United Kingdom, 30 October 1991.
663 Recommendation No. R (98) 13, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
18 September 1998.
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treatment. A remedy is effective if  it is carried out by a judicial authority, or, if  it is an 
administrative authority, it should be impartial and independent, as well as have 
competence to  decide. Furthermore, the execution of the deportation order should be 
suspended until the decision is taken, also in the case that a claim was dismissed as 
manifestly unfound. However, national states may find in the arguable claim 
requirement o f Article 13 ECHR opportunities to evade their obligations with regard to 
persons seeking entry or leave to stay: if  in their interpretation a claim is not arguable 
because the country of destination in the expulsion order is designed as a safe third 
country, the recommendation of the Committee o f Ministers does not apply, unless the 
claim concerns substantial grounds to prove that the asylum seeker will be 
persecuted.664
EC legislation will contribute to a strengthening of rule of law elements 
internationally in asylum procedures. Council Directive 2005/85/EC, to be implemented 
by the Member States by l December 2007, sets minimum standards on national 
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status 663 Chapter V of the Directive 
requires Member States to ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an 
effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a decision on their application666 
These rights o f appeal concern only requests for international protection under the 
Geneva Convention;667 requests for subsidiary protection fall outside their scope.
In this Section I have set out the basic legal framework concerning exceptions to 
the exclusionary powers o f the sovereign state based on refugee law or related human 
rights grounds. And while states are careful to sustain formal compliance with these 
fields of international law, meanwhile they also attempt to reduce the number of 
recorded asylum seekers 668 Contemporary practice demonstrates that Western states are 
apt at minimising the scope of the limits on their exclusionary powers by the use of 
concepts as safe third country, safe countiy o f origin and manifestly unfounded claims. 
In addition, states endeavour to evade human rights obligations to individuals who are
664 See the Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (98) 13, par 13.
665 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. O.J. L 326,13 December 2005, pp. 13-34.
666 Also in the case that an application is not examined (Art. 36) or declared inadmissible (Art 25(2)) on 
the grounds of tlie safe third country concept. See article 39 o f Directive 2005/85/EC.
667 Article 2(b) jo. Article 39 Directive 2005/85/EC.
668 Martin (1989), p. 574.
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not authorised to enter or stay on national territory by making it very difficult for them 
to reach their national territories. Interception of asylum seekers at the high seas, the use 
of airport liaison officers, carrier sanctions and visa regulations serve to make sure that 
states can control movement without having to assume responsibility for the people that 
move. The way in which national states increasingly make use of concepts and 
techniques that allow them to (re)assert their exclusionary powers are perhaps best 
illustrated in regionally specific frameworks for dealing with asylum applications or 
other claims for international protection, such as that of the European Union. In Section 
5.4.2., I will come back the way in which the EU Member States have to a certain extent 
harmonised and even exported their views on the issue of national sovereignty with 
regard to immigration.
5.3.3. Family rights and limits on immigration control
The family rights of non-nationals constitute another area in which fundamental 
rights may limit the state’s exclusionary powers. This Section will address the way in 
which a right to remain or enter is construed against the background of family rights in 
international law. The main emphasis will be on the way in which states’ immigration 
policies are constrained by Article 8 ECHR, but European case law regarding the 
application of this provision in immigration decision-making will be placed in a larger 
perspective by occasionally referring to the ICCPR and decisions made by the HRC.
In the ECHR, Article 8 stipulates that everyone has the right to respect for his 
family and private life. Paragraph 2 o f  this article follows the familiar formula for 
derogable rights under the ECHR: interferences with family or private life should be “in 
accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being o f the country, for the 
prevention o f disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection o f the rights and freedoms o f  others.” In the ICCPR, the family is protected 
by two separate provisions. Article 17 deals with the family and private life of the 
individual and establishes a prohibition on interference. According to article 23(1), the 
family is to be protected by the law.669 Although there seems to be a difference between
669 HRC, General Comment 19 (Thirty-ninth session, 1990) at 149.
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the two provisions, generally decisions on violations have involved the two articles 
simultaneously.670
If as a result of immigration decision making a breach of Article 8 ECHR is 
alleged, the Court in Strasbourg will first establish the existence o f family life. The 
Court -  and similarly the HRC in applying Article 23 ICCPR -  regards this question as 
one o f fact, depending on the existence of close personal ties.671 A person who has no 
family life can nonetheless benefit from the protection o f  Article 8 ECHR on account of 
his private life, including links connected to educational or professional activities.672 If 
the existence of family life is ascertained, the removal o f  a person from a state where 
close members o f his family are resident may amount to  an infringement of the right to 
respect for family life as guaranteed in Article 8(1) ECHR 673
In this context, the Court in Strasbourg always reiterates that fact that “no right 
of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country is as such guaranteed by the 
Convention,” and that “as a matter o f well-established international law and subject to 
its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its 
territory.”674 However, i f  such control leads to interference with the right protected 
under Article 8 ECHR, it needs to be in accordance with the requirements under the 
second paragraph o f this provision. It will not be difficult for the state to argue that the 
contested measures fall under one o f the legitimate aims o f Article 8(2) ECHR, but it is 
the necessity of the deportation that will generally be the main point of contestation675
670 Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2004), p. 591.
671 Family life exists ipso iure between a child bom of a marital union and lus parents, which bond can 
only be broken by exceptional circumstances. See ECtHR Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 21 June 1988. 
§21; Hokkanen v. Finland, 23 September 1994, §54; Gill v. Switzerland, 19 February 1996, §32, and 
Ciliz v. the Netherlands, 11 July 2000, §§59 and 60. Regarding relations of couples, both marriages as de 
facto  relationships can constitute family life, depending on a number of factors, such as “whether the 
couple live together, the length of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their 
commitment to each other by having children together or by any other means.” Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20 
June 2002, §112. See also ECtHR in Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1994, §30; and A', 
1’ and  Z  v. the United Kingdom, 22 April 1997, §36. For the HRC see: Balaguer Santacana v. Spain, 15 
July 1994.
6,: ECtHR. C. v Belgium, 7 August 1996, p. 915, §25.
6 3 ECtHR, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002, § 114.
674 Boultif v. Switzerland' 2 August 2001, §39
675 Rarely lias it been asserted iliac the measures w'ere not “in accordance with the law”. See Sherlock
(1998), p. 64.
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With regard to the right to enter, the balancing act is a little more 
straightforward; while the main aim o f Article 8 ECHR is to protect against arbitrary 
interference, the refusal on a request for entry may constitute a breach of a positive 
obligation inherent in an effective respect for family life.676 However, in this case a 
wide margin of appreciation is left to the national authorities 677 In particular, the duty 
imposed by Article 8 ECHR cannot be considered as extending a general obligation on 
the part of a contracting state to respect the choice made by married couples of the 
country of their residence and to accept non-national spouses for settlement there, or 
otherwise authorise family reunion in its territory 678 The test applied by the Court is 
whether it can reasonably be expected from the persons concerned to establish family 
life in their own or their families’ home countries. This test is to be more stringently 
applied when it concerns requests for family formation than in the case of family re­
unification 679 Similarly, the HRC does not deduce from Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR a 
guarantee for establishing family life in a particular country, but the test to be applied is 
simply whether there can be effective family life, wherever that may be.
As always when assessing whether encroachments by the state on individual 
liberties constitute violations of fundamental rights, the court engages in a balancing act 
by which the interests of the applicant in maintaining family life are balanced with those 
o f the sovereign state in controlling entry and residence. However, in the case law of the 
HRC and the ECtHR, it appears that when the right to enter or remain is at stake, rather 
more emphasis is traditionally laid on the powers that are implied by national 
sovereignty than in cases where mere jurisdiction over nationals is involved. Indeed, the 
case law seems to imply that the right to control entry and residence on national 
territory as inherent in territorial sovereignty is in itself a fundamental interest of the 
state, from which only special circumstances can cause a departure.
The Court’s silent acquiescence to territorial sovereignty’s aim o f allocating 
distinct populations to separate states, by the use of a formal concept such as 
nationality, is most clearly expressed in those cases in which it dealt with deportation o f 
second generation immigrants after conviction for serious criminal offences. While it
676 Forder (2005). p. 72-73.
677 ECtHR, Gul v. Sw itzerland\ 19 February 1996, §38. See also Blake (2004). p. 442.
678 ECtHR Abdulaziz. Cabales and Balkandali v. The United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, §68; and ECtHR 
G ulv. Switzerland. 19 February 1996, §38.
6,9 ECtHR. Sen v. The Netherlands, 21 December 2001, §96.
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has regularly concluded that the states actions interfering with a person’s existing 
residence may in such cases may constitute a violation of Article 8,680 it has in a  
significant amount of cases condoned the expulsion o f a person from a country which 
he could call his own in every sense except for the fact that he did not possess its  
nationality.681
It can be argued that in these cases, the requirement of proportionality, entailing 
that no interference with fundamental rights is justified if there are less intrusive 
measures available, has not really been applied by the Court, as national states have also 
found adequate ways to deal with national criminals682 The HRC in such cases shows 
even more deference to national sovereignty: if  the decision to deport takes into account 
the effect of the deportation on the deportee’s family life and if there are no evident 
flaws in the domestic proceedings, deportation is permissible under the ICCPR 683
On the other hand, the early decision by the European Court in Berrehab also 
shows that the reasons for deportation, i f  the latter constitute a serious interference with 
someone’s family life, need to go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration laws. 
In D alia, the Court attached importance to the fact that the applicant’s Algerian 
nationality was not a mere legal fact, but a reflection o f certain social and emotional 
links 684 Furthermore, a departure from the Court’s deferential stance with regard to 
territorial sovereignty may also be signalled by its more recent judgments. In Sen, a case 
concerning family re-uniflcation, the issue to be decided, according to the Court, was 
not whether the Netherlands was the only country in which the applicants could 
establish family life, but rather what was the most suitable way for the family members
681'* ECtHR: Moustaquim  v. Belgium , 18 February 1991; Nasri v. France. 13 July 1995, Boultif v. 
Switzerland, 2 August 2001; and Afehemi v. France, 26 September 1997.
681 ECtHR, C. \>. Belgium, 7 August 1996; Baghli v. France, 13 November 1999; Bouchelkia v. France, 
29 January 1997. See also the judgments in E l Boujaidi v. France, 26 September 1997; Boughanemi v. 
France, 24 April 1996; and Boujlifa v. France, 21 October 1997, in which cases the Court considered as a 
factor of importance that the applicants had never shown any desire to acquire French nationality, even 
when they were entitled to do so. Moreover, Dembour (2003, p. 67) mentions that the cases of dozens of 
applicants arguing that deportation would violate the right to family life have been declared inadmissible 
by the EcommHR. See also Recommendation 1504 (2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly o f the Council 
of Europe on non-expulsion of long-term residents (adopted on 14 March 2001).
682 Dembour (2003), p. 67.
683 HRC, Stewart v. Canada, Decision of 1 November 1996.
ECtHR, Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998.
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to continue their family life together. 685 In the recent case o f Sezen, removal of the 
applicant, even if on the grounds of a serious crime, would constitute a violation o f 
Article 8, partly because to ask of Mr. Semen’s family members to follow him to his 
country of origin in order to continue family life would constitute a radical upheaval for 
them 686
Nevertheless, the importance which the Court ascribes to the exclusionary 
powers of the national state is evident by the way in which the Court deals with family 
life that is established while an applicant was unlawfully present within the territory. 
The Court regards the obligation flowing from Article 8 EC HR as positive in the case 
that an applicant enjoys family life without being entitled to legal residence,687 and 
family life that is established during such unlawful presence will only be protected in 
“the most exceptional circumstances”.688 Although the HRC seems to attach less 
importance to the fact whether family life is established during lawful or unlawful 
residence, its adherence to the territorial sovereignty of the state is proven by its 
statement that only extraordinary circumstances may require a State to demonstrate 
factors justifying the removal o f persons within its jurisdiction that go beyond a simple 
enforcement o f its immigration policies 689
Furthermore, it should be observed that EU Member States’ decisions regarding 
family re-unification have to be in accordance with the EC Directive on family 
reunification.690 At fist sight, the directive seems to afford rather little scope for the 
assertion of territorial sovereignty with the sole aim o f governing populations as the 
entry of children and spouses o f lawfully residing third country nationals can only be 
refused on the grounds of public order, internal security or public health. Nonetheless, 
national states are afforded some discretion to make the right conditional, inter alia, 
upon integration requirements691 In addition, not all third country nationals are covered
685 Forder (2005), p. 87.
686 ECtHR, Sezen v. The Netherlands, 31 January 2006. See also Me hem i v. France, 26 September 1997, 
§36.
687 ECtHR, Ahmut v. Netherlands, 28 November 1996, §63.
688 ECtHR. Mitchell v. The United Kingdom (inadmissible). 24 November 1998.
689 HRC. Sahid v. New Zealand, 28 March 2003 at 8.2. See for the HRC acknowledging such 
extraordinary circumstances: IVinata v. Australia, 26 July 2001.
69u Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification. OJ L251, 3 
October 2003.
691 See Schneider and Wicsbrock (2005).
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by the EC rules, as they do not fully include former spouses after divorce, unmarried 
partners, and the economically less advantaged 692
The /I/-Atas/w/judgment made clear that formal rule of law guarantees are also 
contained in the second paragraph o f Article 8 ECHR.693 In this case, the ECtHR held 
that there must be procedural safeguards to ensure that the discretion that is left to the 
executive is exercised in accordance with the law. If the deportation is ordered pursuant 
to a regime that does not provide the necessary safeguards against arbitrariness, there 
will be a breach of Article 8(2) ECHR. Even when national security is at stake, the 
concept o f the rule of law requires that measures affecting the fundamental rights o f 
individuals must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an 
independent body.
The circumstance that there was no possibility for appeal to an independent 
authority on the decision to deport Mr. Al-Nashif, a measure that interfered with his 
right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR, amounted to a breach o f the 
second paragraph of that provision.694 The fact that these issues were subject o f 
considerable constitutional contention in Bulgaria was a matter o f importance to the 
Court in Strasbourg 695 The way in which it interpreted in this case the requirements o f 
Article 8(2) ECHR approach the fair trial guarantees o f Article 6 ECHR. They have the 
effect of annulling the effect o f the exclusion of this latter provision on immigration 
decision-making whenever there are family rights involved in a decision to deport an 
individual.
In addition, pursuant to Article 13 ECHR, a domestic remedy, which is 
effective, should be available if there is an arguable complaint that family rights are 
violated as a result o f immigration decision making. Again, national security 
considerations cannot justify the absence o f such a remedy, although they may be a 
reason for certain limitations on the type of remedies available. However, in the case of 
expulsion o f  an alien on the grounds o f national security, the Court observed in Al- 
N ashif that reconciling the interests o f preserving sensitive information is less difficult 
than in a case in which systems o f secret surveillance or secret checks could only
692 Peers (2005). p. 4.
693 ECtHR, Al-N ashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002.
694 Ibid. §§122-128.
695 Ibid. §127.
function if the individual remained unaware of the measures affecting him 696 
Procedural safeguards may be necessary as to avoid leakage o f sensitive information, 
and the reviewing authority may have to afford the executive a wide margin o f 
appreciation, but there could be no justification for doing away with remedies altogether 
whenever the executive has chosen to invoke “national security” .
The decision in Al-Nashif on procedural safeguards in the context of both Article 
8(2) and Article 13 ECHR contrasts sharply with the requirements under Article 1 
Protocol 7 ECHR as discussed in Section 5,3.1. We saw that according to Article 1 
Protocol 7 ECHR, a legal resident can invoke his procedural rights -  rights that are 
significantly more limited in scope than those formulated in Al-N ashif -  only after 
expulsion whenever the national state chooses to invoke reasons o f national security to 
justify such expulsion. Again, it appears that the right to remain acquires considerably 
more importance whenever there are other fundamental rights involved in the decision 
to deport.
In this Section, I have addressed how international norms constrain state action 
in the area o f migration control. One of the conclusions to be drawn is that one should 
definitely not overstate the importance o f these norms on the state’s territorial 
sovereignty. First, because nearly all of them, with the exception o f the norm contained 
in Article 3 ECHR, operate from a bias which is decidedly territorial, an issue to which 
I will come in Section 5.6.3. But additionally, states have invented strategies to 
circumvent the application of these norms.697 In the next Section we will see that the EU 
provides good examples of just such strategies.
5.4. The European Union, national sovereignty and immigration from third
COUNTRIES
Any account on freedom of movement without treating at least in some detail 
the special legal order of the EU would be incomplete. It is in the context of the EU that 
individual rights of international movement have developed most extensively. However, 
the scope of this study does not permit me to deal with freedom o f movement rights of
696 Ibid. 20 June 2002. §137.
697 Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), p. 175.
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citizens of the Union, except for the way in which they have an impact on immigration 
policies vis-à-vis third country nationals. Below I will look at the way in which national 
states have transferred elements o f national sovereignty to the level o f the EU in the 
field o f immigration and sojourn o f third country nationals. Instead of a comprehensive 
investigation in the EU common asylum and immigration policy, aspects of which have 
already been touched upon above, th is Section deals with the way in which issues o f 
national and territorial sovereignty are exemplified by how the Union deals with 
immigration and sojourn o f third country nationals.
It is helpful to address the EU in this chapter for three reasons. First, the 
Member States’ pursuing o f supranational policies in some areas, while displaying 
reluctance to do so in other, shows how they make highly selective use of the concept of 
national sovereignty. This in turn reveals that they perceive national sovereignty still as 
decisive for unity, notwithstanding the fact that the way in which that unity is imagined 
may have changed as a result o f the European project. Second, the common asylum and 
immigration policy shows unambiguously how states endeavour to find means by which 
they can circumvent the constraints put upon them by international law. The third 
reason, related to the former two, is that the EU provides a good example o f  the 
changing connotations of the territorial border.
5.4.1. Freedom of movement within the EU
While EU citizens benefit from extensive freedom of movement rights between 
the Member States, the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement are not applicable to 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents in a Member State. It is important to 
note that other fields of EC law are much more inclusive of third-country nationals, 
such as the rules on free movement of capital or transfer o f undertakings, consumer law 
and transport policy, and rules regarding working conditions and social security 
schemes.698 The assertion o f exclusionary powers per se is no longer deemed necessary, 
nor legitimate, with regard to EU citizens, but national states wish to keep their 
discretionary powers with regard to entry and sojourn of third-country nationals in their 
own hands. According to the ECtHR, such preferential treatment of EU citizens as
698 Boelaert-Suominen (2005), p. 1014.
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compared to third country nationals does not constitute prohibited discrimination on the 
ground of nationality on account of the special legal order o f the EU.699 This is a clear 
illustration o f the way in which Member States’ perception o f national sovereignty has 
changed in keeping with the European project, but has far from been abandoned.
Council Directive 2003/109/EC on the status o f third country nationals who are 
long term residents has somewhat rectified this situation, but substantive possibilities 
for national discretion remain.700 The still vivid image o f national sovereignty as 
ultimate territorial control in order to regulate populations is affirmed by the 
(temporary) reservations that many Member States made with regard to the free 
movement rights o f the new EU citizens in Central and Eastern Europe701 Hence, 
nationality, rights and the possibility for trans-national movement remain firmly linked 
in the post-national entity of the EU.
For non-citizens of the EU, internal borders are not really disappearing: national 
sovereignty is still a factor o f crucial importance when they want to move from the 
territory of one Member State to another. This is not to say that the creation of a single 
market in which goods, persons and capital move freely has not made a real difference 
for them too, caused by the fact that the internal border is control free. But instead o f 
according them more freedom, the absence of internal border controls combined with 
Member States’ insistence on their exclusionary powers vis-à-vis third country 
nationals, has led to a situation in which, quoting Malcolm Anderson and Didier Bigo, 
“controls are still there, but now over the whole of the territory, although perhaps not 
applied to everyone, but certainly to persons categorised as dangerous and especially as 
“unwelcome migrants with dark skins.”
The European aim of creating a single market where goods, persons, services 
and capital move freely, has led to a willingness on the part o f the Member States to 
part with elements o f national sovereignty. However, this willingness has a clear limit: 
when the right to exclude those whom Member States perceive as “real” outsiders, is 
threatened, national sovereignty once again becomes the pivotal issue. Supranational 
policies of abolishment of internal borders are acceptable to the Member States only if
699 ECtHR: C. v. Belgium, 7 August 1996, §34; and Moustaquim v. Belgium, 18 February 1991, §49.
700 O.J. 2004. L 16/44. See Carrera (2005).
701 Tire Accession treaties contain provisions that make this possible in order to “phase in ’ free movement 
rights for the new EU citizens.
702 Anderson and Bigo (2002), p. 18.
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the national state is able to maintain and control its linkage of population and territory, 
if  not in a formal sense, than at least in reality. In this respect, it is significant that in the 
past the Commission has been in favour of extending free movement rights for third- 
country nationals, partly motivated with the argument that freedom of movement for 
economic activities was not as widely used by the nationals of Member States as would 
be desirable for internal market purposes.
The controversial Chen judgm ent by the ECJ provides an excellent example of 
Member States’ strategic use of the concept of national sovereignty. Legislation 
pertaining to nationality has been held firmly within their sovereign prerogatives, while 
the issue o f free movement rights for EU citizens is within the competence o f the EC. 
We have seen in Chapter 3 that EU citizenship is dependent on citizenship o f one o f the 
Member States. In this construction, individual member states retain the power to 
decide who can benefit from free movement rights, but the reverse side o f the coin is 
that they have to respect other M ember States’ decisions in this area equally. Their 
interest in preserving their prerogative over recognition of citizenship status is 
indicative o f their will to retain crucial elements o f sovereign statehood.704
However, the Chen case b f showed that such an approach to EU citizenship is 
not always in the interest o f an individual Member State wishing to preserve its ultimate 
powers to exclude. Catherine Chen was bom in Belfast, whereupon she acquired Irish 
nationality. H er Chinese mother went to England with her (without having to cross any 
international border), where she held a temporary residence permit as her husband was 
engaged in business between England and China. The ECJ decided that as an EU 
citizen, baby Chen had the right to reside in any Member State, under the usual 
conditions laid down in various directives. As her right of residence would be 
illusionary without her mother to take care o f her, her mother acquired a right of 
residence as well. The argument which was used by the UK government in the 
proceedings is revealing; the mother’s travelling to Belfast to give birth to her son and 
thus acquire residence rights in the UK would constitute an abuse o f EC law. It is 
difficult to imagine any other case in which a Member State would voluntarily ask the 
ECJ to usurp “the power o f the Member States to decide on whom they can confer
103 ECJ. Case C-200/02, Chen Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Law  tie Chen v. Secretary o f  State fo r the 
Home Department, 19 October 2004.
704 Sec Dashwood (1998), p, 203; andKveinen (2002), p. 31.
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nationality and consequently also citizenship.”705 It is equally easy to understand why 
the UK did precisely that in the Chen case: suddenly Irish nationality law in a real sense 
affected its powers to exclude with possibly far-reaching consequences.
The decision in Chen, based upon the fundamental status of EU citizenship, is to  
be distinguished from cases in which the Court decided that the exercise of Treaty rights 
by EU citizens entails effective respect for their family life.706 However, it should be 
recognised that this construction has similarly led to a situation in which the concept o f 
EU citizenship has made significant inroads in Member States’ power to exclude third- 
country nationals. However, to what extent a third-country national unlawfully present 
in the Union territory can derive rights as a family member of a Union citizen is unclear.
In Akrich, the ECJ seemed to repeal some of the principles established by its 
earlier case law by refusing the use of Community law in order to rectify the illegal 
status of a third-country national by the exercise of free movement rights of his Union 
citizen wife.707 Instead of recognising that Member States have exclusive competence to 
regulate migration flows from outside the Union and thus endorsing their territorial 
sovereignty, this ruling rather seems to result from a consistent interpretation o f 
(secondary) EU law: if there was no right to residence to start with (as in the case o f 
illegal residence o f a spouse), movement will not bring about a loss of rights. That the 
Court in Luxembourg is not too concerned about Member States’ (collective) 
sensitivities with regard to national sovereignty is evident from several of its decisions 
concerning third-country nationals and national immigration control.709
Thus, while seen from the inside through the eyes of an insider (i.e. European 
citizens), territorial borders have lost considerable relevance. However, accounts of the 
EU that take its constellation to be truly post-Westphalian overlook the traditional, 
sovereignty-oriented role of the national state with regard to third-country nationals. 
Similarly, the Fortress Europe metaphor, which merely calls attention to the fact that the 
function of Europe’s external borders as distinguishing between inside and outside have
705 Kunoy (2006), p. 190.
706 ECJ, Case C60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary o f  State for the Home Department. 11 July 2002: and ECJ, 
Case C-459/99. Mouvement contre le racisme, l ’antisémitisme, et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v. Belgian 
State, 25 July 2002.
707 ECJ Case C-109/01, Secretary o f State for the Home Departments Akrich, 23 September 2003.
708 See Spavcnta (2005). p. 228.
709 See for example ECJ, Case C-503/03, Commission v. Spain, 31 January 2006.
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become stronger, fails to see that internal (national) borders have not really diminished 
in importance. Rather, the location o f their control has shifted, so that the regulation o f 
trans-national movement is increasingly located inside the country.710 Enrica Rigo 
rightly observes that it is only partially true that controls have been relocated from 
national borders to the external frontiers of the Union. In reality, she argues, the very 
concept of borders itself underwent deep transformation.711 This is not to say that the 
external borders o f the EU are not important when we investigate the way in which the 
Member States keep on to their exclusionary powers. On the contrary, as we will see 
below, they have reinforced the traditional territory-identity link by the use o f novel 
techniques.
5.4.2. The Common Immigration and Asylum Policy
Before the Treaty o f Amsterdam, which made immigration and asylum policy a 
matter of EC competence, co-operation on these matters had for a long time been purely 
intergovernmental. This was largely due to Member States’ reluctance to communitarize 
an area which was so clearly labelled, both by them and their national constituencies, as 
constituting the core of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, from the 1980’s onwards, a 
certain degree of Europeanization o f  migration policies -  although not part o f the 
integration process in a formal sense712 -  had taken place in the form of various forms 
of trans-national cooperation by individual Member States.
Some authors make a link between the beginnings of European co-operation and 
a developing awareness o f legal constraints domestically. Immigration control 
authorities found that they had more freedom of action if  they operated at the European 
level, where decision-making was largely free of judicial checks and public scrutiny.713 
Even when at Maastricht, co-operation was institutionalised in the third pillar, the 
situation in which primacy laid with national executives remained largely the same: 
apart from the absence of domestic constitutional constraints, there was little scope for
710 BaubSck (2003), p. 7; and Bigo and Guild (2005), p. 238.
7,1 Rigo (2003), p. i.
71: Huysmans (2000), p. 755.
713 See Gcddes (2001). p. 28; Boswell (2003), p. 623; and Guiraudon (2003).
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action by the Commission, European Parliament or the ECJ.714 This is one instance 
through which it may be shown that the European project provides Member States with 
an opportunity to reassert national sovereignty with regard to control over international 
movement, by turning to the traditional administrative culture o f immigration decision 
making where the rule of law is severely curtailed.715 Thus, while European integration 
may superficially be perceived as limiting the pursuit o f some elements of sovereignty, 
in reality it strengthens the kind of “sovereign authority emerging as central in a 
globalising world.”716
Hence, when Member States’ concern over immigration had risen sufficiently 
high and dissatisfaction with the intergovernmental approach of the Third Pillar 
emerged, at Amsterdam the Treaty on the European Union was changed in such a 
manner that immigration and asylum were moved from the third pillar to the first717 
Increasing immigration pressure on the European Union countries made the Member 
States realise that purely intergovernmental strategies would no longer be sufficient to 
protect their national states. Moreover, although it seems to have been only a secondary 
motivation, the absence of internal border controls made a common stance on 
immigration from third countries seem logically required. The complex manner in 
which the common immigration and asylum policy is shaped, with rules from many 
overlapping sources, opt-in and opt-out provisions for certain Member States and forms 
o f  policy making which depart from the traditional EC legislative process such as the 
open method of co-ordination is a reflection of Member States’ ambiguous feelings 
regarding the loss of their exclusive competences in this area. Another such example is 
contained in the special provision for preliminary rulings under Title IV that deviates 
from the normal procedure for preliminary rulings. According to Article 68 EC only 
national courts o f last instance can refer questions for preliminary rulings to the 
European Court o f Justice.718 Furthermore, cooperation between Member States still
7,4 Boswell (2003), p. 623.
715 Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), p. 178; Gcddes (2001), p. 36; and Geddes (2005), p. 788.
7.6 Cohen (2001), p. 84.
7.7 Duff (1997), pp. 8, 9,20; and Huysmans (2000), p. 756.
718 Tire Council did not adapt this provision after the transition of the transitionary period that expired on 
1 May 2004 as required by Article 67(2) EC. See Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions 
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Adaptation of the provisions of Title IV of the EC
also takes place outside the formal structure of the EU, such as multilateral cooperation 
between several Member States in combating illegal immigration under the Priim 
Convention 719 The explicit intention of such cooperation is the transferral of the rules 
the participating states have agreed upon to the level o f the EU. Even though such 
intergovernmental cooperation may be motivated by a genuine wish of some Member 
States to achieve closer integration, the inevitable result is that checks on the executive 
power are largely absent: the European Parliament for example has no say on the 
proceedings and outcomes within these multilateral frameworks.
Instead of analysing the bulk o f EU legislation that has been enacted under Title 
IV of the EC Treaty, I will focus upon how EU law and policies in this area have 
changed the connotations of the territorial border with regard to international 
movement. I will argue that these changes have been triggered by Member States’ 
wishes to retain their sovereign power to exclude in response to the evolving human 
rights norms as discussed in Section 5.3. They have done so by shifting and extending 
the enactment of their sovereign powers. I already discussed the shift “upwards”, 
denoting the transferring o f  migration decision making to the Community level.720 The 
measures and policies which have been taken so far as a result of this upward shifting 
show that strong emphasis is laid on traditional control o f the territorial border.721 In 
spite of the comprehensive approach to be taken to migration, proclaimed indispensable 
at Tampere,722 legislation and other instruments such as on harmonising existing 
practices on expulsions,723 mutual recognition of expulsion decisions,724 voluntary 
repatriation,725 the organisation o f  jo in t flights for expulsion,726 and controlling illegal
Treaty relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of justice with a view to ensuring more effective judicial 
protection (European Commission, 28 June 2006).
719 Convention on the stepping up of cross border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross- 
border crime and illegal iminigratioa signed at Priim on 27 May 2005 (Schengen III). Participating states 
are Belgium, France, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy.
7:0 Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), p. 176-177.
721 Ibid.
“  EU Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council. 15 and 16 October 2001.
23 Various Recommendations, see for example OJ C 5, 10 January 1996 and OJ C 274. 19 September 
1996.
724 Council Directive 2001/40/EC, OJ L 149, 2 June 2001
725 Council Decision 97/340/JHA of 26 May 1997, OJ L 147, 5 June 1997.
26 Council Decision of 29 April 2004, OJ L261,6 August 2004, pp. 28-35.
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immigration in a more general sense,727 all point to Member States’ strong commitment 
to a rigid territory-identity link.
Apart from an upward shift, Member States have externalised migration control 
through various EU policies, in what can be described as a shift “outwards”. They have 
done so in different ways which all lead to a separation between the concept o f the 
border and the perimeter of European territory.728 The first o f such policies is the 
Schengen system o f visa regulation. The Schengen visa system governs movement o f 
potential migrants in their countries of origin instead o f at the moment of their arrival at 
the actual border o f the Member States. Particularly in combination with carrier 
sanctions, through which private actors are made responsible for the typical sovereign 
act of control over borders, the European visa requirements lead to a construction in 
which control over movement is more easily exercised because the extra­
territorialisation o f such control facilitates the evasion of human rights obligations. The 
regulation of visa under Schengen is also indicative o f the fact that States are not averse 
o f  ceding formal sovereignty if  they can win back substantive powers of exclusion: 
participating states are under an obligation to refuse entry if the Schengen conditions are 
not m et730
Furthermore, the stationing of immigration liaison officers in third countries in 
order to prevent what is called irregular migration, is another illustration o f the extra- 
territorializing of sovereignty, and thus implicitly of the way in which Member States
727 See amongst many other documents: Green Paper on Community return policy for illegal residents 
(European Commission, 10 April 2002); Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
Parliament on a common policy’ on illegal immigration (European Commission, 15 November 2001); 
Council Decision of 27 March 2000 on the improved exchange of information to combat counterfeit 
travel document O.J. L81, 1 April 2000; Council Regulation EC/2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 
concerning "Eurodac”, O.J. L 316, 15 December 2000; EU Presidency Conclusions on Justice and Home 
Affairs of the Lacken European Council, 17 December 2001; EU Presidency’ Conclusions to the Brussels 
European Council 25/26 March 2004 including the Hague Programme, and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC of 16 March 2005 on establishing a secure web-based Information and Co-ordination 
Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services, O.J. L 083, 1 April 2005, pp. 48-51
728 Rigo (2003), p. 6.
729 Based upon Art. 26 of the 1990 Supplementation Agreement of the Schengen Convention.
730 Steenbergen (1992), p. 65.
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conceive o f the importance of access to territory for their human rights obligations.731 
Similarly, certain provisions o f The Hague Programme, in particular relating to the 
establishment o f a Border Control Agency (Frontex), make it possible to organise joint 
EU-level measures to intercept persons travelling on the high seas.732
Other venues for the extension of control and police methods concerning trans­
national movement consist of shifting responsibility to third countries: “third countries 
are encouraged, or in the case of candidate countries, obliged, to apply EU standards of 
migration management, or to enter into agreements for readmitting irregular 
migrants.”733 Readmission agreements fit very well in a system based on territoriality: 
they are a means by which control over movement is exercised as they govern 
populations both inside and outside a state’s territory734
While we have seen above that such a means of regulating populations may be 
disrupted on the grounds of certain human rights considerations, concepts such as safe 
third country and safe country o f origin, now commonly used by all Member States, 
attempt to reinstate the system o f territorial governance. Apart from redirecting 
territorial responsibility for the fundamental rights o f applicants for international 
protection coming from a safe third country or a safe country of origin, these concepts 
will inevitably undermine the assessment of fundamental rights at stake in individual
735cases.
Further proof of the pushing of borders outwards, thereby de-territorializing 
sovereignty, is provided by proposals made by Italy, Germany, and the UK, for so- 
called Transit Processing Centres. These proposals were inspired by Australia’s ‘pacific 
solution’, its asylum policy consisting of “patrolling a naval barrier created around 
Australia’s territorial waters in order to prevent unauthorized vessels carrying asylum 
seekers from entering. Intercepted vessels are diverted to off-shore processing centres in
731 Council Regulation EC/3 77/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network, OJ L 64, 2 March 2004, pp. 1-4
732 European Agency for the Management o f Operational Cooperation at the External Borders o f the 
Member States o f the EU, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004. ILPA in House of 
Lords (23 March 2003), p. 34. See also European Commission Newsroom 4 August 2006: “EU common 
patrols to control maritime borders will be organised shortly in the south Mediterranean regioa”




counties to host [these] in return for financial incentives. [...] if  granted refugee status, 
the refugees are then resettled in third countries.”736 European ideas for Transit 
Processing Centres similarly envisaged the processing of claims that were made in one 
of the Member States outside the territory of the EU, thereby facilitating the contracting 
out of asylum services to third countries 737 It is persuasively argued by several authors 
that significant legal obstacles would be encountered in realising these plans,738 which 
perhaps explains why they have up to date not been adopted by the Commission.
Member States, however, seem to think that these obstacles can be evaded if 
camps for illegal immigrants are set up in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritius, 
Morocco, and Libya, not under formal supervision of the EU, but of these respective 
countries.739 Increasing co-operation between individual Member States and North 
African countries, such as between Italy and Libya or Mauritania and Spain, shows a 
willingness on both sides to contain the alleged threat of migration on the non-European 
side of the Mediterranean.740 Such co-operation has also been institutionalised within 
the framework of the EU.741 In Libya,742 the European Commission has four projects: 
centres to house illegal immigrants, information campaigns, training of immigration 
officials and improvements to border controls. It has furthermore recently adopted a 
package of measures to help Mauritania contain the flow o f illegal immigrants to the
736 Lynskey (2006), p. 242.
37 Ibid. p. 247; and Saint-Saëns (2004).
738 Lynskey (2006); and Noll (2003).
739 Helmut (2005); and Andrijasevic (2005-2006), p. 15-16.
740 Such as Italy financing the construction of detention camps in Libya. See European Commission 
(2005), p. 59. Spain has agreed to pay for the construction of detention centres for illegal immigrants in 
Mauritania (Reuters, 17 March 2006).
741 For example in the Aeneas Programme, Regulation (EC) 491/2004 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 10 march 2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance for third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum, O.J. 18 march 2004 L80/1. See also Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament integrating migration issues in the European 
Union's relations with third countries, European Commission (3 December 2002); and Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Thematic program for the cooperation 
with third countries in the areas of immigration and asylum (European Commission. 25 January 2006).
742 A country which “does not recognize the mandate of the UNHCR, has no asylum system, is not a 
signatory' of the Geneva Convention and in which, as NGOs documented, irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers are at risk of arbitrary7 detentions, unfair trails, disappearance and torture while in detention.” 
Andrijasevic (2005-2006), p. 22
Canary Islands. Resources for detention form part o f  the package, a €  2.45 m illion 
programme, which furthermore includes capacity building for detection and 
apprehension; revision o f existing legislation; and institutional support.743 The 
background o f such initiatives is a growing unwillingness on the part of the EU to deal 
with the effects of migration on its own soil, but to contain the problem in non-Member- 
States, who are enticed to co-operation with political and financial advantages. 
Although occasionally worded in terms o f humanitarian concern,744 Member States use 
EU cooperation with third countries to export their views on territorial sovereignty, 
even though the situation in these third countries is hardly comparable to the situation in 
Europe. Similarly, plans for regional protection programmes,745 although arguably 
partly motivated by a genuine wish to provide more accessible and effective protection 
for refugees in their regions of origin, also fit within an image of a Europe reluctant to  
be engaged in refugee protection on account of its territorial responsibility.
I have said in the introduction to this Section that a communautarian perspective 
on international movement reveals important insights with regard to national 
sovereignty and territoriality. The way in which the Union and its Member States look 
upon and have regulated free movement within and into the territory of the European 
Union show that national sovereignty plays a decisive role in shaping the legal and 
political framework dealing with free movement and immigration. The limited scope for 
the Court o f Justice to give preliminary rulings on matters of immigration and asylum 
and Member States’ reluctance to align its jurisdiction on the general scheme of the 
Treaty is illustrative in this respect.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the (imaginary) unity with which national 
sovereignty is concerned has changed as a result o f the European project: the capacity to 
control the entry and stay by EU citizens has greatly diminished. Perhaps even more
743 See European Commission Press Release, 10 July 2006, Brussels, IP 06/967.
44 With regard to plans for the establishment of reception camps in North Africa, the Austrian Minster of 
the Interior remarked: "Ce ne sont pas seulement des camps, ce sont des programmes pour créer de 
l'emploi, pour leur offrir un enseignement, pour les aider à commencer une vie par eux-mêmes." Source: 
Liberation 13 January 2006.
45 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Regional 
Protection Programmes. European Commission (6 April 2005). At the Vienna Justice and Home Affairs 
Council. EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agreed upon launching regional protection programmes 
in Belarus, Moldova. Ukraine and Tanzania.
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importantly, the abolishment of internal border controls has conceptually 
‘problemadzed’ border controls as obstacles to individual freedom, and in certain 
respects the Schengen acquis has ‘denaturalised* the border.746
As a result, in Enrica Rigo’s words, one can discern a “blurring o f an 
exclusive/inclusive dichotomy of membership.”747 In this sense, the development of 
Europe into a post-national polity raises interesting novel issues, as shown by 
Commission v. Spain. In this case, the European Court of Justice decided that automatic 
refusal of entry by one Member State on the ground of an alert issued by another 
Member State under CIS A (implementing the 1990 Schengen Convention) violates EC 
law if the refusals concern spouses o f EU citizens 748 On the other hand, quoting Rigo 
again, “functions typical of national borders are maintained or even reinforced**749 
through the European project. The quintessential function o f the territorial border is not 
changing, although its location and the manner of its enforcement on the individual are 
evolving. Europe reveals “a system of differentiated memberships, framed by the norms 
that identify boundaries at each level o f the European polity’*750 Rigo argues that such a 
system corresponds to a multilevel system of governance o f people’s mobility.
Indeed, whereas before the concept of nationality was the essential tool with 
which national states have monopolised the question of trans-national movement, the 
EU and its Member States have brought about a considerably more sophisticated system 
o f international government of populations. Concepts such as EU citizens, third country 
nationals, safe country of origin, safe third country, Schengen, and readmission 
agreements are the constituent elements of this novel structure. However, 
notwithstanding the novelty o f the tools, national sovereignty with its emphasis on 
control of outsiders’ access to national territoiy is the ratio behind the very existence of 
that structure. The pushing o f Europe’s borders outwards through various policies fits 
also within a traditional image of sovereignty, but instead o f solely facilitating control 
over access to territory, it operates from a complementary logic. In order to protect 
national territory, it makes use of the fact that access to fundamental rights is still 
largely limited by the borders of the national state.
746 Walters (2002b)
747 Rigo (2003). p. 12.
748 ECJ. Case C-503/03, Commission i\ Spain, 31 January 2006.
749 Rigo (2003). p. 12.
750 Rigo (2003). p. 11. See also Walters (2002b), p. 567.
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5.5. Reaffirming sovereignty: deportation and detention
Deportation is the physical removal and therefore ultimate exclusion of individuals or groups 
from the territory of the state. Detention is enclosure in a camp or prison and consequently the 
exclusion from the receiving society.751
Deportation and detention are often regarded as simple instances of immigration 
law enforcement. In official political discourse they are presented as the proper and 
natural response of the sovereign state to those who have violated its territorial 
sovereignty. Deportation, and to a lesser extent detention, are so embedded within the 
contemporary administrative practice o f liberal states that it receives far less attention in 
comparison with other forms of state violence and forced migration.752 Criticism, be it 
political, academic or activist, revolves mainly about the conditions of their application, 
but deportation in particular is seldom questioned as more than the unfortunate but 
predictable consequence o f unwanted immigration. However, as so evocatively put 
by Nathalie Peutz and Nicholas de Genova, there must inevitably be something greater 
at stake in practices of detention and removal, including “the formulation and empathic 
reaffirmation of state sovereignty itself as well as its concomitant production and 
refashioning o f political subjectivities for “natural” and “naturalized” citizens, all 
manner o f “immigrant” and “foreign” denizens, the communities where the deportees 
are more or less coercively returned and of course the deportees themselves ”754 Their 
words accurately express the idea that deportation and detention constitute the litmus 
test for the way in which territoriality shapes the world and the life of its inhabitants.
In addition, as they both engage the exposed core o f state power,755 deportation 
and detention make clear what sovereignty is about; both with regard to its aspect of
751 Schuster (2005), p. 608.
752 Walters (2002). p. 256.
53 In an interv iew with the Corriere Della Sera of 3 July 2006, the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano 
stated that “non c’è alcuna alternativa ai Cpt [Centri di Permanenza Temporanera. the Italian immigration 
detention centres!. Si può discutere sul modo in cui vengono gestiti, ma altro chiederne la chiusura. Se 
esiste un problema di sovraffollamento, piuttosto che pensare a chiudere i centri, bisogna aprirne altri.”
754 Peutz and Nicholas (forthcoming).
753 Dauvergne (2004), p. 592.
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monopolist violence756 as with regard its claim to determine the inside and the outside. 
Furthermore, deportation and detention in a global perspective exemplify the idea o f an 
international police of aliens: territoriality and citizenship as mechanisms of allocating 
responsibility over distinct populations. Monopolist violence and sovereignty’s claim to 
determine the boundaries o f the body politic have been looked at closely in Chapter 2, 
whereas Chapter 3 paid attention to citizenship’s structuring role in a world made up of 
nation states.
In Section 5.5.1., I will discuss the way in which the administrative practice of 
deportation relates to state power and territoriality by setting it in a wider Field of 
political and administrative practice 757 By doing so I draw for a large extent on the 
work of William Walters who, by comparing modem deportation practice with 
historical forms of expulsion, offers a venue through which we can historicize and 
denaturalise deportation 758 Section 5.5.2. subsequently deals with the relationship 
between immigration detention and state power. Michel Foucault’s work on 
confinement and Hannah Arendt’s reflections on Europe’s post-war internment camps 
for displaced persons are briefly discussed in order to place the practice of immigration 
detention in a larger historical narrative of imprisonment. By doing so, Section 5.5.2. 
seeks to answer the question why in contemporary Europe the detention of unwanted 
foreigners is increasingly prevailing over other forms of administering the entry and 
removal of aliens.
5.5.1. Deportation as administrative practice
By investigating historical forms of expulsion, William Walters makes the claim 
that deportation’s link with contemporary immigration policies is not as self-evident as 
it may seem at first sight. The first form of expulsion he addresses is exile or 
banishment. Exile was generally used as a form of punishment for serious crimes, in a 
period reaching from ancient Greece and early Rome until the late Middle Ages. Exile
756 “There is no easy way to make those who do not want to depart actually leave: shackles and drugs are 
both on the menu.” (Dauvergne 2004, p. 592)




was used against a person who was a member o f the body politic, and Walters quotes 
the Italian jurist Beccaria (1738-1794) to illustrate the effect of banishment. It nullified 
all the ties between society and the delinquent citizen: with respect to the body politic, 
banishment was a civil death, which should produce the same effect as natural death 759 
Thus, the loss o f citizenship put men at the mercy o f  sovereign power; and as such 
banishment illustrates the importance o f citizenship while at the same time it exposes 
the insignificance of “bare life”760 when confronted with sovereign power, despite 
declarations and theories in which rights are accorded to men prior to and independent 
of any political power. Hence, although banishment was frequently employed to lessen 
the punishment for serious crimes, especially for the poor its impact could be far more 
serious than imprisonment, which, although greatly restricting individual liberty, did not 
affect one’s presence in the legal and political order.
Subsequently, Walters considers expulsions that are associated with poor policy 
in early modem Europe. In England, for example, those who were likely to become a 
charge on the poor rate of a particular parish were subject to removal. Indeed, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the determination to restrict relief only to  the local 
poor was a general feature of Western Europe, and paupers from other localities could 
be removed 761 Thus, although the modem nation state had already started to take form, 
when it came to deportation the fault line between inside and outside was not 
determined by nationality, but by the distinction o f local versus foreigner.
It is important to note that with regard to warfare, and also taxation, this fault 
line had started to shift slowly but decisively in the direction o f national versus 
foreigner. It is precisely this shift that is detectable in the third historic example o f 
expulsion that Walters discusses: expulsion on the basis of group membership. 
Notwithstanding the fact that corporate expulsions in Medieval Europe were not 
targeted at other nationalities but rather at different religious groups, they were an 
important tool in the formation o f national states as political loyalties and religion were 
clearly intertwined in this period.762 Although the expulsion of religious groups became 
less commonplace when national states and the state system had consolidated in 
Western Europe, a new form of forced migration took over as a result o f external
759 Ibid. p. 269.
760 The term comes from Agamben (1998).
761 Walters (2002), p. 270.
762Ibid. p.270.
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colonization and internal social regulation, the latter denoting the enormous growth of 
state power, penetrating more and more aspects of the lives of its citizens. One of the 
ways in which states dealt with those individuals that they perceived as undesirable in 
their social order was to transport them to colonies overseas where they were subjected 
to forced labour. Thus, the poor and the criminal were not merely banished; the practice 
of transportation differed from classic exile as it sought to combine “forced removal 
with the game of colonization and economic exploitation.”763 Not only convicts were 
transported to the colonies: the legalisation of deportation in the English Vagrancy Act 
o f 1597 shows that transportation as social regulation encompassed more than the 
pursuing o f criminal law objectives. An intriguing detail with regard to these policies, 
offering interesting parallels with contemporary practice of readmission agreements, is 
the case o f countries that, as they did not have any significant colonies abroad, sought to 
arrange transportation of their undesirables with other colonial powers.764
The final form of expulsion that Walters examines in his historical overview is 
so-called population transfer. We have seen in Chapter 3 that the way in which 
international law dealt with the case of minorities in Europe in the first half of the 
twentieth century affirmed the perception of a logical link between identity, nation, and 
state. International law aspired to protect minorities because in their cases, this link did 
not reflect their actual situation. Another way of dealing with the scenario in which a 
nation state found itself confronted with minorities o f another nation within its borders 
was the transferral o f such minorities to their “own” state. Examples o f such “tidying up 
o f  national frontiers”765 have been described in Section 5.2, but here it is important to 
appreciate how population transfer relates to modem state power. In this context 
Walters discerns a significant difference with group expulsions in the early modem 
period when the nation state had not yet grown to maturity:
[...] with the early modem period expulsion was frequently used as a threat. It could be avoided
if the subject agreed to accept baptism, conversion or foreswear the practice of usury. Expulsion
as population transfer operates on a biopolitical territory7 where difference is marked indelibly.766
763 Ibid, p. 272.
764 Ibid. p. 272.
765 Linklater (1998), p. 160.
766 Waltere (2002), p. 247.
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The changing connotations o f expulsion which Walters tackles here correspond 
to the change from the medieval order based on individual differences and universal 
values to the modem state system where the principle of identity was pursued within 
states. The way in which the state came to assert a specific national identity, and how  
this process of assuming a collective and pre-political identity relates to theories on state 
power have been addressed extensively in Section 2.4.3. of Chapter 2. These processes 
explain the changing character o f state administered forced migration.
Walters’ genealogy o f deportation is significant in three respects. In the first 
place, it shows us that deportation is not the particular response of the state to one 
singular situation. Deportation at various times in history has been a tool to facilitate 
state building; an instrument to regulate wealth; a means of social regulation; and a way 
in which to realise national ideology. Secondly, in changing practices of deportation one 
can detect the changing role of state power. Banishment in the early modem period was 
reserved for political enemies o f the state and transfer of religious residents was 
opportune for creating the modem sovereign state. With the risk of oversimplifying, one 
could say that such expulsions served to make sure that the emerging state could 
exercise effective power over a certain territory. The more modem modes o f  expulsion 
which became prevalent in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, 
such as transportation o f  convicts and vagrants to colonies and population transfers 
based on ethnicity, show that the state was no longer merely concerned with territorial 
exclusiveness of power, but also with its substantial capacity of controlling its citizens’ 
life and identity. These tendencies were reflected in immigration policies: during the 
same period, as we have seen in Section 5.2., immigration laws were introduced that 
prevented the immigration of paupers or persons with ‘low morals’ and certain specific 
nationalities.
This link between forms o f  state power and modes of deportation leads us to the 
third important issue that Walters addresses through his genealogy of deportation. He 
asks what contemporary deportation practice may tell us about present forms of state 
power and images of political community. There are two answers to this question.
In the first place, one needs to be aware of the fact that modem deportation 
practice is the result of the territorial state system. Chapter 3 described how the 
institution o f citizenship is rooted in and simultaneously produces a territorial system 
through which distinct populations are ascribed to distinct territorial entities. 
Citizenship’s role in a world made up of nation states is to allocate the responsibility for
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populations to states. Even conceptions of post-national citizenship depend on initial 
authorization for presence on national territory by the sovereign state, and are thus 
consistent with Barry Hindess’ idea of citizenship as international ‘police’.767 
International law is formed by this construction of an international government of 
populations: it prohibits the expulsion o f citizens and has naturalised the link between 
sovereignty and deportation of foreign nationals, as we saw in Section 5.3. of the 
present Chapter.
But -  and it is here that we find the first answer to the question as to what the 
practice of deportation tells us about state power and political community -  deportation 
is not merely the inevitable outcome o f the notions of citizenship and territoriality. It is 
much more than that. Deportation itself is actively involved in producing and preserving 
the territorial order. A world made up of independent, sovereign nation states is the 
result of historical contingencies, not a natural way of structuring the world, nor the 
inevitable outcome of a linear path o f progress, and as such it does not and cannot 
reproduce itself naturally.768 It is the practice of deportation that is constitutive for the 
modem territorial order.769 The EU return policy reveals a similar relation between 
territoriality, governance of populations and deportation: EU policies .with regard to 
return that, as we have seen above, intensify cooperation with third countries, find their 
“ roots in the emergence of a dominant interpretative framework pertaining to the 
‘management of international migration’.”770
The constitutive element of deportation leads us to its second feature that is 
important in order to understand the way in which modem practices of deportation 
relate to state power. Deportation does not only function as a factual way in which to 
govern populations. In light of the ineffectiveness of many expulsion measures in 
several of the Member States,771 its significance is perhaps more of a symbolic and 
indirect character. Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen argue that although deportation 
measures are often ineffectual, they are a necessity for governments who need to be 
seen in control o f migration and borders. According to these authors, the established 
practice o f deportation is necessary because it “assuages public opinion which would
767 Hindess (1998) and (2000).
768 Walters (2002). p. 288.
769 Ibid.
770 Cassarino (2006), p. 10.
771 See Nascimbcnc (2001); and Schuster (2005), p. 612.
not view the states incapacity in this area with equanimity” and because it acts as a 
disincentive to other potential migrants 772 William Walters uses the same arguments by 
placing deportation in the context o f govemmentaiity. Although this study will not 
address conceptual distinctions between sovereign power and governmental power, the 
latter supposedly a distinctly novel way of reflecting on and exercising state power, one 
aspect of govemmentality deserves to  be mentioned in the context o f deportation. That 
is the concern o f the state with the governmental mechanism of deportation itself:
"Governments are presently obsessed with the need to ‘tighten up’ their deportation and 
repatriation policies. One of the main reasons they give is the need to maintain the ‘integrity’ of 
tlieir immigration and asylum systems. The problem identified is one where lax administration of 
deportation -  the failure to execute deportation orders and actually to remove the subject -  marks 
a particular state as a ‘soft touch’. The fear is tliat asylum ‘shoppers’ will then flock towards that 
state to profit from its generous terms of admission Strictly enforced migration policies send 
‘signals’ to asylum seekers and ‘illegal’ migrants. What is being governed is not the population 
in a direct manner, as was with the population transfer or the socially undesirable, but the 
governmental system.”773
Here we can again draw a parallel with common EU return policies which 
“reassert the managerial capacity o f the state” and should lead to a “strengthening of the 
public credibility of states”.774 Hence, the practice of deportation offers us two images 
of state power. The first image is of state power that forms part of a territorial system of 
sovereign states. In this system deportation is central to  the allocation of populations to 
states.775 Governance of populations has become territorial in the second half of the 
twentieth century, a development that is reflected in modem international law which has 
delegitimised historical forms of expulsion such as the expulsion of religious minorities, 
mass expulsions, and transportation o f citizens, while simultaneously it naturalised the 
link between deportation and foreign nationals. Once again it is possible to discern 
international law’s opposing tendencies: it couples concern with and limitations on the 
jurisdictional content of sovereignty with acquiescence to the state’s exercise of power 
whenever it presents it as based on sovereignty’s territorial frame. For although
7 : Gibncy and Hansen (2003). p. 2.
773 Walters (2002), p. 280.
774 Cassarino (2006), p. 10.
775 Walters (2002), p. 267.
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deportation clearly constitutes the exercise of jurisdiction over people, in the 
contemporary global structure, the basis for the exercise of this power is constituted by 
sovereignty’s territorial frame. Once we take into account the ‘sacred’ territorial basis of 
such state power, we understand contemporary international law’s differentiation 
between transportation of the socially undesirable, religious minorities or citizens in 
general and deportation of the foreigner.
The second image of state power that is revealed by the practice of deportation is 
internal. Deportation is necessary to prove that a state takes control of its borders and it 
epitomises sovereignty as the power to distinguish between the inside and the outside. 
These two images of state power, the first structural and the second internal, are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing, as is illustrated by the continuity between the 
externalisation o f border control such as visa requirements and readmission agreements 
and its internalisation resulting precisely from practices such as deportation and 
detention 776
Similarly, the criminalization o f illegal stay in national territory also shows how 
the internal and the structural features of state power complement each other: 
international governance of populations has reached a peak when merely administrative 
sanctions do longer seem to suffice and the tendency to criminalize migrants internally 
gives a very powerful incentive to the inside/outside distinction.777 The widespread use 
o f the word ‘illegal’ in conjunction with migration and migrant, also when discussing 
preventive and international approaches to migration -  even though logically “a migrant 
can only be illegal once he finds himself within a state whose laws define his presence 
as illegal”778 -  has the same effect of both emphasising each individual state’s territorial 
sovereignty and calling attention to an international regime o f governance o f the larger 
human population in which certain kinds of movement are taken for granted while other 
forms are undesirable and thus penalised.
776 Rigo (2003), p. 11.
777 See about criminal sanctions to illegal presence in various Member States: the va nous country reports 
in Nascimbcnc (2001), in particular p. 592.
778 See Elspcth Guild in House of Lords (23 March 2005). at 27.
5.5.2. Immigration detention, state power and territoriality
The above observations on state power and deportation hold equally true for 
administrative practices o f immigration detention: if their aim is to facilitate removal 
and prevent illegal stay they fit within and simultaneously perpetuate a territorial image 
of the world. And even if  the majority o f those held in detention centres are eventually
*77Q
released, just as deportation, detention is a necessity for states that want to be seen in 
‘control’ o f  their borders by their own populations. Furthermore, the symbolic function 
o f immigration detention lies also in its deterrent effect to the outside world: detention 
centres are meant to signal that “ ‘our’ immigration policies are not a soft touch.”780
However, immigration detention is special amongst the other venues through 
which states try to stem unwanted immigration such as deportation. In the first place it 
is special because deprivation o f liberty is the sharpest technique by which states 
attempt to preserve the territorial order o f sovereign states. We have seen in Chapter 2 
that personal liberty and sovereignty are conceptually intertwined: the protection o f the 
former is the reason for the existence o f  the latter. In societies based upon the rule o f 
law there is no more serious interference with an individual’s fundamental rights as 
depriving him of his liberty. The intimate relationship between personal liberty, 
sovereignty and violence warrants the utmost scrutiny when assessing the 
indiscriminate detention o f thousands o f  people in light o f  traditional safeguards against 
sovereign power. But in this Section we will see that yet more is at stake in practices o f 
immigration detention, It is this practice that, even more so than deportation, 
exemplifies in the clearest possible way the consequences of a world fully divided into 
territorial nation states on the life o f the individual.
In M adness and C ivilization , Foucault traces the origins of and rationale behind 
the great confinement of the seventeenth century, which ascribed “the same homeland 
to the poor, to the unemployed, to prisoners and to the insane.”781 William Walters, by 
drawing a parallel between the logic of medieval poor laws and modem deportation
79 “ [...] either because they cannot be removed because of conditions in the country of origin, or because 
travel documents for the person to be removed cannot be issued or because they arc allowed to appeal, or 
because they are granted leave to remain on compassionate grounds, or, finally, because their claim for 
asylum is allowed.” Schuster (2005), p. 612-613. See also Andrijasevic (2005-2006), p. 18.
780 Walters (2002), p. 286.
781 Foucault (1967), p. 39.
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practices, was able to point at the constitutive role o f deportation in governing 
populations. In the same way, the confinement of the poor, the homeless and the insane 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may tells us something about contemporary 
immigration detention.782 Precisely the poor laws of medieval Europe, the local logic of 
which is presently reconstituted on a global, international scale through immigration 
policies, were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries replaced by regulations which 
provided for the confinement of those who would have been expelled before:
it was, in any case, a new solution For the first time, purely negative measures of 
exclusion were replaced by a measure of confinement; the unemployed person was no longer 
driven away or punished; he was taken in charge, at the expense of the nation but at the cost of 
liis individual liberty.”783
Indeed, whereas an edict of the parliament from 1606 ordered the beggars of 
Paris to be driven away from the city, fifty years later those people were hunted down 
and herded into the various buildings o f the Hôpital Général. The latter institution was a 
single organisation which united already exiting establishments which took care o f the 
poor, but instead of merely an administrative reform, the establishment of the Hôpital 
Général in 1656 brought about a new "instance of order, o f the monarchical and 
bourgeois order being organised in France during this period.”784 While the origin of 
former measures of exclusion had been mostly local, the edicts that first established the 
Hôpital Général in Paris in 1656 and later prescribed the establishment of such 
institutions in every city of France in 1676, originated from the King. It was an early 
sign that one of the concerns o f the emerging modern state was control over its citizens’ 
life and identity, because mere local territorial control -  by means of territorial 
exclusion o f the undesirable from certain towns or provinces -  would no longer function 
in a polity that aspired national government.
Thus the main aims of the ‘great confinement’ consisted of control and moral 
reform. Instead of being simply excluded, the poor and those without a fixed abode 
were now governed, albeit still by a logic which was driven by the “fear of pauperism,
78~ Vagabondage and mental illness still constitute legal grounds for deprivation of liberty' according to 
Article 5 of the ECHR.
783 Foucault (1967), p. 48.
784 Ibid. p. 40.
with its dangerous ‘fluid, elusive sociality, impossible to control or utilise’.”785 In order 
to suppress such pauperism, the various Hôpitals Généraux provided for the “territorial 
sedentarization of populations”786, but the difference with later measures aiming at a 
similar result such as public housing, was the repressive nature of confinement. The 
near absoluteness of the power o f  the directors of the Hôpitals Généraux reminds o f 
sovereign power without restraints: it consisted of “jurisdiction without appeal” and it 
entailed “writs o f execution against which nothing can prevail.”787
The emergence of imprisonment as an instituted response to crime dates from 
the eighteenth century and Michel Foucault has shown that this development is linked in 
important ways with ideas on liberal government.788 Although I will not investigate the 
history o f this development in depth, two of its aspects nonetheless deserve to be briefly 
mentioned here. In the first place, practices o f  imprisonment had for centuries been 
linked with the worst abuses of royal power, of which the infamous lettres de cachet 
offer the best example 789 Yet, in modernity, prisons became a site where the very 
power to punish was made accountable and measurable and as such imprisonment can 
be seen as an “enabling technology of what we would now call the rule of law.”790 
Secondly, the imprisonment of criminals, just as the confinement of the poor, had 
important reforming functions. These two elements in particular made that the “rise of 
the penitentiary [...] is in a very real sense a story of rights and liberties as much as it is 
a story of prejudice and oppression.”791
Such a story of rights and liberties is conspicuously absent in Hannah Arendt’s 
account o f the internment camps which were set up for the stateless and refugees of 
totalitarian regimes during the thirties in Europe. Towards the end of the Second World 
War, millions o f  refugees and displaced people were kept in these camps, scattered all 
over Europe, and many of the former work and concentration camps in Germany were 
used as “assembly centres” for those people after the war had ended 792 We have seen in
785 Walters (2002), p. 286.
786 Ibid.
787 Foucault (1967), p. 40.
788 Foucault (1989).
789 Ibid, and Foucault (1967), p. 38.
790 Simon (1998), p.597.
791 Ibid. p. 599.
79: Malkki (1995). p. 499.
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Chapter 3 that the very existence of the internment camps made painfully clear that the 
Rights of Man were utterly dependent on citizenship. As the national state did not know 
what to do with those foreigners who had lost the protection of their national 
government, they were forced to live outside the jurisdiction o f the law, interned in 
camps, which became “the only practical substitute for a non-existent homeland”793
Arendt writes that it was not so much the loss of a home which led to this 
situation, but the impossibility of finding a new home, which was a problem not o f 
“space but of political organisation ”794 In other words, the very construction of a world 
made up of territorial nation states with their rigid link between identity, territory and 
rights made that the internment camp was “the only place which the world had to offer 
the stateless.”795 The stateless and the refugees were not interned on account of what 
they had done, but because they did not fit within the territorial image of the world, and 
it seemed easier to deprive these innocent people of their right to have rights than those 
who had committed a crime.
In Hannah Arendt’s portrayal of the internment camps we do not encounter 
elements o f reform or enabling technologies of the rule of law. Rather, it presents us 
with an image o f exceptional ism, sovereign power that is reduced to violence, a 
situation in which the rule of law has reached its limits. Evidently, the rationale for this 
exceptional ism was the assumed threat of the stateless and the refugees to the unity o f 
the state and the overall order of the state system.
How then do contemporary immigration prisons feature in accounts of the 
modem state and the system it forms part of? Are they, like the confinement of the poor 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, essentially a means of territorial control 
and moral reform? Or, do they provide in addition, just as the penitentiary did in the 
nineteenth century, an opportunity for legal accountability? Alternatively, can they be 
compared with the exceptionalism of the internment camp for the stateless that was set 
up in Europe during and after the Second World War?
There are certainly similarities concerning the regulation o f human mobility in 
immigration detention in contemporary Europe and the historic examples o f internment 
that have been discussed above. We saw that the confinement of the poor as an answer
793 Arendt (1976), p. 284, p. 287.
794 Ibid., p.294
795 Ibid. 287.
to pauperism amounted to “territorial sedentarization” o f the poor so that “ fixed 
concentrations o f populations” could be produced.796 Similarly, the internment camp o f  
post-war Europe was a “standardized, generalizable technology of power in the 
management of mass displacement.”797 Liisa Malkki writes that these refugee camps 
were a device o f power as they provided for the spatial concentration and ordering o f  
people.798 The detention o f the unwanted foreigner in contemporary Europe can be seen 
as a comparable “sedentarization campaign” to regulate and control “surplus 
humanity” .799 Unlike confinement o f the poor and imprisonment as a response to crime, 
immigration prisons do not function as a site for reform. Instead of aiming at the 
production o f proper citizens, their sole aim consists o f  territorial control o f persons in 
order to keep the territorial ideal intact.
Hence, it is certainly helpful to place immigration detention in a historical 
perspective on imprisonment, for it shows us that unlike deportation, immigration 
detention is not simply a technology to preserve the territorial state system and its 
allocation o f citizens to states. In addition to being a means through which the national 
state, despite celebrations of universal human rights and assertions of post-national 
citizenship, violently guards the rigid link between territory, identity and rights, the 
immigration detention centre also provides an immediate place for those who do not fit 
within the territorial ideal of the world. The asylum seeker and the illegal immigrant 
“represent the nomadic excess that the state seeks to capture and normalize through 
panoptic confinement” in detention centres.800 Hence, immigration detention is an 
explicit exception to the assumption that all the world’s populations belong to a country, 
but at the same time, paradoxically, that very assumption is dependent on the existence 
of immigration detention.801
Furthermore, immigration detention is not only a way in which states violently 
guard the territoriality o f the global state system and provide a solution for what is 
perceived as an anomaly in that system; people between national borders. In addition, 
by resorting to immigration detention, they make ultimate use of territoriality’s logic:
796 Walters (2002), p. 286.
797 Malkki (1995), p. 498.
798 Ibid. p. 498.
799 Walters (2002), p. 286.
800 Diken and Laustscn (2003), p. 3.
8<” Walters (2002), p. 286.
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the territorial blind spot of individual rights protection as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Perhaps here we can draw an additional parallel between the post-war internment camps 
for refugees and the contemporary immigration prison. Territorial blindness of the law, 
a blindness that states seem only too eager to protect, has made the detention of 
thousands of people, simply because they crossed boundaries, possible and normal. 
Hannah Arendt argued that the internment camps were places of exceptionalism, where 
people were placed outside the normal legal order. With regard to the immigration 
prison the same argument can be made: the indiscriminate detention of thousands of 
people, sometimes for periods which are not bound to a maximum by law, under special 
security administration, special laws and wide administrative powers in places which 
are difficult to access and control, certainly gives the impression of being a practice 
which is outside the usual legal framework of the Rechtsstaat.
Bulent Diken and Carsten Laustsen recount the outbreak from the Australian 
detention camp Woomera, where fifty people managed to escape. Most of them were 
captured afterwards, but “they are unlikely to be prosecuted or jailed -  if they were, 
they would have visiting rights and a definite length of imprisonment, luxuries denied 
them as asylum seekers inside Woomera.802 Precisely this situation would qualify for 
what Arendt calls one of the perplexities inherent in the concept of human rights: “ it 
seems to easier to deprive a completely innocent person of legality than someone that 
has committed a crime.”803 We can regard the immigration prison as extra-territorial to 
the extent that it is outside the normal territorial legal and juridical order.804 However, 
this extra-territoriality is simultaneously governed by the logic of territoriality: only 
those who are not authorised by the state to be present on national territory will be 
subjected to detention under these exceptional conditions.
In addition, the immigration prison operates in the zone of indistinction between 
inside and outside in another, related sense as well. Its two folded logic of 
sedentarization and exceptionalism leads to what Giorgio Agamben has called 
“exclusionary inclusion”.805 Immigration detention is not solely about exclusion. For 
although detention puts refugees and illegal immigrants outside the normal legal 
framework of the liberal state, their life inside the immigration detention centre is
802 Diken and Laustsen (2003), p. 5 (quoting from the Guardian Weekly 25 May 2002. pp. 25-31).
803 Arendt (1976), p. 275.
804 Walters (2002), p. 286.
805 Agamben (1998).
strictly ruled and restricted by the law, and they are thus in a very real sense included in 
the state’s domain of sovereign power.806
According to Liza Schuster, the normalization o f detention as a way in which to 
deal with unwanted migration in contemporary Europe is disquieting. It exemplifies that 
it has become acceptable to treat certain categories of people as less deserving of dignity 
and less deserving of their human rights. She contends that, even disregarding the 
corrosive impact o f such practices on society as a whole,807 the way in which they affect 
the group that is targeted is unacceptable.808 However, whether immigration detention is 
a tale of mere exceptionalism or whether it has the potential to transform into a site for 
some kind o f legal investigation and accountability, is a question that remains to be 
answered. Just as the imprisonment o f criminals offered courts a venue through which 
to review the sovereign power to punish, I will argue in Chapter 8 that, however 
minimal the legal investigation o f practices o f immigration detention, it holds a promise 
of bringing about legal claims that can possibly unsettle the notion o f territorial 
sovereignty in an unprecedented manner. In order to address these issues 
comprehensively, we first need to examine closely the way in which contemporary 
human rights law features in cases of immigration detention. Chapter 6 and 7 will 
investigate whether and how international human rights law may provide for the legal 
accountability of practices of immigration detention.
5 .6 . Conclusions: Freedom o f  movement, sovereignty and rights in a
TERRITORIAL WORLD
5.6.1. Freedom of movement and territoriality’s implications
This Chapter has dealt with the exclusionary powers of the sovereign state. It 
has focussed on the dominant perception of sovereignty as entailing a right to exclude. 
Although the exclusion of the foreigner since the end o f the nineteenth century has been 
presented as self-evidently inherent in territorial sovereignty, we have seen that such
806 Diken and Laustsen (2003). p 2-3. See also Foucault (1989), p. 419-420.
807 See Neumann (2000) about the larger effects on society as a whole of what he calls ‘anomalous 
zones’.
808 Schuster (2005), p.618.
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self-evidence has not always been the case. Indeed, looking upon immigration as 
closely bound up with sovereignty’s territorial frame and falling within a field that is 
characterised by large executive discretion is a phenomenon that finds its origins in the 
late nineteenth century. At that time, under the influence o f political particularistic 
ideologies, the modern state’s link between sovereignty, identity and rights had become 
exclusive and rigid. In such a political context, it was easy to portray immigration as a 
threat to sovereignty’s claim to determine the inside from the outside and the unity of 
the state. As a result, it could become a domain that was largely excluded from normal 
processes o f legal accountability.
The tendency to depict immigration as a threat and a danger has gained 
momentum in the last three decades, during which it is being increasingly represented 
as a challenge to the modem state’s national identity and its welfare provisions 809 At 
present, the individual has no right to enter or stay in national territory without state 
authorisation and unauthorised entry or sojourn is seen as a violation of the state’s legal 
order with allegedly grave consequences for its public order and domestic stability.810 
The preponderance of this view in Europe is amongst other things reflected in a 
growing body of legislation codifying penal sanctions on illegal entry or stay in various 
Member States.
But at the same time, sovereignty has decreased in importance when it concerns 
matters relating to exit, as we have seen in the previous Chapter. While immigration has 
progressively more been turned into an issue of sovereign discretion in a securitized 
agenda, the question of exit has become regulated by the discourse of fundamental 
rights: everybody has the right to leave his or her country. In this concluding Section, I 
will seek to reconcile these seemingly opposing tendencies, which result in an 
unambiguous asymmetry in the international legal framework regulating international 
movement.
How can we explain that entry is regarded as a matter so very different from 
exit? It cannot be contended that entry is different from exit merely because sovereignty 
has become popular sovereignty, because, if sovereignty is located in the people, it is 
possible to argue that not only control over entry into, but also control over exit from 
that voting, resource and rights claiming population is crucial to protecting
809 Huysmans (2000). p. 752.
810 Anderson and Bigo (2002): Kostakopoulou (2004); and Huysmans (2000).
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sovereignty.811 This line of reasoning can be countered with the basic premise 
underlying popular sovereignty: the voluntary contract entails that everyone should b e  
free to decide whether or not to participate in the body politic. Nonetheless, although 
the latter argument can certainly be employed to claim a fundamental right to leave, it 
does not follow that there is no corresponding right to enter, as nothing in liberal theory 
justifies why solely a territorially predefined group is initially entitled to become party 
to the voluntary contract. Alternatively, arguments rooted in the communitarian 
tradition, maintaining that restrictions on entry are legitimate as they intend to protect 
an already defined community, whereas restrictions on exit replace commitment w ith 
coercion, perhaps serve to justify limitations on uncontrolled entry, but they do not in  
themselves show why coercion is not legitimate in the case of exit. Hence, neither they 
can explain the asymmetry of the present framework dealing with international freedom 
of movement.
The only way in which we are able to account for what at first seems a flagrant 
inconsistency in the contemporary system o f  movement controls is by taking into 
account the fundamental role that is played by territoriality. Two implications o f  
territoriality as an organising principle for the global political system are essential in 
explaining the contemporary regulation o f international movement.
In the first place, we need to consider territoriality’s function in allocating 
distinct populations to distinct states and the resultant territorial bias in the concept o f  
fundamental rights. In the second place, it is imperative to be aware o f the reification o f  
territoriality as a natural and innocent concept, which has led to a conceptual division 
within international law between sovereignty’s territorial frame and its content as the 
exercise o f jurisdiction within a given body politic. These two aspects of sovereignty 
are looked upon differently by international law: although the modem version of the 
rule of law has increasingly taken into account the personal interests that are involved in 
the jurisdictional content o f  state sovereignty, its territorial frame is considered neutral, 
resulting in the existence o f  largely unrestrained power whenever the state presents its 
claims as based upon sovereignty’s territorial frame.
In order to clarify how these two, mutually reinforcing, implications o f 
territoriality have shaped the global system of movement controls, I will address their
811 Shanks (2001), p. 268.
812 See Walzcr (1983).
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role in the overall framework of movement controls as was dealt with in this and the 
previous Chapter in Section 5.6.2. Subsequently, I will support my argument concerning 
territoriality’s importance by demonstrating in Section 5.6.3. how most limitations to 
the sovereign right to exclude, with particular emphasis on refugee law, operate from 
territoriality’s logic. We will see that the only exception to such particular territorial 
logic is constituted by international law’s prohibition on torture or cruel or degrading 
punishment. However, even with regard to this prohibition, states increasingly seek to 
evade their obligations by deterritorialising the tools with which they deal with 
unwanted immigration. Thus, even in the case that territory and rights have to a certain 
extent become decoupled, states strategically make use of what they stubbornly wish to 
perceive as the territoriality o f their responsibilities. Finally, in section 5.6.4., I will 
explain the appeal of immigration detention in particular as a response to unwanted 
immigration.
5.6.2. Territoriality and the asymm etry of international movement
European states’ insistence on their sovereign prerogative to control the entry 
and stay of foreign nationals has led to the contradictory situation that the function of 
Europe’s eastern frontiers in controlling individual movement do not differ much from 
their role during the Cold War. This situation is especially paradoxical because the same 
countries that were vilified by the West because they infringed the right to leave during 
the Communist era were shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall reprimanded for causing 
too many illegal entries in Western European countries.
The result is that a country such a Romania introduced extensive regulations 
concerning exit controls; regulations that, it could easily be argued, violate the right to 
leave in unambiguous terms. For instance, Romanian citizens who overstay their visa in 
EU countries can, upon return to Romania, be sanctioned by Romanian law from 
suspending the right of free circulation to the annulment of the right to bear a 
passport.813 In addition, anyone wishing to depart from Romanian territory must prove 
that he will return within three months by showing transportation documents pertaining 
to a round trip. Furthermore, possession of an amount of €100 per day and a valid health
813 Lazaroiu and Alexandra (2005). p. 6.
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insurance must guarantee that the traveller will not fall back on public funds of the host 
country.814
All o f these requirements constitute interferences with the right to leave.815 As 
we have seen in Chapter 4, restrictions on the right to leave can only be invoked under a  
limited number o f circumstances. It is highly disputable whether the fight against 
irregular immigration by another country constitutes a justifiable ground for interfering 
with the right to leave. Invoking the public interest of another country in order to restrict 
fundamental rights o f nationals is, to say the least, unusual. A complicating 
circumstance with regard to the judicial scrutiny o f such interferences is that it will 
almost be impossible to assess their necessity and proportionality. Clearly, these new  
regulations on the part o f Romania are motivated by a wish to acquire good relations 
with the EU, with an eye on possible future accession.
Detailed exit regulations such as discussed above exemplify unambiguously how 
the right to leave in the national context is affected by the exclusionary powers of other 
states. In the conclusions to Chapter 4 , 1 have referred to various attempts made by third 
states to stem “illegal emigration”, a concept that in this context is not so much 
introduced in order to protect a clearly defined national interest, but resulting from the 
wish to assist Western states to stem the flows o f unwanted immigration816
However, also without any action on the part o f  the state who ought to guarantee 
the right to leave, that right is factually jeopardised by everyday practices o f Western 
states: visa policies, readmission agreements, the stationing of airport liaison officers in 
other countries and the vigilant patrolling of borders by use of watch towers, military 
and police all result in the inability o f individuals to exercise their right to leave. Thus, 
it has been said that “instead o f being chained to the soil of a feudal lord, the twentieth 
century poor gradually became chained to the territory of their countries of origin 
because other countries’ rules forbade them entry.”817 A new step in the 
* externalisation’ of border control is the recent launch of EU patrols in the
814 Ibid. p. 6.
815 General Comment 27 (Sixty-seventh session, 1999) at 8.
8 ,61.e. in August 2006, the Senegalese police forces in  Basse-Casamance interrogated 58 people who 
wanted to migrate ‘illegally’ to Spain. Source: JeuneAfrique.com, 3 august 2006, Senegal. Senegalese 
authorities announced that they arrested 15000 candidates for ‘illegal’ emigration. Source: AFP. 22 May
2006.
817 Dummct and Nicol (1990), p. 13.
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Mediterranean under the auspices of Frontex. Already since June 2006, several Spanish 
boats patrol Mauritanian territorial waters, in order to prevent ‘clandestine emigrations’. 
These policies have the declared aim o f being a deterrent for people who want to leave: 
“L'objectif est dissuasif. Il faut que les candidats à l'émigration réalisent que les pays 
Européens sont là, bien présents, et qu'ils ne pourront pas partir."818
At first sight, a legal regime o f  international movement that allows for these 
inconsistencies seems illogical819 However, as I have said, we need to understand that 
the contemporary system of movement controls is rooted in territoriality. Chapter 3 
described how the international state system based on territoriality does not only 
constitute states and regulate conduct between them. It also brings about a dispersed 
regime of governance covering the overall population of the states concerned.820 This 
situation is reflected in international law, with its central notion that the state occupies a 
definite part o f the earth within which it exercises jurisdiction over people to the 
exclusion o f other states. International law in this sense is a distributing mechanism for 
determining which state can exercise sovereignty over a certain, well-defined group of 
people.821
We have also seen that the rule of law requires that the exercise of sovereignty 
entails responsibility as well, a responsibility on the part of the state that has become 
embodied in the concept of fundamental rights. The result of territoriality’s function of 
allocating distinct populations to distinct states is that rights, territory and authority have 
become linked to each other. Thus, the right to leave is to be guaranteed for its 
bestowment is upon people for whom the state clearly bears responsibility: those who 
are present within its boundaries. However, the claim of an individual to enter a state of 
which he is not a national falls outside the unassailable triangle o f rights, territory and 
authority: it is a claim that is made by an individual to whom the state has no 
relationship according to international law and it is thus impossible to translate that 
particular claim in the language of rights.
Hence, international movement shows the very limitations of a discourse o f 
universal rights antecedently and independently of any political power, which has to 
operate in a territorial world. The asymmetry between the right to enter and the right to
818 Eduardo Lobo. the Spanish coordinator of the project. Source: Le Monde (12 August 2006).
819 See McGrath Dale (1991).
820 Hindcss( 1998), p. 65.
821 McCorquodale (2001). p. 142.
leave becomes understandable when we realise that territoriality’s function in 
determining who belongs where, effectively also ascribes the responsibility for the 
protection o f individual rights to a particular state.
In addition to territoriality’s structuring role in the global political system, we 
have seen in Chapter 3 that territoriality has also led to the perception of territory as a 
self-evident and innocent foundation for the body politic in the domestic context. This 
perception in turn has resulted in little awareness of the individual interests that are 
involved in sovereignty’s territorial frame, whereas the exercise of the state’s 
jurisdiction over people within this territorial frame has in the course of history been 
made subject to various processes of legal accountability. Indeed, "‘norms o f human 
dignity, whose enforcement was hitherto locked into state jurisdiction, have seen states 
yielding jurisdiction, but not territory which remains doctrinally entrenched.”822
The fact that norms relating to human dignity have made a fundamental 
difference with regard to the right to leave, while leaving national discretion with regard 
to matters o f exclusion largely intact can partly be explained by this conceptual 
distinction between sovereignty’s form and content. Even though the right to  leave also 
concerns sovereignty’s territorial frame, the visibility o f  the personal interests involved 
have caused the issue of leaving to become a jurisdictional issue of the modem state 
where individual rights have an established role to play, while the implications of 
emigration for territorial sovereignty remain hidden and silent.
With regard to the right to enter, it is precisely the other way around. 
Immigration is presented as engaging solely sovereignty’s territorial frame, frequently 
even in a language that implicitly or explicitly alludes to the sanctity o f territorial 
boundaries in the context o f armed conflict.823 Notwithstanding the fact that in order to 
prevent people from entering national territory and to remove them from it, 
sovereignty’s content must actively be employed, it is the neutral territorial form of 
sovereignty that is put forward to justify an absolute right to exclude. The near 
blindness o f  modem human rights law for the personal interests that are involved in 
sovereignty’s right to exclude is in this construction exacerbated by the fact that these
8”  Panglangan (2001). p. 165
823 See for example U.S Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
(1889), p. 606.) The common use of the word ‘invasion' when discussing immigration, in particular by 
those advocating an absolute right to exclude provides a more recent example of the same attitude as was 
taken in this latter case.
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are the interests o f others, who are far away, or very different. In other words, often 
these interests are frequently literally invisible as well.
International human rights’ distinction between sovereignty’s form and content 
does not only surface when we look at the difference in legal recognition between the 
right to enter and the right to leave, but it is also apparent from the way in which the 
proliferation of human rights norms in the last sixty years has made significant inroads 
in the state’s power to exclude legally residing aliens, a subject which has received 
attention in Section 3.5.2. of Chapter 3. The state is no longer capable to dispose aliens 
at will once their entry or sojourn has been authorised. However, these norms have not 
“markedly increased rights entitlements at the moment of border crossing,” nor have 
they “significantly increased access to human rights for those without legal status, those 
illegals beyond the reach of law but at the centre of present rhetoric.”824 Human rights 
law’s differentiation between the legal resident and the illegal immigrant here lies 
precisely in the alleged violation of the latter of the territorial sovereignty of the state. In 
addition, with regard to legal residents who are present within the territory o f the 
sovereign state, the jurisdictional aspect of sovereignty cannot remain hidden: precisely 
on account of their authorised presence, their interests have become visible.
There is one last example that I want to address in order to draw attention to the 
import of territoriality upon the general framework of freedom of movement. When 
contrasting contemporary views on internal freedom of movement (i.e. within the 
territory of the national state) with international freedom of movement, the reification o f 
territory as a natural foundation for political organisation is illustrated in yet another 
way. Internal freedom of movement is seen as one o f the hallmarks of democracy.825 
Restrictions upon it, such as in South Africa under apartheid and the Soviet Union under 
communism were generally and unequivocally condemned.826 While freedom of 
movement within a country is regarded as an indispensable condition for free 
development of the individual,827 international freedom of movement is nearly always 
subordinated to state interest. In the uneven perception of domestic and international
824 Dauvergnc (2004).
825 Vestal (1955-1956), p. 14. Internal freedom of movement is guaranteed by all major human rights 
instruments. See for example Article 12 (1) ICCPR; Article 2(1) Protocol 4 ECHR; and Article 22(1) 
American Convention on Human Rights.
826 Higgins (1973). p. 343.
827HRC, General Comment 27 (Sixty-seventh session 1999).
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movement, the interconnectedness o f  territoriality’s two implications becomes most 
palpable. On account o f territoriality, the territorial state has become “the primary 
category in understandings of the political”, and "the categories through which we have 
attempted to pose questions about the political are precisely those that have been 
constructed in relation to the state.”828 Thus internal movement is a matter for scrutiny 
as it concerns processes taking place within the nation state, whereas international 
movement presents an anomaly for a world where humanity is divided in “separate, 
closed and homogenous units at various stages o f development ”829
Perceptions on freedom o f movement exemplify the modem tension between the 
universal and the particular in a world divided into nation states: universal values are 
factually aspired and achieved solely within the nation state. In addition, the distinction 
between sovereignty’s form and content plays an important role here as well: it is clear 
that the regulation of internal movement merely concerns the exercise o f jurisdiction 
over persons within a given body politic, whereas international movement impinges 
significantly on sovereignty’s territorial frame.
5,6.3. Territoriality and limitations on the state’s exclusionary powers
“Because o f the way we label, define and categorise people who move, we obscure and make 
invisible their actual lived experience.”830
“A refugee is an anomaly in a world where the human population is managed by ‘belonging’ to 
a sovereign state as a national citizen. It is as a citizen o f an exclusive state community that one 
can enjoy the ‘universal’ principles o f equality, fraternity and liberty. A refugee is someone 
without the protection o f her state and must seek protection in anotlicr state, where she is ‘out of 
place’. Refugeehood indicates a transgression of the social contract between the state and its 
citizen. The propose o f international protection is to provide a surrogate state citizen condition 
until an authentic one can be established through repauiatioa integration and/or settlement -  the 
durable solutions for refugees. A durable solution is one that creates or restores the bond 
betw een a person as a citizen and a state as her legal protector.”831
8"8 Jam s and Paolini (1995), p. 5. 
8:9 Tully, p. 187.
830 Crosby (2006). p. 3.
831 Lui (2002), at 57.
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Territoriality’s implications persist in the instruments that aim to constrain the 
state’s exclusionary powers. Even in the situation in which general international norms 
limit the assertion of territorial sovereignty, less scope to rule of law considerations is 
given than in those cases that merely concern the state’s exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals. One example is that norms with regard to judicial review of exclusionary 
powers are not very well developed, as we have seen in Section 5.3.1. That Section also 
showed that whenever a national state’s public order or national security is allegedly 
threatened, international norms restricting exclusionary powers lose much of their 
strength. Here again we encounter an asymmetry with regard to the right to leave that 
cannot be understood when we disregard fundamental rights discourse’s rootedness in 
territoriality. In this Section I will argue that even though international law’s limitations 
on the state’s exercise of sovereignty in matters of immigration may appear as 
exceptions to territoriality’s logic, in essence most of these limitations operate from that 
very logic.
In Section 5.2., I have already touched upon the relationship between the 
emergence of international refugee law and the way in which national identity, rights 
and territoiy had become linked in the beginning o f the twentieth century. Refugees 
internationally, just as minorities within national boundaries, presented a challenge to 
the territorial state system, and the institution of asylum, just as the system of minority 
protection, intended to ensure that the Westphalian image of the world kept its validity. 
Robin Lui argues that emergence of refugee law was crucial to the management o f 
population displacement and refugee law itself served to affirm the significance o f an 
international order of states as an mechanism to govern human populations and to 
realise peace and stability.832 In order to see this clearly we need to understand the 
central position o f the national state within classical refugee law.
In the first place, we have seen that the granting o f asylum is part o f the 
competence arising from the territorial sovereignty o f the sovereign state.833 No right of 
asylum on the part of the individual exists in international law. Secondly, the state is 
central for the definition of the concept of persecution in the refugee definition: the 
Geneva Convention does not protect against any kind of harm, but only then when there 
is “a risk of a type of injury that would be inconsistent with the basic duty of protection
83: Lui (2002).
833 Oda (1968), p. 490
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owed by a state to its own population.”834 Asylum law is a form of subsidiary human 
rights protection, a back-up system in the case that the normal way in which individual 
rights are guaranteed, has failed.835 Just as citizenship then, asylum law works from the 
territorial premise that allocates the responsibility over distinct populations to distinct 
states. In the third place, the definition of the refugee reveals the centrality o f the 
national state in a further sense:
( ...)  in international law a refugee is defined solely in state terms. The Geneva Convention and 
other international legal agreements limit refugee status to those w ho have left their state o f 
origin because of persecution or violence and who are unable to return for the same rcasoa In 
practice this means that an Ibo woman who is forced to leave her homeland in Nigeria can claim 
refugee status if she moves across the border into the Ibo part of Cameroon, but not if she moves 
in a culturally alien part of Nigeria.836
Thus, the extent to which international refugee law is capable of offering 
protection is dependent on the way in which territorial boundaries are drawn. Robyn Lui 
writes that “categorisation and characterisation o f population displacement are 
techniques o f ordering” and she argues that the question of who is included and 
excluded from the category of 'refugee' is just as important as inclusion and exclusion 
from the nation-state community. Indeed, the answer to both o f these questions is 
decided by the way in which rights, territory and political authority have become linked 
in a historically specific way. The “techniques o f ordering” to which Lui refers, reflect 
the territorial ideal in which this linkage is embodied. Just as the territorial ideal has 
determined the way in which rights are guaranteed in the context of domestic law, in 
international refugee law it affects the extent o f rights to be enjoyed by the individual as 
well. Internationally, the legal position of the Ibo woman who did not cross any national 
border is much less secure than that of her sister who did: there are several area’s of 
insufficient protection and various clear gaps in the international law that deals with 
internally displaced persons.838
834 Hathaway (1991). p. 104.
835 Nathwani (2003).
836 Murphy (1996), p. 105.
837 Lui (2002), at 66.
838 See UN Representative of the Secretary-General (1995).
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The centrality of the state within traditional refugee law is understandable when 
we consider the period in which the international refugee regime emerged. According to 
James Hathaway, the physical presence of a person outside her country of origin was 
not so much a constitutive element of her refugeehood, but rather a practical condition 
precedent to placing her within the effective scope of international protection. He argues 
that when refugee law developed it was unthinkable that it would intervene in the 
territory of a sovereign state to protect citizens from their own government.839
We have seen that contemporary international human rights law aims at the 
creation of a constitutional order over and across national boundaries. In contrast to 
classical international law, international human rights are much less concerned with the 
principle of non-intervention or the notion of domestic jurisdiction. Below, I will 
answer the question whether this has reduced the logic of territoriality in international 
law’s attempts to limit the sovereign right to exclude.
We have seen that the principle of non-refoulement, which originates from 
traditional refugee law, has significantly expanded under the influence of human rights 
law. Especially the prohibition on torture and other inhuman or degrading punishment 
has played a major role in diminishing the state-centred, territorial focus in classical 
asylum law. Refoulement is prohibited to any territory where there is a real risk of 
torture or other cruel or inhuman treatment as a result o f refoulement. For the 
interpretation by the ECtHR of Article 3 ECHR it is irrelevant whether the state bears 
responsibility, directly or indirectly, for the prohibited treatment. Thus, territoriality’s 
logic, by which different states are accorded responsibility for separate populations, is 
absent from the Court’s application of Article 3 ECHR. The HRC applies the relevant 
law in the same manner. In addition, by applying the prohibition on torture and other 
cruel or degrading treatment on asylum seekers and other persons who are not 
authorised to enter or stay on national territory, it is made explicit that individual 
interests are positively involved in sovereignty’s territorial frame. This important 
recognition on the part of the ECtHR is in fact only emphasised by its frequent 
reiteration that there is no right of an alien to enter or to reside in a particular country as 
such guaranteed by the Convention, and that as a matter of well-established 
international law, a state has the right to control the entry o f non-nationals into its 
territory.
839 Hathaway (1991), p. 30-31. Cf. Chimni (2000). p. 392.
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However, it should also be noted that the individual interests that may be 
implicated in sovereignty’s territorial frame are narrowly interpreted, both by the 
ECtHR and the HRC. The real risk construction is only applied to the prohibition o f  
cruel or degrading treatment and occasionally to the right to life. Territorial exclusion 
that may result in the violation o f  other fundamental rights is generally not a reason to 
prohibit refoulement. Nonetheless, there is no logical reason why a consistent 
application o f the way in which the norm of non-refoulement is constructed in Article 3 
ECHR in cases where other fundamental rights are involved, would not lead to 
comparable limitations on the sovereign right to exclude.
Hence, modem human rights law has only in a limited amount o f cases 
decoupled territory and rights: apart from the right to life and physical integrity it still 
accords the responsibility for safeguarding individual rights according to territoriality’s 
logic. Neither does it concede that sovereignty’s territorial frame and the resulting use 
o f the state’s spatial powers may involve other individual interests than those related to 
the physical integrity or the right to life of the individual, that is, with the possible 
exception o f an individual’s family life, to which I will turn now.
In Section 5.3.3., I have investigated the way in which the right to  family life 
may limit the sovereign state’s exclusionary powers. At first sight it seems that the way 
in which the ECtHR applies Article 8 ECHR (and similar case law o f the HRC based on 
Article 7 ICCPR) in exclusion cases amounts to recognition that individual interests are 
involved in the assertion of a state’s territorial sovereignty. For a right to enter or 
remain is constructed on account o f the interest of the individual in being able to enjoy 
an effective family life. Nonetheless, when this proposition is closely scrutinised it 
becomes clear that family rights can only constitute a barrier to the state’s exclusionary 
powers if  a person’s family members are legally residing within the state’s territory. 
This observation serves to illustrate that when the state’s exclusionary powers are 
limited by an individual’s family rights, there is a direct link with sovereignty’s 
jurisdictional content, and that, in applying Article 8 ECHR, the Court employs the 
traditional construction by which responsibility for the safeguarding o f rights is 
assigned to states according to territoriality’s logic. Thus, limitations on sovereignty in 
matters o f  exclusion on account o f family rights differ fundamentally from the 
prohibition o f refoulement that I have discussed above.
Even so, it should nevertheless be valued that in the case law of the ECtHR and 
the HRC, the interest of the individual in the enjoyment o f his family life has at times
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been able to override the state’s exclusionary powers. On the other hand, the ECtHR 
and the HRC seem to consider the right to control entry and residence on national 
territory in itself as a fundamental interest of the state, from which only special 
circumstances can cause a departure. However, recent case law of the ECtHR, which 
takes the notion o f suitable family life as a point o f reference, suggests a growing 
reluctance to endorse territorial sovereignty’s aim of allocating distinct populations to 
separate states by the use of a formal concept such as nationality.
This does not signal an overall departure on the part of the ECtHR from the 
importance which international law attaches to the concept o f territorial sovereignty in 
immigration law. The way in which that court deals with family life established while 
an applicant was unlawfully in the state’s territory, and the distinction between positive 
and negative obligations in its case law, exemplify the remaining reification o f 
territorial sovereignty and the distinction between sovereignty’s territorial frame and its 
jurisdictional content within a given body politic. We have seen that international law 
regards an individual whose presence on national territory is illegal as someone who has 
never entered. The Court in Strasbourg follows this construction, therewith construing 
the family rights to which the undocumented migrant may appeal so as to relate to 
entry. These rights are subsequently seen as corresponding to a positive obligation o f 
the state.
Similarly, the refusal of entry is not viewed as an interference with somebody’s 
family rights because a right to enter is not regarded as to correspond to a negative 
obligation of the state (to abstain from any action) but instead as pertaining to a positive 
obligation. However, in it important to understand that these legal fictions do not reflect 
any actual situation: in order to prevent entry or to remove irregular migrants from its 
territory, the national state is actively and positively performing. By structuring rights 
discourse in such a way as to give priority to the fiction of territorial sovereignty over 
the actualities of the exercise of jurisdiction over individual’s lives, human rights law 
feeds “the contradiction between undocumented migrants’ physical and social presence 
and their official negation as ‘illegals’.”840 Again we see illustrated the invisibility o f 
the personal interests that are affected by state power whenever sovereignty’s claims are 
predominantly based on sovereignty’s territorial form.
840 Dc Genova (2002), p. 427.
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In Chapter 3, I have argued that three separate perspectives are important to  
understand the way in which territory and fundamental rights interact. In Section 
3.5.3.1., I argued that territoriality has construed space as a political concept, which 
concept subsequently determines who has actual access to fundamental rights, 
notwithstanding the alleged universality of these rights. In addition, in Section 3.5.3.2., I 
have made the claim that on account o f its reification in the modem world, territoriality 
has resulted in virtual silence on the part of human rights when it comes to the exercise 
of the state’s spatial powers whenever they are a direct result of sovereignty’s territorial 
frame. These implications of territoriality on human rights law have been applied to the 
specific context of freedom o f movement and the sovereign right to exclude in the 
previous paragraphs.
W e have seen that the only instance in which human rights appear to succeed in 
overcoming territoriality’s limiting influence is in the application o f the prohibition on 
inhuman and degrading treatment. Thus, it seemed justified to conclude that territory 
and rights are decoupled in the case that the state’s exclusionary powers are constrained 
by a norm such as contained in Article 3 ECHR. However, in reaching this conclusion a 
third perspective on the relationship between territory and international human rights 
law has not yet been considered. In Section 3.5.3.1. o f Chapter 3 ,1 have also looked at 
the territorial scope of the human rights obligations o f the state. We have seen that the 
issue of state responsibility for extra-territorial acts is a complex matter, mainly on 
account of the diverging interpretations that have been given to the term jurisdiction. 
Especially the recent decision by the ECtHR in Bcmkovic does not help in laying down 
clear-cut guidelines for determining when a state can be held responsible for extra­
territorial acts.
In the more recent cases that are decided in Strasbourg, the Court has considered 
recognition o f  the exercise o f  acts of extra-territorial jurisdiction exceptional. In 
Bcmkovic it held onto an understanding of jurisdiction in the classic sense, as a concept 
that regulates the relations of sovereign states amongst each other. I have already 
observed in Chapter 3 that such an interpretation fits ill within a system for the 
protection o f individual rights. Especially the Court’s observations regarding the legal 
space that the Convention aims to cover,841 remind o f the old blue print of citizenship, 
in which territory is determinative for the extent of rights to be enjoyed, precisely the
841 EClHR, Bcmkovic and Others v. Belgium (inadmissible), 12 December 2001, §80.
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situation that modem human rights law wished to thwart. Indeed, if  consistently applied, 
holding that the Convention only applies within the legal space that it normally aims to 
cover leads to “a rather distasteful distinction between what Contracting Parties can do 
‘at home’ and what they can do ‘abroad’, and, by implication, between ‘us’ and 
‘them’.”842 Nonetheless, it should be reiterated that the narrow interpretation that was 
given to extra-territorial responsibility for human rights violations in Bankovic was 
mitigated again in later cases decided by the Court.
The issue o f extra-territorial responsibility for actions that affect the fundamental 
rights o f individuals is of particular importance in the context of the contemporary 
regulation of international movement. We have seen that especially in the context of the 
EU, there has occurred a spatial extension of control far from the EU’s actual 
frontiers.843 Police a  distance methods such as visa polices; the stationing of airport 
liaison officers in host countries; interception practices at the high seas; and plans for 
the extraterritorial processing of refugee claims, all point to  sovereign states’ wish to 
control international movement without having to assume responsibility. In these 
practices we can discern Western states’ perception that possible loopholes in an 
internationally administered rule of law lie precisely in what they perceive as the 
territoriality of their responsibilities. Australia’s ‘pacific solution’ as was described in 
Section 5.4.2. o f this Chapter provides a good example of just such an approach. The 
incident in 2001, in which the MV Tampa, a Norwegian ship carrying 422 asylum 
seekers who were rescued at sea, was prevented from entering Australian waters, 
provides a dispiriting illustration of Australia’s position that its responsibility for the 
protection o f fundamental rights is limited by its territorial boundaries. In addition, 
Australia resorts to immigration detention outside its national territory in order to deny 
refugees and other immigrants fundamental rights.
Employing a similar logic, the United States has maintained that its policy o f 
intercepting Haitian refugees on the high seas and returning them to Haiti did not 
violate international law as the principle of non-refoulement was not applicable in a 
situation where a person is returned from the high seas to the territory from which he 
fled.844 The United States Supreme Court concurred with this view, observing that
842 Happold (2003), p. 88.
843 Samers (2004). p. 43.
844 Submissions of the United States in Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the Haitian Centre 
fo r  Human Rights et. AI, v. United States, 13 March 1997.
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although gathering fleeing refugees and returning them to the one country they had 
desperately sought to escape may violate the spirit o f Article 33 o f the Refugee 
Convention, general humanitarian intent cannot impose uncontemplated obligations on 
treaty signatories845 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in contrast 
approached the matter not from the perspective of the Refugee Convention, but instead 
it scrutinised the U.S. Executive Order that directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels 
illegally transporting passengers from Haiti to the United States and to return those 
passengers to Haiti, in the light of the provisions laid down in the American Convention 
of Human Rights. It held that not only did the Order infringe the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum as guaranteed by the American Convention, but in addition, it violated the right 
to life and security, as some of the persons thus returned were subsequently killed or
O J /
tortured by the Haitian government. The fact that these violations occurred on the 
high seas, thus not within United States territory did not impede the IACHR from 
drawing this conclusion.
In the light of the Ocalan case, in which it stressed the existence o f  physical 
control and actual authority by agents o f the state when acting extra-territorially, it is 
doubtful whether the ECtHR would recognise that functions performed by airport 
liaison officers would constitute an exercise of jurisdiction as meant in Article 1 
ECtHR. In a case that was brought before the House o f  Lords, appellants were refused 
leave to enter the UK by British immigration officers who were, by agreement between 
the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, stationed at Prague Airport. In effect, this 
meant that they were effectively hindered from boarding a plane bound for that country. 
The House o f Lords did not squarely answer the question whether the actions performed 
by these officials constituted the exercise o f extra-territorial jurisdiction, but it 
expressed the gravest doubt that they would. In addition, it considered that, even if it 
would allow for the assumption that the United Kingdom exercised its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially in this case, appellants were at any time free to travel to another 
country or to travel to the United Kingdom otherwise than by air from Prague. Thus, 
there could be no question o f a violation of Article 2, nor of Article 3 ECHR.847 These
815 US Supreme Court, Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Sendee, Et. A i v. 
Haitian Centers Council, INC., Et. A l No. 92-344, decided June 1991 (1993).
846 Inter-American CommHR, the Haitian Centre for Human Rights et. Al. v. Cm ted States. 13 March 
1997.
847 House of Lords, Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, 9 December 2004. at 21,
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observations contrast sharply with the arguments submitted by the UNHCR in its 
amicus curiae brief that it filed in the same case.848 By claiming that the United 
Kingdom effectively extended its frontier into the Czech Republic, the UNHCR 
recognised that the stationing o f airport liaison officers leads to a separation between the 
concept o f the border and the perimeter of British territory. It was argued that in this 
situation, the United Kingdom should remain bound by its international obligations, and 
that close scrutiny is required of extra-territorial measures that impinge on human 
rights, as regular access to the courts may be restricted for practical or jurisdictional
849reasons.
However, the “shipping out” o f the control agenda entails more than placing 
police and customs officers in third country airports, as is illustrated by Frontex’s 
project to install patrols in the territorial waters of Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde. 
The intent of these patrols, which are carried out with the aid o f the individual Member 
States Finland, Spain and Portugal, is clear: prevention o f international movement. 
Spain and Senegal reached agreement over joint patrols commandeered by two vessels 
of the Spanish Guardia Civil in Senegal’s territorial waters.850 In August 2006, a 
Portuguese patrol vessel arrived at Cape Verde for a 45-day mission against ‘illegal’ 
migration.851 The Spanish-Mauritanian patrols that have been running since April 2006 
have resulted in the interception of several hundreds o f emigrants.852 Those individuals 
are intercepted by joint operations between individual EU Member States and third 
countries and are subsequently put aboard military vessels that are controlled and 
owned by EU Member States.
However, in view of Frontex’s imprecise role in these operations and the 
vagueness surrounding the legal bases on which these schemes of international 
cooperation operate, it is uncertain whether the ECtHR would be willing to recognise 
that the actions o f the Member States involved constitute an instance of the exercise o f 
jurisdiction for the purposes o f Article 1 ECHR.853 If  it would recognise that operations 
o f Member States that lead to the arrest of individuals in the coastal waters of certain
848 UNHCR (2005).
849 Ibid. p. 452.
850 Source: Reuters. 22 August 2006.
851 Source: JeuneAfrique. 12 August 2006.
85~ Source: Agence Presse, 14 august 2006.
853 See ECtHR, Hussein v. Albania and others (Inadmissible). 14 March 2006.
249
A J L J
West African countries involve the exercise o f their jurisdiction, complex issues would 
arise with respect to Article 5 ECHR854 and Article 2 Protocol 4 ECHR. In that case, it 
is difficult to see how the Member State involved could avoid being condemned for 
violating the right to leave as laid down in the latter provision.
The question as to how extra-territorial measures in the field of immigration 
may or may not engage the responsibility of states in the interpretation of (inter)national 
courts is without doubt an interesting and highly significant one. The legal complexities 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction are compounded by the fact that extra-territorial measures 
targeting international movement are increasingly carried out in the framework of the 
EU.855 But even without meticulously analysing these complexities, the very fact that 
states turn to  police a distance policies, reveals that they themselves feel that access to 
the perimeter o f their territory is decisive for the extent o f rights to be enjoyed, also with 
regard to their obligations flowing from the norm contained in Article 3 ECHR. And 
once again, irrespective o f how a court of law may judge such an assumption, it 
certainly reflects contemporary reality where in most cases, access to fundamental rights 
remains inexorably linked to territory because:
For obvious reasons there are very few cases which could in fact cliallenge the policies 
constituting the non-arrival regime because the concerned individuals rarely get the chance to get 
in close contact with a lawyer who could bring their cases to court.856
5.6.4. Maintaining the territorial order
It is important to realise that immigration policies are not merely a result of the 
contemporaiy system of territoriality. Practices such as deportation and detention 
actively contribute in reproducing the territorial order in which different populations are 
ascribed to distinct states. In this sense, immigration laws are not only a “functional by-
85-1 ECtHR, Ocalart v. Turkey, 12 March 2003: and EcommHR. Stocké v. Germany, Decision of 12 
October 1989.
855 Thereby introducing even more aspects to be considered with regard to Article 1 ECHR and the 
application of the Convention See ECtHR, Bosphorus etc. v. Turkey, 30 June 2005. §§136-137 and 156.
856 Kjaerum (2002). pp. 525-526.
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product of some presumed (and thus teleological) structural logic,”857 but they are 
essential in maintaining the territorial status quo. The distinctiveness of immigration 
detention in particular is that it provides a territorial solution for a problem which is 
perceived as a problem precisely because it cannot be reduced to a territorial solution. 
Moreover, the appeal for national states in resorting to immigration detention lies in its 
additional value o f providing an extra-territorial way to deal with unwanted 
immigration. As a result, they can evade regular constitutional norms that apply to 
domestic deprivations of liberty. It is noteworthy that, during the nineties, infamous 
Guantanamo was used by the U.S. government to detain Haitian and Cuban asylum- 
seekers, who could not rely on a constitutional right to liberty by invoking the habeas 
corpus jurisdiction of federal courts 858
Hence, by resorting to immigration detention, national states do not only aim to 
protect the territoriality of fundamental rights protection, but in addition, they seek to 
make ultimate use of its territorial blind spot. In the remaining Chapters of this study, I 
will analyse whether the application of international human rights to cases of 
immigration detention is capable of reversing this situation.
857 De Genova (2002), p. 424.
858 Cuban American Bar Association v. Christopher, 43 F. 3d 1412.1425 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Chapter 6 Immigration detention and international human rights
6.1. Introduction
In this and the next Chapter o f this study, I will deal with the way in which the  
international discourse o f human rights has posed limits to the state’s power to resort to  
immigration detention. I will focus on the international regime of human rights instead 
o f particular national constitutional discourses, because of international human rights’ 
explicit aim of overcoming the ‘particular universalism’ that one finds in traditional 
versions o f the rule of law. Moreover, I will limit my investigation to the application o f  
international human rights by international bodies, with particular emphasis on the 
ECtHR. That is not because national courts do not have an important role to play in this 
area: for we have seen in Chapter 3 that especially with regard to the modern version o f  
the rule o f law, the distinction between national and international law has become a 
blurred one. International law in this field has a decisive impact on individual rights 
protection at the national level as domestic courts may apply a broad range o f  
international norms pertaining to the protection of human dignity. However, for reasons 
concerning the length o f this study, I will not examine the role o f national courts in 
cases of immigration detention apart from occasional references as illustrations for a 
particular argument or position.
In Chapter 1, we have seen that the use o f immigration detention by EU Member 
States can be divided in three categories. These are detention upon arrival; detention o f 
individuals within the asylum system; and detention as a result of a decision to deport or 
expulse the foreigner. In all these three, sometimes overlapping, instances, detention is 
employed in order to protect and vindicate the presupposed sovereign right o f the state 
to decide on matters of entry and stay o f foreign nationals, as was elaborated upon in the 
previous Chapter. There we have also seen that the practice of detention is not only the 
result of a particular conception o f (territorial) sovereignty that holds that refusal o f 
entry of foreign nationals and removal of persons not lawfully within the state’s
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tenritory fall almost wholly within the state’s sovereign discretion. Detention is also 
essential in maintaining the territorial status quo of a global political system based on 
territoriality. Furthermore, in the overview regarding state practice in this area that was 
provided in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1.2.), it has become clear that many regular 
constitutional norms either are not applicable, or they are for a variety of reasons not 
applied by national states to the deprivation of liberty under immigration legislation. 
The perceived neutrality and naturalness of sovereignty’s territorial frame has led to a 
territorial blind spot in the rule o f law, which in turn has made detention an attractive 
policy option -  on account of its perceived unassailability -  for national governments 
wishing to fight irregular immigration and decrease the numbers of asylum applications.
A good illustration o f this position is given by Australia’s submissions in some 
of the cases that were brought against it before the HRC. Australia has mandatory 
detention provisions in its alien’s legislation, and unlawful arrivals must be arrested on 
arrival and cannot be released except when a residence permit is granted 859 Australia 
maintains that the purposes of such detention reflect the state’s sovereign right under 
international law to regulate the admittance of aliens, and hence such detention cannot 
be unjust, inappropriate or improper.860 Its reasoning is not logical from a legal 
perspective -  it is saying that if  a certain state act flows from a sovereign right 
recognised under international law, it cannot be in violation o f a fundamental right. 
Such an argument by a liberal democracy would be inconceivable in a purely ‘domestic’ 
context -  dealing with, say, freedom of expression -  where only the content of 
sovereignty and not also its territorial frame played a role.
However, when defending policies of immigration detention it is all but 
exceptional to find such statements issued by national governments and they provide 
outstanding examples of the assumption that the territorial frame of sovereignty is 
immune to forces of legal correction and thus forms an “unproblematic and legitimate 
site of legal violence”.861 Another, slightly more disguised, illustration of that 
assumption can be found in the contentions of the Belgium government in the Canka 
Case before the ECtHR, in which it stated that to employ a ‘little ruse’ in order to arrest 
irregular migrants and subsequently detain them could not be illegal as they had been
8'9 1958 Migration A ct Section 189.
860 For example: Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 6 November 2003.
861 Burke (2002), at 14. with regard to sovereignty in general.
861 De Genova (2002). p. 424.
served with orders to leave the territory, which expressly stated that they were liable to  
detention with a view to deportation if  they failed to comply.862
In the remainder of this study, I will analyse whether international human rights 
may destabilize such a perception of sovereignty’s territorial frame. Due the its unique 
manner o f implementation and the right o f the individual to appeal directly to the 
ECtHR, the case law o f this Court is arguably be the best place to conduct such an 
analysis with regard to the situation in Europe. However, before turning to the way in 
which the Strasbourg Court addresses immigration detention as an example of the 
approach o f an international constitutional court in Chapter 7, in this Chapter 1 will first 
sketch a general outline o f the human rights regime relevant for the topic under 
consideration.
Accordingly, it will give a wide overview o f human rights instruments that are 
applicable to the practice of immigration detention. It should be noted that not all 
instruments that are significant for that practice will be discussed. The matter under 
consideration in this study is the state’s power to resort to detention under immigration 
legislation, rather than subsequent conditions o f detention as such. Therefore discussion 
in this and the next Chapter will concentrate on the way in which the particular right o f  
personal liberty is protected in international human rights law. With regard to 
procedural guarantees it will be principally those that are included in the scope of this 
right which will receive attention.
This Chapter is divided in five Sections. Section 6.2. deals with universal 
protection of the right to personal liberty, as laid down in Article 9 ICCPR. Substantial 
guarantees as well as procedural requirements o f this provision such as formulated by 
the HRC and other international human rights bodies will be discussed with specific 
regard to their implications for the practice of immigration detention. Thereafter, 
international instalments specifically devised for asylum seekers and refugees will be 
focussed on in Section 6.3. Section 6.4. addresses the human rights discourse pertaining 
to immigration detention in the framework o f  the Council of Europe (excluding the 
ECHR). In Section 6.5., I will present some preliminaiy observations regarding 
international human rights discourse’s potential for destabilizing sovereignty’s 
territorial frame, when applied to questions o f immigration detention.
86: ECtHR. Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, par. 37.
254
6.2. P ersonal  lib er t y  and a rbitra rin ess: universal hum an  rights
6.2.1. Scope and character of the right to personal liberty
In societies based upon the rule of law there is no more serious interference with 
an individual’s fundamental rights as depriving him of his liberty. Chapter 2 has made 
clear that personal liberty and sovereignty are conceptually intertwined: the protection 
of the former is the reason for the existence of the latter. The right to liberty of person is 
also one of the oldest recognised basic rights,863 and a fundamental principle of 
international human rights law.864 However, this does not mean that the right to liberty 
is an absolute right which can not be restricted by states. On the contrary, there are 
many instances in which international law recognises that deprivation of liberty is a 
legitimate form of state control, thus not in violation o f the right in question.865 
International human rights law concerning the right to liberty revolves around the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a detention or an arrest not to be arbitrary 
as the prohibition on arbitrariness constitutes the core of the right in question.
863 Magna Carta 1215. Article 39; “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with 
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of 
the land.” Accordingly, the English Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679 codified and perfected an 
already existing procedure by which somebody deprived of his liberty' could challenge detention by the 
King and Council (Marcoux, 1982, p. 347). Sec also Article 7 of the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Men and the Citizen, 1789.
864 Article 3 and 9 of the UDHR; Article 9 of the ICCPR; Article 5 ECHR; Article 6 of the 2000 Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Article 7 of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights: Article 6 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Article 20 of the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam; Article 20 of the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights. There arc 
some instruments that deserve special mention: Article 5(a) of The Declaration on the Human Rights of 
Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they Live (1985), and Article 16 of the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families. Most human rights instruments protect the right to personal liberty together with the right to 
security of person. Whereas the ECtHR has n o t as we shall see, accorded the right to security of person 
an independent status alongside the right to personal liberty, the right to security in Article 9 ICCPR aims 
to guarantee state protection against interference with personal integrity by private persons (Nowak 
(1993), p. 162; and HRC, Delgado Paez v. Columbia. 12 July 1990, par. 5.5, 5.6, 6), Accordingly, it can 
be defined as a right with horizontal effects, and is accordingly not relevant for this study.
865 Joseph, Schulz and Castan (2003). p. 304,
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The term liberty of person refers to freedom of bodily movement in the 
narrowest sense, which implies that interference with the right occurs only if  a person is 
forced to remain at a certain narrowly confined space. AH less serious restrictions on 
bodily movement fall under the scope of the right to freedom of movement and are not 
covered by the protection offered by the right to liberty.866 Noteworthy in this respect is 
Article 9 of the UDHR, which combines the right to personal liberty with freedom o f  
movement, for this provision stipulates that no-one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile. As I have already mentioned in Chapter 1, only those individuals that 
are placed in closed centres, or are unable to leave any other narrowly confined location, 
such as an airport transit zone, fall under the protection of the right to liberty.867 When 
considering whether a person is in detention, the cumulative impact of the restrictions, 
as well as the degree and intensity o f each one should be assessed.868
Another restriction on the scope of the protection offered by the right to liberty 
is that it should be seen as applying only to the fact of deprivation of liberty itself and 
the specific procedural guarantees that are part of it.869 In general, a person who is 
mistreated whilst in detention cannot claim a violation of the right to personal liberty or 
security. However, taking into account that the conditions of detention may in a limited 
amount o f cases bear upon the question o f its possible arbitrariness, arguably especially 
so in the field of immigration detention, I will briefly pay some attention to their 
relationship in Section 6.2.2.3.
6.2.2. Article 9 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
In the remainder o f this Section, I will focus on Article 9 of the ICCPR. While 
discussing this provision, I will in particular pay attention to jurisprudence of the
866 See HRC, Celepli v. Sweden. 18 July 1994; and Karker v. France, 26 October 2000.
86 Deliberation No. 5. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights, 
28 December 1999).
868 UNHCR (1999) Revised Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the detention 
of asylum seekers, Guideline 1.
869 Nowak ( 1993). p. 160.
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Human Rights Committee (HRC) under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR,870 as well 
as to reports and documents of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, a UN body 
entrusted with the investigation of instances of alleged arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and detention otherwise inconsistent with international legal instruments.871
Article 9 ICCPR: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person No one shall be 
subjected to aibitraiy arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are establislied by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest 
and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or to release. It stall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial stall be 
detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other 
stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness 
of his detention and order his release if the detention is not law ful.
5. Anyone w ho has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation.
Article 9 ICCPR does not provide an exhaustive list of situations in which 
detention may be permitted, but it simply forbids arbitrary detention, as well as 
detention that is unlawful. The initial draft of Article 9 ICCPR contained a list of 
permissible grounds for detention. However, there were quite a few states that thought 
that this list was too limited, and proposed an additional number of reasons for 
restriction. It soon became obvious that to reach agreement on permissible grounds for 
deprivation of liberty would be impossible. Besides, an enumeration of about forty 
exceptions to the right to liberty was not considered to make a favourable impression.872 
Therefore two proposals that respectively prohibited arbitrary as well as unlawful
870 Under the optional Protocol, the HRC is entitled to receive communications from individuals who 
claim to be victim of a violation of any of the rights in the Covenant if that violation is committed by a 
State who is party to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol.
871 Establislied by Resolution 1991/42 of the Commission on Human Rights, which extended and clarified
its mandate in resolution 1997/50.
872 Nowak (1993), p. 164.
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detention were accepted, and no list of exceptions to the right to liberty found its w ay  
into the ICCPR.
6.2.2. L Prohibition o f arbitrariness in Article 9 ICCPR
It is clear from the wording of Article 9 ICCPR and its drafting history tha t 
arbitrary cannot be equalled with unlawful in the narrow sense of that word. The 
prohibition of an unlawful detention in that sense is expressed in the third sentence o f  
Article 9 ICCPR, which refers to the principle of legality, requiring that detention m ust 
be in accordance with a procedure laid down by domestic law. This principle is violated 
if someone is detained on grounds which are not clearly established by national law or i f  
the act of deprivation o f liberty disregards national law.874 Thus, the prohibition o f  
arbitrariness requires more than obedience to national laws: these laws and their 
enforcement must satisfy certain conditions.
The prohibition of arbitrariness was expressed in Article 9 ICCPR because the 
majority o f members of the Commission on Human Rights thought it necessary to  
impose an international standard on the content of domestic laws since the principle o f  
legality did not provide safeguards against detention authorised by unjust domestic 
laws. Thus, with the introduction of the prohibition of arbitrariness, concepts o f  
reasonableness and justice were introduced in the protection of the right to personal 
liberty. The definition in the 1964 Study o f the Right of Everyone to be Free from 
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile876 confirms that the protection o f the right to 
liberty extends beyond protection against deprivation of liberty which is merely 
unlawful:
“Arrest or detention is aibitraiy if  it is; (a) on grounds or in accordance with procedures other 
than those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law. the purpose of which is 
incompatible with the right to liberty and security of person.”877
873 See Nowak (1993), pp. 164-166; and Marcoux (1982), pp. 359-364.
87>1 Nowak (1993), p. 172. See also Principle 6 of Deliberation no. 5 of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 December 1999).
875 Marcoux (1982), p. 363. See also Lillich (1984b), p. 138; and Dinstein (1981). p. 130.
8 6 UN Commission on Human Rights (1964).
8,7 See the Draft Principles on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, attached to the Study of the 
Right of Every one to be Free from Arbitrary' Arrest, Detention and Exile, UN Commission on Human 
Rights (1964), p. 205.
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The HRC uses a different approach to interpret the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivations o f liberty:
“Arbitrariness is not to be equated with ‘against the law’ but must be interpreted more broadly to
include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of
law.“878
This means that deprivation of liberty may not be manifestly disproportional, 
and the specific manner in which the arrest is made should not be discriminatory and 
must be proportional in view of the circumstances.879 The principle of proportionality 
constitutes only one aspect of the prohibition of arbitrariness, but it is a practical and 
useful criterion for the assessment whether the purpose of the deprivation of liberty is 
incompatible with the right to liberty. Human rights bodies such as the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention use it as a yardstick to evaluate state practice. In its concluding 
report o f its visit to the United Kingdom in 1998, the Working Group reminded the 
government o f that country that detention of asylum seekers and immigrants should 
only be resorted to if there exists a compelling need to detain that is based on individual 
circumstances; that detention should be for the shortest possible time; and that 
alternative, non-custodial measures should always be considered before resorting to 
detention.880
A similar conclusion regarding the central importance of the principle o f 
proportionality in immigration detention can be drawn from the approach that the HRC 
has taken to the Australian policy of mandatory detention o f asylum seekers, already 
referred to in the introduction to this Chapter. The HRC does not deem the detention of 
asylum seekers or irregular immigrants in itself arbitrary and in violation with Article 9 
ICC PR:
“The fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other factors 
particular to the individual such as the likelihood o f absconding and lack of co-operation, which
8 8 HRC, Afukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994. at. 9.8 and also Van Alphen v. the Netherlands, 23 July 
1990.
879 Nowak (1993), p. 173.
880 See Report on the Visit of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to the United Kingdom on the 
issue of immigrants and asylum seekers, p. 12 (UN Commission on Human Rights, 18 December 1998)
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may justify detention for a period. Without such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, 
even if entry was illegal.” 881
However, in some of the Australian cases that were brought before it, the HRC 
considered Australian detention policy in violation of Article 9 ICCPR, as the 
government solely brought forward general justifications for the detention of asylum 
seekers, instead of stating any individual justification for the necessity of the 
detention. Thus, immigration detention must be reasonable and necessary in view o f  
factors which are particular to the individual in order to be in accordance with Article 9 
ICCPR.883 Accordingly, in Jalloh  v. The Netherlands, the HRC did not deem it 
unreasonable to have detained the individual concerned for a limited time until the 
administrative procedure relating to his case was completed, taking into consideration 
that he had fled from the open facility at which he was accommodated from the time o f  
his arrival for around eleven months.884
The importance o f the criteria o f reasonability and proportionality becomes 
evident once more when the HRC assesses the duration of immigration detention, as it 
holds that “detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State can 
provide appropriate justification” .885 W ith regard to detention in order to secure 
removal, the HRC has clarified this requirement as meaning that once a reasonable 
prospect of expelling the individual concerned no longer exists, the detention should be 
terminated.886 Concerning the duration o f  immigration detention in general, the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention further insists that a maximum period should be 
set by law and that the duration may never be unlimited or excessive.887
881 HRC, A. v. Australia, 3 April 1997, par 9.4.
882 See for example: Baban v. Australia, 18 September 2003, par. 7.2; and Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 6 
November 2003, par. 9.2. and 9.3.
883 See also Oda (1968), p. 483.
884 Jalloh v. The Netherlands, 26 March 2002, par. 8.2. See also Afadafferi v. Australia, Decision of 26 
July 2004, in which case the HRC did not deem the initial decision to detain unlawful as it was based on 
an individual assessment that had shown there w as a risk of flight.
885 A. v. Australia, 3 April 1997, par. 9.4.
886 Jalloh v. The Netherlands, 26 March 2002, par. 8.2.





This Section will briefly address paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 9 ICCPR that 
contain procedural safeguards for persons who are deprived of their liberty. These 
guarantees form an integral part o f the right to personal liberty, and their violation will 
accordingly entail a violation o f the right to personal liberty 888
Paragraph 2 of Article 9 ICCPR contains the right to be informed about the 
reasons for detention. In the 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (hereinafter the 1988 Body of 
Principles),889 the obligation o f information is further elaborated by the requirement that 
anyone detained should be provided with information on and an explanation o f his 
rights and how to avail himself of such rights.890 Although Article 9 ICCPR does not 
state explicitly that the person concerned needs to be informed in a language that he 
understands, it would be difficult to maintain that someone is informed if he does not 
understand what is being communicated to him.891 Whether or not notification o f the 
custodial measure is given in writing in a language understood by the asylum seeker or 
immigrant is one o f the factors the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers 
when it assesses whether immigration detention is arbitrary.892 According to the 
Working Group, the right to information in the case of immigration detainees should 
include the nature of and the grounds for the decision refusing permission to enter or 
reside in the territory.893
The right to information about the reasons for the deprivation of liberty serves, 
inter alia , to enable the detainee to make use of the right to challenge his detention in
888 In accordance with tliis, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention takes due consideration of whether 
or not the alien is able to enjoy certain guarantees in order to determine whether a case of immigration 
detention can be considered arbitrary. See Deliberation no. 5 of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 December 1999).
889 General Assembly Resolution 43/173 (1988).
890 1988 Body o f Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment. Principle 13.
891 According to the 1988 Body o f Principles, anyone who does not speak or understand the language 
used by the authorities, is entitled to receive the required information in a language lie understands (1988 
Body o f Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
Principle 14).
892 Deliberation no. 5 (UN Commission on Human Rights. 28 December 1999). Principle 8.
893 Ibid. Principle 1.
court, a fundamental procedural guarantee contained in Article 9 ICCPR. Hence, the  
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention requires the information provided to the  
immigration detainee to include notification o f the conditions under which he is able to  
apply for a remedy to a judicial authority.894
Article 9 ICCPR includes two habeas corpus provisions: its paragraph 3 is 
specifically meant for persons detained on criminal charges, who shall be brought 
promptly before a judge. With regard to persons detained on other grounds, such as 
immigration detainees, paragraph 4 o f Article 9 ICCPR gives them the right to have the 
lawfulness of their detention reviewed in court, which shall decide without delay. 
Without delay means that the decision usually has to be made within several weeks, 
although this may depend on the type of deprivation of liberty and other individual 
circumstances.895
Thus, Article 9(4) ICCPR requires that recourse eventually be had to a “court” . 
This may be an administrative court, as long certain requirements of impartiality and 
independence are satisfied. If the initial decision to detain is taken by a court in the 
sense o f Article 9(4) ICCPR, this provision is usually complied with. What specific 
form of the judicial procedure in which the legality o f  the detention is challenged takes 
is irrelevant, as long as it results in release if  the detention is unlawful.896
“The Working Group considers that the right to challenge the legality of detention or to petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus or remedy of amparo is a personal right, which must in all 
circumstances be guaranteed by the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.”897
89-1 Ibid. Principle 8.
895 Nowak (1993). p. 179. According to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, immigration 
detainees must be brought promptly before a judicial or other authority, therewith according immigration 
detainees and persons detained on criminal grounds almost equal rights, were it not for the addition of the 
words ‘other authority’. Deliberation no. 5. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN 
Commission on Human Rights. 28 December 1999 See also the 1988 Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. Principle 11).
896 1988 Body of Principles for the Protection o f All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment. Principle 32.
897 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrai)- Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights. 15 
December 2003), p. 23.
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According to the HRC, the scope of the review of the lawfulness by the 
domestic court is not limited to a mere review whether the detention is in compliance 
with domestic law, but it should include whether the detention is in accordance with the 
requirements o f Article 9(1) ICCPR.898 Thus, the court in question should evaluate the 
case in the light o f the individual circumstances, instead of merely assessing whether 
the law has been correctly applied. Consequently, it deems the procedure of habeas 
corpus in a state with immigration legislation containing mandatory detention 
provisions that have been declared constitutional by its highest court in violation of 
Article 9(4) ICCPR, as such a procedure would merely entail a verification o f the 
applicability o f the mandatory detention provisions to the detainee without due regard to 
the circumstances particular to the individual concerned 899
Paragraph 5 of Article 9 ICCPR gives anyone who is deprived of their liberty in 
an unlawful manner the enforceable right to compensation. This right covers pecuniary 
as well as non-pecuniary damages.900 Some additional guarantees particular to the 
situation of immigration detainees have been formulated by the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention. Asylum seekers or immigrants in custody must have the possibility 
of communicating with the outside world, and of contacting a lawyer, a consular 
representative, and relatives901 The UNHCR and the Red Cross and other duly 
authorised NGO’s must be allowed access to places of custody.902 Furthermore, 
immigration detainees must be registered, and informed of the internal regulations.903
898 Baban v. Australia. Decision of 18 September 2003, par. 7.2.; and Bakhtivari v. Australia. Decision of 
6 November 2003, par. 9.4.
899 A. v. Australia, Decision of 30 April 1997; Baban v. Australia, par. 7.2 and Bakhtivari v. Australia, 
par. 8.2 and 9.4.
900 Nowak (1993), p. 182.
901 Deliberation no. 5 of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights. 
28 December 1999). Principle 2. See also Article 36(1) under b and c of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (1963) and Article 6 of the European Convention on Consular Functions (1967) about 
the right of detained foreigners to have their consular representatives informed.
902 Deliberation no. 5 of tire Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights. 
28 December 1999), Principle 10.
903 Ibid. Principles 4 and 5.
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6.2.2.3. Conditions o f immigration detention and arbitrariness
I have already mentioned that, as a rule, the conditions o f detention do not fall 
under the scope of the right to personal liberty. Accordingly, the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention does examine neither complaints about alleged torture during 
detention, nor complaints concerning inhuman conditions of detention 904 Other general 
human rights norms such as Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 ECHR and those contained in 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Punishment (CAT) are applicable in these situations. In addition, international human 
rights law has accorded the treatment of detainees special attention on account of the 
especially vulnerable position o f persons who are deprived of their liberty, as is shown 
by Article 10 ICCPR. Also the 1988 Body o f  Principles contains detailed provisions in 
this respect.905 These legal norms in themselves, however, do not limit the state’s power 
to resort to  immigration detention as such.
This being said, given the importance of the principle o f proportionality in 
assessing the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty, conditions o f immigration 
detention may occasionally play a role in balancing the interest of the state to resort to  
immigration detention on the one hand and the individual’s interest in the enjoyment o f 
his fundamental rights. Accordingly, it can be argued that in a limited amount of 
situations, the conditions o f detention may bear upon the question of its arbitrariness, 
and thus influence the question o f the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty itself, as 
was alluded to by HRC in the case o f M adafferi v. Australia.
904 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet 26.
905 In the European context, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) is a key actor in 
this respect. The CPT examines, by means of visits to member states of the Council o f Europe, the 
treatment of persons deprived o f their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of 
such persons from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 1 of the 1987 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment). In recent years, it has paid special attention to the treatment of immigration detainees (CPT, 
10 September 2003, p. 10; and CPT, 16 December 2003) and it lias repeatedly stressed that, if it is 
deemed necessary' to deprive persons of their liberty under immigration legislation, it is far preferable to 
accommodate them in centres specifically designed for that purpose, offering material conditions and a 
regime appropriate to the legal status o f such persons, and staffed by suitably qualified personnel (CPT 
Standards, 2003, par. 28-29. See also CPT, 14 June 2004, p. 20).
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“As to Mr. Madafferi's return to Maribymong Immigration Detention Centre on 25 June 2003, 
where lie was detained until his committal to a psychiatric hospital on 18 September 2003, the 
Committee [...] observes the author's arguments, which remain uncontested by the State party, 
that this form of detention was contrary to the advice of various doctors and psychiatrists, 
consulted by the State party, who all advised that a further period of placement in an 
immigration detention centre would risk further deterioration of Mr. Madafferi's mental health. 
Against tlie backdrop of such advice and given the eventual involuntary admission of Mr. 
Madafferi to a psychiatric hospital, the Committee finds that the State party's decision to return 
Mr. Madafferi to Maribymong and the manner in w hich that transfer was affected was not based 
on a proper assessment of the circumstances of the case but was. as such, disproportionate.”**
As the HRC accordingly found that the detention was in violation of article 
10(1) ICCPR, a “provision [...] dealing specifically with the situation of persons 
deprived of their liberty and encompassing for such persons the elements set out 
generally in article 7 ICCPR”, it did not deem it necessary to consider the claims arising 
under article 7 ICCPR separately.907
Support for the position that the conditions of detention may result in an 
unlawful deprivation of liberty can also be found in national jurisprudence. A Dutch 
administrative court decided in 2005 that deprivation of liberty lasting longer than six 
months on a so called prison-boat (a facility specifically designed for immigration 
detention) was unlawful on account o f the conditions of detention, which were deemed 
to result in a disproportional interference with the detainees* fundamental rights 908
6 .3 . H u m a n  rights and detention of refugees and asylum seekers
Refugees and asylum seekers will often constitute a large part of the population 
in many of the European immigration detention centres.909 According to the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, a deprivation of liberty that results solely from the
906 Madafferi v. Australia. 26 July 2004, par. 9.3.
907 Ibid.
9us (Rechtbank 's Gravenhagc. 18 March 2005). The court reached this decision in spite of the fact that 
Dutch administrative courts arc excluded by law’ from assessing the conditions and regulations applicable 
to immigration detention.
^  See i.e. the United Kingdom, where the vast majority of those detained have applied for asylum at one 
stage or another (FPP-CR United Kingdom; and Gil-Roblcs. 8 June 2005).
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exercise o f the right to seek and enjoy asylum as laid down in Article 14 UDHR 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation o f liberty, and is accordingly in violation of Article 
9 ICCPR.910 The Working Group estimates that thousands of people are subject each 
year to arbitrary detention, inter alia, because o f “the growing and pre-occupying 
practice o f administrative detention, notably for those seeking asylum.”911 Clearly, the 
safeguards o f Article 9 ICCPR are applicable to applicants for asylum, but as they are 
regarded as a particularly vulnerable group, additional guarantees concerning the ir 
detention have been formulated.912 In this Section, I will provide a brief overview o f  
some specific guarantees that apply to the detention of applicants for asylum and 
refugees, mainly formulated by the UNHCR.
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is o f key 
importance for the use of detention against refugees. The first paragraph of this 
provision prohibits criminal sanctions being used against refugees who come directly 
from a country of persecution, on account of their illegal entry or presence, provided 
they present themselves to the authorities without delay. It is not plausible that this 
provision would be violated when a refugee is detained on account of his illegal entry, i f  
the deprivation of liberty is an administrative measure and not categorised as a criminal 
sanction as such 913 But paragraph 2 of Article 31 extends protection in that case: states 
shall not apply to the freedom of movement of such refugees restrictions other than 
those which are necessary. Thus, this provision requires the detention to be proportional 
in view o f the individual circumstances of each refugee.
The UNHCR has elaborated further on the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in its Revised Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards 
Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers (hereinafter the 1999 Guidelines)914 The 
1999 Guidelines are not applicable to asylum seekers whose requests have been rejected
910 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet 26.
9,1 Ibid.
912 Extra concern is warranted with regard to this group as the concerned individuals may have suffered 
persecution or other hardships, and detention in the supposed safe haven that they have fled to will thus 
be extra harsh. Sec Sub-Commission on Human Rights (18 August 2000).
913 According to NGO's. illegal entry of asylum applicants should never be a ground for detention. See 
European Council for Refugees and Exiles (April 1996), General Remark No. 14; and Jesuit Refugee 
Serv ice Europe (2004). p. 11.
9,4 UNHCR (February 1999).
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on substantial grounds, but they do apply to those refugees whose claims are not 
investigated because of a principle such as safe third country, or because, for other 
reasons, another country is responsible for the handling of the claim.
According to the 1999 Guidelines, detention of asylum seekers must whenever 
possible be avoided, and alternative measures, such as reporting obligations, always 
need to be considered firs t915 The UNHCR has expressed scepticism about bail 
hearings as an alternative for detention as the focus would be on establishing the 
reliability of the surety and its relationship to the applicant as opposed to the reasons for 
detention.916 In assessing whether detention of asylum-seekers is necessary, account 
should be taken o f whether the detention is reasonable and whether it is proportional to 
the objectives to be achieved.917 If detention is exceptionally resorted to, it is only 
permitted if it is prescribed by a national law, which has to be in conformity with 
general norms and principles of international human rights 918
Apart from these more general requirements that flow, as we saw above, also 
from Article 9 ICCPR, the 1999 Guidelines specify that detention of refugees may only 
be used in order to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim for 
asylum is based; in the case that the asylum seekers has destroyed their documents or 
used fraudulent documents; or to protect national security or public order 919 Detention 
may certainly not be used to deter other asylum seekers; neither should it constitute a 
sanction for failure to comply with administrative requirements or breach of reception 
centre or other institutional restrictions 920
It is unclear why the 1999 Guidelines include national security or public order as 
separate grounds for the detention o f asylum seekers, as there is no reason why 
detention for these reasons in the case o f asylum seekers should differ from detention 
for the same reasons of nationals or regular immigrants921 In fact, if we take national
915 UNHCR Revised Guidelines (1999), Guidelines 2, 3 and 4; and UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 44 
(XXXVII) 1986. See also European Council on Refugees and Exiles (April 1996).
916 UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioners Programme (4 June 1999), p. 168.
917 UNHCR Revised Guidelines (1999). Guideline 3.
918 Ibid.
919 Ibid. The same grounds are mentioned in UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) 1986, under 
(b).
9-0 UNHCR. Revised Guidelines (1999), Guideline 3. See also Amnesty International (1996).
9:1 Nor is it necessary’ to include tliese grounds: by analog}', the 1999 Guidelines do not allow for tlic 
detention of asylum seekers on suspicion of common criminal charges: nonetheless it is clear that in that
executives’ interpretation of national legislation as a point of reference, the public order 
and national security grounds risk becoming a license to resort to detention o f asylum  
seekers on an extensive scale.922 More generally, it can be argued that the grounds o f  
detention as specified in the 1999 Guidelines are very wide and they can therefore be 
interpreted by states as providing the basis for detaining large numbers o f asylum 
seekers 923 Detention in order to determine the elements on which the claim for asylum 
is based in particular may conflict with the principle that there should be a presumption 
against detention. Also the use o f  fraudulent documents as a ground for detention m ay 
raise serious objections in the case o f refugees, a category that is often forced to have 
recourse to such documents in order to flee. However, it would clearly go against the 
text, object and purpose o f the 1999 Guidelines to interpret these grounds for detention 
in such a manner that the requirement of proportionality would no longer have any 
significance.
According to the 1999 Guidelines, detention should only be imposed in a non- 
discriminatory manner. In addition, minors who are asylum seekers should not 
detained.924 Detention o f children in general should be a measure of last resort and is 
even subject to more severe restrictions than detention o f adults.925 The 1999 Guidelines
case national laws would be applicable to them in the same way as to anyone else. However, the ECRE in 
its position paper on the detention o f asylum seekers makes explicit mention of criminal charges as a 
ground for detention of asylum seekers. Probably the reason for this is that it specifies the kind of offence: 
it needs to be serious and non-political, and excludes offences under immigration law (European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles. April 1996, General Remark No. 12).
922 Especially when taking into account the way in which national governments inteipret the term public 
order and codify it in national legislation with regard to immigration detention in general. See van 
Kalmthout (2005b), pp. 325-327 with regard to the situation in tire Netherlands, where the public order 
criterion has lost much if its significance in daily practice. See also Article 59(2) of the Dutch Aliens Act 
2000 which provision employs the legal fiction that the detention is required by public order if the 
nccessaiy papers for removal are available or will be available soon.
923 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (April 1996), General Remark No. 9; and Jesuit Refugee 
Service Europe (2004), p. 12.
92'  UNHCR (1999) Guideline 6.
925 See also the Article 37 under (b) o f  the Convention on the Rights of the Cliild 1989/1990: No child 
shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a 
cliild shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure o f last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time. Cf. the UN Committee on the Rights of the Cliild (2004), par. 29-30.
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also focus on the conditions of detention, which, they stipulate, should be humane with 
respect for the inherent dignity of every person.
6.4 . R e g io n a l  d i s c o u r s e : T h e  C o u n c i l  o f  E u r o p e  a n d  i m m i g r a t i o n  d e t e n t i o n
With regard to the human rights discourse relating to immigration detention in 
the framework of the Council of Europe, excluding the ECtHR, the most important 
document is a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on measures of detention 
of asylum seekers adopted in 2003 926 It states that measures of detention of asylum 
seekers should be in accordance with international standards and prescribed by a 
national law.927 It is important to note that according to the recommendation, alternative 
measures always have to be considered before resorting to detention 928 If these are not 
feasible in the individual case, then detention is only permitted in the following 
situations: if  the identity, including nationality, of the asylum seekers has to be verified 
(especially if they have destroyed their documents or used false ones); if  detention is 
necessary to obtain elements on which their asylum claims are based; if  a decision needs 
to be taken with regard to their right of entry to the territory; and lastly, if  their 
detention is necessary with regard to national security or public order.929
These grounds are very wide, capable of leaving a large discretion to national 
states. Accordingly, their inclusion in the recommendation raises similar concerns as 
were discussed in the previous Section with regard to the grounds for detention included 
in the 1999 Guidelines. Again, the principle of proportionality -  detention should not be 
resorted to if alternative measures are feasible in the individual case -  should curb a too 
extensive use o f these grounds.
926 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)5 of the Committee to 
member states on measures of detention of asylum seekers (16 April 2003).
927 Ibid. General Provisions 4 and 5.
928 Ibid. General Provision 6. Such as monitoring requirements, release on bail, stay at open reception 
centres and the provision of a guarantor. See Explanatory Memorandum of Recommendation Rec(2003)5.
929 Recommendation Rec(2003)5 of the Committee to member states on measures of detention of asylum 
seekers (16 April 2003), General Provision 3.
The recommendation also stipulates that the detention of asylum seekers should 
be reviewed regularly by a court 930 Moreover, detained asylum seekers have the right to  
have contact with the UNHCR, a legal representative, NGO’s, and family and 
friends 931 The remaining provisions o f the recommendation deal with guarantees fo r  
the mental, spiritual and physical well-being o f the asylum seekers, and there are in th is  
respect some special provisions with regard to minors, who, it is stipulated, should only 
be detained as a measure o f last resort and for the shortest possible time.932
W ith regard to the detention of irregular immigrants who are subject to removal 
orders, the “Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return”933 adopted by the Committee o f  
Ministers contain some relevant provisions.934 In the first place, they require that a 
person may only be deprived o f his liberty in accordance with a procedure prescribed by  
law with a view to ensuring that a removal order will be executed. In addition, it m ust 
be ascertained, after a careful examination o f the necessity of the detention in each 
individual case, that compliance with the removal order cannot be ensured as effectively 
by resorting to non-custodial measures such as supervision systems, the requirement to  
report regularly to the authorities, bail or other guarantee systems.935
The latter requirement o f  an individualised examination of the necessity to  
detain in order to secure removal is deemed “part of a broader protection against 
arbitrariness.”936 It is further elaborated upon by stipulating that detention pending 
removal shall be for a time a short as possible and in any case justified only for as long 
as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence by the 
national authorities.937 Furthermore, the person detained shall be informed promptly 
about the reasons for his detention in a language that he understands and he has the right 
to access to a lawyer from the very outset of the detention938
930 Ibid. General Provision 5.
931 Ibid. General Provisions 16. 17 and 18.
932 Ibid. General Provisions 20-23
933 Committee of Minsters, 20 Guidelines on Forced Return (9 May 2005).
934 These Guidelines are not applicable to detention upon arrival. Sec CAHAR (Ad hoc Committee o f 
Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees and Stateless Persons) (20 May 2005). p. 2. 
935Committee o f Minsters, 20 Guidelines on Forced Return (9 May 2005). Guideline 6, par. 1.
936 CAHAR (Ad hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum. Refugees and 
Stateless Persons) (20 May 2005). p. 25.
937 Committee o f Minsters, 20 Guidelines on Forced Return (9 May 2005). Guideline 7 and 8. par. 1.
938 Ibid. Guideline 6, par. 2.
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The administrative decision to detain is to be reviewed at regular intervals by the 
authorities and in the case o f prolonged detention such reviews are to be subject to the 
supervision o f a judicial authority.939 Requirements regarding the immigration 
detainee’s entitlement to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention is 
decided upon by a court are similar to those flowing from Article 9 ICCPR, except for 
the explicit addition that legal aid should be provided for in accordance with national 
legislation.940
Similar guarantees have been formulated by the Commissioner for Human 
Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), also with 
regard to detention upon arrival941 The CPT has repeatedly emphasised in several o f its 
reports that in the case of immigration detention, the same procedural guarantees shall 
apply as with regard to other categories of deprivation of liberty.942 Especially in 
waiting zones o f airports this is often not the case, and the CPT warns this situation 
cannot be justified. It does not attach crucial weight to the typical argument made by 
states that the persons located in such places can leave at any time by taking any 
international flight of their choice: a stay in a transit, or international zone, can under 
circumstances amount to deprivation o f liberty.943
The origin of the “20 Guidelines on Forced Return” lies in a Parliamentary 
Assembly Recommendation, urging the member states o f the Council of Europe to 
guarantee, under regular supervision by the judge, the strict necessity and the 
proportionality o f the use and continuation of detention for the enforcement of the 
deportation order, and to set the length of detention at a maximum of one month.944 In 
addition, the same recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly insists on member 
states favouring alternatives to detention that place less restrictions on freedom, such as
939 Ibid. Guideline 8.
940 Ibid. Guideline 9.
941 Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (19 September 2001), Recommendation 
concerning the rights of aliens wishing to enter a Council of Europe member state and the enforcement of 
expulsion orders, p. 3-4.
942 See i.e. See CPT (10 September 2003), p. 10: and CPT (16 December 2003).
943 CPT Standards (2003). par. 25.
944 Parliamentary Assemby, Recommendation 1547 (2002) 1 on Expulsion procedures in conformity with 
human rights and enforced with respect for safety and dignity (22 January 2002).
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compulsory residence orders or other forms o f monitoring, such as the obligation to
* 945register.
6.5. Conclusions: The right to personal liberty and sovereignty’s frame
This Chapter has shown that international human rights norms pose limits to the 
sovereign states1 power to resort to immigration detention. The decision to detain 
immigrants and asylum seekers needs to satisfy certain substantial conditions, as well as 
some essential procedural requirements. Immigration detention is only allowed with an 
eye to specific purposes which all have to do with the administration o f immigration 
policies in the narrow sense. These consist of regulating entry and securing expulsion. 
These purposes have acquired an even stricter interpretation when it comes to a specific 
category o f immigrants: refugees or asylum seekers. In any case, detention to deter o r 
penalise immigrants is not allowed. Neither is it permitted to use immigration detention 
for purposes related to criminal law. Abuses o f the law on immigration to evade judicial 
safeguards and hold aliens in detention indefinitely have been explicitly addressed by 
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, as it has repeatedly expressed concern 
about improper and discriminatory use o f immigration laws to circumvent the 
presumption o f innocence and related judicial guarantees946
Furthermore, detention should be a proportional measure with regard to the 
legitimate purposes that it serves. According to the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, one of the main causes o f arbitrary deprivation of liberty is precisely non- 
observance o f the principle of proportionality between the gravity of the measure taken 
and the situation concerned.947 The requirement that detention needs to be proportional 
is to be found in almost all international instruments, either expressly articulated, or 
implied by the prohibition on arbitrary detention or by formulating specific constraints
945 Ibid.
946 Report o f the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights, 15 
December 2003), p. 17, 18 and 20. See also Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary’ Detention (UN 
Commission on Human Rights. 3 December 2002). These concerns have become more prominent after 11 
September 2001.
947 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary’ Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights. 15 
December 2003), p. 18.
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on the use of immigration detention such as that alternative measures need to have been 
considered. It is worth mentioning here that also the Charter of Fundamental Rights o f 
the European Union permits limitations on the right to personal liberty only if these 
limitations are proportionate and necessary, and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest which are recognised by the Union.948
By categorising immigration detention as a legitimate form of state control, 
international human rights law reaffirms its recognition of the sovereign right o f the 
state to control the entry and sojourn o f foreign nationals on its territory. However, the 
presumption that the regulation of entry and sojourn of non-nationals is a matter falling 
within the sovereign prerogatives of the national state does not impede international law 
from safeguarding the human rights of immigration detainees. Although immigration 
detention per se is not in violation of international legal norms, states may not resort to 
detention solely on the ground that a person does not have the right to enter or stay on 
national territory. International human rights law requires that there must be some 
substantive basis for detention in each individual case. In addition, international legal 
norms oblige national states to provide for a judicial procedure reviewing the lawfulness 
o f immigration detention. In particular with regard to immigration detainees, the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has placed considerable emphasis on states’ 
duty to guarantee the effectiveness of the right provided by Article 9(4) ICCPR949 
According to the HRC, the scope of the review required by the this provision may not 
be limited to a mere review whether the detention is in compliance with domestic law, 
but it should include reviewing whether the detention is in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 9(1) ICCPR. As a result, the court in question should evaluate 
the case in the light of the individual circumstances, taking due account o f the 
proportionality and reasonableness of the detention, instead of merely assessing whether 
national immigration legislation has been correctly applied.
By balancing the state’s sovereign right to control entry and residence of foreign 
nationals in its territory with the individual’s right to personal liberty, international legal 
norms pertaining to deprivations of liberty under immigration legislation acknowledge 
the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s territorial frame. As such, they
^A rticle 6 and Article 52(1) of tlx: Charter.
949 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UN Commission on Human Rights. 12 
December 2005), p.2.
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have the potential to undermine the perceived neutrality and self-evidence o f  
sovereignty’s territorial frame. Their consistent application to domestic practices o f  
immigration detention, especially in view o f the important procedural guarantees th a t 
they contain, could result in diminishing the immunity of territorial sovereignty against 
forces o f legal correction. The way in which this particular process operates will b e  
further dealt with in the conclusions to this study in Chapter 8.
Nevertheless, also a few critical remarks are called for with regard to th e  
international legal framework as was dealt with in this Chapter. When it comes to th e  
specific practice of immigration detention, the interests of asylum seekers are far m ore  
often addressed than those o f irregular immigrants. This recurring emphasis on asylum  
seekers and refugees in international norms and documents that address th e  
administrative detention of non-nationals, however understandable in view of th e ir 
vulnerable position and need for protection, also runs a risk of resulting in a n  
affirmation of the perception o f territorial sovereignty as site of legal and unproblematic 
violence when it comes to irregular migrants.
A good example of this is to be found in the UNHCR Executive Committee’s 
criticism regarding the failure on the part o f states to  make the necessary distinction 
between asylum seekers and illegal migrants, “therewith exposing the former to such 
control measures as automatic detention for indeterminate periods”.950 Although 
undoubtedly not the intent o f the Executive Committee, remarks as these, which 
subsequently fail to address the more fundamental sovereign assumptions that underlie 
the practice of immigration detention as a whole, may raise the impression that 
automatic detention for indeterminate periods o f irregular migrants remains a sovereign 
prerogative.
By sketching a wide overview of the international legal regime pertaining to  
immigration detention, this Chapter investigated only to limited extent the way in which 
the relevant international norms are implemented and enforced. We have seen that many 
of the international documents that explicitly address the practice of immigration 
detention, such as those by the Council of Europe or the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, articulate recommendations to states, or are in another way directed to states. 
They do not accord rights to individuals and appealing to them or demanding their 
implementation by those who would supposedly benefit from them is often not possible.
950 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (1999), pp. 164-165.
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Neither do they in themselves compel states to change existing policies 951 An exception 
is Article 9 ICCPR, but the HRC in its rulings on individual cases under the Optional 
Protocol is sometimes simply ignored by states, of which Australia’s stance affords a 
discouraging example952
Indeed, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers, 
international human rights obligations of states are inadequately translated into practice 
at the national level. Measures aimed at stopping irregular immigration are all too often 
taken without due regard for international norms, standards and principles953 They 
undermine migrant’s basic rights, including the right to be protected against arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty: detention is often resorted to without due regard for the 
individual history o f the migrant; broad powers to detain are not checked by procedural 
guarantees; and detention is often very lengthy or even indefinite 954
In the European context, Member States’ frequent and wide-spread lack of 
concern for the reasonableness, necessity and proportionality of immigration detention 
as was described in Chapter 1, results in de facto violations o f Article 9 ICCPR.955 
Furthermore, national judicial procedures such as at the highest administrative court in 
the Netherlands may well fall below the standards imposed by Article 9(4) ICCPR, as
951 See for instance Australia’s position as quoted in the 2003 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, p. 16: “ Immigration detention is an essential element underpinning the integrity o f  Australia's 
migration programme and the protection o f  Australia's borders. There is no recognition in the Working 
Group's report o f  the role Australia plays every year in the resettlement o f  thousands o f refugees around 
the world. In conclusion, the Government considered that, yet again, a United Nations human rights body 
had produced a report misguidedly critical o f  Australia.” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 15 
December 2003)
952 The Australian Attorney-General expressed tire following opinion after several decisions and reports in 
w hich the Committee found violations: “The concerns expressed by the Committee about the application 
o f  our immigration policies to asylum-seekers are not new. The Government has, on pre\nous occasions, 
made clear to the Committee the reasons fo r  these policies, including that o f  maintaining the integrity o f  
our orderly migration program. The Government has no intention o f  changing its policy o f mandatory 
detention o f  asylum-seekers, which is consistent with our obligations under the Covenant." 29 July 2000.
953 Report of the Special Rapporteur: Rodriguez Pizamo (2002), p. 11.
954 Ibid. p. 2 and 3.
955 For example Hungary w here the detention of asylum seekers depends on “accidental circumstances 
and arbitrary decisions of the authorities” (FPP-CR-Hungary, par. 3.5.) and irregular migrants arc 
detained on the sole ground that they have been found on Hungarian territory without a valid residence 
permit (Commissioner of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Follow-Up Report on Hungary. 2006, p.20.)
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that court has limited the scope o f review of the lawfulness of the detention in favour o f  
the executive by repeatedly arguing that it is not for the judge to assess what is 
essentially the proportionality o f immigration detention.956 The reservation by the 
United Kingdom of its right to comply or not with some of the “20 Guidelines on 
Forced Return,” provides another clear example of national practice risking violation o f  
binding international norms because the requirements of some of the guidelines to  
which it made a reservation flow directly from Article 9 ICCPR.
As I have explained above, the length of this study does not permit me to  
analyse in depth how international human rights are actually implemented at the 
national constitutional level. In order to investigate the way in which international 
human rights law may more coercively restrain the state’s power to resort to  
immigration detention, the next Chapter will address the case law of the ECtHR, a court 
that, as has been convincingly argued, has become the Constitutional Court for 
Europe.958
956 See Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State. 6 september 2005. 200507112/1, JV 
2005/452 and 16 August 2005, 200505443/1, JV 2005/396.
95' Committee of Minsters. 20 Guidelines on Forced Return (9 May 2005). p. 1: “the Permanent 
Representative of the United Kingdom indicated that, in accordance with Article 10.2c of the Rules o f 
Procedure for the meetings of the Ministers' Deputies, he reserved the right of his Government to comply 
or not with Guidelines 2, 4,6, 7 ,8 ,11 and 16.”
958 Greer (1996).
Chapter 7 Immigration detention and the ECtHR: A limited
discourse?
7 .1 . I n t r o d u c t io n
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the ECHR and its enforcement mechanism are 
by far the most effective and extensive of international human rights mechanisms. 
According to Steven Greer, the ECtHR has become the Constitutional Court for Europe, 
promoting national Convention compliance which results in convergence in the “deep 
structure of national constitutional, legal and political systems.”959 Indeed, although the 
constitution that the Convention provides is only partial, seeing that it does not confer 
legislative powers,960 the fact that it provides for executive functions alongside to its 
judicial ones is essential in reaching this conclusion. Greater convergence in the 
structure of national systems with regard to fundamental rights is made possible by the 
fact that contracting parties to the Convention generally abide by the judgements o f the 
Court, encouraged as they are by a number of pressures and interests, not the least 
important of which is the fact that the execution o f the judgments of the ECtHR is 
supervised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The special 
position o f the ECtHR as the European Constitutional Court makes it an excellent site to 
conduct an analysis of the way in which states are in a real sense restrained by 
international legal norms that protect the human rights of immigration detainees.
Whereas the previous Chapter gave a broad overview o f relevant international 
human rights law with regard to the right to personal liberty in immigration detention 
cases, the larger part of my investigation of the case law of the ECtHR concerning 
Article 5 ECHR in this Chapter will focus on the substantive conditions that need to be 




7.2. I will investigate the legitimate aims o f immigration detention under the ECH R. 
After that, Section 7.3. will deal with the prohibition on arbitrary deprivations o f liberty  
under the ECHR. I will first address the lawfulness o f deprivations in general u n d e r 
Article 5(1) ECHR, after which I discuss the safeguards against arbitrary detention th a t 
are contained in the remaining paragraphs o f Article 5 ECHR. Subsequently, in Section 
7.4., I will look how the Court assesses the lawfulness of immigration detention in  
particular. It will become clear that the Court’s case law in this field is lacking in  
considerations of proportionality and necessity. In Section 7.5., I will compare its  
approach to immigration detention with the method in which it generally interprets th e  
Convention, as well as with the protection it offers to another category o f individuals 
who may be deprived o f  their liberty under Article 5 ECHR, namely persons of unsound 
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts and vagrants. This comparison will bring to ligh t 
incongruities in the Court’s assessment o f the lawfulness of immigration detention, 
resulting in a serious shortcoming in the European protection of the right to liberty in  
immigration law. In the conclusions to this Chapter in Section 7.6., I will argue that th is  
lack in adequate protection for immigration detainees cannot be explained by a single 
cause, but that several factors contribute to these inconsistencies, the most important o f  
which is the immunisation of the territorial frame o f sovereignty against the usual forces 
of legal correction.
7,2. Legitimate aims of immigration detention under the ECHR
In the ECHR, the right to personal liberty has been laid down in Article 5. This 
provision stipulates that everyone has the right to liberty, but it enumerates in its first 
paragraph six cases in which lawful deprivation o f liberty is permitted, if  it is carried 
out in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
Article 5(1) ECHR: Everyone has the right to liberty' and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after comiction by a competent court:
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court
or in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law:
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(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority'*,
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of 
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants:
(f) the law ful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into 
the country' or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition.
The list o f permissible cases o f deprivation of liberty under paragraph 1 is 
exhaustive: if an actual case of detention or arrest cannot be classified as belonging to 
one of the categories mentioned in this first paragraph of Article 5, it is not permitted by 
the ECHR. The state’s exercise of its power to deprive individuals of their liberty is 
further restricted by the notion that only a narrow interpretation of the exceptions to the 
right to liberty is consistent with the aim of Article 5 961
We have seen in the previous Chapter that under general international legal 
norms, immigration detention is only allowed when it serves the regulation of entry of 
foreign nationals or else secures their removal from national territory. Some documents 
have elaborated further upon these purposes, often specifically with the detention upon 
anrival of asylum seekers in mind. Article 5(1 )(f) ECHR only deals with two categories 
of immigration detention: detention upon arrival and detention related to deportation, 
and it does not contain specific provisions with regard to the deprivation of liberty of 
applicants for asylum 962 From the text of this provision it is clear that the ECHR 
recognises the prevention of unauthorised immigration as a legitimate purpose to resort 
to detention upon arrival.
961 See inter alia: D.G. v. Ireland\ 16 may 2002, §74; Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, §25; Van der Leer v. 
the Netherlands, 2 1 Februaiy 1990, §22; IVassink v. the Netherlands, 27 September 1990, §24; Quinn v. 
France, 22 March 1995, §42; and K. -F. v. Germany. 27 November 1997, §70.
962 It also deals with detention of persons who are to be extradited, a separate category' of detention of 
foreigners that will not be dealt with in this study. Moreover, note that only non-nationals can be 
subjected to immigration detention in the European system of human rights’ protection because expulsion 
of nationals is prohibited and the right of nationals to be admitted to their own country is guaranteed by 
Article 3 of Protocol no. 4 to tlx: ECHR.
Concerning pre-deportation detention, the Convention is not equally 
unambiguous. By merely stipulating that detention is permitted of persons against 
whom “action is taken with a view to deportation”, Article 5(1 )(f) does only articulate 
indirectly on the legitimate aim o f pre-deportation through the requirement that the 
action is taken with a view to deportation. In this respect, this ground for detention is to 
some extent comparable with the permissible detention of persons of an unsound mind, 
alcoholics and drug addicts or vagrants under subparagraph e of Article 5(1) BCHR. 
With regard to that category, the Convention neither makes explicit the aim of the 
deprivation o f liberty. Some authors have argued the purpose of pre-deportation 
detention is to make it possible to decide on the deportation.963 However, it seems more 
consistent with the aim o f pre-admittance detention to conclude that the purpose of pre­
deportation detention is realisation o f deportation 964 This can also been deduced for the 
fact that detention is prohibited by Article 5(1) BCHR when deportation is no longer 
possible965
W e may conclude that in the European system o f protection of human rights, the 
only legitimate reasons for states to  have recourse to immigration detention are 
regulation o f  entry and securing expulsion. The fact that immigration detention resorted 
to for any other reasons is prohibited by the ECHR as a whole is corroborated by Article 
18 ECHR, which provision contains a prohibition on using the permitted restrictions by 
the Convention to the rights guaranteed by it for any purpose other than for which they 
have been described.
7.3. The prohibition on arbitrary detention in Article 5 ECHR
7.3.1. “Lawful” detention “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”
According to Article 5 BCHR, an individual can only be deprived o f his liberty 
“in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” . In addition, the subparagraphs 
under Article 5(1) ECHR enumerating the permissible cases of deprivation of liberty
963 van Dijk and van Hoof (1998), p. 364.
964 See Chemishova (2001), p. 4.
965 ECommHR, Alt v. Switzerland1 Opinion o f 26 Februaiy 1997, p. 2152.
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each require separately that the detention or arrest is “lawful”. According to the Court, 
these two expressions reflect the importance of the aim underlying Article 5(1) ECHR, 
which is to ensure that no one is dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary fashion 966 
The importance o f the prohibition on arbitrariness is emphasised by the interpretation 
that has been given to the right to security of person in Article 5 ECHR, in particular in 
some decisions by the ECommHR.967 It has held that the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘security’ in 
Article 5 ECHR must be read as a whole, both referring only to physical liberty and 
security, with the notion of security explicitly denoting the protection against arbitrary 
interferences with the liberty o f person968
Although in many respects, the term “lawful” overlaps with the notion “in 
accordance with a procedure in accordance with the law”, in theory they are 
distinguishable. “In accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” is the narrower 
one, as it refers mainly to domestic procedural laws. In order not to violate this 
requirement, domestic law must lay down a procedure which has to be followed 
whenever a detention or an arrest is carried out 969 In the case o f Shamsa, the ECtHR 
found a violation o f this requirement because the Polish government had permitted the 
deprivation of liberty to last longer than 90 days although Polish law requires the 
immigration detainee to be set free if the expulsion is not effected within this period.970
However, even in the case that a procedure laid down by national law is 
followed, a violation o f Article 5 ECHR can still occur if the procedural domestic laws 
do not conform to the Conventions standards:
“The Court considers that the words ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’ 
essentially refer back to domestic law; they state the need for compliance with the relevant 
procedure under that law. However, the domestic law must itself be in conformity with the 
Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. The notion underlying 
the term in question is one of fair and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a
966 IVinterwerpv. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, par. 37 and 39.
967 De Meyer (1995), p. 190.
968 Adler and Bivas v. the Federal Republic o f  Germany, 16 July 1976, § 146.
969 The deprivation of liberty must have a legal basis in domestic law. see: Amuur v\ France, 25 June 
1996, §50; and Riera Blume and others v. Spain, 14 October 1999, §§31-35.
970 Shamsa a'. Poland1 27 November 2003, par. 52.
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person of his liberty should issue from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should
not be arbitrary.’'971
Whereas the expression “ in accordance with a procedure proscribed by law” 
thus refers only to procedural requirements, the notion o f ‘lawful’ contained in each o f 
subparagraphs of Article 5 ECHR covers substantive as well as procedural 
requirements. Moreover, it denotes both the specific requirement that the deprivation o f 
liberty is in accordance with national laws as the more general requirement that any 
measure depriving the individual o f his liberty is compatible with the purpose o f Article 
5 ECHR, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness 972 The prohibition on 
arbitrary deprivation on liberty also entails that the domestic law that deprives 
somebody of his liberty must be in conformity with the Convention, including the 
general principles expressed or implied therein as well as in the light o f the aim o f the 
restrictions permitted by Article 5(1) 973
The Court generally considers the two concepts together and the distinction 
between them is often blurred in its judgments.974 Where they both refer back to 
domestic law, compliance with domestic law becomes part of states’ Convention-based 
obligations over which the Court in Strasbourg has jurisdiction975 However, when 
analysing the level of protection offered by the Convention in this respect, it must be 
taken into account that the scope of this jurisdiction is subject to certain limits. It is in 
the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply
971 Winterwerpv. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, A-33, §45.
9 2 See, for instance, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §§39 and 45; Bozano v. France, 18 
December 1986, §54; Bouamarv. Belgium, 29 February7 1988, §47; Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 
June 1996, §40; and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §118.
973 Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1989, §65; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 
24 October 1979, §45; Erkalo v. the Netherlands, 2 September 1998, §52; and Kctwka v. Poland, 9 
January' 2001, §48.
974 See e.g. Lukanov v. Bulgaria, 20 March 1997, §41: “the centra! issue (...) is w hether the (...) detention 
(...) was "lawful” within the meaning o f  Article 5 para. 1, including whether it was effected "in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. ”
975 And where a Member State of the EU is concerned, community- law must also be taken into 
consideration to the extent that it is self-executing. ECommHR, Caprino v. United Kingdom, 3 March 
1987, p. 14.
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domestic law, who are given a certain margin of appreciation in this respect 976 It is the 
Court’s task to ascertain that domestic laws are not interpreted or applied in an arbitrary 
manner.
7.3.2. Safeguards against arbitrary detention in Article 5 ECHR
Before investigating more specifically how the Court applies the prohibition on 
arbitrary detention in cases of immigration detention, I will first discuss some important 
procedural safeguards against arbitrary detention, embodied in paragraphs 2 and 4 o f 
Article 5 ECHR.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of 
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this 
article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. 
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who Iras been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of 
this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
According to the Court, the remedy of habeas corpus in paragraph 4 is a 
fundamental guarantee, judicial control being implied by “the rule o f law and one of the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society.”977 The notion o f a court in Article 5(4) 
ECHR does not necessarily imply the involvement o f a traditional court, integrated in 
the normal judicial structures o f a state. Instead, the reviewing body needs to satisfy 
certain substantial requirements in order to be considered a court in the sense of article 
5(4) ECHR. ‘
9 6 See U'interwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §46; Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, §48; 
Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986, §58; and Kemmache v. France, 24 November 1994, §42. See for 
more Reid (1998), p. 182.
9 7ECtHR, Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1989, §58.
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Three different criteria can be distinguished in the Court’s assessment whether 
an organ fulfils these requirements. The first o f these is apparent from the words of the 
provision itself: the ‘court’ must have the power to order the release of the detainee if  it 
finds that the deprivation o f liberty is unlawful. A reviewing body with merely 
consulting powers cannot be considered a court in the sense of article 5(4) ECHR.
The second criterion concerns the organisation and impartiality o f the reviewing 
organ vis-à-vis the executive and the parties to the case. According to the Court in 
Neumeister, independence and impartiality are essential features o f the concept o f a 
‘court’ in paragraph 4.979 Thus, appeal to a higher administrative body to review the 
decision to detain would not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4) ECHR.
Apart from these formal requirements, the court testing the lawfulness o f the 
detention must provide fundamental guarantees in the proceedings that assess the 
lawfulness o f the detention, the third condition to be fulfilled in order to be deemed a 
court in the sense of Article 5(4) ECHR. These proceedings must have a judicial 
character, and in order to determine whether they offer adequate guarantees, regard 
must be had to the particular nature o f the circumstances in which they take place.980 It 
depends on the kind of deprivation o f liberty in question what kind of guarantees must 
be offered.981 In any case, the individual affected by the deprivation of liberty must be 
able to participate properly in the proceedings, which implies they should have an 
adversarial character. Thus, the person who is deprived o f his liberty should be able to 
submit his views on the matter to the court. With regard to detention to effect a 
deportation, this requirement entails that the detainee should be well informed of the 
reasons o f the decision to deport him.983 The same would be required in case of 
detention to prevent entry. In some cases the court is obliged to hear somebody deprived
918 M eeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, §64; A', v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981, §61, 
and Chahalv. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §130.
919Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, §24. See also De IVilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium. 18 June 
1971, §77; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §56; and Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 
March 1987, §61.
980De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, §§76 and 78; Wintenverp v. the Netherlands. 24 
October 1979; and Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 24 June 1982, §47.
981 Weeks u the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, §61; Wassink v. The Netherlands. 27 September 1990, 
§30; Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, §57.
982 Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, §66.
983 Chahalv. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §130.
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of his liberty in person.984 It is not clear whether the Court considers hearing in person 
in the case of immigration detainees essential. In the case of Sanchez-Reisse, which 
dealt with detention for the purpose o f extradition, it stated that hearing in person was 
not necessary because the applicant’s presence would not have made a difference for the 
outcome o f the proceedings.985 Taking into account that the remedy of habeas corpus 
does not only provide protection against unlawful detention, but also functions as an 
important safeguard against ill-treatment during detention, this position of the Court is 
at least questionable.
The issue o f legal assistance in case of detention is directly related to the habeas 
corpus provision contained in Article 5 ECHR. The Strasbourg case-law seems to 
indicate that in the case of detention to prevent entry or to effect expulsion, a right to 
legal assistance is implied by article 5(4) ECHR. In the case o f Chahal, the fact that Mr. 
Chahal was not entitled to legal representation before the panel that reviewed his 
detention was one o f the circumstances which lead the Court to conclude that this panel 
could not be considered a court in the sense of article 5(4) ECHR. Immigration 
detention always concerns non-nationals, often neither familiar with the legal system of 
the state depriving them of their liberty, nor able to speak the language. .Accordingly, a 
lack of legal assistance would prevent them from making a meaningful appeal to a 
court987 Accordingly, one may conclude that in most cases o f immigration detention, 
legal assistance should be provided for in order to render the safeguard contained in
•  Q O O
Article 5(4) practical and effective.
The second question is whether article 5(4) ECHR is always applicable. If the 
decision depriving someone of his liberty is taken by an administrative body, the person 
concerned is entitled to the judicial review meant in article 5(4) ECHR. This entitlement 
exists no matter how short the period of detention is.989 Moreover, legitimate security
^W interwerp  v. the Netherlands. 24 October 1979, §60; and Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, 
§60.
985Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 21 October 1986, §51.
986See Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §130.
987 Conka v. Belgium. 5 February 2002, §44 and 55.
988 In the case of Bouamar the Court deemed legal representation imperative in the habeas corpus 
proceedings of a minor (Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February' 1988). It lias also considered that special 
procedural safeguards may be called upon in habeas corpus proceedings in the case of mentally ill people 
w ho are deprived o f their liberty (U'intenverp v. The Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §60).
989 Al Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002, §92.
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concerns with regard to a foreigner can never justify a complete lack of judicial review 
o f the detention 990 However, if  the decision to detain is made by a court at the close o f 
judicial proceedings, the supervision required by Article 5(4) ECHR is already 
incorporated in the decision, that is to say, if the court that took the initial decision to 
detain satisfies the requirements that were discussed above.991 We have seen in Chapter 
1 that in the Member States o f the EU, different practices exist with regard to who 
orders immigration detention. In the majority o f countries the administrative body that 
is dealing with the application for entry or with the expulsion order will also be 
responsible for ordering the detention. Accordingly, judicial review of that decision by a 
court is required by Article 5 ECHR.
The scope of the judicial review is the next aspect of article 5(4) ECHR to be 
considered. Article 5 ECHR should be read as a whole which means that the term 
lawfulness in paragraph 4 of this provision has the same meaning as in its first 
paragraph.992 Accordingly, even though the executive has a certain margin o f 
appreciation with regard to the ordering of the detention, the review should in any case 
be “wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the ''lawful" 
detention o f a person according to Article 5(1) ECHR.”993 I will deal with the 
substantive requirements that the first paragraph o f  Article 5 ECHR imposes on 
deprivations o f liberty under immigration legislation below, but for now it is important 
to note that Article 5(4) ECHR thus imposes an autonomous standard on the judicial 
procedure challenging the lawfulness of the detention by requiring it to address the 
question whether the actual deprivation of liberty was not arbitrary in the sense o f 
Article 5 ECHR. The question whether domestic law has been complied with thus 
contains only one element o f the review required by Article 5(4) ECHR, which is in this 
respect comparable to Article 9 ICCPR.
Article 5(4) ECHR requires moreover that the review should take place speedily. 
What does the Court regard as speedily? Seeing that the answer on this question in
990 ECtHR, A l Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002, § 95; and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 
1996.
991 ECtHR, De Wilde, OomsandVersypv. Belgium, 18 June 1971, §76.
992 ECtHR, Dougoz v. Greece. 6 March 2001, §61; andAshingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985. 
§52.
" 3Chahal v. the United Kingdom. 15 November 1996, §127; and Weeks v. the United Kingdom. 2 March 
1987, §59.
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particular depends on the circumstances o f the case, the Court has never given a clear 
time limit by which the review must have taken place.994 Certainly, the term speedily in 
paragraph 4 of article 5 ECHR allows for less urgency than the notion of promptly 
required for the review of deprivations o f liberty under criminal law in paragraph 3 o f 
that provision.995 In the case o f E  v. Norway, dealing with a deprivation of liberty of a 
mentally ill person, the Court found a period of eight weeks excessive and thus in 
violation of article 5(4) ECHR.996 In Sanchez-Reisse, periods of 31 and 46 days between 
requests for release and the judicial decisions on the lawfulness o f extradition detention 
were not considered as in compliance with the notion ‘speedily’.997 Various 
circumstances of the case may play a role in determining whether the requirement o f a 
speedy review has been fulfilled, in particular the complexity o f the case, the behaviour 
o f the applicant, the conduct o f the authorities, and what is at stake for the applicant998 
However, delays caused by an excessive workload or vacation periods can never be 
justified, because the Contracting States are obliged to organise their legal systems in 
such a way as to enable their courts to comply with the Convention’s requirements. 
Indeed, according to the Court, judicial authorities must ensure that urgent matters in 
general are dealt with speedily, and this holds especially true when individual liberty is 
at stake 999
Does article 5(4) ECHR entail a right to periodical judicial reviews? The Court 
has answered this question in various cases, the most important o f which deal with the 
deprivation of liberty of mentally ill persons. With regard to this category, the Court has 
deducted a right o f periodical judicial review at reasonable intervals from the fact that 
the reasons initially warranting deprivation of liberty may cease to exist.1000 After the 
first judicial review, new issues affecting the lawfulness of the detention may also arise 
in the case of detention to prevent unauthorised entry or detention to effect expulsion or
" 4Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 21 October 1986, §55; and E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990.
995E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, §64.
996 Ibid. §64-66.
991 Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 21 October 1986, §59-60.
998 Lawson and Schermers (1999). p. 108. See also ECtHR in Luberti v. Italy, 23 February 1984.
999Bezicheri v. Italy, 25 October 1989, A-164, §25 and E. v. Norway, 67, §66. See also Letellier r. France, 
26 June 1992. §54-57, about the 'speediness’ of subsequent reviews.
x<mlVinterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §55; andA'. v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 
1981, §52.
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deportation. The length o f the detention may become excessively long, the state may not 
be handling the expulsion procedures adequately, or expulsion or deportation may no 
longer be possible. Therefore, if  automatic periodical judicial review is not provided for, 
the immigration detainee should at least be entitled to institute proceedings to challenge 
the continuing lawfulness of his detention at reasonable intervals. However, it should be 
noted that the Court has never expressed an opinion on the question what constitutes a 
reasonable interval between judicial reviews o f immigration detention.
Article 5(4) ECHR does not give persons deprived of their liberty a right to 
appeal the decision of the court reviewing the lawfulness of their detention or arrest. 
However, i f  domestic law allows for such an appeal, the judicial procedure followed by 
the higher instance should satisfy the requirements of article 5(4).
Paragraph 2 of article 5 ECHR gives everybody the right to be told, in simple, 
non technical language which he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds 
for his arrest.1001 This provision is applicable to all categories of deprivation o f 
liberty.1002 It is closely related to the right of judicial review of the deprivation of liberty 
as only someone who is aware o f  the reasons for his detention can effectively challenge 
its lawfulness.1003 In addition, this right has an independent meaning as.well: it is “the 
embodiment o f a kind of legitimate confidence in the relations between the individual 
and the public powers.”1004
Three requirements flow from the obligation laid down in article 5(2) ECHR: 
the information must be given promptly; it should be complete; and it ought to be 
communicated in an intelligible manner. The inclusion of the term promptly requires 
that somebody deprived o f  his liberty should be informed of the broad reasons right at 
the moment o f arrest or detention. Only very special circumstances may justify a 
delay.1005 Detailed written reasons for immigration detention may be supplied somewhat 
later, as the Court confirmed in the case of Conka,1006 The Court found a violation of 
Article 5(2) in Saadi, as the applicant had been in immigration detention for some 76
100i Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, §50.
'<mlan  der Leer v. The Netherlands, 21 February 1990, §27-28.
1003 Vv. the United Kingdom, 55, §66.
‘"^See dissenting opinion of judge Evrigenis attached to .V. v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981. 
,005 van Dijk and van Hoof (1998), p. 369.
1006 Conka v. Belgium. of 5 February 2001, par. 47-52.
288
hours before his lawyer was orally provided with the real reasons for his detention.1007 
The information needs to be complete: which in expulsion cases implies that somebody 
should not only be informed that he is detained in order to deport or expulse him, but 
also of the reasons justifying this expulsion.1008 Finally, the importance of the 
requirement that the reasons for arrest or detention need to be communicated in a 
language which the detained understands, is evident in cases of immigration detention.
The last paragraph o f article 5 ECHR holds a unique provision in the 
Convention. It gives anybody the right to compensation if he has been deprived of his 
liberty in contravention of article 5 ECHR. This provision differs from article 50 ECHR 
in that it gives the individual whose rights under article 5 ECHR have been violated a 
right to compensation directly vis-à-vis the national authorities. In this respect it is not 
relevant whether it was the Court in Strasbourg who found a violation or a national 
court.
In the absence of an enforceable right to compensation under national law in 
respect of breaches o f article 5 ECHR, paragraph 5 of that provision is violated, also i f  
the detention is not illegal under national law.1009 Nonetheless, case law shows that 
article 5(5) ECHR does not prohibit the Contracting States from making the award o f 
compensation dependent upon the ability of the person concerned to show damage 
resulting from the breach. Indeed, in the Court's view there can be no question o f 
"compensation” where there is no pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to  
compensate.1010
7.4. Immigration detention and the prohibition of arbitrariness
7.4.1. General
As already mentioned above, the term ‘lawful’, therewith including ‘in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’ contained in Article 5(1) ECHR
1007 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, II July 2006, par. 54-55.
Iü08De Gouttes (1995), p. 206.
umBrannigan and McBride, 26 May 1993, §37, and Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 29 
November 1989, §67.
]0](JUassink v. The Netherlands. 27 September 1990, §38.
289
requires that any measure depriving the individual o f his liberty is compatible with the 
purpose o f Article 5 ECHR, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness.101 * As 
we have seen above, the notion o f  arbitrariness clearly goes beyond a violation of the 
positive law, and it can be understood to contain elements o f injustice, 
inappropriateness, unpredictability and unreasonableness.1012
In this Section, I will address the way in which the ECtHR applies the 
prohibition on arbitrary detention in cases of immigration detention. When analysing 
case law o f the Court, one can roughly distinguish between four aspects of the detention 
which have a bearing upon its lawfulness in the sense o f Article 5 ECHR: the quality of 
the national law authorising the detention; the conditions and place of detention; the 
reasons underlying the decision to  resort to detention; and the duration o f the detention. 
I will first address the first two aspects in relation to immigration detention, because 
they elucidate the manner in which the Court gives concrete shape to some aspects of 
the notion o f arbitrariness. After that I will analyse under which conditions the 
legitimate purposes of immigration detention under Article 5 ECHR justify a decision to 
resort to detention in a concrete case.
7.4.2. Lack of predictability and inappropriateness as elements of arbitrariness
When the Court examines whether the detention is carried out in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law, it attaches crucial importance to the quality of the 
domestic law authorising detention. It is important that these laws are accessible to the 
person concerned, who should in addition be able to foresee the consequences. 
Legislation that is imprecise or vague will not satisfy these ‘foreseeability and 
accessibility requirements’.1013 Accordingly, any deprivation of liberty authorised by
10,1 See, for instance, Winterwerpv. the Netherlands. 24 October 1979, §§39 and 45; Bozano v. France, 
18 December 1986, §54; Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, §47; and Benham v. the United 
Kingdom. 10 June 1996, §40.
1012 HRC, Mukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994, at. 9.8 and Nowak (1993). p. 292.
1013 Sec about these ‘quality requirements' o f the domestic laws in general: Sunday Times v. the United 
Kingdom, 26 April 1979, §49; Silver and others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, §87-88; Malone 
v. the United Kingdom, 2 August 1984, §66; Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, §50, 51; Kruslin r. 
France, 24 April 1990, §30; Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990, §29, 31, 33. For these requirements
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such laws violates Article 5(1) ECHR. It is only logical that with regard to aliens’ 
legislation these requirements gain extra weight, as it concerns people that are 
unfamiliar with the national laws. The Court confirmed this in Amuur, adding that these 
quality requirements must be satisfied in order to avoid all risk o f arbitrariness.1014 It 
can be argued that the extensive administrative discretion to order immigration 
detention in many EU Member States may result in arbitrary detentions on account o f a 
lack of predictability.
The manner of implementation of the detention may also play a role in 
determining its lawfulness. Admittedly, the Court decided in Bizotto  that arrangements 
for implementing sentences cannot, in principle, have any bearing on the "lawfulness" 
of a deprivation o f liberty.1015 Nonetheless, this judgement of the Court must not be 
misinterpreted to purport that conditions of detention can never constitute criteria that 
are relevant for the determination o f the lawfulness. The cases of Ashingdane and 
Bouamar confirmed that there should indeed be a relationship between the main ground 
o f permitted deprivation of liberty relied on by the authorities and the manner o f 
implementation o f detention.1016
Ashingdane was a mental patient and Bouamar was a minor who was detained 
with the aim of educational supervision. In these cases the aim o f detention gave clear 
indication o f the place and conditions o f the deprivation of liberty. With regard to 
detention permitted under Article 5(l)(f) it is more difficult to deduct from the aim of 
the deprivation o f liberty binding conclusions about the place or conditions of detention. 
It seems reasonable to say that deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1 )(f) should not 
consist of more restrictions than necessary.1017 Detaining asylum seekers and illegal 
immigrants in police cells or prison facilities, although questionable from a 
humanitarian viewpoint will not be unlawful under Article 5(1 )(f), although the Court 
established that the conditions of immigration detention in the case o f Dougoz
specifically with regard to immigration detention: Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, §50 and Dougoz v. 
Greece, 6 March 2001, §55-57.
1014 Amuur r France. 25 June 1996, §50.
1015 Bizzotto r Greece, 15 November 1996, §34.
1016 Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985. §44; Bouamar v. Belgium. 29 February 1988; and 
also in Bizzotto v. Greece, 15 November 19%, §31.
1017 van Dijk and van Hoof (1998). p. 364.
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constituted a breach of Article 3 ECHR.1018 However, i f  immigration detainees are 
obliged to follow the daily routine of the other prison inmates, a routine often 
characterised by punitive aspects, questions of lawfulness according to Article 5 ECHR 
may arise.
A good example where the manner o f implementation of immigration detention 
affected its lawfulness can be found in Conka v. Belgium. In this case the Belgium 
police had sent a notice to a number o f rejected asylum seekers, requiring them to attend 
the police station. The notice stated that their attendance was required to enable the files 
concerning their applications for asylum to be completed. At the police station however, 
they were served with an order to leave the territory, accompanied by a decision for 
their removal and their detention for that purpose and they were taken to a closed transit 
centre. The Court condemned the use o f a “ruse” whereby the authorities tried by 
misleading asylum seekers to gain their trust in order to arrest and subsequently to 
deport them:
“The Court reiterates that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty secured in Article 5 g 1 is 
an exhaustive one and only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim 
of that provision In the Court’s view, that requirement must also be reflected in the reliability of 
communications such as those sent to the applicants, irrespective of whether the recipients are 
lawfully present in the country or not. It follows that, even as regards overstayers, a conscious 
decision by the authorities to facilitate or improve the effectiveness of a planned operation for 
the expulsion of aliens by misleading them about the purpose of a notice so as to make it easier 
to deprive them of their liberty is not compatible with Article 5.” 1019
Conka made more concrete the way the Court envisages the relationship 
between immigration detention and the manner o f implementation thereof. That is to 
say, whereas the Court did not seem to exclude the use o f stratagems in order to deprive 
criminals o f their liberty, it did not deem it in accordance with the general principles 
embodied in the Convention if those stratagems were used to gain the trust o f asylum 
seekers in order to arrest them.
1018 Tlie Court has never given a judgment on the relationship between the ground o f immigration 
detention and the manner of implementation thereof. However, in the case of Dougoz v. Greece, 6 March 
2001, it found the conditions of detention to be in violation of Article 3.
1019 Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, §42.
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7.4.3. When do the prevention of illegal entry and securing expulsion justify 
detention?
Clearly, the reasons underlying the decision to detain will affect its lawfulness as 
well. We have seen in Section 7.2. that the Convention only recognises two legitimate 
aims for detention under immigration legislation: the removal of the person concerned 
and the prevention of illegal entry. Article 18 ECHR prohibits using the restrictions that 
are permitted by the Convention to the rights guaranteed by it for any other purpose 
other than for which they have been described. Indeed, were it otherwise, the assertion 
by the Court that the list of exceptions to the right to liberty secured in Article 5(1) 
ECHR is an exhaustive one, and that only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is 
consistent with the aim of that provision, would be rendered meaningless. The issue to 
be dealt with in this Section is the manner in which the Court interprets the exception 
under Article 5(1 )(f) ECHR. In other words, under which conditions do the legitimate 
purposes of immigration detention under Article 5 ECHR justify a decision to resort to 
detention in an individual case? I will address pre-deportation detention in the context 
of this question, after which I will deal with detention upon arrival.
With regard to pre-deportation detention, the Court, when reviewing the initial 
decision to detain a foreigner, barely seems to perceive a difference between the 
question o f what is brought forward as a legitimate aim of immigration detention and 
the question as to under which circumstances such a reason may justify the decision to 
detention in an individual case as was shown in Chahal:
“Article 5<l)(f) docs not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing; in this respect Article 5(1 ){f) provides a different level of 
protection from Article 5(l)(c). Indeed, all that is required under this provision is that "action is 
being taken with a view to deportation". It is therefore immaterial, for the purposes of Article 
5(l)(f). whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention 
law.” 1020
10-0 Chahal i\ the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996. §112: Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2(X)2, §38; 
Quinn, 22 March 1995, §48. (The last case concerned detention pending extradition)
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It is by elaborating on the specific circumstances in which the expulsion or 
deportation o f an individual allow for his detention, that issues such as reasonability, 
proportionality and necessity come into play, of which the decisions o f the HRC as were 
discussed in the previous Chapter provide a good example. But according to the Court 
in Strasbourg, any person against whom deportation proceedings are taken can be 
detained, without considering these important principles. In the recent case of Conka, 
the applicants explicitly brought the argument forward that their arrest had not been 
necessary to secure their departure from Belgium. However, the Court quoted from its 
earlier case law to express once more that an unnecessary pre-deportation detention is 
not unlawful.1021 Its statements in Chahal, which were once more reiterated in Saadi as 
we will see below,1022 cannot be interpreted otherwise as to mean that even if the 
lawfulness o f the deportation proceedings is in dispute, detention based upon those 
proceedings need not to be unlawful in the light of the ECHR.
One exception to the C ourt's deference to national authorities’ decisions in this 
regard is provided by the situation in which there is no legal basis whatsoever for the 
deportation proceedings. In that case, the Court has found a violation of the requirement 
in Article 5(1 )(f) that the deprivation o f liberty needs to be carried out in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law .1023
The only other instance in which the Court addresses issues concerning 
reasonability, necessity and proportionality of the detention ipso facto  relate to the 
duration o f the detention. Article 5 ECHR mentions limits to the duration of deprivation 
of liberty solely with regard to people detained on suspicion of criminal offences. With 
regard to detention to effect expulsion, the Court has never given any clear guidelines as 
regards the maximum duration o f  deprivation o f liberty. In Chahal, the Court stated that 
the deprivation of liberty will be justified only as long as deportation proceedings are in
] 021 Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, §38. However, note the Court’s remark in Bozano v. France, 18 
December 1986. §60; “Depriving Bozano o f  his liberty in this yvav [did not amount] to "detention" 
necessary in the ordinary course o f  "action. taken with a view to dep o rta tio n "
10“  Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 2006, par 33.
1023 Mohdv. Greece, 27 April 2006, par. 20-24.
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progress.1024 If these proceedings are not carried out with due diligence the detention 
will cease to be lawful under Article 5 ECHR.1025
When assessing the duration o f the expulsion proceedings, attention must also 
be paid to the detainee’s behaviour. If his conduct was the cause for delays, the State 
cannot be held responsible for an exceedingly long duration.1026 To judge the diligence 
with which the state handles the expulsion proceedings the interests at stake for the 
applicant also play a role.1027 In Chahal, the applicant held that if he would be returned 
to his country o f origin, he would be subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3 
ECHR. As his case accordingly involved considerations o f an extremely serious and 
weighty nature, it was neither considered in his interest, nor in that of the general 
public, if decisions about his expulsion would be taken hastily.1028 Accordingly, if  such 
grave interests are at stake, it is only logical that deportation proceedings take longer 
then when the applicant’s interests are of a less serious nature. Thus, a lack o f due 
diligence of the authorities in the expulsion proceedings amounts to a violation of 
Article 5(1 )(f). In assessing this aspect of the detention, the Court seems to pay rather 
more attention to the question as to whether the state has remained active during the 
period of detention, than to the actual duration of the detention.1029
As we have seen above, pre-admittance detention is only permissible in order to 
prevent the person concerned from effecting an unauthorised entry in the country. In 
Amuitr,1030 the Court was not required to arrive at any detailed conclusion as to the test 
to be applied to detention upon arrival allegedly falling within Article 5(1 )(f> ECHR, 
because this case focussed on the quality of the national laws that were applicable.1031 
Nonetheless, it was a highly significant case, as the Court decided that to hold asylum
1024 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §113.
i°25 e q h R Quinn v. France, 22 March 1995, §48; and Singh v. The Czech Republic, 25 January 2005. 
The Ouinn and Singh cases concerned extradition proceedings, but the same principle applies to expulsion 
proceedings; Kolompar v. Belgium , 24 September 1992, §36; and Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 
November 1996. §113.
1026 Kolompar v. Belgium , 24 September 1992, §42.
1027 See Velde (1999), p. 42.
1028 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §117. The Court did not consider Mr. Chahal’s 
detention, which took almost six years, too long.
1029 ECtHR. Ntumba Kabongo c. Belgique (inadmissible), 2 June 2005.
1030 Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996.
1031 See Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 2006, par. 35.
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seekers in the international zone o f  an airport constitutes a restriction of liberty which 
under circumstances can turn into a deprivation o f liberty. According to the Court, a 
state cannot refute the existence o f deprivation o f liberty with the argument that the 
asylum seekers are not on its territory or that they are free to leave at any time. The 
possibility for asylum seekers to leave voluntarily the country where they wish to take 
refuge does not exclude the existence of a restriction of liberty, which can under 
circumstances become a deprivation of liberty.1032
“The Court notes that many member States of the Council of Europe have been confronted 
for a number of years now with an increasing flow of asylum-seekers. It is aware of the 
difficulties involved in the reception of asylum-seekers at most large European airports and in 
the processing of their applications. [...] Contracting States have the undeniable sovereign right 
to control aliens' entry' into and residence in their territory'. The Court emphasises, however, that 
this right must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, including 
Article 5.” 1033
“Holding aliens in the international zone does indeed involve a restriction upon liberty', but one 
which is not in every respect comparable to that which obtains in centres for the detention o f 
aliens pending deportation. Such confinement, accompanied by suitable safeguards for the 
persons concerned, is acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful immigration 
while complying with their international obligations, particularly under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
States’ legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent attempts to circumvent immigration 
restrictions must not deprive asylum-seekers of the protection afforded by these conventions. [...] 
In that connection account should be taken of the fact that the measure is applicable not to those 
who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled 
from their own country.“1034
Taking into account that the applicants were placed under strict and constant 
police surveillance and had no legal and social assistance, the Court concluded that their 
situation amounted to a deprivation of liberty which fell under the scope of Article 5 
ECHR.1035 Subsequently, it deemed their detention in violation of Article 5 ECHR 
because the rules governing their detention in the international zone were not of a
,03“ Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, par. 48.
*033 Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996. §41.
1034 Ibid. §43.
1035 Ibid. par. 45 and 49.
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sufficient quality to satisfy the requirement that the deprivation of liberty should be in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.1036
The Court’s decision in Amuur is important in that it takes due account o f the 
individual interests that are involved in sovereignty’s territorial frame. Although the 
Court recognises the sovereign right o f states to regulate the entry of foreigners, it also 
acknowledges the actualities of the individual movement in a global political system 
based on territoriality. As such, it effectively dismisses as artificial the sovereign 
argument that asylum seekers are free to go wherever they want as long as it is not in 
the territory o f the sovereign state that is making that argument.
However, it is arguable that the destabilizing effect of Armtur on the territorial 
frame of sovereignty was mitigated in a later case that was decided by the Court. In 
M ahdid and Haddar, concerning the case of two asylum seekers whose applications had 
been dismissed by the Austrian government, the Court judged that the applicants’ stay 
on Vienna airport fell outside the scope of Article 5 ECHR.1037 After the applicants’ 
requests for asylum had been dismissed, they destroyed their travel documents so that 
they could not be removed. This, “a deliberate choice for which the Contracting State 
cannot in any way be held responsible”, together with the fact that, the applicants 
remained without any special police surveillance and had refused better accommodation 
in the (surveillanced) transit zone, led the Court to conclude that their stay in Vienna 
Airport did not amount to a deprivation of liberty.1038
Although this case indeed differed in important aspects from Amuur, the Court’s 
quick characterisation of the situation as entirely due to the deliberate choice of 
applicants is questionable. If one would assume that the Bundesasylamt had been wrong 
in dismissing their applications for asylum -  not a mere theoretical possibility as it was 
still possible to appeal the decision made by the Bundesasylamt -  the deliberateness of 
the position o f the applicants would have been a lot more difficult to defend.1039
In the cases discussed above, there was no need for the Court to address the 
question of the necessity or the proportionality of pre-admittance detention. However, in 
Saadi it became clear that for the Court, these aspects o f the decision to detain are as
1036 Ibid. §43.
1037 Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (inadmissible). 8 December 2005.
1038 Ibid.
1039 Lawson (2005). See for a similar case in which the court's stance is more defensible: M ogos v. 
Romania, 13 October 2005
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inconsequential for the question o f its lawfulness as they are with regard to pre­
deportation detention.1040 Indeed, when reviewing the lawfulness of pre-admittance 
detention in this case, the Court explicitly refuted the applicability o f the principles o f 
proportionality and necessity, a definite shortcoming in its case law that is only the 
more prominent because with regard to the legitimate aim of this type of detention, the 
wording o f Article 5(1) ECHR is unambiguous: it is to be resorted to in order to  prevent 
unauthorised entries.
In order to reflect the position o f  the Court unequivocally, I resort to  extended 
quotation from Saadi, which concerned the detention o f an asylum seeker in Oakington, 
a British immigration detention that, according to  the UK government, is used only for 
those who do not present a risk o f absconding. The sole aim of detention at Oakington is 
to speed up immigration procedures by using a “fast-track” procedure.
“The first question which the Court must address is whether a person who has presented himself 
to the immigration authorities and has been granted temporaiy admission to the country can be 
considered as a person who is seeking to effect an “unauthorised entry” into the country. The 
Court does not accept that, as soon as a potential immigrant has surrendered himself to the 
immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, with the result that 
detention cannot be justified under the first limb of Article 5(1 )(f). In particular, it is a normal 
part of States’ “undeniable right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in their country that 
States are permitted to detain would-be immigrants who have applied for permission to enter, 
whether by way of asylum or not. Such detention must be compatible with tire overall purpose of 
Article 5, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness, but it is evident from the tenor of 
tire judgment in Amuur that the detention of potential immigrants is capable of being compatible 
with Article 5(l)(f). As to the difference between a short period of detention on arrival in a 
country in order to assess the risk of absconding [...J and subsequent detention in order to 
facilitate the processing of cases the Court agrees with the Government that, until a 
potential immigrant has been granted leave to remain in the country, he lias not effected a lawful 
entry, and detention can reasonably be considered to be aimed at preventing unlawful entry.”1041
Accordingly, the Court concluded that in spite o f  the fact that the applicant had 
been granted temporaiy admission, his detention was to prevent his effecting an 
unlawful entry because, formal entry clearance lacking, he had not lawfully entered the 
country. Subsequently, the Court investigated whether it was permissible to detain a
1040 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 2006.
1041 Ibid. par. 39-40.
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potential asylum seeker or immigrant in circumstances where there is no risk of his 
absconding or other misconduct:
“Detention of a person is a major interference with personal liberty, and must always be subject 
to close scrutiny. Where individuals are lawfully at large in a country, the authorities may only 
detain if [...] a “reasonable balance” is struck between the requirements of society and the 
individual’s freedom. The position regarding potential immigrants, w hether they are applying for 
asylum or not, is different to the extent that, until their application for immigration clearance 
and/or asylum has been dealt with, they are not “authorised” to be on the territory. Subject, as 
always, to the rule against arbitrariness, the Court accepts that the State has a broader discretion 
to decide whether to detain potential immigrants than is the case for other interferences with the 
right to liberty. Accordingly, and this finding does no more titan apply to the first limb of Article 
5(l)(f) the ruling the Court has already made as regards the second limb of the provision, there is 
no requirement in Article 5(1 )(f) that the detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing. All that is required is that the detention should be a 
genuine part of the process to determine whether the individual should be granted immigration 
clearance and/or asylum, and that it should not otherwise be arbitrary, for example on account of 
its length”
The Court concluded it judgment by dismissing the applicants claim that the 
detention was arbitrary -  for example because its aim was to decide more speedily or 
because it involved the use o f a list o f countries whose nationals could or could not be 
detained at Oakington -  as it viewed these claims as mere restatements of the claim that 
there should be a necessity test for such a detention. In addition, it did deem it necessary 
to address the applicant’s separate claim that Article 14 ECHR had been breached as a 
result of the legislation that provided for a list of countries whose nationals could or 
could not be detained. Essentially, the Court seems to allow for discrimination on the 
ground of nationality on account of the broad discretion it grants the state to decide on 
immigration detention.
Regarding both pre-admittance detention and pre-deportation detention, the 
Court’s interpretation of the restriction on the right to personal liberty permitted by 
Article 5(1 )(f) ECHR can hardly be regarded as a narrow one. On the contrary: it is 
difficult to think o f an interpretation that gives the state more discretion. The Court’s 
understanding of Article 5(l)(f) seems almost impossible to reconcile with its position 
that detention must always be compatible with the puipose o f Article 5(1) of the
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Convention, which is to prevent persons from being deprived o f their liberty in an 
arbitrary fashion. Moreover, it is unclear how to evaluate the position o f  Article 18 
ECHR in the Court’s approach. Especially the case o f Saadi, where the respondent 
government openly admitted that the aim of detaining the applicant at Oakington was to 
speed up asylum procedures, warrants no other conclusion than that the Court does not 
deem Article 18 applicable in cases o f immigration detention.
The Court’s interpretation o f the right to liberty authorises detention o f asylum 
seekers or illegal immigrants which is unnecessary and lacking in proportionality. As 
we saw, such detentions would be in contravention o f Article 9 ICCPR because they 
violate the prohibition o f arbitrariness in the context o f this provision. This raises some 
basic questions concerning the protection offered by the Strasbourg Court. What exactly 
is proportionality, how does it relate to the concept o f necessity, and does it belong to 
the general principles embodied in the Convention? Moreover, perhaps we need to 
investigate the way in which the Court evaluates the lawfulness of other categories o f 
deprivation of liberty in order to understand its immigration detention case law.
7.5. Proportionality as a general principle embodied in the ECHR
7.5.1. The concept of proportionality in the Strasbourg case law
The purpose of using the concept of proportionality is to reconcile rights 
protection with the public interest by attempting to find a balance between the two. That 
the Court feels at ease with this concept is apparent by its frequent employment of the 
term ‘fair balance’, a concept that appears very regularly in its case law.1042 According 
to the Court the search for a fair balance between the demands of general interest of the 
community and the requirements o f the protection of the individual’s rights is inherent 
in the whole of the Convention.1043 In Klass, the Court agreed with the Commission that
KM_ See among mam': Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1989. §48. Rees v the 
United Kingdom, 17 October 1986, §37: Gaskin v. the United Kingdom. 7 July 1989, §42; B. v. France, 
25 March 1992, §44; 1 asilopoulou v. Greece, 21 March 2002, §24; Mikulicv. Croatia. 7 February 2002. 
§58: and Joke la v. Finland, 21 May 2002, §53.
1043 Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, §161. See also Cassev v. the United Kingdom, 27 
September 1990, §37.
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"some compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society and 
individual rights is inherent in the system of the Convention".10*4 In the Belgian 
Linguistics Case, it added that while searching for this fair balance particular 
importance should be attached to individual rights protection.1045
In the field of human rights protection the concept of proportionality can be used 
when conflicts arise between individual rights and public interest. It can serve as a tool 
to evaluate justifications of public authorities for interferences with fundamental 
rights.1046 The seriousness of the interference is balanced against the importance of the 
aim pursued by it.1047 The proportionality test in the abstract consists of three different 
stages. The first step involves examining whether the measure, which interferes with the 
right, is suitable to protect the public interest. In other words: there should be some 
causal relationship between the measure and the aim pursued therewith l04l< The next 
step consists of assessing the measure’s necessity to realise the required protection If a 
less restrictive measure would also suffice it follows that the measure in question is not 
necessary. This follows from “the very recognition that certain interests arc to be 
regarded as important rights” which means that “any invasion of them should be kept to 
the minimum.”1049 And finally, in the context of protection of fundamental rights, the 
measure, even when suitable and necessary, should not impose an excessive burden on 
the individual concerned. This last requirement can be referred to as proportionality in 
the narrow sense. Accordingly, if even the least restrictive measure inflicts an 
unreasonable burden upon the individual it cannot be considered as proportional.
Proportionality is nowhere mentioned in the text of the ECHR. However, in one 
o f its provisions the concept is all but mentioned: Article 15 ECHR permits the 
contracting States to derogate from the rights protected in the Convention in time of 
emergency but only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation 
These last words embody the idea of proportionality, which was confirmed by the Court
1044 Klassv. Germany, 6 September 1978, §59.
1045 Case "relating to certain aspects o f the taws on the use o f languages in education tn B e lg iu m 23 
June 1968. §5.
1046 Feldham (1999), p. 118.
1047 The Court uses this formulation in the case of Berrehah i\ the Sethcrtand'i. 21 June 1988. A-138. 
§29. See also Matscher (1993), p. 78.
1048 Jans (2000), p. 240.
1049 Craig (1999), p. 97.
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u
in Brannigan and  M cBride,1050 The Court used the word proportionality for the first 
time in the Belgian Linguistics C ase . This was in regard to Article 14 ECHR, the 
provision in the Convention that prohibits discrimination. According to the Court 
difference in treatment does not always violate Article 14 ECHR, provided that a 
legitimate aim is pursued with the measure which amounts to a difference o f treatment. 
However, if  the measure in question “does not fully respect [...] the relationship o f 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought” it will be 
incompatible with Article 14 ECHR.1051
When using the proportionality principle as a yardstick to evaluate the 
lawfulness of interferences the Court does not apply the proportionality test as described 
above in a clear and structured way. On the contrary, the Court has taken many different 
approaches. W hat follows is an attempt to identify some red lines in the way in which 
proportionality features in the Strasbourg case law.
The principle of proportionality has played the most prominent role in case law 
based on those articles in the Convention which have a second paragraph in which it is 
expressly stated that limitations to the rights protected in the first paragraph are 
permitted if this is necessary in a democratic society to achieve a legitimate purpose. 
These consist o f the Articles 8 to 11 o f the Convention, protecting the right to family 
and private life, freedom from thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, 
and freedom o f assembly and association. The Court will examine whether the reasons 
given by the authorities for the restrictive measure are relevant and sufficient.1052
1050 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, §54.
1051 Case ”relating to certain aspects o f the laws on the use o f  languages in education in Belgium", 23 
June 1968, §32.
10s: See inter alia: OIsson v. Sweden, 24 March 1988, A-130, §68; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 
September 1998, §51; K. and T. v. Finland' 27 April 2000, §135; Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, 
§55; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, §54; Handvside v. the United Kingdom, 7 
December 1976, §50; Ungens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §40; Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 26 
April 1979, §50; Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, §52; and Bergens Tidende and others v. Norway, 
2 May 2000, §48. See specifically for requirements of sufficiency and relevance of tire reasons given for 
interferences with the right to liberty in cases examined under Article 5(1) under c: N.C. v. Italy. 11 
January 2001. §60; Letellierv. France, 26 June 1991, §52, Tomasi r. France, 27 August 1992, §91.1.A. v. 
France, 23 September 1998, §104; Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968. §12; Kenmache v. France. 27 
November 1991, §52; Van der Tang r. Spain, 30 July 1995, §67; and Muller v. France, 17 March 1997, 
§45.
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Especially the element of relevance indicates that this assessment can be seen as 
the first stage of the proportionality test. If the reasons given for the interference are not 
relevant, it is justified to conclude that the measure is not suitable to protect the 
legitimate interest. Nevertheless, the word sufficient does indicate that this examination 
goes further than just the first step of the proportionality test. The reasons given by the 
authorities must specifically address the necessity of the interference and it docs not 
suffice if they are solely of a general nature.1053 This refers to the notion of necessity, 
the second stage.
Regarding this second stage it is interesting to see how the Court has interpreted 
the words ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Necessary in this context is not the same 
as indispensable but neither does it have the flexibility of expressions such as 
admissible, useful, reasonable or desirable.1054 According to the Court the notion of 
necessity implies a pressing social need.1055 Now that is somewhat unclear and it does 
not concur with what was described above as the second step in the proportionality test, 
This interpretation is misleading insofar as the legitimacy of the purpose is challenged 
with this notion.1056 The legitimacy of the purpose of the measure is something that 
should be examined elsewhere, and is in itself not relevant for assessing the 
proportionality of the measure. Also, it is incorrect that in determining what is 
proportionate it should be taken into account whether a particular interest was actually 
in peril.1057 For it is only after the Court has decided that the exercise of a right does 
influence a legitimate public interest that it should proceed to assess the proportionality 
o f the measure interfering with this right. More in line with the second step of the 
proportionality test is the Court’s statement that the restrictions permitted under the 
second paragraphs are to be given a narrow interpretation, since they provide for an 
exception to a right guaranteed by the Convention.1058
1053 Margareta and Roger Andersson i'. Sweden, 25 Februar)’ 1992. §96.
I05‘l llandyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, §67.
1055 Ibid. §48. See also Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, 26 April 1979. §59; Dudgeon v. the ( nited 
Kingdom, 22 October 1981, §§51.60; and Lehideux andlsomi v. France, 23 September 1998. §51.
1056 See also Matscher (1993), p. 79.
1057 See McBride (1999). p. 25. If the public interest is not in peril at all. there is no need for am 
balancing to be done. However, if there are some possible adverse effects but these are minor it is dear 
w hich outcome the search for proportionality will have: Hertel \ \  Switzerland, 25 august 1998. §§49-50. 
and 1 ereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs und Gubi v. Austria, 19 December 1994. §39.
1058 Klass v. Germany, 6 September 1978, §42.
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In a number of cases the Court did actually examine whether the legitimate 
interest can be pursued in another, less restrictive way.1059 Also in conformity with this 
reasoning is the conclusion reached in the cases o f C r e m ie u x , M ih a ilh e , and F tm k e : i f  
the measure does not have adequate and effective safeguards against abuse it cannot be 
said to be strictly proportionate to the aim pursued.1060 In other words, if the restrictions 
are “too lax and full of loopholes” they cannot be regarded as necessary to achieve a 
legitimate aim and authorities must look for measures which gives them less discretion 
to encroach on the right in question. However, the Court has also come to the 
conclusion that, even though the authorities could have taken “less severe measures” to 
pursue their legitimate aim, they nevertheless did not fail to strike a fair balance 
between the economic interest o f the individual and the general national interest.1061
Apart from interpreting the words “necessary in a democratic society” in such a 
manner as to  imply a pressing social need the Court has also explicitly equalled this 
requirement to  proportionality.1062 In the case o f H a n d y s id e , the very elements of a 
democratic society (tolerance, pluralism and broad-mindedness) were presumed to 
imply that restrictions on freedom o f  expression had to be proportionate to the aim 
pursued.1063 Sometimes the necessity requirement is considered to demand only 
proportionality o f the measure in question.1064 In some cases the Court simply equals 
democratic necessity with proportionality: if the measure is not proportional it is not 
necessary in a democratic society.1065
1059 Sec Campbell v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1992, §48; Afarckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, A-31, 
§40; and Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, §57, where it was inter alia the seriousness 
of a criminal conviction for publicly defending the crimes of collaboration, having regard to the existence 
of other means of intervention and rebuttal, particularly through civil remedies, which made tire measure 
disproportional; and some cases examined under Article 5(1) under e. which w ill be treated later.
1060 Cremieux v. France, 25 February 1993, §39; Mihailhe v. France, 25 February 1993, §38; and Funke 
v. France, 25 February 1993, §57.
1061 Tre Traktorer Bolag v. Sweden, 7 June 1989, §62.
i06'  Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, §58; Gillow v. the United Kingdom, 24 November 1986, §55; 
Olsson v. Sw eden , 24 March 1988, §67; Schdnenberger and D urm azv. Switzerland, 20 June 1988, §27; 
Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 21 June 1988, §28; Beldjoudi v. France, 26 March 1992. §74; and Thomav. 
Luxembourg, 29 March 2001, §48.
1063 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, §49.
1064 Eriksson v. Sw eden, 22 June 1989, §69. See Cremona (1995), p. 330.
106' Barthold  v. Germany, 25 March 1985, §59; Margareta and Roger Anders son v. Sweden, 25 February 
1992, §97; Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 21 June 1988, §29.
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Also taken into account in the Strasbourg case law is the question whether the 
measure places an excessive burden on the individual concerned: the last step in the 
proportionality test. The Court uses the concept of “excessive burden” to determine 
whether an interference is disproportionate especially in cases it examines under Article 
1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. According to this provision no one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in cases in which this is in the public interest In the case of 
Sporrong andLonnroth, the term proportionality was not used but the excessive burden 
that was placed on the applicants made that the fair balance which should be struck 
between the protection of the right o f property and the requirements of the general 
interest was upset. The Court accordingly concluded that Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR 
was violated.1066 In subsequent cases dealing with this provision, the Court has also 
used the word proportionality explicitly. According to the Court Article 1 o f Protocol 1 
ECHR requires a proportional relationship between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised. The required proportionality is not found if  the person concerned 
has to bear an excessive and individual burden.1067
In regard to Article 2 ECHR, which protects the right to life, the Court has 
deduced from the meaning of ‘strictly necessary’ the requirement of strict 
proportionality between the force used and the aims to be achieved therewith.1068 
Moreover, proportionality plays a role with regard to provisions that do not explicitly 
allow for restrictions as well. In connection with Article 6 ECHR for example, if the 
individual’s access to a court is limited, the Court in Strasbourg will examine whether 
the limitation pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a reasonable relationship 
o f proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.1069 
In such cases, proportionality is addressed with a reference to the essence of a right.1070
1066 Sporrong and L&nnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, §73.
1067 Hakansson and Sturesson r. Sweden. 21 February 1990, §51; Jmmobiliare Sajp v. Italy, 28 July 1999, 
§59; James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, §50; Vasilopoulou v. Greece, 21 March 
2002, §24; Lithgow and others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, §120; Beyeler v. Italy, 5 January' 
2000, §§122; and Ghidotti v. Italy, 21 February 2002, §§28 and 32,
1068 McCann v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995. §§148-149; Andronicou and Constantinou v. 
Cyprus. 9 October 1997, §171; and Tanli v. Turkey, 10 April 2001, §140.
1069 Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, §57; Z  and Others v. the United Kingdom, 10 May 
2001; and Osman v. the United Kingdom. 28 October 1998. §154.
1070 See Eissen (1993), p. 144.
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In a case concerning the right to marry, the Court found restrictions on this right 
not to be proportional to the aim pursued. Again the fact that the measure in question 
affected the very essence o f the right was mentioned in the same sentence as in which 
was concluded that it was disproportional. 1071 Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR 
guarantees the rights to vote and to  stand for election. However, since this provision 
recognises those rights without defining them, there is room for implied limitations. 
According to  the Court these limitations are only allowed as long as they do not curtail 
the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence, have a legitimate 
aim; and are proportional in relationship to this aim.1072
In sum, with regard to proportionality in the Court’s case law it can be said that 
the Court does not neatly apply the three steps o f the test as described above, but instead 
addresses some elements o f these steps. Which elements are addressed varies per case. 
In some cases the Court just equals proportionality with necessity, in other cases it 
deems sufficient to examine whether a measure places an excessive burden on the 
individual to reach a conclusion about its accordance with the principle of 
proportionality. And sometimes the fact that a measure strikes at the very essence o f a 
right results in disproportionality in the Court’s view.
Despite this doctrinal uncertainty regarding the way the Court assesses 
restrictions on fundamental rights,1073 it is clear that the principle of proportionality is 
an essential tool in the Court’s assessment o f the balance between individual rights 
protection and the requirements o f  public interest. It features not only in case law 
dealing with provisions in which limitations are expressly allowed for in the public 
interest, but also in cases based on provisions where the applicability of that concept is 
not immediately evident from their wording. Accordingly, it is justified to conclude that 
the principle o f proportionality has acquired the status o f a general principle embodied 
in the Convention.1074
1071 F, v. Switzerland, 18 December 1987, §40.
10 : Mathieu-M ohin and Cierfayt v. Belgium . 2 March 1987, §47; Labita v. Italy. 6 April 2000, §201; 
Gitonas and Others v. Greece, 1 July 1997, §39; and Matthews v. the United Kingdom, 18 February' 1999, 
§63.
1073 See McHarg (1999), p. 692 and Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (1995), p, 299.
10,4 van Dijk and van Hoof (1998). p. 81.
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7.5.2. The m argin of appreciation and proportionality
The ECHR does not aim to establish a legal framework of human rights 
protection that is uniform, but instead wants to provide a minimum level of protection 
without erasing all the differences which exist between national legal systems.1075 This 
is the reason for the existence of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This 
concept entails that the state is allowed a certain measure o f discretion when it takes 
action in the area o f a Convention right.1076 It is not a coincidence that the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation has featured strongly in cases where the principle of 
proportionality played a role. State authorities are, “by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries”, in principle in a better 
position than an international judge to weigh competing public and private interests.1077
The margin of appreciation applies to actions of the legislator as well as to 
national instances, judicial ones amongst others, which are called upon to interpret and 
apply the laws in force.1078 Inherent in the concept of the margin of appreciation is that 
it cannot be applied uniformly and important in determining its scope in a particular 
case are the rights involved, the particular aim that the domestic authorities pursue with 
the interference, as well as the question whether the case concerns general policies o f 
the State.1079
However, with regard to the relationship between the European judiciary on the 
one hand and the domestic executive and legislative powers on the other hand one could 
argue that there is another justification for the allowance by the former of a certain 
measure o f discretion in favour o f the latter. One finds the same justification in 
literature discussing the principle o f proportionality as an independent ground for 
review by courts in national law.1080 It consists of the generally accepted view that it is 
not for courts to substitute their judgements on the merits o f the case for that of the
1075 Jacot-Guillardmod (1995), p. 50.
1076 Harris. O ’Boyle and Warbrick (1995), p. 12.
1077 Hartdyside v. the United Kingdom* 7 December 1976, §48.
10 8 Handvside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, §48; Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 
June 1976, §100; De Wilde, Ooms and i 'ersyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, §93; Golder v. the United 
Kingdom, 21 February 1975, §45.
1079 Gillow v. the United Kingdom, 24 November 1986, §55. See van Dijk and van Hoof (1998), p.95.
1080 See for example: Craig (1999); de Burca (1997). Jowell (19%), pp. 401-411.
307
primary decision-maker. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all conflicts between 
competing interests must be resolved by the legislature, and neither is it always 
inappropriate for a Court to ask whether a certain public interest could have been 
pursued by other means.1081 It is argued by some that the margin o f appreciation 
obscures questions of appropriateness,1082 and that its uneven application by the Court 
in Strasbourg causes the principle o f proportionality to be implied less vigorously in 
some cases as in others.1083 W hether there is always a valid and coherent explanation for 
this is to be doubted.1084
7.5.3. Deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound m ind, alcoholics and vagrants
There are certain similarities between the provisions of Article 5(1 )(f) and 
Article 5(1 )(e). The Convention explicates neither with regard to detention pending 
deportation nor with regard to detention of mentally ill people, alcoholics, drug addicts 
or vagrants, the aim of detention. Reading these provisions of the Convention gives the 
impression that deprivation of liberty o f these people is simply permitted because of 
their status as people that are ill, addicted, vagrants or about to be expulsed from the 
country. We already saw that concerning the last category this is true: all that is required 
for pre-deportation detention to be permitted is that deportation procedures are carried 
out. But is case law dealing with detention o f mentally ill, drunks or vagrants also 
almost devoid o f considerations o f necessity or proportionality?
In the case of Guzzardi, the Court shed light on the reason for allowing the 
deprivation o f liberty of the mentally ill, drug addicts, alcoholics and vagrants. The 
Convention permits these people to  be deprived o f their liberty, not only because they 
have to be considered as dangerous for public safety but also since their own interests 
may necessitate their detention.1085 According to the Court an individual cannot be 
considered to be "of unsound mind" for the purposes o f Article 5(1) ECHR and 
deprived of his liberty under subparagraph e o f  that provision unless three conditions
1081 Craig (1999), p. 103. 
t08“ Macdonald (1993). p. 124.
1083 McBride (1999), p. 23.
1084 Sec for example vanDijkand van Hoof (1998), p. 93; McBride (1999). p. 23; and McHarg, (1999).
1085 Guzzardi v. Italy. 6 November 1980, §98.
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are satisfied. Firstly the person concerned must be reliably shown to be of unsound 
mind. In the second place, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting 
compulsory confinement Lastly, the validity of continued confinement depends upon 
the persistence o f such a disorder.1086
The last two conditions clearly imply that the Court regards proportionality and 
necessity o f the detention as indispensable requirements when assessing the lawfulness 
of such deprivations of liberty. The Court’s requirement that an objective medical report 
must demonstrate to the competent national authority the existence of genuine mental 
disturbance whose nature or extent is such as to justify such deprivation of liberty, 
which cannot be extended unless the mental disturbance continues, is a more concrete 
manifestation o f these conditions.1087 In the case of Varbanov, the Court explicitly 
referred, in general terms, to the necessity of the deprivation o f liberty in the sense that 
less restrictive measures would not suffice:
“The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, 
less severe measures, have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the 
individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. The 
deprivation of liberty must be showrn to have been necessary in the circumstances.”1088
The national authorities are granted a wide margin of appreciation with regard to 
the necessity of the detention o f mentally ill, because it is primarily for them to evaluate 
the evidence brought forward. 1089 The Courts’ task is to review under the Convention 
the decisions of these authorities.1090 Therefore the Court does normally not elaborate 
on what in its own view would constitute a kind or degree o f  mental illness to justify 
deprivation of liberty. In the case o f Winterwerp, it examined instead the Dutch
1086 See A' v. the United Kingdom, 5 November 1981, §40; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 
1979, §39; Luberti v. Italy, 23 February 1984, §27; Johnson v. the United Kingdom, 24 October 1997, 
§60; Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 5 October 2000, §45.
1087 Herczegfahy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, §63.
1088 Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 5 October 2000, §46.
1089 See for example Wassink v. the Netherlands, 27 September 1990, §25: "The Court sees no grounds 
fo r  questioning the w eight o f  the e\’idence on which the President relied to reach his decision that it was 
necessary to extend Wassink's confinement. ”
1090 Luberti v. Italy, 23 February 1984. §27; Herczegfahy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, §63; and 
Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §40.
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legislation which permitted Mr. Winterwerp’s confinement in the light o f Article 5 
ECHR. This legislation, just as the Convention, did not give a definition o f persons of 
unsound mind. This would hardly be very useful either, since the concept o f unsound 
mind evolves with changes in society and medical progress. However, the relevant 
Dutch legislation laid down the following grounds for committing people to a 
psychiatric hospital. Such commitment must be in the interest of the person suffering 
from the illness or in the public interest, and there must be a medical declaration to the 
effect that the person is in a state of mental illness and that it is necessary or desirable to 
treat him in a psychiatric hospital. In addition, it appeared from Dutch case law that 
Dutch courts authorise confinement only if  the mental disorder of the person concerned 
is o f such a kind or gravity as to make him an actual danger to himself or to others.1091 
After the Court had informed itself of the above it reached the conclusion that the 
deprivation o f liberty of Mr. Winterwerp was in conformity with Article 5(1) under f.
In the case of W itold Litwa, the Court elaborated on what is meant with the term 
alcoholics in Article 5(1 )(e) ECHR. It contemplated again the object and purpose o f this 
provision, which is not only to safeguard public interest but also to protect the interest 
of the person concerned.1092 Subsequently it deduced from this ratio legis the 
interpretation o f the term ‘alcoholics’. In the light of the object and purpose o f Article 
5(1 )(e) ECHR, the Court considered that persons who are not medically diagnosed as 
alcoholics, but whose conduct and behaviour under the influence o f alcohol pose a 
threat to public order or themselves, can be taken into custody for the protection of the 
public or their own interests, such as their health or personal safety.”1093
The Court found the detention of Mr. Witold Litwa under Article 5§l(e) 
unlawful, because it considered it unnecessary under the given circumstances. The 
Court repeats in this case its generally formulated statement that the detention o f an 
individual is such a serious measure that “it is only justified where other, less severe 
measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to public or individual 
interest which might require that the person concerned should be detained.” It 
concluded this argumentation by stating that the deprivation of liberty must be 
necessary in the circumstances.1094
1091 Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, §38.




It is noteworthy that with regard to the deprivation of liberty of vagrants the 
Court has been less observant of criteria such as proportionality and necessity. In the 
case of Ooms, Wilde and Versyp, Belgian law defined vagrants as people without a 
fixed abode, no means of subsistence and no regular trade or profession The Court 
declared persons who fell within this definition to be vagrants for the purposes of 
Article 5(1 )(e) ECHR. The definition of vagrant is to be narrowly interpreted l(w? 
Guzzardi had made clear the reasons for the allowance for deprivation of liberty of 
vagrants. It is not only because they can be dangerous for public safety but also because
i / y v "
their own interests may necessitate their detention.
However, in the only case in which the Court had a chance to elaborate when 
these reasons would justify detention in a concrete case it did not do that. It seems that 
once somebody has the character of a "vagrant”, he can, under Article 5{IXc), be made 
the subject of a detention provided that it was ordered by the competent authorities and 
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by domestic law.1097 Considerations of 
necessity or proportionality do not seem to play a role with regard to this category 
either. Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that Ooms, J)e Wilde and Versyp v. 
Belgium was decided in 1971, when the Court had yet not dealt with many cases 
concerning deprivations of liberty. It is possible that it would pay more attention to 
these issues were it to decide such a case now,1098 but at the same time one cannot help 
drawing a parallel with immigration detention, especially when keeping in mind the 
“great confinement” as an instrument to achieve sedentarization of populations.
7 .6 . C o n c l u s i o n s : I m m ig r a t io n  d e t e n t io n  as t h e  b u n d  s p o t  o f  t h e  ECHR?
It has become clear that the level of scrutiny applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights when it assesses the lawfulness of immigration detention is not of the 
same intensity as it is when the lawfulness of several other categories of deprivation of 
liberty is examined. Nor are those principles applied which are considered intrinsic to 
the European system of human rights’ protection. The Court’s case law with regard to
1095 Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980. §98.
1096 Ibid. §98.
1097 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium. 18 June 1971. §69.
1098 See also Harris, O ’Boyle and Warbrick (1995), p. 125.
immigration detention is seriously lacking in considerations of proportionality and 
necessity,1099 even though these considerations are not entirely absent from its 
judgments. They play a role when the Court examines the duration of pre-deportation 
detention, for the requisite due diligence on behalf o f the state can be seen as a 
requirement that the detention should be proportionate to  the aim that is pursued with 
it.1100 A passing remark in Saadi indicates that it is also willing to address the length of 
pre-admittance detention with regard to  the prohibition on arbitrary detentions.1101
Moreover, the fact that the Court takes into account the detainee’s behaviour as 
well as his interests when determining whether the duration is excessive, points to a 
proper application of the concept o f proportionality. The case of Conka illustrates that 
proportionality has also featured in the Court’s case law with regard to the 
implementation o f immigration detention.1102
Yet, why does the Court consider it largely irrelevant whether the deportation 
order underlying the detention is lawful, whereas with regard to mentally ill persons, it 
is regarded o f crucial importance for the lawfulness o f the confinement that the person 
concerned is in reality suffering from a mental illness? Why does the Court with regard 
to immigration detention neither apply a “necessity test” , nor require that other, less 
severe measures, have been considered and found to be insufficient to achieve the 
permissible aims as it does with regard to other interferences with the right to liberty? 
Why is it merely sufficient to start deportation proceedings or refuse entry in order to be 
able to detain a foreign national? The case law on immigration detention by the ECtHR 
invokes a legion o f pressing questions.
In addition to the ones above, it cannot but surprise that the Court does not even 
refer once to  the documents, discussed in the previous Chapter, that have been realised 
within the framework of the Council of Europe -  the same international organisation as
1099 Some judges in Strasbourg question tliis approach. See the partly dissenting and partly concurring 
opinion of Judge Kovler in Slivenko v. Latvia, 9 October 2003, in which this judge has problems 
reconciling the conclusion that Article 8 ECHR was violated with the fact that tire deportation 
proceedings and the detention of the applicants were not deemed unlawful. See also Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Casadcvall. Traja and Sikuta in Saadi v. the United Kingdom. 11 July 2006.
1100 Harris. O’Boyle and Warbrick (1995). p. 127.
1,01 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 2006, par. 44.
110" See especially partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion o f Mr Vcrlaers. Judge Ad Hoc, Conka 
v. Belgium. 5 February 2002.
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to which the Court belongs -  which require an individualized examination of the 
necessity to deprive an individual o f his liberty under immigration legislation. 
Furthermore, the judgment in Saadi leaves one with questions regarding the quality o f 
national laws authorising the detention. Indeed, how can legislation providing for wide 
discretionary powers, sometimes even allowing for discrimination based on nationality 
be deemed in accordance with the Court’s substantive interpretation of the expression 
“in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5(1) ECHR?
At last, how is Article 18 ECHR to be understood against the background of the 
Court’s position, especially as elaborated upon in Saadft According to the Court, the 
detention o f someone who is not authorised to enter can always be justified as long as it 
is a genuine part o f the process to determine whether the individual concerned should be 
granted immigration clearance or asylum.1103 With such an attitude, detourmment de 
pouvoir is at best impossible to prove, at worst it is encouraged.
The Court, by refusing to assess on a case by case basis when prevention o f 
unauthorised entry or realisation of deportation justify detention, leaves the Contracting 
States a very wide margin of appreciation. This margin is all the wider because the 
Court does not explain the reasons behind this uneven application of that concept 
compared to other categories o f deprivations of liberty, apart from a remark in Saadi in 
which it states that the lack of state authorisation for presence on national territory 
accounts for the broad discretion of the state to detain under immigration legislation 
when compared to other interferences with the right to liberty.1104 However, instead o f 
contributing to an explanation of the remarkable approach that the Court takes in cases 
o f immigration detention, this reasoning begs the question.
Several factors contribute to the serious inconsistencies in the court’s case law 
concerning immigration detention. To begin with, it is tme that the Court in general 
deals neither consistently, nor in a clearly reasoned way with individual rights 
protection versus public interest, which is probably partly due to its general failure to 
develop a coherent set o f concepts to determine when and how rights prevail over public 
interest.1105 In addition, the fact that recourse to immigration detention has increasingly
1103 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 12 July 2006, par. 44.
,lw Ibid.
1105 See about this general doctrinal uncertainty: McHarg (1999) pp. 671-196.
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become a general policy of European states is likely to cause that those states are 
allowed a w ider margin of appreciation.
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that there is no right to reside for 
foreigners to be found in the Convention. Nor does the ECtHR have direct control over 
the choices made by states as to priorities in the area of public policy. The dilemmas for 
the Court as to how far it may go to limit the practices of states in this area are 
exacerbated by its international position, where it may at times need to be more 
deferential than national courts in order to keep its credibility. However, the political 
sensitivity o f  the area of immigration policy does not sufficiently explain the wide 
margin o f appreciation that the Court grants states in deciding on immigration detention.
We have seen in Chapter 5 that the attitude taken by the Court in cases dealing 
with immigrants’ rights under Article 3 ECHR has not always been so deferential to 
national sensitivities. In some instances, it has even granted this provision a wider scope 
of protection than national courts did.1106 In this light, it cannot be asserted that the sole 
reason for the Court’s inadequate protection for immigration detainees consists of an 
uneasiness to encroach too far on a sensitive and highly politicised area.1107
The above-mentioned reasons considered separately do not explain the 
inconsistency o f the Strasbourg case law, but together they may well contribute to the 
difficulty the Court has in defining adequate safeguards for immigration detainees. 
However, the very roots o f the problem have to be sought in the immunity of 
sovereignty’s territorial frame against forces of legal correction. It is precisely because 
of the persistent perception o f sovereignty’s territorial frame as neutral and self-evident 
that the Court grants national states an almost unlimited margin of appreciation in 
deciding on immigration detention. Its statement in Saadi that the lack o f state 
authorisation for presence on national territory accounts for the broad discretion of the 
state to detain under immigration legislation can only be understood against the 
background o f  such a perception o f territorial sovereignty. The Court’s perception of 
this specific aspect of sovereignty as a nearly absolute right of states to control their 
territorial borders results in a failure to  address the legitimacy of the coercive means that 
are used to assert this right.
1106 D. v. United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, §§49-54. Sec Hailbronner (2000), p. 495 and Kjaerum (2002), p. 
534.
1,07 Although serious inconsistencies and shortcomings exist in this case law as well as described by 
Dembour (2003).
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Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s position is not one 
of inevitability, as is shown by some o f the decisions o f the HRC that were discussed in 
the previous Chapter. Indeed, even in the ECtHR’s case law dealing with immigration 
detention, one finds an occasional awareness of the fact that the territorial frame of 
sovereignty cannot remain insulated against processes of legal accountability that have 
been accepted as applicable to the content of sovereignty a long time ago. In Conka, 
precisely the fact that the deprivation o f liberty concerned merely persons who were not 
authorised to be on national territory instead of persons guilty of criminal offences made 
that the authorities had to exercise due care in implementing the decision to detain 
irregular migrants. And in Amuttr, the Court took account of the impact of the overall 
system of movement controls on the freedom of the individual in a global territorial 
structure of states. Apart from these exceptions, the Strasbourg case law on immigration 
detention exemplifies the blind spot o f the modem version of the rule of law for the 
human interests that are involved in sovereignty’s territorial frame.
The Court’s refusal in Saadi to examine the complaint under Article 14 ECHR is 
perhaps the most obvious manifestation o f such a territorial blind spot, but the manner 
in which the rights o f immigration detainees are generally protected in Strasbourg 
exemplifies the persistence of the particularism that is the result o f territoriality, even in 
a discourse that explicitly aspires to surpass it. The conclusions to this study in the next 
Chapter will deal with the real possibilities contained in modem human rights law that 
are nevertheless capable of challenging the perceived neutrality of sovereignty’s 
territorial frame, therewith forcing it to respond to the interests of the individual.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions: Destabilization rights and sovereignty’s
territorial frame
8 .1 . S o v e r e i g n t y ’s  f r a m e  a n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ’s  t e r r i t o r i a l  b l in d n e s s
“I once read the story o f  a group o f  people who climbed higher and higher in an unknown and 
very high tower. Their first generation got as far as the fifth storey, the second reached the 
seventh, the third the tenth. In the course o f time their descendants attained the hundredth storey. 
With the passage of time they forgot that their ancestors liad ever lived on lower floors and how 
they had arrived at the hundredth floor. They saw the world and themselves from the perspective 
of the hundredth floor, without knowing how people had arrived there. They even regarded the 
ideas they formed from the perspective o f the hundredth floor as universal human ideas.” 1' 08
In this study I have argued that the contemporary application of human rights is only to 
a very limited extent able to formulate adequate answers in those instances in which the 
national state wishes to enforce what it perceives as its sovereign claims against 
individuals that have allegedly violated its territorial boundaries. The reason for human 
rights’ inadequacy to respond in accordance with its aim of establishing a constitutional 
order over and across boundaries has to be sought in the doctrinal separation that has 
been made within the concept of sovereignty between its form and content.
I have shown that sovereignty’s form as the exercise of jurisdiction over people 
within a given territory has always been limited by various constitutional discourses. 
However, sovereignty’s territorial frame, although a relative latecomer on the political 
stage, has remained substantially insulated against forces of political and legal 
correction. Such insulation of sovereignty’s territorial frame could only occur as a result 
of the reification of territoriality as an organising principle for the global political 
system, which reification in turn has been caused by the lack o f attention to the 
relationship between the exercise o f state power through political institutions and the 
clear spatial demarcation o f the territory in which this power is exercised.
1,08 Elias (1992), p. 135.
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8.1.1. Nationalism and the reification of territoriality: particularistic universalism
I have attempted to make up for this lack of attention by showing how the state’s 
claim to ultimate power within its territory cannot be understood without paying 
attention to both the way in which it determines its boundaries and the way in which its 
external sovereign claims feature in a Westphalian state structure of mutually 
independent states. We have seen that the territorialisation of political organisation had 
largely become a fact by the time that the predominant mode o f  legitimising political 
authority consisted in an appeal to the sovereignty o f the people. Indeed, the very 
process of territorialisation made possible the emergence of a notion as abstract as 
popular sovereignty: its very abstraction one of the characteristics that distinguished 
popular sovereignty from earlier theories by which men had attempted to legitimise 
political authority.
The result o f the fact that ideas o f popular sovereignty came to be executed in a 
system of separate and independent political entities, demarcated by way of territorial 
borders, was that the enlightenment ideals on which the concept o f  the people was based 
quickly lost their universal i Stic implications. Instead, under the influence of nationalism, 
they transformed into a particularistic conception of the nation constituted by the people 
whose bonds to each other were supposedly pre-political. The very survival of a 
political system in which loyalty was no longer required to the King, but to an 
anonymous and abstract multitude called the people would not have been possible 
without an appeal that went deeper than the intangible notion of the people who were 
only united because they were subject to common government within a certain territory. 
Nationalism was able to fill the gap that existed between the abstract notion o f popular 
sovereignty and the actualities o f a political system based on territoriality.
Moreover, the emerging European nation states firmly established territorial 
borders’ Westphalian function of determining the limits o f each state’s jurisdiction in a 
system of sovereign states. The ensuing external sovereign claims by the state largely 
coincided with sovereignty’s internal claim of distinguishing the inside from the 
outside. By establishing external sovereignty as a principle of international relations, the 
Peace of Westphalia ascribed to each territorial state the exclusive government of the 
population within its territory. Again, such a global system of governance of 
populations would not have been viable if  states would not have had at their disposal an
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appeal to unity that went deeper than the mere fact o f shared presence in a certain 
territory.
Constitutional discourses, internationally as well as domestically, were 
inevitably influenced by the fact that territory, identity and sovereignty had become 
linked to each other in what from the end of the nineteenth century onwards was thus 
seen as a natural, necessary and inextricable linkage. The establishment o f the nation 
state coincided with the establishment of constitutional government, although already 
long before that there had been theories concerning limits to the power of the sovereign, 
mostly incorporated in the notion o f individual liberties that were of a contractual 
character. The modem notion of individual rights distinguished itself from these earlier 
perceptions o f individual liberties in that in theory, rights were accorded to the 
individual on account of his humanity, not on account o f his specific place in the body 
politic or by reason of his personal relation to the sovereign ruler.
However, the shift from the universal to the particular in the underlying ideals of 
the nation state, caused by the intricate relation between territorialisation and 
nationalism, also affected the discourse o f the Rights o f Man. The Westphalian global 
structure and the internal claims o f the sovereign state to determine inside from outside 
resulted in a construction in which citizenship, a particular form of membership in the 
territorially defined state, became a necessary condition for access to those rights that 
were supposed to be inalienable and pre-political. When in the beginning o f the 
twentieth century, citizenship’s role had changed from a means by which to realise 
equality on a small scale to what has been called a ‘gatekeeper of humanity’, the link 
between rights, identity and territory seemed natural and inevitable. The result was that 
domestically, legal venues for limiting sovereign violence if  it was perpetrated against 
those individuals who did not share in the identity of the national state did not exist at 
all or were only marginally developed.
The fact that an identity which found its roots in historically contingent 
territorial borders -  notwithstanding the fact that it was presented as based on allegedly 
more profound ties -  determined the fundamental question of access to inalienable 
rights provides the ultimate example o f how the process o f territorialisation has deeply 
influenced questions relating to the legitimacy of the exercise of sovereign power. 
However, the very appeal to more profound ties such as based on blood and language or 
to the notion o f  a people united by a common destiny buttressed the reification of
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territoriality with the insidious result that only sovereignty’s content was problematized 
in domestic constitutional discourse.
The way in which classic international law poses limits to the sovereign power 
of the state is decisively shaped by the process of territorialisation and the force of 
nationalism as well. Here, political particularistic reality’s triumph over the 
universaliStic ideals of the enlightenment era expressed itself in a perception of 
international law as the law for and between sovereign states alone. In the few cases that 
individuals featured in this field of law, international law affirmed the rule that national 
sovereignty should embody a perfect link between identity and territory. Indeed, by 
providing a law of exception only for those who belied a different identity within the 
sovereign state, international law reinforced the perception in which territorial 
belonging constitutes a sine qua non for access to the Rights of Man,
In addition, the circumstance that only states were accorded international legal 
personality combined with the fact that at the basis of international law lies the 
Westphalian notion that a state occupies a definite part of the earth within which it 
exercises jurisdiction over persons to the exclusion of other states, resulted in a system 
in which international law dealt mainly with the territorial frame of sovereignty, with 
regard to which it took into account solely the interests of states in maintaining their so- 
called territorial integrity.
The separateness of domestic constitutional discourse and classic international 
law and the distinct manner in which they problematized sovereign power reinforced the 
perception in which sovereignty’s territorial frame was conceptually distinct from 
sovereignty’s form and in which the latter aspect of sovereignty did not involve the 
interests of the individual. Moreover, the separateness of external and internal 
constraints on state power resulted in the absence of enforceable rights for large groups 
of individuals who could not be fitted within the ideal triangle of sovereignty, territory, 
and identity. International human rights law emerged as a response to those 
consequences of the gap between international and national law and its explicit aim 
consists of securing the Rights of Man universal and effective recognition and 
observance.1109
1109 See for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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8.1.2. The territoriality o f the modern rule of law and its territorial blind spot
I have shown that human rights law has to a certain degree succeeded in 
diminishing the gap between external and internal constraints on state power. In the first 
place, by making the individual a subject of international law, international law is no 
longer the law for sovereign states alone as it offers venues for addressing the individual 
interests that it recognises as being involved in the exercise of jurisdiction by the state 
within a certain territory. In the second place, also domestic constitutional discourses 
have significantly altered under the influence o f human rights law: they have led to a 
weakening o f  the tie between identity and rights with regard to those individuals who 
are present within the territory o f the nation state. Such decoupling of rights and identity 
with regard to sovereignty’s form is most apparent in the case o f those individuals 
whose presence on national territory is authorised by the national state.
However, we should not overlook the fact that even in the case o f legal 
residents, human rights have not completely done away with the old linkage between 
identity and rights, and that formal citizenship status in this respect remains a factor of 
real significance for the individual’s legal position. Indeed, the ECtHR considers that 
the position o f a non-national, even if  he holds a very strong residence status and has 
attained a high degree of integration, cannot be equated with that o f a national when it 
comes to the sovereign power of the state to expel aliens.1110 However, the very nature 
of such distinctions, based as they are on the sole fact that the person concerned “belies 
a different identity within” 1111, is not in accordance with the explicit aim o f the human 
rights discourse.
Moreover, celebrations o f post-national citizenship that applaud the alleged 
decoupling o f identity and rights tend to overlook the fact that the question o f access to 
rights remains determined by territory. Consequently, although human rights law may -  
albeit to a certain extent -  have achieved a decoupling o f identity and rights within the 
territory o f the national state, outside its territory the two remain linked on account of 
the global system in which the nation state is the primary category through which we 
deal with questions bearing on the rights of the individual. Just as traditional accounts of 
formal citizenship status, the discourse o f  post-national citizenship takes a
1110 See fora recent example: Cnerv. the Netherlands, 18 October 2006, par. 56.
1111 Xenos (1996) with regard to citizenship and nationalism.
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predominantly internalist perspective in which both the global territorial structure and 
the ensuing importance of territory for access to those rights that are supposed to be 
inalienable and pre-political are disregarded.
Indeed, the way in which the ECtHR has dealt with the extraterritoriality of the 
Convention in more recent case law shows that the deterritorialisation of the modem 
version of the rule o f law is still very far from being achieved. The interpretation by the 
ECtHR of Article 1 ECHR in Bankovic only serves as the most obvious example of the 
consequences of the reification o f territoriality on an international constitutionalism. In 
this respect, just as they did with regard to traditional citizenship rights, the territorial 
borders of the national state determine the precise extent of the rights to be enjoyed by 
the individual. The territoriality of the modem rule of law ensures that national 
citizenship o f those who are not authorised by the sovereign to enter or stay on national 
territory marks their belonging elsewhere and as such it justifies a fundamental 
difference in the extent to which they are entitled to the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights.
Another reason why human rights have not succeeded in establishing truly 
universal guarantees for the dignity of the individual has to be sought in the fact that the 
modem version o f the rule o f law suffers from what I call a territorial blind spot 
Although norms relating to human dignity have markedly contributed towards 
increasing protection o f fundamental rights for foreigners whose presence within the 
territory is authorised by the state, a corresponding development through which they 
secure rights entitlements for them at the moment of border crossing or in the case of 
irregular presence on national territory is absent.1112 The term territorial blindness 
denotes human rights’ inability to address the individual interests that are affected 
whenever the state bases its claims on sovereignty’s territorial frame.
8.1.3. Freedom of movement and the modern version of the rule of law
I have demonstrated that the international legal norms regulating movement o f 
people exemplify international law’s territorial blind spot: its perception of 
sovereignty’s territorial frame as natural and innocent, in which individual interests as
1112 Dauvergne (2004).
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such do not feature. The territoriality o f the rule of law has reinforced this perception in 
the field o f international migration by making it seem natural that the responsibility for 
safeguarding the fundamental rights o f  individuals lies with the state to which they are 
allocated: by way of identity in the case of nationals; or as a result of the exercise o f  
sovereign discretion in the case o f  legal residents.
The fact that norms relating to human dignity have made significant inroads in 
the state’s discretion to decide on emigration while leaving most decisions relating to 
the entry o f foreign nationals securely embedded in the sovereign prerogative o f the 
national state can only be understood by an approach in which sovereignty’s form and 
content are perceived as separate: the former open to legal contention, the latter only 
very marginally subject to the rule o f law.
At the same time, however, an (historical) investigation o f sovereign states’ 
responses to  the phenomenon of international migration makes clear that the conceptual 
distinction between sovereignty’s territorial form and its jurisdictional content fails to 
do justice to the actualities of state power. The same justifications that sovereign states 
have in the past employed to curtail emigration are currently used to restrict 
immigration. Thus, be it leaving or entering, sovereignty’s jurisdictional content as well 
as its territorial form are involved whenever the state decides on international 
movement. Perhaps this is most obvious with regard to sovereign acts o f immigration 
law enforcement, in order to detain and to deport, sovereignty’s content must be 
actively employed. But also border control, be it at the physical border or by means of 
police à distance, involves the exercise of jurisdiction over people.
Why then are international legal norms dealing with movement o f individuals 
across borders nevertheless able to sustain the distinction between on the one hand what 
it perceives as sovereignty’s innocent territorial frame and on the other hand its content 
that it considers open to legal contention and change? The answer to this question has to 
be sought in the fact that national states portray immigration as engaging solely 
sovereignty’s territorial frame and the resonating force o f the language that they employ 
to do so, a language modelled upon the classic legal discourse reserved for interstate 
violence that emphasises the sanctity of territorial boundaries and in which the 
individual had no role to play. The result of such a discursive approach to immigration 
is that the jurisdictional content o f sovereignty remains hidden and that the personal 
interests that are affected by sovereign decisions in this field stay largely invisible.
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The concealing of the human interests that are involved is made easier by 
keeping the individuals concerned far away from us (one of the many logics 
underpinning police a distance) or by portraying them as very different from us (an 
additional link between identity and rights is thus revealed). Similarly, the way in which 
populist discourse, becoming increasingly common in the Member States of Europe, 
describes immigration phenomena as “ floods”, “avalanches” and “invasions” results in 
little awareness for the real persons that are involved. The preponderance of the 
importance of sovereignty’s territorial frame when perceiving or responding to 
immigration is exacerbated by the current trend in which immigrants are seen as a 
security threat. The language o f security is a political discourse that likewise falls back 
on the traditional distinctions such as between inside vs. outside; sovereignty’s content 
vs. its form; and domestic constraints on state power vs. international modes of 
legjtimisation o f state violence through the laws of war. As such, securitarization offers 
ample opportunity to obscure the way in which sovereign decisions implicate the 
freedom and dignity of the individual.
By contrast, on account o f the Westphalian system that allocates the 
responsibility for the interests of individuals to distinct states, the personal interests that 
are affected by a sovereign decision prohibiting emigration cannot be overlooked. The 
result is that contemporary international law under the influence of human rights law 
regards the issue of leaving as a jurisdictional issue o f the modem state while simply 
ignoring the territorial aspect of sovereign power that is involved in matters o f 
emigration as well.
International law’s categorisation of people that move feeds the circle in which 
human interests alternatively become visible or remain concealed and thus respectively 
emphasise sovereignty’s content or its form. The various ways in which international 
law distinguishes between people that move -  illegal residents vs. long-term legal 
residents; persons without what are officially recognised as close ties vs. those with 
recognised family life; economic migrants and bogus refugees vs. genuine refugees -  
often do not reflect the real experiences o f people, but they serve to reaffirm the state’s 
near absolute right to control territorial borders or alternatively, its duty to act in 
accordance with legal norms that safeguard human dignity on account of the exercise of 
jurisdiction. The way in which this mechanism works is illustrated by the way in which 
the ECtHR deals with the obligations o f a state under Article 8 ECHR to a person 
whose family life has been established during irregular stay in national territory. The
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very fact that those obligations are regarded as positive obligations obscures people’s 
actual lived experiences and it ignores the actualities o f immigration law enforcement 
by the state.
Thus, although the alleged self-evidence and naturalness o f territory as the 
foundation for political power in itself cannot fully explain the asymmetry between the 
right to leave and the right to enter, such self-evidence and perceived neutrality of the 
territorial frame of sovereignty do provide the rationale behind the limited impact o f 
international human rights on the sovereign state’s exclusionary powers whenever these 
are presented as a necessity to protect sovereignty’s territorial frame. Not only the 
asymmetry o f the international legal norms regulating entry on the one hand and exit on 
the other hand can thus be understood, but also the increasing acceptance of the 
constitutional dimensions of freedom of movement within the nation state -  where the 
territoriality o f the modem state is not a factor to be reckoned with -  which has occurred 
simultaneously with a hardening o f views with respect to movement into  the 
territory,1113 is explainable against this conceptual background.
Robert McCorquodale’s argument that the concept of ownership inherent in the 
traditional approach of international law is not able to deal with alternative perceptions 
of sovereignty is thus confirmed by its regulation o f international movement.1114 It 
seems that the international legal order is not prepared to accept a concept i f  it entails a 
clear and visible challenge to the notion of territorial sovereignty. However, the 
importance that states attach to the territorial ideal goes deeper than the mere wish to 
maintain independent sovereign units, for exclusive territorial sovereignty is also 
possible in a country that adheres to an open admissions policy (once again we can 
discern the artificiality o f an ongoing construction in which immigration is perceived as 
per definition solely engaging sovereignty’s territorial frame).
Apart from exclusive and ultimate political authority within a certain demarcated 
territory, the territorial ideal entails the homogenisation of these territorial units: the 
sovereignty that states seek to protect by invoking their territorial powers is about unity. 
In other words, although the focus is on territorial borders, sovereign states’ main 
concern is about “conceptual and organizational borders”, as those are the sites where
1113 See Goodwin-Gill (1996b), p. 103.
1114 McCorquodale (2001), p. 153. See also Kostakopoulou (2004), pp. 44-50; and Kostakopoulou and 
Thomas (2004).
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membership conditions are stipulated.1115 At a time when the discourse of human rights 
has diminished the extent to which national states can distinguish between inside and 
outside within their territories with regard to the fundamental rights of persons under 
their jurisdiction, they put forward their territorial powers -  hitherto largely unrestrained 
by international human rights -  in order to keep asserting what Catherine Dauvergne 
has called their “nation’s nationness.”1116
Paradoxically, the importance that national states attach to the territorial ideal is 
exemplified by the communitarization of immigration policy by the EU Member States. 
The motives underlying that process and the way in which national states have strategic 
recourse to their sovereignty -  for example exemplified by the United Kingdom’s 
arguments in the Chen Case, but also by the possibility of restricting free movement of 
the nationals of the newly acceded countries -  shows that the process of integration in 
this field is driven by a deeply felt wish to maintain the traditional role of territorial 
boundaries in protecting the identity of the nation state, notwithstanding the fact that the 
location o f their control has been shifting in important and unprecedented ways. In 
addition, the European Union and its Member States have refined the system of 
international “police” of populations by the use of concepts such as EU citizen, third 
country nationals, safe country of origin, safe third country, Schengen, and readmission 
agreements. However, their novelty should not distract us from the ratio for these tools: 
an understanding of sovereignty that regards control over identity crucial for the unity 
of the body politic.
The imaginary unity of the nation state is a persistent idea with far-reaching 
consequences for individual freedom. Indeed, in this study I have argued that the ways 
in which we perceive of sovereignty’s territorial frame as neutral and innocent and the 
nation state as a closed container continue to shape the discourse of individual rights 
with the result that “images of maps and sharp borders inform the imaginary community 
of modem constitutional practice.”1117 In other words, the territoriality of the rule of law 
and its territorial blindness ensure that human rights remain firmly linked to territory 
and identity and as such they fail in their ambition of establishing universal guarantees 
for the dignity of the individual. In this study I have put forward the claim that this
1.15 Geddes (2005).
1.16 Dauvergne (2004), p. 595. 
11,7 Tully (1997), p. 201.
failure of the modem version o f the rule of law is best illustrated in the contemporary 
practice o f immigration detention.
8.2. Immigration detention as the litmus test of the territorial order
Immigration detention is a tool by which states aim at reproducing the 
territoriality o f the global state system. With regard to this aspect of immigration 
detention, it is important to be aware o f the fact that we will not understand sovereign 
states’ responses to migration fully if  we fail to take into account each state’s role in a 
global system based on territoriality. In the same way as internal perspectives on 
citizenship are not sufficient in order to understand the way in which states distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders, one should consider the way in which the structural 
features of the modem state system affect the particular policies of individual national 
states that result from such distinctions. In this sense, the immigration prison can be 
fitted in a broader range o f responses o f the sovereign state (or the system that it forms 
part o f ) to what it perceives as threats, not only to the unity of the state but to the 
overall territorial order of the state system. The underlying reasons for the emergence of 
the refugee regime and the early nineteenth century system of minority protection 
constitute such examples, just as the population transfers that were resorted to in 
Europe’s recent past in order to achieve the ideal of a stable order of nation states.
Furthermore, the detention o f unwanted foreigners serves as a validation of 
sovereignty as the power to distinguish the inside from the outside. In this respect, 
immigration detention fits in a trend in which states make increased use o f restrictive 
tools o f migration management in order to demonstrate that they are in control over 
their borders. In the contemporary political climate, the fact that history shows that 
controlling flows across borders is far from being a “necessary criterion for legitimate 
statehood”1118 does nothing to alter states’ perception to the contrary.
In addition, I have argued that the immigration prison provides a territorial 
solution for a problem that is perceived as a problem in our contemporary world 
precisely because it cannot be reduced to a territorial solution. Thus, states do not only 
resort to immigration detention in order to keep the territorial ideal intact, but they
l ,,8 Baubdck (2003), p. 8.
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employ the very tool of detention in order reduce the visibility o f disruptions to that 
ideal. The logic o f the Hopitah Generater, driven by a fear o f a “ fluid, elusive sociality, 
impossible to control or utilise”1119 is presently reconstructed in the practice o f 
immigration detention, which is a similar technology of power that provides for the 
“spatial concentration and ordering o f people”1120; the question of its fluidity and 
elusiveness now determined on the basis of their disruption not merely to the nation 
state, as was the rationale for the great confinement throughout Europe during the 
seventeenth century, but to the international territorial system as a whole.
Yet, even more is at stake in practices of detention. Perhaps most importantly of 
all, by employing detention, states resort to the sharpest technique to achieve the related 
goals of imaginary unity, maintenance o f the territorial order and sedentarization. We 
have seen that personal liberty and sovereignty are conceptually intertwined: the 
protection of the former is the reason for the existence o f the latter. The intimate 
relationship between personal liberty and sovereignty warrants the utmost scrutiny 
when assessing the indiscriminate detention of thousands of people in light o f 
traditional safeguards against sovereign power. Nevertheless, these traditional 
safeguards are conspicuously absent when it comes to the detention of thousands o f 
non-citizens in our liberal democracies.
Although the aim of this study was not to investigate the impact o f national 
constitutional discourses on immigration detention, even a brief overview of state 
practice in this area warrants the conclusion that the normal constitutional safeguards do 
not apply to immigration detainees and that in practice, states refuse to treat them in 
accordance with international standards pertaining to the rights o f  the individual. Thus, 
the very particularity of immigration detention lies in the cynical use that governments 
make of a system in which territory and rights are firmly linked, despite celebrations o f 
universal rights and assertions of post-national citizenship. Immigrants who are 
deprived of their liberty at the borders o f or inside liberal Western democracies are in 
essence outside the pale of the law: even in the case that they are actually within the 
territory of a national state, the absence o f initial state authorization for their presence 
on national territory makes that the usual safeguards embodied in constitutional norms 
are not applied to them.
n 19 Walters (2002). p. 286. 
,,:o Ibid. p. 498.
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Even the Constitutional Court for Europe does not deem it within its powers to 
reverse this situation. Indeed, the ECtHR’s approach to  the lawfulness o f immigration 
detention provides the ultimate illustration of my claim that fundamental rights are to a 
large degree still “caught within the image of the sovereign, the territorial state and the 
traditional [...] institutions.”1121 In the ECtHR’s case law on immigration detention, 
states’ appeal to their territorial sovereignty in order to justify the decision to detain has 
immunized that decision against most forms of legal correction known to the Court. I 
have argued elsewhere that there is a real danger that the manner in which fundamental 
rights are protected in Strasbourg is influenced by the contemporary attitude in 
European states vis a vis immigration.1122 The way in which the ECtHR endorses 
detentions that are in violation both with the core of the right protected by Article 5 
ECHR and with the principle contained in Article 18 ECHR reveals that the ECtHR 
indeed shares the current attitude in which immigration as a general phenomenon 
presents a “threat” to the territorial border o f the nation state that can only be 
“controlled” with far-reaching measures.
8 .3 , De st a b il iza tio n  r ig h t s  and im m ig r a t io n  d e t en tio n
“Certain issues cannot be fitted within the categories, tire description of certain violations cannot 
be harnessed through the procedures, certain claims remain unformulable, and other appear 
irrelevant, too subjective, extra-legal, or simply “mad”. One should not, however, conclude that 
such difficult issues are necessarily improper for international law. After all international law is 
constantly in the making and the community is constantly in the process of (re)construction. 
Therefore, it is senseless to say that everything that is not clearly articulable or categorisable in 
international law is justly driven outside it, for it is the same to say that international law is a 
finished system and that we have arrived at the end of its progress. there are always certain 
silences and incommunicabilities that may be investigated and reconsidered -  arguably -  to the 
benefit of the community and its ordering systems.”1123
We have also seen in this study that there are international legal norms that 
seemingly make inroads in the sovereign power to exclude. I have argued that, even so,
1,21 Huysmans (2003), p. 223, who makes a similar argument with regard to democracy.
1122 Comelisse (2004).
1123 Korhonen (2000), pp. 211 -212.
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the majority of those norms fit within a territorial image of political order The 
international refugee regime is the ultimate example of the way in which international 
laws in this field have not been able to transform the modem territorial order, being a 
form of “geopolitical humanitarianism that has as its core business the preservation of 
the value of the nation-state form”1124 as a political-territorial ideal. Instead of 
contributing to destabilization of the system in which sovereign power, identity, 
territory, and rights are linked, most international rights bearing upon a right to enter or 
stay attempt to fix the inevitable gaps in such a system that is based on such a linkage. 
By failing to address its inherent contradictions, they reinforce the perception of 
territoriality as a natural way of organising the global political system with all its 
concurrent implications for the relationship between identity, territory and rights
There is one important exception to this obdurate impact of territoriality for 
constitutional discourses. The application of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the immigration context shows that human rights norms are able to remedy 
constitutionalism's blind spot by recognizing that human interests are indeed involved 
in sovereignty’s frame. In addition, that application also deconstructs the territoriality of 
the rule o f law by refusing to accept that the responsibility for the dignity of the 
individual lies with the state to which that individual is allocated on the basis of 
territoriality’s logic.
Thus, the application of the norm as contained in Article 3 ECHR in 
immigration cases shows that territory, identity and rights can be decoupled 
(notwithstanding the fact that in practice this occurs only with regard to a very limited 
amount of non-derogable rights), if it were not for states’ ever growing attempts to 
resort to extra-territorial measures of immigration control. Their practices of fx>hce à 
distance show that states themselves are convinced that presence on territory is crucial 
for the enjoyment o f rights, and in many cases it will be difficult to vindicate claims to 
the contrary, not least because of practical obstacles. Thus, as a response to the fact that 
human rights’ territorial blind spots have to a certain extent been remedied at the 
constitutional level, states make increasingly use of the remnants of the territoriality of 
the rule of law in order to evade having to act in accordance with human rights norms
The inability of states to resort to this aspect of the territoriality of the rule of 
law -  access to the perimeter of their territories as a condition for access to rights -  in
11:4 Lui (2002). at 6.
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the case o f immigration detention, makes me believe that the application o f human 
rights to the practice of immigration detention may be more successful in destabilizing 
sovereignty’s territorial frame. We have seen that immigration detention’s two folded 
logic of sedentarization and exceptionalism leads to what Giorgio Agamben has called 
“exclusionary inclusion”.1125 Accordingly, just as the imprisonment o f criminals offered 
courts a venue through which to review the sovereign power to punish, the very fact that 
immigration detainees are in a real sense “included in the state’s domain o f sovereign 
power”1126 may provide an opportunity to subject the exclusionary power of the 
sovereign state to legal contention.
Moreover, we have seen that important procedural guarantees form an inherent 
part of the prohibition on arbitrary deprivations of liberty. The right to challenge the 
lawfulness o f the detention is due to anyone who is deprived of his liberty. In this 
respect, the procedural guarantees that accrue to someone on account of his detention 
are far better developed than those that he may appeal to in the case o f his mere 
exclusion.1127 Indeed, the traditionally wide discretion in immigration law has resulted 
in the existence o f only marginal procedural guarantees with regard to a general right of 
the individual to enter or stay in a country that is not his own.1128 An exception is 
contained in Articles 13 ICCPR and 1 o f Protocol 7 to the ECHR that provide for such 
guarantees with regard to the decision to expel, but these provisions are applicable only 
to those individuals that have lawful residence. In addition, we have seen that they are 
subject to important public order and national security exceptions. The 1951 Refugee 
Convention is silent with regard to procedural guarantees applicable to decisions based 
on the norm contained in its Article 33, even though the Convention as whole implies 
access to fair and effective procedures for determination of an individual’s need for 
international protection.1129
1125 Agamben (1998).
1126 Diken and Laustsen (2003), p 2-3.
1127 See Boelcs (1995), p. 189 who contends that the procedural guarantees in Article 5 (4) ECHR do not 
differ essentially from those laid down by Article 6 ECHR.
1128 In addition, practice at the national constitutional level shows that while in general tire individual's 
procedural protection against administrative decision making has increased over time, with regard to 
immigration procedures, the development is a reverse one. Ibid., p. 367.
1,29 See UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII) 1997, under d(ii) and UNHCR ExCom Conclusion 
No. 103 (LVI) 2005, under (r).
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Seeing that in the European context, immigration procedures do not fall within 
the scope of Article 6 ECHR, the only other international norms pertaining to formal 
rule of law guarantees with regard to decisions on admissibility or deportation are those 
that can be invoked only when other fundamental rights are at stake. If an individual 
presents an arguable claim that as a result of immigration decision making, the norm 
that is contained in Article 3 ECHR is breached or his rights under Article 8 ECHR are 
violated (or, in theory, any other rights guaranteed by the ECHR), he has a right to an 
effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR.1130 However, even in this construction, states 
may simply refuse to afford procedural guarantees by arguing that a complaint is not 
arguable, such as in the case o f the individual who comes from “a safe country o f 
origin” . In contrast, Articles 5(4) ECHR is applicable to anyone who is deprived of his 
liberty under immigration legislation: whether someone is labelled on the hand as 
“ illegal”, a “security risk”, or a “bogus asylum seeker”, or as a “genuine refugee” on the 
other is irrelevant when it comes to the procedural guarantees o f Article 5 ECHR. 
Moreover, the court to which the immigration detainee appeals should evaluate the case 
in the light of the prohibition on arbitrary deprivations of liberty, instead of merely 
assessing whether national immigration legislation has been correctly applied. As a 
result, by resorting to the sharpest technique o f exclusion, states risk greater 
accountability for their actions as well.
Thus, instead of presenting the immigration prison as the ultimate example of 
territorial sovereignty as an “institution that is substantially isolated from processes o f 
normal accountability”,1131 I will conclude this study by arguing that it may become a 
site where human rights transform into claims that unsettle sovereignty’s territorial 
frame as a “structural, paradigm-related and epistemic limitation” which stands in the 
way of the very communicability of individual interests.1132 In order to do so, I will 
draw on the idea o f destabilization rights, a concept coined by Roberto Unger, The 
recurrent theme in Unger’s work is his concern with what he calls institutional 
fetishism: “the belief that abstract institutional conceptions [ ...]  have a single natural
1.30 The ICCPR provides for similar guarantees.
1.31 Sabel and Simon (2004). See also the European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties Justice and 
Home Affairs (30 March 2006). arguing that it is the very nature of immigration detention which in itself 
causes human rights violations.
113: Korhonen (2002), p. 210 about such limitatons in international law in general.
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and necessary institutional expression.'’1133 According to Unger, the pervasiveness of 
this belief should not prevent us from imagining alternative ways in which we can 
organise that society. Indeed, by w ays o f thinking that defy “the immunization of the 
basic institutions of society, defined in law, against effective criticism, challenge and 
revision,” we may arrive at alternatives that are truer to our interests, ideals and 
hopes.1134
Charles Sabel and William Simon have elaborated upon the idea of 
destabilization rights in the area o f  public law litigation. They apply Unger’s idea to a 
wide variety o f policy fields such as pertaining to prisons, schools and housing, in order 
to show that judicial recognition and enforcement o f  rights that “disentrench an 
institution that has systematically failed to meet its obligations and remained immune to 
traditional forces o f political correction” may be effective in bringing about better 
compliance with legal obligations. I will not address their arguments with regard to the 
policy fields that they deal with in substance as these are far too specific to be 
applicable to sovereignty’s territorial frame, but I will refer to some o f the 
“destabilization effects” which they describe in their analysis in order to demonstrate 
how the idea o f destabilization rights may operate in the case of immigration detention.
We have seen that the exercise of state power when based on sovereignty’s 
territorial frame fails to live up to constitutional standards. In addition, the institution of 
territorial sovereignty has thus far not conformed to the usual judicial and  legislative 
modes of exercise that, in addition to individual rights, are inherent in the rule of 
law.1135 As such it satisfies the elements for what Sabel and Simon call the prim a fa d e  
case for public law litigation: “failure to meet standards and political blockage.”1136
With regard to the element o f  political blockage, they distinguish between three 
different patterns, the first o f which is to a certain extent applicable to the way in which 
sovereignty’s territorial frame features in contemporary practices of immigration 
detention: it involves “majoritarian political control unresponsive to the interests of a 
vulnerable, stigmatized community.” 1137 In the case of immigration detention, however, 
those who Simon and Sabel call the stakeholders are not so much excluded from
1133 Unger (1996), p. 7.
1,34 Unger (1996), p. 96.
1135 Dauvergne (2004), p. 592.
1136 Sabel and Simon (2004), p. 1062.
1137 Ibid. p. 163.
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political control on account of their belonging to a minority as such, but their exclusion 
is a result o f the very nature of territorial borders as constructs that define who is 
included in the political community and who is excluded from it. Moreover, the normal 
processes o f political control as they developed in the framework of the constitutional 
state are generally limited when it comes to the sovereign prerogative to exclude, 
associated as it is with the essence of the nation.
However, we have seen that a growing body of human rights law is concerned 
with the practice o f immigration detention. Although these norms recognise the 
sovereign right to control the territorial borders of the nation state, they make the 
exercise of this right subject to important constraints, all of which are motivated by the 
interest of the individual in the enjoyment of his right to personal liberty. By the very 
fact of balancing the sovereign right to exclude with the individual’s interest, 
international legal norms pertaining to deprivations of liberty under immigration 
legislation acknowledge the individual interests that are involved in sovereignty's 
territorial frame. In contrast to the application of the norm contained in Article 3 ECIIR. 
those are not only the narrowly defined interests of certain individuals, but they include 
the interests of all that have been affected by the sovereign right to exclude if this has 
resulted in a deprivation of liberty. Although a court such as the ECtHR docs not make 
full use of the destabilizing potential of the norms at its disposal in order to undermine 
the perceived neutrality and self-evidence of sovereignty’s territorial frame, such 
destabilization does come to the fore in those immigration detention cases that have 
been brought before the HRC. By insisting that the lawfulness of immigration detention 
requires an individualized test of its proportionality in relation to a limited number of 
aims, this body invalidates sovereign claims to the effect that the exercise of the power 
to exclude cannot be contested as it is based on sovereignty’s territorial frame
It should not be overlooked that one finds such an awareness occasionally in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg as well: its decisions in Amuur and Conka 
provide examples o f the way in which it refutes the state's assertion of territorial 
sovereignty as a carte blanche for the exercise of sovereign power. In addition, there is 
considerable dissent within the ECtHR with regard to the dominant approach as well In 
Saadi, it was only a narrow majority which found that the applicant’s detention in 
Oakington was lawful: it consisted out of four judges to three. The three dissenting 
judges considered the detention unlawful under Article 5(1 KO ECHR as the real reason
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underlying the detention was “purely based on administrative or bureaucratic grounds 
aiming to follow the fast-track procedure with regard to the applicant.” 1138
At the national level we may encounter a similar attitude in judges who address 
the question o f the lawfulness o f immigration detention not only from a formal, 
legalistic perspective, but instead take due account of the effects of the restrictions on 
the individuals concerned. Examples of such judgments are those that condemn the 
detention o f children in immigration centres,1139 or those that include the conditions of 
detention in their assessment o f its lawfulness.1140 Such practices in the domestic 
constitutional sphere may receive an impetus if Article 14 of the proposed directive on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals becomes part of EC law. According to this provision, 
immigration detention of third-country nationals, who are or will be subject to a return 
decision or a removal order, is only to be resorted to if there is a risk o f absconding and 
where it would not be sufficient to apply less restrictive measures.1141 In the explanatory 
memorandum to the proposal, the proposed action with regard to this provision is 
summarised as limiting the use of temporary custody and binding it to the principle of 
proportionality.
Liability determination based on existing human rights law in cases of 
immigration detention can have a series o f disentrenching effects on state practice in 
this area.1142 First, the fact that courts do no longer discern sovereignty’s territorial 
frame as immune from most forces o f legal correction, releases “the mental grip of
tt38 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Casadevall, Traja and Sikuta, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, 11 July 
2006. In addition, another judge, although concurring with the majority, found it necessary to add some 
words to the judgment, in w hich he recognised the concern felt that a person should be deprived of his 
liberty for reasons essentially of administrative efficiency and the risks of arbitrariness which such 
detention may entail. Sec concurring opinion of judge Sir Nicholas Bratza, ibid.
1139 See for example Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court Decision o f 13 July 2005.
1140 See for a Dutch example: Rechtbank s ’ Gravenhage, 18 March 2005.
1,41 European Commission (1 September 2005).
1142 Simon and Sabel (2004) distinguish between six “destabilization effects” resulting from the 
application of destabilization rights in public law litigation: the veil effect; the web effect; the status quo 
effect; the deliberation effect; the publicity effect; and the stakeholder effect. My discussion of the 
application of destabilizing rights to the practice immigration detention will focus on the last five effects, 
as the veil affect is too much realted to usual public lawr litigation to be applicable to immigration 
detention cases.
334
conventional structures on the capacity to consider alternatives" 1143 The regime of 
immigration detention, instead of appearing as a natural and justified response on the 
part of the sovereign state to those that have transgressed its boundaries, becomes 
simply one o f the many responses of the state, and not a very good one at that, in \ieu 
of the fact that in the great majority of cases, it fails to take sufficient account of the 
individual’s fundamental rights.
Related to this is a process in which the abolishment of the neutrality of 
sovereignty’s frame may result in increased pressure on the state to support its position 
with regard to the exercise of its power to exclude with arguments that persuade by the 
validity of their reasons.1144 Thus, in order to resort to immigration detention, states will 
have to support their positions with reasons that are grounded in the usual constitutional 
discourse pertaining to interferences with individual rights on the ground of public 
interest, instead of merely appealing to what we have seen is in essence a self-referential 
notion of territorial sovereignty.
A third effect of the destabilization of sovereignty’s territorial frame is what 
Simon and Sabel call the “publicity effect”: if the indiscriminate use of immigration 
detention by the sovereign state is repeatedly condemned, in particular if this occurs in 
higher national or international courts, that fact will inevitably result in greater public 
awareness o f the problem.1143 In this way, the interests that are involved in 
sovereignty’s territorial frame become publicly visible and articulable, not only in a 
j court of law, but also in the political arena, which in turn may result in powerful
j political pressures advocating a different approach.
j In the fourth place, such condemnation provides official legitimation of the
I claims of immigration detainees, which enhances even more the very visibility andj communicability o f their interests.1146 Instead of merely a faceless mass consisting of
| those who do not belong, all those affected by the exercise of the sovereign power to
| exclude become visible as persons to whom the sovereign state is obliged to behave in
| accordance with certain fundamental norms.
I A last effect o f the destabilization of sovereignty’s territorial frame as a result ofj consistent application of human rights norms to cases of immigration detention is what
| ' 143 This is what Simon and Sabel call the “status quo effect". Ibid. p. 1075.
| 1144 Referred to as the "delibaration effect". Ibid. p. 1075.
I 1145 Ibid. p. 1077. See also Caloz-Tschopp (1997). pp. 177-178.
| 1146 Referred to as the “stakeholder effect". Ibid. p. 1077.
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Simon and Sabel refer to as the “w eb effect” :1147 just as the court’s determination o f 
liability in immigration detention cases has a number of unsettling effects on the 
practice of immigration detention, the very fact that the state has become accountable 
for some o f its actions that are based on sovereignty’s territorial frame may have 
ramifications for other practices when similarly based on the self-referential notion o f 
territorial sovereignty. Deportation will perhaps no longer seem as self-evident and 
legitimate a response on the part o f the sovereign state to those who have violated its 
territorial boundaries as it does in contemporary Europe, and in a similar vein, practices 
of police a  distance may lose their image of necessity and legitimacy.
In view o f the current trend o f  externalisation of immigration policies, this last 
effect of the destabilization of sovereignty’s territorial frame is perhaps the most 
important. For although the immigration prison may turn into a place o f destabilization, 
it would be naive to overlook the real risk that such destabilization carries as well. Just 
as states have exported important aspects of their immigration policy as a response to 
enhanced protection of the individual’s rights on account of the norm o f non­
refoulement, they may similarly react to increased protection for immigration detainees 
by offering non-European states incentives to set up detention centres on their own soil 
in order to keep potential immigrants away from Europe’s external borders.
In the case that such camps are set up in Libya as a result of strong involvement 
on the part o f European States, but under the formal responsibility o f Libya,1148 it is 
highly doubtful whether the responsibility of European states would be justiciable. The 
danger o f such exportation o f the immigration prison is compounded by the fact that the 
problem may then just become one o f the many that are suffered by the faceless mass 
outside Europe’s borders. However, we have seen that the right to leave has become 
recognised as a fundamental right o f the individual, and the blanket detention of
1147 Ibid. p. 1080.
1,48 The situation in Libyan camps as observed by the European Commission's technical mission to 
Libya: “In the short-term detention centres, migrants are held under armed police guard. In Sulman, in the 
north of the country, 200 migrants were held in an isolated bam-like structure and sat on tire ground: 
hygiene were described as being “at a minimum", with an absence of kitchens, places to cat and places to 
sleep in beds [...].Long-term detention centres can reportedly “be assimilated to prisons", one of which 
was composed o f rooms with a capacity o f approximately 200 persons, with no divisions according to 
sex, age, race or other characteristics. Another one in Tripoli was described as a “brand-new prison" 
holding 1,100 persons, and a further one in Misratah held 250 persons (although detainees claimed 700 
were registered in previous days), under police guard.." See European Commission (2005).
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candidates for “illegal emigration” is certainly not permitted by international human 
rights law. Perhaps, if  territorial sovereignty has lost its “halo of reasoned authority and 
necessity” from within, there will also be increased pressure on European States to take 
the norms pertaining to the right to leave seriously in their external relations.
It goes far beyond this study to provide an image of the practical arrangements 
of the world where the destabilization o f sovereignty’s frame as I have described above 
may eventually bring us. Therefore I will not answer the question whether such 
destabilization can lead to truly deterritorialized notions o f membership. Neither will I 
deal with its potential for establishing what Dora Kostakopoulou calls a system of 
“ focal territoriality”, where territorial space is seen as a “dwelling place” where the 
inhabitants use and posses the the territory, instead of owning it.1149 In this respect, 
Seyla Benhabib advocates a world of “porous borders”, where first-admittance rights 
are recognised but the right of democracies to regulate the transmission of first- 
admittance to full membership is retained.1150
However, in concluding this study, I want to call attention to the fact that in the 
long term, such destabilization will inevitably result in a perception in which “control 
over territory and borders [...] no longer strikes at the heart of a society’s self- 
determination.”1151 That is not to say ideas o f solidarity and identification as such can be 
done away with, for those remain important for every political community.1152 
However, instead of resulting in their demise, I have argued here that the application o f 
constitutional norms to sovereignty’s territorial frame may bring about new forms o f 
commitment that are more true to our ideals. Even if the destabilization of sovereignty’s 
frame as I have described above has as the most immediate effect merely that the human 
interests which have thus far remained largely concealed acquire a platform where they 
can be addressed in substance, the very fact of their communicability will be a step 
towards a more inclusive legal system where accidental demarcations drawn in the past 
will no longer constitute legitimate reasons for turning a blind eye to the injustices o f 
the present.
1149 Kostakopoulou (2004).
1150 Benhabib (2004), p. 221.
1.51 Kostakopoulou (2004), p. 51.
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